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Abstract 
 
Most governments in the world provide some publicly funded healthcare 
to their citizens, but given the scarcity of resources relative to potential demand, 
some form of rationing or priority setting is required, and some patients must be 
denied effective treatment.  The thesis took the position that an explicit approach 
based on maximising the value that society derives from healthcare is the 
preferred way to address this rationing problem.   
Conventional health economic practice proposes that value should be 
equated with quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), leading to a policy of QALY 
maximisation, but, it is argued, not necessarily value maximisation.  A more 
inclusive approach to defining value, based on societal preferences, may 
maximise overall well-being and be associated with greater trust and legitimacy 
in the priority setting process. 
The thesis identified patient and program characteristics that appeared to 
have empirical evidence of public support as well as a defensible ethical 
justification in determining the strength of a patient’s claim to societal healthcare 
resources.  The relative strength of preferences for these characteristics, or the 
equity-efficiency trade-off, was estimated using stated preference methods.  Two 
different methods, discrete choice experiments and constant-sum paired 
comparisons, were used and the response behaviours of the two elicitations were 
compared to identify a preferred method for eliciting societal preferences in the 
context of healthcare. 
Both methods found a statistically significant equity-efficiency trade-off in 
an age and sex representative sample of the Canadian public as well as a 
convenience sample of decision-making agents.  This suggested that society 
would be willing to sacrifice some degree of efficiency in maximising individual 
life year gains in order to prioritise other characteristics consistent with the 
promotion of equity or distributive justice in the allocation of healthcare 
resources.  However, differences between the results of the two elicitation 
methods suggested some systematic procedural variance.   
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction, objectives  
and thesis outline 
Health is a primary foundation of what Culyer (2001b) has termed “a 
flourishing life,” the ultimate human condition.  Any reduction in health, 
through disease or injury, reduces a person’s potential to enjoy such a life.  
Others have been more specific, defining health as part of a set of capabilities 
that provide an individual a normal range of opportunity (Sen 1985; Daniels 
2001).  This fundamental importance imbues health with a special moral 
significance to society (Sen 2002; Anand 2002), and in turn gives healthcare a 
particular significance, as it is an important – although not the only – factor in 
achieving and maintaining an optimal level of health (Culyer 2001b).   
Modern healthcare is able to offer some health benefit to almost any 
condition, but this very effectiveness suggests that the demand for healthcare is 
likely to outstrip supply (Appleby & Harrison 2006; New 2000).  In a market 
system, demand would be would be constrained by the price mechanism and an 
individual’s willingness and ability to pay.  However, there are a number of 
specific and well recognised failures in the market for healthcare.  These include 
uncertainty around the timing and quantity of an individual’s demand for 
healthcare, the ‘public good’ nature of many healthcare services, positive 
externalities associated with healthcare, asymmetry of information between 
patients and providers, and the absence or distortion of price signals (Arrow 
1963).  While these market failures are not necessarily unique to the health 
sector, most believe that healthcare is so fundamentally different than other 
goods and services that a market mechanism would fail to deliver an efficient or 
2 
equitable level of health (Daniels 2001; Culyer 2001a; Maynard & Bloor 1998; 
Hauck et al. 2004).   
In light of these market failures, most governments in the world have 
undertaken to provide, to a greater or lesser degree, publicly funded healthcare to 
their citizens.  However, even government resources are finite, so there must still 
be a mechanism for coping with excess demand.  If societal healthcare resources 
are not to be allocated on the basis of the price mechanism, a process of rationing 
or priority setting1 is required, which can be understood as “the deliberate and 
systematic withholding of beneficial goods or services on the grounds that 
society cannot afford to extend them.” (Fleck 1992)  Through this process, 
effective healthcare must be denied to someone that could potentially benefit, 
and thus the fundamental problem facing the healthcare decision maker is how 
to decide who will be allowed to benefit from societal healthcare resources and 
who will not (New 1996).  This thesis describes a normative economics approach 
to addressing this decision problem. 
1.1 Thesis objectives 
The thesis takes the position that an explicit approach to healthcare 
priority setting, based on clearly defined objectives and criteria that reflect the 
preferences of society, can improve the value that society derives from 
healthcare.2  Value in this context should be understood as a broader concept 
than health, as the total value that society derives from healthcare may be greater 
or less than the sum of the value that individual patients derive from their own 
health gains.  The degree to which these concepts differ reflects the societal 
desire for equity or distributive justice in the allocation of health gains, as for 
                                                 
1 Although these terms are effectively equivalent and each may appear throughout the thesis, 
‘priority setting’ will be preferred as it is more consistent with Broome’s (1989) view, adopted 
here, that fairness requires that resources should be allocated according to the strength of one 
person’s claim relative to another’s.  In this view, it is not a question of which patient is treated 
and which is not, but of which patient gets priority. 
2 The terms healthcare and health gain will be used more or less synonymously when referring to 
the source of societal value, on the presumption that the primary output, and object of value, of 
healthcare is health gain.  This is not true in the presence of caring externalities, where healthcare 
may also be valued for non-health outcomes such as dignity, compassion or maintenance of 
hope.  These externalities are assumed away for now, but will be discussed later in the thesis. 
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equity reasons society may value health gains to some patients more (or less) 
highly than gains to others.  This implies that society may be willing to sacrifice 
some degree of efficiency in maximising aggregate health gains in exchange for a 
distribution that is perceived to be more fair; this is known as the ‘equity-
efficiency trade-off’ (Wagstaff 1991; Sassi et al. 2001).  The more strongly society 
prefers a particular conception of equity, the greater the sacrifice in terms of 
potential health gains it should be willing to make to achieve that distribution.   
The key challenge in this approach to maximising the value of healthcare 
is defining the criteria by which value should be judged.  Within healthcare, 
value has conventionally been defined by decision makers in terms of quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs), which weight years of life by a quality adjustment 
representing the ‘healthiness’ of those years (Culyer 1989; Brouwer et al. 2008; 
Coast 2009).  Under a QALY maximising objective and a presumption of 
distributive neutrality, where the societal value of an additional QALY is held to 
be the same regardless of who receives it (Nord et al. 1995; Dolan et al. 2005), 
priority has been given to patients with conditions whose treatment will generate 
the greatest QALY gains.   
Although this QALY maximising decision rule may be entirely consistent 
with societal preferences, it will be argued that this relatively narrow definition of 
value appears to neglect a number of patient and program3 characteristics that 
empirical studies of societal preferences have suggested may be relevant.  
Explicit consideration of these factors, though a broader conception of value, 
could align the allocation of resources more closely with societal preferences.  
This, in turn, would lead greater efficiency in translating healthcare resources 
into societal value, as well as a more equitable distribution of societal resources.  
It may also lead to greater trust and legitimacy in the priority setting process.  To 
this end, the primary objective of the thesis was to identify the factors relevant 
to the societal value of healthcare, and to estimate the strength of the equity-
efficiency trade-off over these factors.  Secondary objectives were to compare 
different methods for eliciting these societal preferences, and to test the 
                                                 
3 As the Canadian usage of ‘program’ rather than the British ‘programme’ was presented to 
survey respondents, this form will be used throughout the thesis. 
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homogeneity of preferences between the public and the decision-making agents 
responsible for making priority setting decisions on their behalf. 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into two parts.  Part one provides a background on 
priority setting in healthcare, including an introduction to priority setting 
approaches within normative economics, a review of patient and program 
characteristics that may be relevant to priority setting, and a comparative review 
of the different stated preference methods that can be used to elicit the strength of 
societal preferences for different characteristics, particularly in the context of 
healthcare.  Part two presents empirical work.  This includes a pilot survey, 
which compared two different preference elicitation with the intention of 
identifying a preferred method, and a primary survey, which elicited the strength 
of societal preferences for the factors identified in part one from an age and 
gender representative sample of the Canadian public as well as a convenience 
sample of self-identified decision-making agents.  The results of the pilot survey 
did not indicate a clearly preferred elicitation method, so the same two stated 
preference methods tested in the pilot survey were used in the primary survey.  
Part two therefore also includes a comparison of the response behaviours of two 
methods based on the larger sample of the primary survey, and a detailed 
discussion of the relative preferences derived from each method.  The thesis 
concludes with a discussion of the results and their implications for healthcare 
policy, as well as the limitations of this work and suggestions for future research.  
A more detailed outline of the chapters in each section is presented below.  
It is important to highlight that whereas respondents to pilot survey were 
told that the health states in the survey were entirely hypothetical, respondents to 
the primary survey were told that the different patient groups all had some form 
of cancer.  A cancer context was used for pragmatic reasons, as funding for the 
primary survey was provided by the Canadian Centre for Applied Research in 
Cancer Control, but a specific context may also provide respondents with a more 
concrete and more comparable understanding of the different health states 
presented in the survey.  Indeed, the impact of cancer and cancer treatments on 
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morbidity and mortality will be reasonably familiar and understandable to most 
respondents.  However, to ensure a focus on the attributes and levels of each 
program and not the disease labels, the alternatives in each choice task were 
unlabelled and presented generically as Program A and Program B.  In the 
absence of specific labels, there is little reason to suspect that the results from the 
primary elicitations should not be generalizable to other disease contexts. 
1.2.1 Part one 
Chapter 2 offers an introduction to normative economics, and contrasts 
welfarist and extra-welfarist approaches to normative economic decision making.  
The welfarist approach emphasises individual well-being, and as such, it is 
argued that it offers an impractical guide to the allocation of societal resources.  
The extra-welfarist approach, in theory, goes beyond individual well-being and 
allows for a broader understanding of societal well-being.  However, this requires 
an implicit or explicit definition of the factors that may contribute to societal 
well-being, as well as an understanding of who should contribute to that 
definition.  The chapter will outline the arguments for and against an explicit 
definition of these factors, and discuss the merits of narrow impartiality and 
objectivity versus broader and more subjective perspectives in societal priority 
setting.  The chapter will also discuss the use of the equity-weighted QALY as 
one approach to explicitly incorporating societal preferences into healthcare 
priority setting.    
Chapter 3 reviews the potential factors that may contribute to the societal 
value of healthcare.  The most straightforward approach to identifying these 
factors is to ask people which factors they consider important.  However, many 
argue that simple majority support for particular attributes or characteristics is 
not sufficient grounds for distributing something as important as healthcare.  
Therefore, the review took an empirical ethics approach, “involving both an 
empirical study of population values and ethical analysis of the results,” 
(Richardson & McKie 2005) to identify factors that can be considered both 
relevant and fair.  To this end, attributes had to have empirical evidence of public 
support, and be consistent with a dominant theory of distributive justice. 
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Chapter 4 reviews different stated preference methods for eliciting the 
strength of societal preferences.  The empirical ethics review of Chapter 3 was 
not sufficient to justify priority for particular factors, as most empirical studies 
gave little or no consideration to the trade-offs between factors or outcomes.  
Rather, estimating the relative strength of preferences requires a process that 
forces trade-offs between these factors.  This chapter compares different stated 
preference methods, and concludes that two methods – discrete choice 
experiments (DCEs) and constant-sum paired comparisons (CSPCs) – appear to 
have advantages in eliciting societal preferences in this context.   
1.2.2 Part two 
Chapter 5 details a pilot survey used to compare the DCE and CSPC 
elicitation methods to identify a preferred stated preference method for the 
primary elicitation.  The survey was also used to refine the wording and 
presentation of the choice tasks.  The chapter outlines the methods used in 
developing the survey, included the assignment of levels to the attributes 
identified in Chapter 3, the development of the experimental design, and the data 
collection and analysis.  The two stated preference methods were compared on a 
number of dimensions, and the results of these comparisons, particularly with 
respect to their bearing on identifying a preferred elicitation method for the 
primary survey, are also detailed. 
Chapter 6 describes the methods used for the primary survey.  The pilot 
survey identified advantages with both elicitation methods, and it was decided 
that it would be of interest to compare them in more detail based on the larger 
sample of the primary survey.  As a result, both the DCE and the CSPC 
elicitation formats were used in the primary survey.  This chapter emphasises the 
methodological differences from the pilot survey, including the survey sample, 
the experimental design, and the presentation and context of the choice tasks.  
As the following chapters present the results of the two elicitation formats 
separately, Chapter 6 also takes the opportunity to present a summary of the 
overall survey sample, including their representativeness of the larger Canadian 
population and their attitudes towards rationing and their support for public 
involvement in priority setting.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
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implications of their attitudes for more participatory approaches to priority 
setting. 
Chapter 7 presents a comparison of the two stated preference methods, 
based on the lager, representative sample of the primary survey.  The 
implications of these comparisons for a preferred method for eliciting societal 
preferences are also discussed. 
Chapters 8 and 9 present the methods used in the statistical modelling of 
the DCE and CSPC choice responses and estimating the welfare effects 
associated with changes in the attributes included in the elicitations.  The results, 
in terms of marginal welfare effects and holistic scenario rankings are presented, 
along with a comparison of the preferences of the general public and decision 
making agents. 
Finally, Chapter 10 discusses the implications of these results for the 
allocation of societal healthcare resources, and for the use of QALY 
maximisation as a societal decision rule.  It also compares these results with 
previous elicitations, discusses the strengths and limitations of the methods and 
results, and outlines how future research may be able to build upon the strength 
and address the limitations. 
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Chapter 2:  
Normative economics and  
healthcare priority setting 
Normative economics addresses the question of how resources ought to be 
distributed, weighing the maximisation of outcomes against the ‘fairness’ of the 
distribution, based largely on ethical and philosophical visions of distributive 
justice (Culyer 2001a; Johansson-Stenman 1998).  Unlike positive economics, 
which is in principle a value-free description of what is, normative economics, by 
definition, starts with an implicit or explicit value judgement about what is 
‘good’ or ‘desirable’ to describe what ought to be (Feldman & Serrano 2006; 
Johansson-Stenman 1998).   
This chapter describes the two dominant approaches to normative 
economics: the welfarist approach, described in section 2.1, and the extra-
welfarist approach, described in section 2.2.  The welfarist approach emphasises 
individual well-being, while the extra-welfarist take a broader view and 
emphasises societal well-being.  However, this requires some definition of the 
factors beyond individual well-being that contribute to societal well-being, as 
well as an understanding of who should contribute to that definition.  Section 2.3 
outlines the arguments for and against an explicit definition of these factors, 
while section 2.4 describes more and less inclusive approaches to defining which 
potential factors may be relevant to the societal value of healthcare, and 
discusses the role of objectivity in societal priority setting.  Finally, section 2.5 
describes the equity-weighted QALY as one approach to explicitly incorporating 
societal preferences in healthcare priority setting.    
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2.1 The welfarist approach 
 Hurley (1998) and Brouwer et al. (2008) describe four value judgements 
that make up the neo-classical welfarist approach to normative economics: utility 
maximisation, individual sovereignty, consequentialism and welfarism.  The 
principle of utility maximisation implies that individuals maximise their welfare 
by comparing different alternatives and choosing the one with the greatest 
‘utility,’ which should be understood as an ordinal measure of the degree to 
which a particular alternative satisfies an individual's preferences.  A more 
preferred alternative is said to have greater utility, and consistently choosing 
alternatives with the highest utility is assumed to maximise an individual’s 
overall welfare.  Individual sovereignty holds that welfare (or utility) is unique to 
an individual, and that the individual can be the only judge of their own welfare.  
This principle rejects paternalism, or that a third party may know better than the 
individual what is best for them.  Consequentialism holds that any action or 
decision must be judged solely by its outcome, not the processes or intentions 
that led to that outcome.  Finally, welfarism holds that the ‘goodness’ of any 
situation should be judged solely by the utility attained by individuals in that 
situation. The primacy of individual preferences in neo-classical economic 
theory is based on the assumption that individuals are rational, self-interested 
and perfectly informed; thus, individuals will prefer X to Y if, and only if, X is in 
fact better for them.  This leads to a formal theory of welfare that holds that the 
welfare of an individual can be equated with how well their preferences are 
satisfied (Feldman & Serrano 2006; Hausman & McPherson 2009). 
The welfarist approach shares the principles of utility maximisation, 
consequentialism and welfarism with utilitarianism.  But whereas utilitarianism 
takes the view that “justice is ultimately a matter of maximising the sum total of 
human happiness”(Mill 1871; Williams & Cookson 2000), and that alternatives 
should be evaluated on the basis of aggregate individual utility, the welfarist 
approach is adamant that utility is ordinal, and cannot be compared or 
aggregated across individuals (Brouwer et al. 2008).  Individual sovereignty and 
welfarism effectively rule out interpersonal comparisons – individuals are to be 
the sole judges of their welfare and the welfare of each individual is equally 
important.  Within the welfarist framework, therefore, the societal desirability of 
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a reallocation is judged by the Pareto Improvement Criterion, which states that a 
potential reallocation is a desirable improvement if, and only if, the welfare of at 
least one member of society is improved without making anyone worse off 
(Sugden & Williams 1978; Feldman & Serrano 2006).  The current allocation of 
resources is taken as a given, and if resources cannot be reallocated in a way that 
satisfies this criterion, the current allocation is said to be ‘Pareto optimal.’  As 
this may rule out reallocations that could improve aggregate societal welfare, the 
welfarist approach has been described as applying a weak version of 
utilitarianism, in that it is willing to accept as optimal an allocation that does not 
maximise aggregate welfare (Culyer 2001a).  The strict reallocation conditions of 
the Pareto Improvement Criterion also mean that the welfarist approach cannot 
accommodate equity concerns – the well-being of the worst-off in society can be 
no more (or less) important than the well-being of the best-off.  This has the 
implication that flagrantly unequal or inequitable allocations can be considered 
Pareto optimal if the existing distribution of resources cannot be reallocated 
without creating a ‘loser’ (Hurley 1998; Konow 2003; Feldman & Serrano 2006). 
2.2 The extra-welfarist approach  
Although the Pareto criterion is in itself a relatively weak and 
uncontroversial value judgement, the supremacy of the individual means that it 
is a restricted and somewhat impractical guide to allocating societal resources, 
which generally involves reallocating resources from the better-off to the worse-
off (Hauck et al. 2004; Feldman & Serrano 2006; Tsuchiya & Williams 2001; 
Coast et al. 2008b).  As a result, many of the principles of the welfarist 
framework have been modified to provide more practical normative guidance to 
societal decision making.  This has led to ‘extra-welfarist’ or ‘non-welfarist’ 
approaches (Brouwer et al. 2008; Hurley 1998; Culyer 1989; Coast et al. 2008b).4   
                                                 
4 The distinction between the terms extra-welfarist and non-welfarist is not always clear, and the 
two are often used more or less synonymously, but Coast (2009) offers a useful perspective in 
suggesting that extra-welfarism  can be seen as a specific theoretical framework within the larger 
set of often atheoretical non-welfarist approaches. 
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There are four key principles that distinguish the extra-welfarist approach 
from the welfarist approach (Brouwer et al. 2008; Hurley 1998; Culyer 1989).  
First, it allows for the consideration of non-utility factors as well as individual 
utility.  Second, it incorporates valuations from sources other than the affected 
individual.  This allows for external value judgements that may override the 
principle of individual sovereignty.  Third, it allows for the explicit incorporation 
of equity weights that are not necessarily preference based.  Fourth, it assumes 
that utility is cardinal, and allows for inter-personal comparisons of well-being.  
The extra-welfarist approach moves toward a concept of societal well-being that 
Culyer (1989) argues “transcends traditional welfare” by supplementing 
information on individual welfare with information on other aspects of 
individuals, including the distribution of well-being between them.  Hurley 
(1998) goes further, and suggests that non-utility factors may even be more 
important than individual utility.  These principles – and particularly the inter-
personal comparison of cardinal utilities – allow for a relaxed version of the 
Pareto improvement criterion, known as the potential Pareto improvement, or 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion.  If, in principle, the gainers from a particular reallocation 
are able to fully compensate the losers and remain at least as well off as before 
the reallocation, the new state is considered a potential Pareto improvement over 
the original state (Feldman & Serrano 2006; Tsuchiya & Williams 2001).   
The potential for a redistribution that would leave everyone at least as 
well off is used as a justification within both the welfarist and extra-welfarist 
approaches for emphasising the maximisation of outputs and disregarding the 
distribution of those outputs as a political matter (Sugden & Williams 1978; 
Coast 2009).  However, Sassi et al. (2001) argue that in neglecting equity 
concerns, economics loses much of its normative power and restricts itself to the 
relatively narrow domain of technical efficiency.  Furthermore, within a 
healthcare context, it is not possible to separate the production of health from its 
distribution; production and allocation happen simultaneously (Coast 2009).  As 
Menzel (1999) points out, “…it is often not possible to redistribute health, or to 
compensate for healthcare allocations through the distribution of other goods.  It 
is difficult to compensate someone who has died because one program received 
priority over another.”  For these reasons, healthcare priority setting can be seen 
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as a matter of allocative as well as technical efficiency, and as such requires 
explicit consideration of equity and distributive justice (Williams 1988; Menzel 
et al. 1999; Coast 2009).     
In this context, Hurley (1998) describes the ‘analytic imperative’ of the 
extra-welfarist approach as follows: from the characteristics of people, define a 
set of normatively relevant characteristics; measure the relative level deprivation 
within those characteristics and the corresponding need5 for commodities (e.g. 
healthcare) to address these deprivations; and compare alternative allocations of 
commodities with respect to their ability to alleviate deprivations.  This 
description of defining normatively relevant characteristics and comparing 
alternative allocations highlights (at least) two questions that must be resolved 
before proceeding with an extra-welfarist evaluation: on what terms should 
alternative allocations be compared, and who should define those terms?  The 
first question concerns the explicitness of the decision rule for choosing between 
allocations, and the second question concerns the inclusiveness and perspective 
of the priority setting process.  These two issues will be considered in turn below. 
2.3 Explicitness in priority setting 
Approaches to healthcare priority setting can be understood as implicit or 
explicit.  Coast (1997) defines an implicit approach as the rationing or 
prioritisation of healthcare where neither the decisions about what programs to 
fund nor the bases of these decisions are clearly expressed.  Under an implicit 
approach, equity-efficiency trade-offs are implicitly recognised but not explicitly 
quantified, and prioritisation decisions are based largely on the judgement of 
individual decision makers.  Under more explicit approaches, the responsibility 
of decision makers is to define a consistent and transparent set of factors and 
weights that define acceptable equity-efficiency trade-offs, and prioritisation 
decisions are made on the basis of these weights and a pre-defined decision rule 
rather than individual judgement.   
                                                 
5 Hurley (1998) noted that deprivation does not automatically imply a corresponding need for 
healthcare, as need also requires an effective treatment.  In the absence of an effective treatment, 
a person cannot be said to have need. 
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2.3.1 Implicit priority setting 
Proponents of a more implicit approach see priority setting as an 
“inescapably political process” (Ham & Coulter 2001), requiring discussion and 
compromise rather than inflexible decision rules (Hunter 2001; Robinson 1999).  
A key benefit of an implicit approach is the avoidance of conflict:  
Principles that incorporate semiautomatic formula for implementing them 
(like maximising health benefits) tend to be highly contentious, while 
uncontentious principles owe their acceptability to the fact there is 
ambiguity about their implementation (Klein 1997). 
 
Many argue that this ambiguity, in terms of what is funded and why, offers the 
flexibility necessary to address the inherent complexity of healthcare decision 
making, including the practical difficulties of defining and weighting explicit 
criteria, and enforcing the resulting decisions across all settings (Hunter 2001; 
Klein 1997; Mechanic 1995).  A lack of transparency is also argued to be 
necessary to overcome consumer and provider resistance and lobbies (Klein 
1992).  In this view, a lack of transparency allows decision makers to make the 
‘correct’ choice rather than the ‘popular’ choice.  This is similar to Wirtz et al.’s 
(2003) suggestion of a “hidden curriculum” within healthcare decision making 
that tacitly emphasises process concerns over technical factors such as efficiency, 
effectiveness and affordability.  In their view, process factors such as the 
maintenance of good relations with major stakeholders (what they refer to as 
‘picking your battles’), the management of organizational burden (managing 
trust and morale, in addition to purely financial issues) and public defensibility 
(emphasising perceived fairness over technical measures) justify taking a more 
implicit approach to priority setting.  Such an approach is consistent with a cost-
consequence decision framework, where the costs and benefits are measured and 
presented in a disaggregated format, but each decision maker assigns his or her 
own weights across the different factors in deciding whether the benefits of a 
particular program are worth the costs (Mauskopf et al. 1998).  
At the individual level, some proponents of an implicit approach also 
noted that it could be painful for patients to be told that effective care is being 
denied, and for decision makers to take responsibility for such decisions.  From a 
utilitarian perspective, an implicit approach may maximise societal well-being by 
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minimising such ‘deprivation disutility’ and ‘denial disutility,’ respectively 
(Coast 1997; Mooney & Lange 1993).  They suggested that the patient and the 
clinical decision maker can only be made worse-off by the explicit 
communication that effective and beneficial healthcare was denied on the basis 
of criteria other than clinical effectiveness.  Therefore it is better for both parties, 
and for society in general, to leave the patient with the impression that the 
decision was based on clinical factors beyond anyone’s control (Coast 1997).  
Qualitative research, though, has found that even though patients acknowledged 
some distress from the knowledge, they consistently expressed a desire to be told 
if their care was being rationed (Coast 2001b; Owen-Smith et al. 2010).  The 
primary motivation appeared to be a simple desire to be as informed as possible 
about their care, and to have “a good explanation as to why the decision was 
made.” (Coast 2001b)  Patients as well as providers also felt that the knowledge 
an effective treatment was available but had been rationed would allow patients 
to seek the treatment by other means, such as political lobbying, or private or 
self-funding (Coast 2001b; Owen-Smith et al. 2010).  From the perspective of the 
providers, although most expressed support for a principle of full and explicit 
disclosure, many acknowledged being less explicit about rationing decisions 
when they felt that a patient may not have had alternative means to access 
treatment (Coast 2001b; Owen-Smith et al. 2010).   
2.3.2 Explicit priority setting 
Proponents of a more explicit approach argue that from an ethical and 
moral perspective, clearly defined objectives and criteria, and transparency in the 
decision making process, are the bases of citizens’ democratic rights to informed 
consent and political autonomy.  It is also the basis of citizens’ ability to hold 
decision makers responsible for their decisions (Doyal 1997; Lauridsen et al. 
2007; Rumbold et al. 2012).  As Doyal (1997) notes, transparency and 
accountability may undoubtedly lead citizens to give decision makers a difficult 
time, but that is their right in a democracy, particularly over issues with the 
fundamental importance of healthcare.  Furthermore, as denial disutility is at 
least in part a consequence of decisions around levels of taxation and funding, it 
makes little sense to hide the necessity of priority setting from citizens, as they 
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can only make informed choices about funding levels if they can see the 
consequences of their decisions (Buxton & Chambers 2011).  As an aside, it is 
interesting to note that one result of the Oregon experiment in explicit priority 
setting of the early 1990s was an increase in the overall level of healthcare 
funding (Ham 1998).   
From a technical perspective, proponents of more explicit approaches 
argue that bringing as much relevant information as possible together within an 
explicit framework supports rigorous evaluation and continuous improvement to 
a much greater degree than implicit approaches (Dowie 1998; Doyal 1997; 
Mitton 2002).  Doyal (1997) argues that to not make an attempt be explicit in 
decision criteria is to give up the ability to evaluate the efficiency or justice of a 
particular distribution of resources, and to accept the possibility that a 
redistribution could do as much harm as good.  Finally, making the criteria for 
decisions more transparent decreases the potential influence of special interest 
groups and may increase trust in the decision-making process (Coast 2001b; 
Devlin et al. 2003; Doyal 1997).  Fleck (1992) suggests that implicit priority 
setting can create an invisible class of ‘others,’ who may be victims of injustice 
without knowing it.  Similarly, Broqvist and Garpenby (2014) suggest that 
priority setting is based on a social contract by which citizens accept the need to 
forego some effective healthcare in order that those with a greater need may 
receive priority; in return they expect that others will stand aside when they have 
the greater need.  A poor understanding of why particular patients were 
prioritised erodes trust in this contract, and makes citizens less willing to stand 
aside for others.   
A more explicit approach to priority setting appears to be associated with 
a more informed citizenry, more accountable decision makers, greater 
opportunities for evaluation and improvement, and greater trust in the priority 
setting process.  To the extent that these outcomes are in themselves desirable, a 
more explicit approach to healthcare priority setting appears justified.  However, 
it is still necessary to define what factors will be considered in an explicit 
decision-making approach, and perhaps even more importantly, who will define 
these factors. 
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2.4 Inclusiveness and objectivity within the extra-welfarist framework 
Coast et al. (2008b) explain that because an individual's preferences are 
not paramount within the extra-welfarist approach, it is necessary to decide what 
other factors are normatively relevant and what weight each should carry in the 
decision making process.  This is what Broome (1989) describes as distinguishing 
an individual’s normative claims to some good or resource from the reasons they 
should have it.  He argues that claims, and not reasons, are the object of fairness: 
“if there are reasons why a person should have a good, but she does not get it, no 
unfairness is done her unless she has a claim to it.”  Critically, it is also necessary 
to decide who should define what characteristics are relevant; that is, which 
reasons rise to the level of claims and which do not (Broome 1989).  There is a 
range of perspectives that can be applied, but this range is arguably anchored at 
one end by the strictly impartial decision-maker perspective, and at the other by 
a more inclusive and subjective democratic or Communitarian perspective.  
2.4.1 The decision-maker perspective and QALY maximisation 
  The extra-welfarist approach has most commonly adopted what Sugden 
and Williams (1978) call a ‘decision maker’ perspective, whereby the relevance 
of different characteristics is defined by those individual responsible for making 
(or analysing) policy decisions on behalf of society (Sugden & Williams 1978; 
Coast 2004).  A perceived advantage of the decision maker perspective is that 
societal decision makers, on the basis of their knowledge, expertise and 
professionalism, are uniquely “impersonal, impartial, unbiased and neutral” 
(Buchanan et al. 1998), or in other words, objective.  Indeed, when Coast et al. 
(2001a) asked members of the general public and a group of healthcare decision-
makers, including government bureaucrats, physicians, hospital administrators, 
who should participate in healthcare rationing, they found that decision makers 
as well as the public felt that citizens lacked sufficient objectivity.  Both groups 
viewed objectivity as the ability to make decisions based solely on facts while 
setting aside any emotion or empathy.   
Relying on impartial decision makers to make societal decisions is an 
example of ‘procedural objectivity,’ or the idea that objective decision makers 
will tend to reach an objective truth.  In this context, Fine (1998) defines an 
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objective truth as one that can be accepted by all concerned with no further 
persuasion or explanation.  This is in contrast to a subjective truth, which may be 
true from the perspective of a particular individual, but not necessarily true for 
all individuals.  An example of an objective truth is that 10 is a larger number 
than 9; an example of a subjective truth is that blue is a better colour than red.  
Like blue versus red, the optimal allocation of healthcare resources is not an 
objective truth, and the value of a particular allocation ultimately rests upon 
subjective tastes, perspective and persuasion (Fleck 1992; Klein & Williams 
2000; Daniels 2001).  Relying on small groups of professional decision makers is 
viewed as a way to resolve this dilemma, and to arrive at an allocation that is 
objectively ‘best.’  Although this approach concentrates decision making 
authority in the hands of a relatively small group of decision makers, Sugden and 
Williams (1978) suggest that such an approach is fair and representative of 
broader society to the extent that these decision makers occupy their position as 
a result of a socially accepted process, and to the extent that they can be held 
accountable for their decisions through the same process.  Brouwer, Culyer, van 
Exel and Rutten (2008) go even further, and suggest that the responsibility of 
societal decision makers is not to reflect how citizens would act, but rather how 
they ought to act, avoiding what Robinson (1999) refers to as a “dictatorship of 
the uninformed.”  This is consistent with the view that less transparency allows 
decision-makers to the correct choice rather than the popular choice.   
Within this decision maker perspective, aggregate health rather than 
individual utility has tended to be paramount.  Coast et al. (2008b) argue that 
this perspective has been strongly influenced by Sen’s Capability theory, which 
holds that an individual’s well-being should be judged not by their own 
subjective utility, but by their objective capability to do things that he or she has 
reason to value (Sen 2011).  Sen (1992) argues that the welfarist conception of 
utility suffers in particular from problems of physical condition neglect and 
valuation neglect.  Physical condition neglect suggests that a disabled person 
may adjust their expectations downward to accommodate their circumstances – 
what Sen describes as learning to take pleasure in small mercies.  Although such 
an individual may have a high subjective utility relative to their lowered 
expectations, what should matter in evaluating societal utility is the individual’s 
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objectively limited range of capabilities (Mooney 2005; Richardson & McKie 
2005).  Similarly, valuation neglect implies that “the strength of desire is 
influenced by considerations of realism in one’s circumstances,” and therefore 
welfarism has an over-reliance on “what people ‘manage to desire’” and is 
“particularly neglectful of the claims of those who are too subdued or broken to 
have the courage to desire much.” (Sen 1992; Mooney 2005)  So while utility in 
the welfarist approach is defined by an individual’s subjective reaction to their 
choices and desires, Sen’s conception of well-being is defined by the objective 
range of choices and desires available to an individual, avoiding a reliance on the 
‘metric of desire.’ (Cookson 2005; Brouwer et al. 2008)  By insisting that we 
must not value only happiness, Sen justifies a definition of well-being largely 
external to the preferences and desires of the individual (Sen 1992; Cookson 
2005; Coast et al. 2008b).  Indeed, Sugden (1993) suggests that Sen wants to say 
that some functionings are intrinsically valuable, whether they are desired or not. 
Sen (1992; 2011) has resisted an explicit definition of what capabilities 
should be valued, saying that the relevant capability set will depend on the 
nature of the question being addressed, but Nussbaum (2011) has suggested that 
life and health are fundamental, and Culyer (1989) makes specific reference to 
Capability theory in discussing the development of the extra-welfarist approach 
to health economic evaluation.  Culyer notes a broad range of potentially 
relevant characteristics, including a person's genetic endowment of health, 
relative deprivation, moral ‘worth’, pain, stigmatisation and relationships, but 
acknowledges that “the extra-welfarist approach has taken ‘health’ as the 
proximate maximand,” where health is most often measured in terms of the 
QALY.  This approach has become known as QALY maximisation. 
By equating well-being with health, and health with the QALY, it follows 
that the QALY is a merit good, with an intrinsic value outside of its contribution 
to an individual’s utility (Culyer 2001b; Dolan 2001; Gold 1996).  By focusing 
on QALYs rather than individual utility, and – critically – by presuming that an 
additional QALY is of equal value to everyone (Nord et al. 1995; Dolan et al. 
2005; Weinstein et al. 2009), QALY maximisation avoids the welfarist 
implication that resources should be directed away from those who may place a 
lower value on their health (Wagstaff 1991).  QALY maximisation also 
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presumes ‘distributive neutrality,’ or that the value society derives from each 
additional QALY is the same regardless of the characteristics of who receives it 
or the number of QALYs they may have already gained (Nord et al. 1995; Dolan 
et al. 2005).  However, this conflation of QALYs and well-being, along with the 
Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion’s emphasis on the maximisation over 
the distribution of gains, imposes a narrow perspective where more QALYs is 
always necessarily better than fewer, and rules out trading health for other goals 
such as gains in individual utility or distributive justice, even if such a trade 
would increase overall well-being (Gold 1996; Dolan 2001; Coast 2009). 
Despite the consistency between QALY maximisation and procedural 
objectivity, in the sense that the QALY was defined by impartial analysts as an 
objective measure of (health-related) well-being, this has not lead to its 
widespread acceptance as a societal decision rule (Drummond et al. 2003; 
Hoffmann et al. 2002; Innvaer et al. 2002; Ross 1995).  This perhaps relates to 
Fine’s (1998) characterisation of procedural objectivity as “the view from 
nowhere, and of no-one in particular.”  By carefully excluding personal 
perspectives from societal allocation decisions, he argues that procedural 
objectivity makes it impossible to understand the very nature of subjective truths: 
that truth depends on tastes, perspective, and persuasion.  In his view, a 
societally preferred allocation of resources cannot be reached by means of 
procedural objectivity alone, and personal perspectives – particularly concerning 
visions of distributive justice – must be acknowledged.   
He goes on to argue that the fundamental point of objectivity in societal 
decision-making is not truth, but trust.  Citizens do not value objectivity because 
they believe it arrives at an objective truth; they value it because they believe it 
arrives at a decision they can trust.  In this view, objectivity represents anything 
that improves trust in a decision.  In some circumstances, trust may be enhanced 
by the impartiality of societal decision makers, but in others, trust may be 
enhanced by a broader process, with more personal perspectives.  Similarly, Sen 
(2011) wonders if it is possible to have a “…satisfactory understanding of ethics 
in general and justice in particular that confines its attention to some people and 
not to others, presuming – if only implicitly – that some people are relevant 
while others simply are not?”  In his view, ‘universality of inclusion’ is an 
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integral part of objectivity.  Heldke and Kellert (1995) make a similar argument, 
and suggest that ‘pure’ objectivity – which they define as knowledge that is 
independent from the perspectives of particular persons – is impossible, and to a 
large extent, undesirable.  They argue that “knowledge is actually strengthened 
by systematically increasing the number of concrete, identifiable perspectives 
represented.”  Together, these views are consistent with a more directly 
democratic (Fleck 1992) or Communitarian (Callahan 2003a; Mooney 2005) 
approach to defining the normative relevance of different characteristics. 
2.4.2 A democratic or Communitarian perspective 
Fleck (1992) argues that in order to justify its rationing decisions, a 
democratic government must ultimately appeal to some vision of distributive 
justice.  However, as a single view of justice is unlikely to be endorsed by all 
citizens – particularly those who may lose out as the result of a rationing 
decision – it is essential that the government be able to demonstrate the moral 
legitimacy of its particular vision.  Prima facie moral legitimacy could be 
achieved, he suggests, by creating “social processes through which rationing 
decisions become something that we collectively impose upon ourselves.”  To 
this end, he argues that it should be the responsibility of all citizens in a 
democracy to contribute to determining the fair allocation of scarce healthcare 
resources.  Fleck acknowledges the difficult and uncomfortable choices that this 
process may require of citizens, but emphasises the responsibilities, as well as the 
rights, of citizens in a democracy.  
The democratic approach outlined by Fleck is similar to the 
Communitarian approach, advocated by Mooney (1998b; 2005) and Callahan 
(2003a; 2003b).  Callahan (2003a) rejects the individualistic principles of 
welfarism on the grounds that they preclude a societal understanding of well-
being.  Such principles, he argues, only make sense if one believes in an ‘invisible 
hand’ that can shape individual well-being into societal well-being.  In their place 
Mooney (2005) argues that societal resources should be allocated on the basis of 
community preferences for “what sort of society citizens want, including what 
sort of social institutions they want and what sort of rules or principles they want 
to govern these social institutions.”  These preferences would determine the 
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objectives of the healthcare system, and would inform efficiency in terms of what 
it was the health system was trying to achieve (Mooney 1998b).  The better the 
health system met these objectives – that is, the better societal preferences were 
satisfied – the greater value society would derive from the healthcare system.   
Although citizens may indeed be ill-informed about which specific 
healthcare interventions should be provided, Mooney (1998b) argues that they 
can and should contribute to the principles by which healthcare resources are 
allocated.  As noted above, these principles are inherently subjective and do not 
necessarily require technical expertise.  Once these principles are defined, the re-
allocation of resources necessary to achieve these equity and efficiency objectives 
would be left to professional decision makers and clinicians at the meso and 
micro levels (Mooney 1998b; Nord et al. 1999).  The different roles of the public 
and the decision makers reflects the role of objective knowledge and expertise at 
different stages of the priority setting process (Buchanan et al. 1998).  At the 
macro level, there is no objectively best allocation of resources; it is a subjective 
judgement that ultimately rests upon tastes, perspective and persuasion.  Once 
the objectives of the healthcare system have been defined, however, the 
allocation of resources at the meso/micro level to best meet these objectives is a 
technical matter that relies on professional knowledge and expertise. 
2.5 Societal preferences in priority setting: the equity-weighted QALY 
Recent reviews have suggested that society is concerned about factors 
other than QALY gains, and may be willing to sacrifice aggregate QALY gains 
to prioritise patients on the basis of characteristics such as age, social role or 
disease severity (Sassi et al. 2001; Schwappach 2002a; Dolan et al. 2005; 
Stafinski et al. 2011).  Consistent with these suggestions of societal support for 
equity as well as efficiency in the allocation of health and healthcare resources, 
operational applications of QALY maximisation have tended to ease the strict 
QALY maximising decision rule and allow for consideration of equity alongside 
efficiency in priority setting decisions.  For example, health economic evaluation 
guidelines from the Canadian Agency For Drugs and Technologies in Health 
(CADTH) note that age, sex, ethnicity, geographic location (usually understood 
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as remoteness), socioeconomic group or health status may be relevant to some 
evaluations (Canadian Agency For Drugs and Technologies in Health 2006).  
Similarly, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) citizens 
council, which is intended to represent UK public opinion on overarching moral 
and ethical issues (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2013), has 
noted that factors such as the age of the patient, disease severity, or life-saving 
treatment may justify greater priority (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence 2008).  However, the inclusion of factors other than length and 
quality of life has tended to be ad hoc.  There is little specific guidance on when it 
is or is not necessary to consider these factors, or how they should be weighted 
relative to each other or to the objective of maximising QALYs.  This lack of 
consistency may jeopardise the public trust in the priority setting process.    
One way to explicitly incorporate the distributional preferences of society 
into priority setting decisions is through what is referred to as the ‘equity-
weighted’ QALY.  This measure would weight QALY gains to reflect the 
strength of the equity-efficiency trade-off, and its key feature is that the sum of 
equity-weighted QALYs accruing to any particular individual can be greater or 
less than the sum of their unweighted QALYs.  Note that at the aggregate level, 
however, the sum of equity weighted QALYs must equal the sum of unweighted 
QALYs, and for each patient that receives a greater weight another must 
necessarily receive lower weight (Ham & Coulter 2001; Wailoo et al. 2009).  
Culyer (1989) suggests that such a measure, by explicitly integrating equity and 
efficiency, addresses allocative as well as technical efficiency.   
The use of the equity-weighted QALY as a measure of value in healthcare 
leads to what Nord (1995b) describes as ‘cost-value analysis,’ where the objective 
is to maximise the total value of QALYs gained, rather than the sum of 
individual QALY gains (Mooney 1998b; Nord et al. 1999).  There is nothing in 
the equity-weighted QALY that requires a democratic or Communitarian 
approach to defining the relevant equity considerations, but for the reasons 
discussed above these approaches appear to have advantages for defining equity 
weights.  Such a measure is also consistent with Williams’ (1996) view that 
“QALYs will also have a role in more complex rules, and more complex rules 
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will almost certainly be needed if collective priority-setting is to reflect the views 
of the general public.”  
An advantage of the equity-weighted QALY is that it offers an escape 
from the theoretical ‘QALY trap’ of conventional QALY maximisation, where 
“the health-related quality-of-life of any health condition determines not only the 
benefit of curing the condition but also the benefit of saving the life of someone 
with that condition.” (Ubel et al. 2000)  This implies that saving the life of a 
person with a permanent disability (e.g. paraplegia) is less valuable than saving 
the life of someone who is otherwise in perfect health, since the person with 
paraplegia will generate fewer lifetime QALYs.6  Conversely, if saving the life of 
a person with paraplegia is to be considered equally valuable, it is necessary to 
regard a cure for paraplegia as having no value (Menzel 1999).  With an equity-
weighted QALY, societal value is not constrained by the individual utility 
gained, and it is possible to value the two lives equally.  Therefore, “the strength 
of a claim is not a function of an individual's ability to manage to feel harmed.  
Harms, and the strength of harms, are for the society to judge.” (Mooney 1998b)   
 The equity-weighted QALY is based on the assumption that efficiency 
and equity are commensurate concepts, and that efficiency in maximising health 
gains can be traded off against concerns for equity.  As Sassi et al. (2001) note, 
this implies that a more equitable intervention can be less efficient and still be 
ranked favourably relative to a more efficient but less equitable intervention.  
There is a limit to this equity-efficiency trade-off, though, and at some point an 
equitable but inefficient intervention will ranked less favourably than a more 
efficient intervention with a less equitable distribution of benefits.  The objective 
over the remainder of the thesis is to estimate the strength of the equity-efficiency 
trade-off for different aspects of equity, and the next chapter will review factors 
that may be relevant to this trade-off. 
                                                 
6 Few economic evaluations incorporate utilities at the individual level, so the QALY trap is 
more of a theoretical than a practical matter, but the implication holds nonetheless. 
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Chapter 3:  
Empirical ethics review  
A fundamental challenge in the extra-welfarist approach is defining the 
set of non-utility characteristics relevant to priority setting.  Strict theoretical 
QALY maximisation, based on a view of well-being as health, defines this set 
solely in terms of length and quality of life, and the number of patients 
benefitting.  More pragmatic applications of this framework have allowed for the 
expansion of set of relevant factors to include implicit consideration of 
characteristics such as age or disease severity.  However, as noted in the previous 
chapter, the inclusion of factors other than length and quality of life has tended 
to be ad hoc, with little guidance for when these factors should be considered, or 
what their weight should be relative to efficiency.  In addition, although many of 
the factors mentioned in the CADTH and NICE guidelines are consistent with 
recent evidence on societal preferences, the factors included in a particular 
evaluation, and their relative weights, ultimately reflect decision maker rather 
than societal preferences.  As an alternative, a democratic or Communitarian 
approach would allow for the set of relevant characteristics, and their relative 
weights, to be defined by the community (Mooney 1998b; Menzel 1999; 
Callahan 2003a).   
The most straightforward approach to identifying these factors would be 
simply to ask representative members of a community which attributes or 
characteristics they consider important.  Indeed, such preference surveys have 
been relatively common in health economics (Nord et al. 1995; Bowling 1996; 
Mossialos & King 1999).  As Mooney (1998b) acknowledges, however, the 
preferences elicited by such surveys will only be ‘good’ to the extent that the 
society from which they derive is also ‘good.’  That is, society may hold 
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preferences that are irrational or perverse by, in Mooney’s terms, “some 
universalist principle.”  Likewise, Ubel et al. (1999) noted that although it is 
important to consider public preferences in healthcare priority setting, these 
preferences may not always be fair.  Although irrational or perverse preferences 
may reflect a societal consensus, it is difficult to accept that incorporating 
community preferences for denying men or particular ethnic minorities 
healthcare, for example, would improve the moral legitimacy of the resulting 
priorities.  Daniels (1998) goes further, and argues that majority support in a 
preference survey is not sufficient grounds for distributing something as 
fundamentally important as healthcare.  Such surveys, he suggests, reveal tastes 
rather than reasons and therefore lack legitimacy: “settling moral disputes simply 
by aggregating preferences seems to ignore fundamental differences between the 
nature of values and commitments to them and tastes or preferences.”  He argues 
that a deliberative process is required to assure the minority that allocation 
preferences are based on reasons that they can accept as relevant.   
Richardson and McKie (2005) agree that ethically important decisions 
cannot be resolved by empirical methods alone, but they suggest that 
deliberation by itself is also insufficient : 
The superiority of one theory over another – ethical or otherwise – cannot 
be determined by logic alone, and yet there must be some agreement about 
what constitutes a better theory.  Neither the discipline of economics nor 
ethics provides a satisfactory answer to this question.  
 
They propose that “defensible principles for allocating healthcare should be 
derived in an iterative way, involving both an empirical study of population 
values and ethical analysis of the results.”  Richardson (2002) described this 
process of identifying factors that are relevant but also, in some sense, fair, as 
‘empirical ethics.’  This process is consistent with Broome’s (1989) view of 
distinguishing claims, which carry some ethical obligation, from the other 
reasons that an individual may be entitled to some share of a limited societal 
resource.   
Richardson (2002) used the term ‘empirical ethics’ to describe a process 
whereby guiding ethical principles are inferred from empirical investigations of 
societal preferences.  That is, evidence of public support should be taken to imply 
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some normative quality.  However, Hausman (2002) has suggested that this 
represents a form of ‘moral relativism,’ whereby what is morally right or wrong 
is reduced to social consensus or even a simple majority.  He feels such a 
position is untenable.  Slavery, he notes, was once held to be acceptable by a 
majority of citizens in many countries, but this support did not make it right or 
ethical.  Like Mooney (1998b) and Ubel et al. (1999), however, Richardson 
recognised that societal preferences should themselves be subject to ethical 
scrutiny, and that at times it may be necessary for decision-makers to over-ride or 
‘launder’ (Goodin 1986) some preferences.  The challenge is to identify which 
preferences should be excluded.  In this regard, Ubel et al. (1999) proposed that 
principles for priority setting should reflect “quantitatively significant” societal 
preferences, and be “consistent with some coherent and defensible ethical theory 
of justice.”  In their view, preferences with a ‘trivial’ impact or minimal support 
should be excluded, as should preferences that cannot be justified by some 
coherent theory of justice.  This approach, of subjecting potentially relevant 
attributes to an empirical and an ethical filter, was adopted here to identify a set 
of attributes that may be considered fair as well as relevant.   
To develop this ethical filter, section 3.1 discusses prominent theories of 
distributive justice that might guide an empirical ethics approach.  As the overall 
objective was to provide specific guidance to the allocation of societal resources, 
the emphasis was on theories that suggest a specific maximand over those that 
advocate a particular process.  Section 3.2 applies empirical and ethical filters in 
reviewing the empirical evidence around public support for different attributes or 
characteristics, and the ethical justifications (or lack thereof) for each attribute 
based on the theories of justice discussed.  Section 3.3 contrasts the attributes 
identified here with the processes and attributes used by other elicitation studies 
in this area.  Finally, section 3.4 discusses the specific attributes that were judged 
fair and relevant by this process, as well as some of the limitations of an 
empirical ethics approach. 
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3.1 Theories of justice in the allocation of healthcare 
As Richardson and McKie (2005) state, “the assertion that one state of 
the world is better than another is always and unavoidably based upon an ethical 
theory or belief.” In order to provide an ethical basis for the attributes included 
among the set of relevant characteristics, this section will briefly review 
prominent theories of distributive justice in healthcare, and draws heavily on 
reviews by Williams and Cookson (2000) and Konow (2003).  It is important to 
note that there are often strong criticisms of all the theories identified here, and it 
is not the intent of the review to argue for an ideal or universal theory of justice.  
Instead, the different theories will be discussed with respect to their respective 
visions of how to allocate inevitably scarce healthcare resources.   
In this regard, Williams and Cookson (2000) distinguish between theories 
of distributive justice that specify a specific objective, or ‘maximand’, and those 
that do not.  Theories without a maximand include ‘pure procedural’ theories 
such as Libertarianism, Contractarianism, Participatory Democracy, and 
Accountability for Reasonableness, which emphasise the process by which a fair 
outcome is reached, rather than the outcome.  Similarly, principles such as the 
absence of envy, equality of access and rule-of-rescue set ‘side conditions’ to 
determine whether an outcome is fair, but again do not specify an overall 
objective.  Principlism and the Pareto principle may also arguably be included 
amongst these side condition principles.  Finally, theories with a specific 
maximand include need, maximisation, egalitarianism, and Rawls’ difference 
principle. 
3.1.1 Pure procedural theories 
Among pure procedural theories, Libertarianism rejects any role for the 
government, and in the context of healthcare holds that publicly-provided 
healthcare should be replaced by private insurance.  Any distribution that results 
from such a free-market arrangement is inherently just (Williams & Cookson 
2000; Nozick 1974).  Libertarianism does not accept that there is ever a 
justification for prioritising one patient’s rights over another’s, arguing that such 
prioritisation would amount to “a utilitarianism of rights.” (Nozick 1974)  
Contractarianism holds that the free and collective agreement of individuals to a 
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particular arrangement shows that it has some normative property (e.g. 
legitimate, just, obligating, etc.) (D’Agostino & Gaus 2008).  A ‘constructivist’ 
interpretation of a social contract views an agreement as normative by virtue of 
the collective agreement itself, while a weaker ‘indicative’ interpretation views a 
collective agreement as evidence of a normative quality, but not a normative 
justification in itself (D’Agostino & Gaus 2008).  Recognise, though, that a 
social contract is only meaningful under conditions of ‘reasonable pluralism’; if 
all individuals had precisely the same set of preferences, there would be no value 
in demonstrating that they could agree on something.  This pluralism implies 
that it is extremely unlikely that all individuals will ever agree on something, and 
therefore a social contract is not defined by what people do agree to, but rather by 
what they would agree to, if they were all hypothetical ‘reasonable individuals,’ 
without biases or false beliefs (D’Agostino & Gaus 2008).  In this sense 
Contractarianism and the social contract are based on the hypothetical 
agreement of hypothetical individuals – what Dworkin (1989) objected to as a 
doubly hypothetical agreement.  Similar to Contractarianism, Participatory 
Democracy as a theory of distributive justice holds that any distribution arrived at 
through a fair democratic process is just.  Both Contractarianism and 
Participatory Democracy are similar to Communitarianism, in that all three 
reflect community preferences.  But whereas Contractarianism and Participatory 
Democracy are based on the idea that community agreement implies a 
normative property, Communitarianism, as understood in the context of this 
thesis, simply holds that allocating resources according to community 
preferences will maximise community welfare; it makes no normative claim 
about the inherent fairness of such a distribution.  Finally, Daniels and Sabin’s 
(2002) ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ (A4R) defines four process conditions 
to a fair outcome: the publicity of decisions and rationales; the rationale for 
decisions should be relevant and be acceptable to ‘fair-minded people’; there 
must be an appeals mechanism for challenging and potentially reversing 
decisions; and the process must be publicly regulated to ensure the first three 
conditions are met.  More generally, Dolan et al. (2007) identify six broad 
characteristics of procedural justice: a means by which affected or potentially 
affected parties can have the opportunity to contribute to the decision making 
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process; neutrality in decision making, or the ability of decision makers to 
separate themselves from preconceptions and self-interest; consistency in the 
roles accorded to similar people in the decision process; a mechanism for 
assessing the accuracy of information to be used in the decision making process; 
an appeals and reversal process; and transparency in the decision making 
process.   
3.1.2 ‘Side condition’ principles 
Among principles that define the characteristics of a fair outcome without 
specifying a maximand, the absence of envy principle defines a fair situation as one 
where no one envies anyone else, taking into account all aspects of a person's 
circumstances (Williams & Cookson 2000).  Creating such a fair situation 
requires a compensation principle to adjust for inherent differences between 
individuals, although this compensation is generally not defined within the 
theory itself.  Within the healthcare context, the absence of envy principle has 
often led to the idea of equality in initial resources, or resource egalitarianism, 
which will be discussed in more detail below.  Equality of access defines fairness 
as equal access to healthcare, consistent with the concepts of horizontal and 
vertical equity.  Horizontal equity requires similar individuals be treated 
similarly, while vertical equity requires dissimilar individuals be treated 
dissimilarly (Culyer 2001b).  Williams and Cookson (2000), though, suggest at 
least four possible interpretations of ‘access’ in healthcare – the quantity of 
healthcare utilization (e.g. physician visits); the cost of healthcare utilization; the 
maximum attainable healthcare; and the opportunity cost of healthcare – and 
criticise this principle on the grounds that it focuses too narrowly on healthcare 
as an end in itself, and does not consider an overall objective in terms of health 
or well-being.  The rule-of-rescue holds that society has an ethical duty to do 
everything possible to rescue identifiable individuals from imminent death and is 
the basis of much of clinical ethics, but does not specify any distribution of 
resources outside of the single individual (McKie & Richardson 2003).  A 
number of authors, though, argue that it is irrational as well as unfair to devote 
resources to people who happen to be in immediate distress at the expense of 
others who may have a greater objective claim to healthcare resources.  Thus, it 
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is difficult to consider the rule-of-rescue a true theory of distributive justice 
(Williams & Cookson 2000; McKie & Richardson 2003; Hauck et al. 2004).  
Rather than defining one condition to a fair outcome, Principlism defines a set of 
principles that form the basis of much of modern medical ethics: respect for 
autonomy, or the right to make one’s own decisions; non-malfeasance, or the 
requirement to do no harm; beneficence, or the prevention of harm and the 
provision of benefit; and justice in the fair distribution of resources (Callahan 
2003b; Beauchamp & DeGrazia 2004).  While there is no mechanism for 
resolving conflicts between the principles, Callahan (2003a) suggests that all the 
other principles can be interpreted as protecting or promoting the autonomy of 
the individual – any conflict between the principles should be resolved in favour 
of the outcome that is most consistent with autonomy.  Beyond the primacy of 
individual autonomy in decision making, though, Principlism offers no guidance 
in how decisions should be made for the benefit of society (Callahan 2003b).  
Principlism is consistent with many of the principles of neo-classical welfarist 
economics with its emphasis on individual sovereignty and welfarism, and in 
this sense, it is largely inconsistent with a Communitarian perspective.  Finally, 
the Pareto principle holds that an outcome is fair (‘Pareto optimal’) if resources 
cannot be reallocated in such a way that the welfare of at least one member of 
society is improved without making anyone else worse off (Sugden & Williams 
1978).  Konow (2003) argues that the Pareto principle has been widely embraced 
by economics on the grounds that it requires “an ostensibly innocuous value 
judgement,” even though its strict reallocation condition means that the Pareto 
principle will accept flagrantly unequal distributions as fair if resources cannot be 
reallocated without creating a ‘loser.’ 
3.1.3 Theories with a specific maximand  
The principles discussed above are largely deontological, in that the 
fairness of an action is judged by its adherence to a particular set of rules or 
principles.  An alternative class of theories of justice are those with a specific 
maximand.  Such theories are consequential in that the fairness of an action is 
judged solely by the outcomes it generates (Konow 2003; Alexander & Moore 
32 
2008).  This class of theories includes need principles, maximising principles, 
and egalitarian principles, including Rawls’ Difference principle.  
Need principles advocate the distribution of healthcare in proportion to 
need, consistent with concepts of horizontal and vertical equity, which require 
that equally ‘needy’ individuals to receive equal preference over equally ‘less 
needy’ individuals, regardless of any other characteristics of those individuals 
(Hauck et al. 2004).  Konow (2003) notes that the need principle requires that a 
just allocation of resources provide for basic needs equally across individuals, 
and suggests that this principle tends to dominate when basic needs are 
endangered.  This is consistent with Walzer’s (1983) argument that healthcare is 
a special good which requires a special kind of distributive principle; specifically, 
that whereas consumer goods can be fairly distributed according to market 
principles, healthcare should be distributed according to need.  
The key requirement to operationalising this principle, though, is an 
appropriate definition of need.  Cookson and Dolan (2000) reject a definition 
based on ‘clinical need’, as they suggest such a criterion leads to a procedural 
principle whereby “any allocation is correct so long as a clinician has taken it.”  
Instead, they identify five potential conceptions of need, each with slightly 
different implications for healthcare allocation: 
 Need as the degree of immediate threat to life implies that saving (or 
prolonging) a life should always take priority over enhancing life. 
 Need as the degree of immediate ill-health includes immediate threat to life, 
but also encompasses immediate pain and suffering and implies those in 
more severe states should take priority. 
 Need as the degree of lifetime ill-health takes a broader perspective and 
considers an individual's lifetime health experience.  Individuals who 
have had a relatively long, healthy life would have less priority. 
 Need as the degree of immediate capacity-to-benefit interprets need as the 
ability to gain from effective treatment.  By this definition, if an individual 
cannot gain from treatment, they have no need for healthcare.  Similarly, 
Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) argue that the provision of ineffective 
healthcare should not attract any equity concerns, except insofar as it 
33 
would be inequitable to use resources that could be used to promote 
equitable outcomes elsewhere.  This principle emphasises health gains 
without considering duration. 
 Need as the degree of lifetime capacity-to-benefit expands capacity-to-benefit to 
include consideration of duration in terms of life expectancy remaining. 
 
Advocates of maximising principles take the view that justice is ultimately 
a matter of maximising the sum total of human happiness.  In a health context 
this implies allocating healthcare so as to bring about the best possible 
consequences, in terms of aggregate population health, most commonly defined 
in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), or something broader, such as 
well-being or ‘flourishing’ (Cookson & Dolan 2000).  Although maximising 
principles in healthcare are broadly utilitarian, they do not conform to a welfarist 
definition since well-being is not defined by subjective individual utility but by a 
more limited conception of health-related utility.  Indeed, within healthcare, 
even broader measures of well-being or flourishing are most often understood in 
objective terms such as capabilities rather than subjective utility (Culyer 1989; 
Cookson & Dolan 2000).  Maximising principles are the basis of the QALY 
maximisation approach and correspond closely with an interpretation of need as 
the lifetime capacity-to-benefit (Culyer 1989; Coast 2009).  The key distinction 
between the maximisation and need principles is that whereas maximising 
principles would concentrate gains amongst those most able to benefit, possibly 
to the exclusion of those who could gain less, need principles allocate resources 
proportionate to need, implying at least some resources to those with lesser need 
(Cookson & Dolan 2000).  
Egalitarian principles advocate allocating healthcare so as to reduce 
inequalities in health.  As described by Daniels (1990), egalitarianism is willing 
“to forego delivering a greater benefit to someone who is already better off in 
order to deliver a lesser benefit to someone who is worse off.”  However, Konow 
(2003) notes that this relatively simple rule is complicated by different 
conceptions of equality, and Daniels (1990) identifies at least three potential 
targets for egalitarian concerns in a healthcare context: equality of welfare, 
equality of resources to pursue welfare, and equality of objective capabilities.  
34 
Equality of welfare can be thought of as an operationalisation of the 
absence of envy principle, and requires that all individuals be equally happy with 
their situation in life.  However, as each individual’s welfare is a function their 
preferences, an unequal distribution of resources may be required in order to 
achieve an equal distribution of welfare.  As Sen (1985) suggests, individuals 
differ with respect to their ability to convert resources into well-being, and 
therefore individuals with ‘expensive tastes,’ for example, may require a greater 
share of resources to achieve a given level of welfare.  In such cases, Daniels 
(1990) argues that egalitarian concerns have been hijacked.  An alternative 
interpretation of equality of welfare is offered by Williams (1997), who suggests 
that every individual is entitled to a certain quantity of lifetime health (i.e. their 
‘fair innings’) and that individuals who have gained a greater share of their 
entitlement should have a weaker claim to societal healthcare resources.  An 
absolutist interpretation of this argument would hold that there is no value to be 
gained by treating patients who have achieved their full share of life years or 
healthy life years and would deny treatment to elderly patients, while a relativist 
interpretation would give relatively greater priority to younger patients (Tsuchiya 
2000).  In general, the further an individual is from achieving their fair allotment 
of healthy life years, the stronger their claim relative to those who have already 
achieved their fair innings.  
Equality of resources, or resource egalitarianism, holds that justice 
requires each individual to have the same initial resources in order to pursue 
their welfare but does not prescribe a particular outcome; outcomes are 
determined by each individual’s free choices.  In this perspective, poor health is 
just if an individual had an opportunity for full health but failed to achieve it 
through their own choices (Cookson & Dolan 2000).  However, resource 
egalitarians also generally hold that circumstances over which individuals have 
no control should not adversely affect their life prospects.  An unequal 
distribution of resources may therefore be justified in order to compensate 
individuals disadvantaged by ‘brute luck’ beyond their control (Daniels 1990; 
Anderson 1999).  Because of this compensation condition,  resource 
egalitarianism is also called ‘luck egalitarianism.’ (Anderson 1999; Arneson 
2000; Feiring 2008)  Anderson (1999), though, does not accept that egalitarian 
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principles can be used to justify fundamental inequalities, no matter what their 
cause.  She rejects luck egalitarianism on the grounds that it fails the most basic 
test of any egalitarian theory: “that its principles express equal respect and 
concern for all citizens.”  Luck egalitarianism, she argues, effectively dictates 
what people can do with their freedoms, and abandons individuals judged to 
have made poor use of that freedom. 
Finally, equality of capabilities holds that the objective of healthcare 
should be to maintain an individual’s “normal opportunity range.” (Daniels 
1990)  This view sees health as instrumental to an individual’s overall well-being, 
and that fair equality of opportunity requires that an individual have 
opportunities equivalent to others with the same talents and skills.  Like resource 
egalitarianism, free choices that affect an individual’s range opportunities are not 
unjust, so equality of capabilities would prioritise healthcare for individuals 
disadvantaged by brute luck while at the same time limiting healthcare to those 
with a normal range of opportunity.  Daniels (1990) recognises that a particular 
disease may have a different impact on the normal range of opportunity at 
different stages of life, and suggests that resources should be allocated so as to 
protect a contextual range of opportunity, thereby contributing to a fair 
distribution of resources between age groups.   
The imperative of maintaining an equal range of opportunity is 
conceptually similar to Capability theory, which holds that the objective of 
policy should be to promote and maintain the capabilities necessary to achieve a 
range of ‘functionings.’  In this context, capabilities are what a person can do, 
even if they choose not to translate these capabilities into a specific functioning 
(Cookson 2005; Hausman & McPherson 2006).  To illustrate, literacy would be 
a capability, while reading for pleasure would a functioning (Sen 2011).  But 
although the Capability approach has generally been interpreted as advocating 
an equal distribution of capabilities (Coast et al. 2008a), Sen (2011) argues that 
the Capability approach does not prescribe a specific maximand, but rather offers 
an ‘informational focus’ that society should consider in assessing justice and 
injustice.  In this sense, the Capability approach can be viewed more as the 
‘currency’ of distributive justice, similar to the QALY, rather than as a specific 
theory of distributive justice. 
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Rawls (1999; 2001) proposed a theory of justice based on two principles: 
first, ‘primary goods’, including rights, liberties and opportunities, should be 
distributed equally and at the maximum level that is compatible with everyone 
receiving the same allocation.  This principle is very close to resource 
egalitarianism.  Second, where there are inequalities, these should be arranged in 
order to benefit the least advantaged groups.  This second principle has become 
known as Rawls’ Difference Principle.  Although Rawls’ theory is based on an 
equal respect for all persons, his primary concern is for the absolute position of 
the least advantaged group.  If it is possible to improve the absolute position of 
the least advantaged by having some inequalities, Rawls’ Difference principle 
prescribes inequality up to the point that the absolute position of the least 
advantaged can no longer be improved (Lamont & Favor 2008).  In this sense 
Rawls argues for a lexicographic welfare function where the absolute position of 
the least advantaged determines overall societal welfare (Mueller 2003).  In 
justifying his theory, Rawls (1999) imagines an initial position in which people 
are behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ and would not know their position in society.  In 
this ‘original position’, he argues that free and rational individuals would 
understand that it was equally probable that they could be well-off or badly-off, 
and would accept a social contract based on equality in order to minimise their 
risk by ensuring that the worst off are as well-off as possible.  
Although Williams and Cookson (2000) have interpreted Rawls’ 
Difference principle in the context of healthcare as prioritising those in the most 
severe health states, they note that Rawls explicitly excluded health from his list 
of ‘primary goods.’  First, Rawls felt that health was distributed by nature as 
much as society.  Second, he felt health is an end in itself, not just a means to 
pursue other ends.  Third, a strict application of the Difference principle could 
result in excessive share of healthcare resources going to those in the most severe 
health states.  However they also note that Rawls has suggested that the 
Difference principle may not apply once all members of society have been 
brought up to a minimum level of health, similar to Daniels’ (1990) 
interpretation of equality of opportunity.  
Similar to Rawls’ difference principle, as well as to aspects of the rule-of-
rescue, Prioritarianism holds that the worst-off should have priority over those 
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that are better-off (Parfit 1997; Arneson 2000).  Prioritarianism is distinguished 
from different forms of egalitarianism by its concern for absolute, rather than 
relative well-being.  To illustrate, a ‘fair-innings’ egalitarian would assign priority 
to a moderately ill child and a very ill senior on the basis of their relative 
accumulation of lifetime health.  The child has gained relatively less of her fair-
innings and so deserves relatively greater priority than the senior.  A Prioritarian, 
in contrast, would assign priority on the basis of absolute well-being: the senior is 
more severely ill, and so deserves greater priority.  Hausman and McPherson 
(2006), though, suggest that an emphasis on the worst-off will tend to have the 
effect of lessening inequalities, making the distinction between Prioritarianism 
and egalitarian theories relatively insignificant. 
Few advocates of egalitarian principles would pursue equity as the sole 
objective, and instead combine equality with other principles of justice such as 
need or maximisation (Cookson & Dolan 2000; Culyer 2001b; Hausman & 
McPherson 2006).  In theory, a strictly egalitarian focus on health differences 
could achieve equality by reducing rather than improving overall health, so to 
avoid this result, egalitarianism might be combined with maximising principles; 
what Parfit (1997) refers to as ‘pluralist egalitarianism.’ 
3.1.4 Defensible theories of justice 
In considering theories of distributive justice, particularly as applied 
within healthcare, Williams and Cookson (2000) adopted an economic decision-
making perspective and rejected deontological theories and principles on the 
grounds that they lack a maximand and therefore offer no specific distributional 
guidance to decision makers.  This is particularly true where there is no optimal 
solution and some trade-off must be made between ‘unjust’ alternatives 
(Williams & Cookson 2000; Hausman & McPherson 2006).  This pragmatic 
justification for a decision-making perspective was adopted here, and 
deontological theories and principles were not accepted as a primary ethical 
justification for particular preferences or attributes, although they could be 
acknowledged as secondary considerations.   
Instead, need principles, maximising principles, and egalitarian principles, 
including Rawls’ Difference principle and Prioritarianism, were the primary 
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theories of distributive justice used to support the inclusion of different attributes.  
The decision to exclude deontological theories and principles should not be 
interpreted as a reflection of their coherence or defensibility, but simply of their 
practicality for the specific purposes of this empirical ethics review.  It is also 
important to recognise that this decision introduces an element of subjectivity 
into the review.  Including deontological theories such as Contractarianism or 
Participatory Democracy would likely have identified a different set of fair and 
relevant attributes.  Indeed, as mentioned in section 3.1.1, those two theories in 
particular suggest that any distribution based on collective or majority agreement 
is, by definition, fair.  This effectively reduces ‘ethically defensible’ to ‘majority 
support.’  Although this may be consistent with the idea of inferring ethical 
principles from population preferences, this relativism is rejected here in favour 
of Williams and Cookson’s (2000) decision-making perspective.  
3.2 Attribute Review 
Attributes potentially relevant to a Communitarian approach to priority 
setting were identified through a review of the health economics, medical, and 
ethics literature.  The review took a ‘citation pearl growing’ strategy, beginning 
with reviews by Schwappach (2002a) and Dolan et al. (2005).  The 
bibliographies of these reviews were searched and the ‘related articles’ feature of 
PubMed and Web of Science was used to identify other potentially relevant 
studies.  Keywords from the Schwappach and Dolan reviews were also searched 
in PubMed, EconLit and Google Scholar.  A pearl-growing strategy is suggested 
to be particularly useful for interdisciplinary topics where relevant studies may 
use different keywords and be found across different citation databases 
(Schlosser et al. 2006). 
From these results, four reviews, by Sassi et al. (2001), Schwappach 
(2002b), Dolan et al. (2005), and Stafinski (2011), were deemed comprehensive 
in that they discussed a broad range of attributes that may be relevant to 
preferences for health and healthcare.  Additionally, a review by Olsen et al. 
(2003) considered the relevance of three broad categories of personal 
characteristics: a person’s relations to others, a person’s relations to the cause of 
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illness and the person’s ‘self’.  While they also noted age and aspects directly 
related to efficiency and distributive justice, such as health gains and severity, 
they specifically excluded these factors from the discussion as their emphasis was 
on personal characteristics.  Between them, these five reviews identified and 
discussed 14 unique concepts or factors (see Table 3.1).  These factors were taken 
to represent the set of attributes potentially relevant to a societal perspective on 
healthcare priority setting.  
Table 3.1: Potentially relevant attributes  
 Attribute 
Sassi et al. 
(2001) 
Schwappach 
(2002a) 
Olsen et al. 
(2003) 
Dolan et al. 
(2005) 
Stafinski et al. 
(2011) 
Age   ND   
Social role/productivity      
Lifestyle/responsibility      
Prior healthcare      
Social inequality      
Desert/merit      
‘Self’      
Initial severity   I/ND   
Endpoint       
Treatment effect   I/ND   
Duration of benefit      
Direction of benefit      
Distribution of gains      
Rarity     I/ND 
I/ND = Identified, but not discussed 
 
Each potentially relevant attribute is discussed in detail below, with an 
emphasis on the concept the attribute embodies, empirical evidence of public 
support and the ethical justifications for the concept.  Attributes identified in the 
review that did not have a defensible ethical justification were excluded (or in the 
term of Goodin (1986), ‘laundered’) from the final set of relevant attributes, and 
likewise, factors that had a strong ethical justification but limited public support 
were also excluded as Communitarianism is firmly based on the idea that 
societal value should reflect rather than impose preferences.   
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3.2.1 Age  
Preferences for age, or ageism7, can be based on a number of ethical 
principles.  Utilitarian ageism is based on a principle of maximising health gains: 
as younger patients are expected to live longer than older patients, ceteris paribus, 
there is a greater expected value to saving a younger patient (Tsuchiya 1999; 
Nord et al. 1996).  Productivity ageism holds that the very young and the very 
old have less societal value than individuals at ages in between by virtue of their 
relative contributions to society.  As the very young and the very old tend to 
require support from the rest of society, while those ages in between tend to be 
net contributors to society, it may be appropriate to value their health unequally.  
Indeed, this is the basis of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) developed by 
the World Health Organization, which are based on maximising the value of 
societal productivity (Tsuchiya 2000; Murray & Acharya 1997).  A third 
conception of ageism stems from a perceived moral obligation to save a young 
life over an older life because they have had fewer life years.  This desire to 
equalise the age at death is known as egalitarian ageism (Tsuchiya 1999; Nord et 
al. 1996).  Williams (1997) takes the egalitarian ageism argument one step 
further and suggests that it is not age at death that should be equalised, but 
lifetime health outcomes in the form of QALYs – the so-called ‘fair innings’ 
argument.  Harris (1987; 2005), though, rejects maximising and egalitarian 
arguments for age-related preferences and argues that healthcare should be 
allocated so as to maximise lives, based on a position that each life is equally 
valuable, regardless of its expected length or quality.  Such a position denies that 
there is any justification for considering the age of a patient in determining social 
value, either explicitly in terms of age in itself, or implicitly, in terms of the 
expected duration of benefit. 
Tsuchiya (1999) reviewed nine empirical studies of age-related 
preferences and in general the results indicated a consistent preference for 
younger patients, independent of the age of the respondent.  Age-related 
preference weights consistently declined after middle age and although there was 
                                                 
7 ‘Ageism’ in this context is used in the same neutral manner as Tsuchiya et al. (2003), where it 
simply describes a differential societal value by age rather than implying an unfair discrimination 
on the basis of age.  
41 
some disagreement over whether weights peaked at middle age or childhood, 
there was no support for equal weightings across all age groups.  These 
preferences were based on a mix of productivity, utilitarian and egalitarian 
rationale, but when Nord et al. (1996) elicited preferences for pure utilitarian 
ageism by specifying all patients were the same age and concentrating on 
duration of benefit, they found evidence of positive but diminishing utilitarian 
ageism.  Respondents favoured younger patients with a greater capacity to 
benefit, but the strength of these preferences was not proportional to duration of 
benefit, offering support for a weak version of pure utilitarian ageism.   
Studies of hybrid utilitarian ageism combine aspects of utilitarianism and 
egalitarianism by studying life-saving treatments in patients of different ages.  
Here as well the preference was to favour younger patients, although again 
preferences were not proportional to the duration of benefit (Tsuchiya 1999).  
Support for productivity ageism was mixed.  The ‘humped-shaped’ age-weight 
profile demonstrated in most of the studies was consistent with productivity 
ageism, or the view that a year of healthy life is valued differently at different 
ages (Sassi et al. 2001; Schwappach 2002a; Tsuchiya 1999).  However, 
Busschbach (1993) found that the age-weight profile peaked at the earliest ages 
(ages 5 and 10), supporting utilitarian and/or egalitarian ageism over 
productivity ageism.  The NICE Social QALY team found a similar result, 
where a year of full health experienced by a child (aged 0-18) was valued more 
highly than a year of full health experienced by an adult (Dolan et al. 2008).   
Nord et al. (1996) tested the support for ‘weak’ egalitarian ageism by 
comparing preferences for younger and older patients with the same capacity to 
benefit.  Weak egalitarian ageism favours the younger patient when both a 
younger and an older patient can benefit equally, while strong egalitarian ageism 
favours the younger patient even when the older patient can benefit more.  They 
found that younger patients were consistently preferred when capacity to benefit 
was equal.  Similarly, Baker et al. (2010) found that 64 percent of respondents 
gave priority to 40-60 year olds over 60-80 year olds, although only 36 percent 
gave priority to 0-20 years olds over 20-40 year olds, consistent with the humped 
age profile observed by Tsuchiya (1999) as well as with a productivity ageism 
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view of priority.  They also noted that elderly respondents appeared more likely 
to prioritise the older age group in both sets of comparisons.  
Among the comprehensive reviews, Sassi et al. (2001) concluded that the 
empirical results demonstrated a preference for prioritising younger patients over 
older patients, consistent with a view of equity as a concern for equality in 
lifetime health, although these preferences also appeared to be humped-shaped, 
suggesting that they may reverse at very young ages.  They also suggested that at 
least some people hold preferences for setting priorities on the basis of the 
individual value of health and productivity at different ages.  Schwappach 
(2002a) found little support for absolute age cut-offs, but strong preferences for 
prioritising younger patients over older patients.  These preferences exceeded the 
magnitude that would be expected based on duration of benefit alone, again 
suggesting a mix of utilitarian and egalitarian preferences.  He also highlighted 
that while there was strong support for prioritising the young, there was much 
less support for discrimination against the elderly.  This suggested significant 
framing effects in the elicitations – it mattered how the questions were asked.  
This was also supported by Nord et al. (1996), who found that respondents were 
reluctant to discriminate between individuals on the basis of age but were 
comfortable with prioritising budgets for programs that favoured younger 
patients.  Finally, Dolan et al. (2005) found that in most studies respondents 
gave less weight to older patients, although again it was not clear whether this 
was for utilitarian or egalitarian reasons.  
Green and Gerard (2009) argued that age preferences are confounded by 
the inability of empirical studies to explicitly separate the effects of age from 
duration of benefit.  In this case, age is primarily a proxy for capacity to benefit 
and therefore does not represent a true preference for or against specific age 
groups.  Tsuchiya et al. (2003), however, found that although there was some 
evidence that respondents confused utilitarian and egalitarian motives, there was 
clearly a humped-shaped age-weight profile, peaking around age 35, once the 
elicitations explicitly control for the duration of benefit.  This finding was 
supported by Petrou et al. (2013), who elicited the relative value of a fixed health 
gain across 19 different age groups, from newborn to age 90, and found that 
value peaked around age 30. 
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Persad et al. (2009) and Olsen et al. (2003) argued that age is a marker of 
different stages in every person’s lifetime, not a distinct, permanent characteristic 
that distinguishes one individual from another, and therefore that differentiation 
by age is not in itself discriminatory.  This, along with justifiable maximisation 
and egalitarian arguments, makes it difficult to conclude that preferences based 
on age are unfairly discriminatory.  Despite Harris' (1987) argument that all lives 
are equally valuable, regardless of their length, the empirical evidence appeared 
to demonstrate public support for prioritising younger patients, consistent with 
utilitarian as well as egalitarian principles.    
3.2.2 Social Role & Productivity 
Social role refers to the societal duties or responsibilities of an individual.  
For example, patients with dependents such a young child or an elderly parent, 
might be considered to play a more valuable societal role than patients without 
dependents.  Similarly, patients with particularly productive skills might be 
valued more highly than patients with less productive skills.  As Schwappach 
(2002a) pointed out, the hump-shaped age-weight profile discussed above 
corresponds with values for social roles and productivity.  This is not surprising, 
given the close correlation between social roles, productivity and life stage.  
However, whereas productivity ageism would discriminate between patients of 
equal productivity on the basis of age, explicit preferences for social role or 
productivity would discriminate between patients of equal age on the basis of 
productivity or prioritise a productive older patient over a less productive 
younger patient.  In this way, preferences based purely on social role or 
productivity can lead to different allocations than preferences based on 
productivity ageism, although clearly there is a significant overlap between these 
concepts. 
In their review of the moral relevance of personal characteristics, Olsen et 
al. (2003) found only limited support for factors related to social role or 
productivity.  Preferences were strongest for patients caring for children or the 
elderly, although support peaked at 47 percent of respondents to one survey 
(Olsen et al. 1998).  Other surveys reported support for carers ranging between 
15 and 33 percent (Olsen et al. 2003), while support for priority based on 
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productivity was even lower, peaking at 27 percent support for prioritising 
employed people (coincidentally in the same survey that reported the strongest 
support for carers).  Other surveys of preferences for productivity found little or 
no support for prioritising breadwinners, employed over unemployed, skilled 
over unskilled, or teachers over lorry drivers (Olsen et al. 2003).  
Preferences based on social roles and productivity can be justified by the 
maximising principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, 
particularly if the change in utility of all affected parties is considered (Olsen et 
al. 2003; Mill 1871).  In the context of social roles and productivity, one 
individual's health may have external benefits that increase the welfare of other 
members of society.  An additional QALY to a uniquely productive individual, 
such as a skilled surgeon for example, may have an aggregate benefit of more 
than one QALY for society.  Olsen et al. (2003) refer to the welfare generated 
“through caring and personal interaction” as non-pecuniary utility and the 
welfare generated through what an individual is able to produce as pecuniary 
utility, and suggest that the aggregate welfare generated through pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary sources could be substantial.  Saving the life of a parent, they 
noted, generates utility for the patient but also increases the non-pecuniary utility 
of the child, who benefits from growing up with that parent.  Despite an ethical 
justification based on maximising non-pecuniary and pecuniary externalities, 
though, there appears to be only limited support for prioritising on the basis of 
social role or productivity.   
3.2.3 Lifestyle and responsibility 
A number of the comprehensive reviews noted that society does not 
appear to be indifferent to a patient's health-related lifestyle and its relationship 
to the cause of their disease (Schwappach 2002a; Olsen et al. 2003; Dolan et al. 
2005).  This suggests that society feels more obligated to prioritise patients with 
‘exogenous’ causes of disease over those they feel may have contributed to their 
disease through unhealthy choices (Olsen et al. 2003).  Such preferences are 
consistent with a luck egalitarian view of the objective of healthcare as offsetting 
the impact of bad luck that falls on individuals through no fault of their own 
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(Feiring 2008).  Health inequalities that are a result of an individual’s own 
choices are not unjust and thus do not justify priority. 
This view appears to be reflected in surveys which have found strong 
support for prioritising non-smokers over smokers and light drinkers over heavy 
drinkers (Schwappach 2002a; Olsen et al. 2003).  Nord et al. (1995), for example, 
found that 60 percent of respondents to an Australian survey favoured 
prioritising non-smokers over smokers, while in the context of liver 
transplantation, Ratcliffe (2000) found that 71 percent of respondents to a UK 
survey “agreed or strongly agreed” that preference should be given to patients 
with naturally occurring liver disease over those with personal responsibility (i.e. 
heavy alcohol consumption).  Dolan et al. (2008) found that respondents showed 
a statistically significant preference for treating health conditions caused by 
health service negligence (e.g. MRSA infections) than to conditions where 
patient lifestyle was a contributing cause.  Anand and Wailoo (2000), though, 
found mixed preferences.  Sixty percent of respondents to their UK survey 
supported prioritising healthcare for individuals infected with HIV through blood 
transfusions over those infected through illegal intravenous drug use, but only 40 
percent favoured prioritising individuals with ‘cautious’ lifestyles in more general 
circumstances.  A UK choice experiment by Edlin et al. (2012) suggested an 
even more complex interaction of preferences: although individual responsibility 
for poorer health prospects tended to be associated with lower priority, the very 
existence of a health inequality tended to lead to higher priority.  The net effect 
was to give greater priority to patients with poorer health prospects, regardless of 
the cause of the inequality.  Opposition to prioritisation based on individual 
responsibility was suggested by qualitative discussions conducted as part of the 
Social Value of a QALY (SVQ) Project (Baker et al. 2010).  These discussions 
drew out the difficulties of assigning blame to individual patients and where the 
line between culpable and not culpable should be drawn.  Sports injuries were 
mentioned as an example of this difficulty.  Finally, in a US survey of public 
preferences for organ transplantation, Ubel et al. (1999) reported that among 
respondents who preferred an unequal distribution of scarce organs, only 27 
percent preferred lower priority for patients responsible for their disease.  It is 
also worth noting in the context of these findings that respondents who did not 
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accept prioritising on the basis of a healthy lifestyle were often strongly opposed 
(Schwappach 2002a).   
A preference for giving lower priority to patients with an unhealthy 
lifestyle can be justified by a luck egalitarianism, which holds that unequal health 
outcomes that are the result of an individual’s free choices are just provided that 
all individuals had the same initial opportunity for lifetime health.  The 
preferences expressed in the surveys noted above, though – particularly those 
observed by Anand and Wailoo (2000) – appear to be based more on a moralistic 
attitude against those with an endogenous cause of illness (Schwappach 2002a; 
Olsen et al. 2003).  Nord et al. (1995) and Olsen et al. (2003) refer to this attitude 
as ‘healthism,’ or a belief that individuals have a moral obligation to society to 
live a healthy life.  Callahan (2003b) suggests that such an attitude is paternalistic 
and violates the autonomy component of Principlism, which holds that 
individuals should live their own lives and make free choices without external 
coercion or manipulation.  Anderson (1999) also finds it difficult to accept that 
egalitarian principles could be used to justify fundamental inequalities, no matter 
what their cause.   
Olsen et al. (2003) and Feiring (2008) argued that the socioeconomic 
gradient explains much health-related activity, particularly around smoking and 
drinking behaviours.  The health-related lifestyle of some patients may therefore 
not have been the result of truly free choices, and they may not have had an 
equal opportunity for lifetime health.  As LeGrand (1987) argued, an individual 
can only be held blameworthy for those factors substantively within their 
control.  Similarly, Olsen et al. (2003) note that ill health is rarely attributable to 
one cause and specifically to a person’s actions: “one cannot take 
epidemiological determinants and hold individuals responsible.” Together, these 
arguments suggest that it is difficult to hold an individual solely responsible for 
their health outcomes.  
Although there appears to be at least some support for prioritising patients 
with a healthy lifestyle, the ethical arguments for supporting such preferences are 
limited.  There may be a maximising justification for prioritising patients with a 
healthy lifestyle if it is associated with an expectation of better health outcomes, 
but in general, preferences over lifestyle appear to be motivated by a paternalistic 
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– or even punitive – application of healthism.  Justifications based on luck 
egalitarianism seem to disregard patient autonomy and basic egalitarian 
principles of equal respect for all persons.   
3.2.4 Prior consumption of healthcare 
Schwappach (2002a) was the only author from amongst the five 
comprehensive reviews to identify the prior consumption of healthcare as a 
potentially relevant factor.  He hypothesised that society may believe that every 
person is entitled to life saving treatment once in their lifetime, regardless of the 
cost, but that once a patient has received such a treatment they should ‘step 
aside’ to allow another patient to benefit.  He also hypothesised an alternative 
position: those patients who require a second life-saving treatment may be 
viewed as having been ‘betrayed’ by life (analogous to Williams’ fair innings 
argument) and may therefore deserve greater healthcare priority.  
The limited empirical evidence offers some support for the former 
hypothesis.  When asked to reconsider their preferences for saving one of two 
groups of patients with fatal illnesses after receiving new information on each 
group’s previous healthcare consumption, 6 percent of respondents to an 
Australian survey changed their responses to favour the group that had not 
received prior life-saving treatment (Olsen et al. 1998).  Similarly, participants in 
a UK qualitative study of public preferences for liver transplantation suggested 
that it seemed unfair to re-transplant one individual while another continues to 
wait for their first transplant (Wilmot & Ratcliffe 2002).   
Ubel et al. (1993), in discussing the ethics of re-transplantation, suggested 
that preferences for limiting healthcare to those with substantial prior 
consumption reflect a common sense view of justice where all needy individuals 
deserve an equal opportunity to benefit from scarce healthcare resources.  In this 
view, individuals should not receive a “second piece of the pie” before some 
have received their first.  However, they argued that such a view is based on a 
narrow or short-term definition of healthcare and ignores other aspects of health 
and social spending such as education or primary care.  It is not clear that an 
individual with an episode of substantial healthcare consumption (e.g. a previous 
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organ transplant) has necessarily consumed an unfair share of overall societal 
resources when a broader definition is applied.   
There may be a maximising justification for considering prior healthcare, 
but this would only apply to the extent that the quantity of prior healthcare 
affected future outcomes.  A strict application of egalitarian principles might also 
justify consideration of prior healthcare consumption, although this would 
require an extreme interpretation that viewed equality in terms of limiting a 
patient’s cumulative access to healthcare.  Anderson (1999), in arguing that 
egalitarianism should be based on principles of inclusion rather than exclusion, 
appears to reject such an interpretation.  In general, lower priority based on a 
patient’s prior consumption of healthcare appears to have only limited evidence 
of public support, and requires an exclusionary interpretation of egalitarian 
principles. 
3.2.5 Time waited 
There may be a preference for those patients who have spent a relatively 
greater length time waiting for healthcare, reflecting a principle of ‘first come, 
first served.’  Such a preference represents a simple, and perhaps simplistic, 
prioritisation criterion that disregards other factors that may be relevant, 
particularly an assessment of need. 
Many of the relevant empirical studies have been conducted in the 
context of organ transplantation.  A qualitative study of 23 participants in the US  
found support for consideration of the length of time a patient had been on the 
wait list when prioritising patients waiting for kidney transplant, although 
participants tended to mention factors such as the benefit that could be gained 
from transplant and the consequences of not receiving a transplant before 
mentioning time on the wait list (Dolan & Shaw 2004).  Two conjoint analyses, 
conducted in the UK (Ratcliffe 2000) and Hong Kong (Chan et al. 2006), 
reported that time on the wait list was a statistically significant factor in 
determining the allocation of scarce livers.  In the context of appropriate wait 
times for elective procedures, a survey of 1,101 individuals in Wales, including 
general practitioners, consultants, health authority commissioners and members 
of the general public, by Edwards et al. (2003), reported that a majority of 
49 
respondents considered factors related to pain and disability as the most relevant 
attributes, while age, responsibility, ability-to-pay and cost were irrelevant to 
determining priority.  Respondents were mixed regarding time already on the 
wait list – it was neither clearly relevant nor clearly irrelevant.  A substantial 
proportion of GPs and consultants and commissioners (38-44 percent) felt that 
priority should be determined by need before time waited, while 32 percent of 
the general public felt that maximum wait times should be guaranteed, implying 
that time waited should supersede need after some specific duration.  
A strict preference for a ‘first come, first served’ model of prioritisation 
can be justified by a theory of egalitarianism where all individuals are presumed 
to be equally deserving in terms of their priority for healthcare, regardless of 
other characteristics (including need).  Indeed, Persad et al. (2009) noted that 
‘first come, first served’ is often viewed as an inherently egalitarian form of a 
natural lottery.  However, although such a preference may be superficially 
consistent with a principle of equality of access, disregarding need in order to 
prioritise based on time waited would seem to violate the underlying 
requirement of vertical equity that requires dissimilar individuals (in terms of 
need) be treated dissimilarly (Culyer 2001b).  Persad et al. (2009) also argued 
that all wait times are not necessarily equal, and that they can be manipulated by 
individuals with the power, influence or information to get themselves added to 
a queue sooner.  Certainly, where all other relevant factors are equal, principles 
of egalitarianism and equality of access seem to support the idea that individuals 
with longer wait times should have some priority.  This does not necessarily 
imply, though, that wait time is itself a relevant factor in prioritisation.  Indeed, 
as Wilmot and Ratcliffe (2002) suggested, a preference based on wait time may 
simply be a mechanistic criterion that helps avoid, rather than inform, 
prioritisation decisions.  
Although the empirical evidence does not appear to rank wait time above 
attributes such as need, benefit, or even age, it is clear that there is at least some 
support for the consideration of wait time in prioritisation.  Similarly, while a 
‘first come, first served’ approach to prioritisation would appear to offer only 
simplistic guidance while violating fundamental principles of vertical equity, 
basic conceptions of fairness would also suggest that longer wait times among 
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patients of equal need should lead to some priority.  Together, this appears to 
support the consideration of wait time as a factor in healthcare prioritisation.  
However, such consideration is complicated by the fact that wait times only 
apply in certain contexts – particularly, as the empirical evidence reflects, 
elective services and the treatment of chronic conditions.  Wait time is not a 
relevant factor in the context acute services, where need and capacity to benefit 
are the primary considerations.  In view of this restricted applicability, its 
equivocal empirical evidence and its limited ethical justification, it is difficult to 
view wait time as a fundamentally relevant attribute in the allocation of 
healthcare resources. 
3.2.6 Societal inequality 
In circumstances of societal inequality, there may be a desire to use of 
healthcare as a tool of social policy.  Specifically, a preferential allocation of 
healthcare resources may be used to compensate individuals disadvantaged in 
other, non-health aspects of society, most commonly in terms of socio-economic 
status (SES) (Sassi et al. 2001; Olsen et al. 2003).  To the extent that low SES is 
associated with low productivity, this is the opposite of the desire embodied by 
greater priority for productivity (e.g. productivity ageism, pecuniary 
utilitarianism) and reflects a desire to compensate rather than penalise low 
productivity groups.  There is also an interpretation that suggests giving lower 
priority to high SES groups may be justified on the grounds that they are more 
able to provide for themselves and have less need for societal resources (Baker et 
al. 2010).  
A review by Olsen et al. (2003) found some support for discriminating 
based on SES, but none of the included studies demonstrated majority support.  
Mooney et al. (1995) found that 41 percent of respondents to an Australian 
survey favoured prioritising low SES groups.  A survey of Swedish politicians 
found a willingness to sacrifice efficiency in order to equalise outcomes between 
‘blue collar’ and ‘white collar’ workers (Lindholm et al. 1998), although Sassi et 
al. (2001) argued that this study may represent a preference for equality between 
groups rather than a preference for lower SES groups per se.  Finally, Dolan et al. 
(1999) found that 23 percent of participants favoured lower priority for rich 
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groups, 10 percent favoured higher priority for poor groups, 8 percent favoured 
higher priority for low education groups and 3 percent favoured higher priority 
for the unemployed.  Thirty-three percent also favoured lower priority for 
individuals with private health insurance, suggesting that respondents may have 
given lower priority to individuals they felt could ‘pay their own way’ in the 
health system.   
Olsen et al. (2003) suggested that preferences based on societal inequality 
may be justified on egalitarian grounds.  They distinguished between general 
egalitarianism, which favours an equal distribution of ‘well-being’, and specific 
egalitarianism, which focuses on one aspect of well-being – in this case, health.  
Preferences for favouring low SES groups may be justified by specific 
egalitarianism to the extent that low SES groups are also disadvantaged in terms 
of health.  In this circumstance, greater priority for low SES in the allocation of 
healthcare may reduce such health inequalities.  Such preferences may also be 
justified by general egalitarianism if the overall well-being of low SES groups can 
be improved through preferential healthcare allocations.  As discussed above, 
prioritising low SES groups is consistent with an egalitarian desire to equalise the 
opportunity for lifetime health, particularly if low SES groups suffer from a 
systemic lack of opportunity.  General egalitarianism may also justify lower 
priority for high SES groups if it narrows the gap in overall well-being, although 
this would require an extreme interpretation of egalitarianism that was 
indifferent to an increase or decrease in overall well-being and focused only on a 
goal of equality.  Finally, an alternative motivation for giving lower priority to 
high SES groups may be based on a desire to, in effect, expand the healthcare 
budget by requiring those groups that are able to pay for their own healthcare to 
do so, although this would require ignoring their contributions to the public 
healthcare system through taxes. 
The prioritisation of low SES groups may be justified by both general and 
specific egalitarian arguments, but there is no evidence of strong public support 
for such a preference.  Although there is also some support for giving lower 
priority to high SES groups, this appears to be a minority opinion with no clear 
ethical justification.   
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3.2.7 Desert and merit 
Preferences based on desert or merit reflect the idea that an individual’s 
meritorious or honourable past actions make them more deserving of healthcare, 
while criminal or dishonourable actions make them less deserving (Olsen et al. 
2003).  Such preferences are based entirely on retrospective, non-health concerns 
and do not take into account past, current or future health needs. 
Olsen et al. (2003) found little public support for preferences based on 
desert or merit, with two studies reporting support of less than 5 percent for 
prioritising patients who have ‘contributed a lot to the community.’  Ubel et al. 
(1999) reported that 15 percent of respondents preferred to give intravenous drug 
users lower priority for organ transplantation, and qualitative interviews 
suggested that these preferences were based on the perceived merit of drug users 
and made no reference to the cause of their disease or their relative prognosis.  
There also appeared to be a convergence of preferences around desert and for a 
healthy lifestyle.  As mentioned earlier, Anand and Wailoo (2000) found that 
only 40 percent of respondents supported prioritising patients with a healthy 
lifestyle over those with a more risky lifestyle, but when presented with a more 
specific choice between patients who developed HIV through a blood transfusion 
or through illegal drug use, the proportion jumped to 60 percent.  This suggested 
that some categories of risky behaviour were felt to be more acceptable than 
others.  In these last two cases, respondents appeared to be punishing illegal 
behaviour by giving patients lower priority for healthcare. 
There is some precedent for prioritisation on the basis of desert – Olsen et 
al. (2003) noted the example of separate healthcare facilities for war veterans.  
They suggested that priority on the basis of meritorious actions may be justified 
where health needs are a direct consequence of trying to improve the overall 
well-being of society, and where such actions were voluntary, on the 
presumption that voluntary sacrifices are more meritorious than paid ones.  On 
the whole, though, they found it difficult to justify priority on the basis of desert, 
as such an arrangement implies that the healthcare system should function as an 
“omnipotent Supreme Court” in imposing rewards or punishments.  With 
respect to lower priority for those with past criminal actions, they argued that 
once atonement has been made through the legal system, a criminal becomes a 
53 
free citizen, with all the entitlements to public services of other citizens.  In 
general, there appeared to be little empirical or ethical support for priority on the 
basis of desert or merit. 
3.2.8 ‘Self’ 
According to the definition provided by Olsen et al. (2003), ‘self’ refers to 
characteristics that are embodied within a person: physical, intellectual or 
attitudinal.  In their review of personal characteristics in setting health priorities, 
‘self’ included sex/gender, race and sexual orientation. 
The only evidence in support of priority setting on the basis of such 
characteristics came from Dolan et al. (1999), who found that 3 percent of 
respondents favoured higher priority for men, 3 percent favoured higher priority 
for women and 10 percent favoured lower priority for homosexuals.  This 
suggested a lack of support for these arguably prejudicial preferences, although it 
must be noted that even 10 percent support highlights the potential pitfalls of 
directly incorporating public preferences into healthcare priority setting. 
Olsen et al. (2003) were unable to identify any ethical arguments to justify 
higher or lower priority on the basis of any of these characteristics.  Rather, they 
concluded that such characteristics are most likely to be associated with different 
types of prejudice or bias such as sexism, racism or homophobia.  This, along 
with an absence of empirical support, appears to justify laundering such 
preferences.  
3.2.9 Initial severity 
It is broadly accepted that healthcare should be allocated according to 
some definition of need.  QALY maximisation has conventionally defined need 
in terms of an individual's capacity-to-benefit from healthcare, but need in terms 
of severity of illness or disability has increasingly come to be regarded as a 
legitimate equity concern (Sassi et al. 2001).  These two definitions of need, 
though, are often at odds with one another.  The most severely ill patients – 
particularly when initial severity is defined by proximity to death – will often 
have the least capacity-to-benefit, while the less severely ill may tend to have a 
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relatively greater capacity-to-benefit in terms of life expectancy and expected 
QALY gains (Culyer 2001b; Hauck et al. 2004; Oliver et al. 2004).8   
The Norwegian National Health Service has concluded that severity 
should be of primary importance in prioritising patients, and several other 
countries, including Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, explicitly consider severity in reimbursement decisions (Shah 
2009).  A review of 19 empirical studies by Shah (2009) found broad evidence 
that respondents preferred a health gain to patients starting at a lower point on a 
quality scale over an equal gain to patients starting a higher point.  Indeed, in 
many of these studies, including Damschroder et al. (2005) and Green (2009), 
respondents preferred a smaller gain to more severe patients over a larger gain to 
less severe patients.  Similarly, Dolan et al. (2008) found that there was a 
premium on health gains in the lower half of the quality scale.  Using an 
alternative interpretation of severity, Ubel and Lowenstein (1996) found 
evidence that respondents were unwilling to prioritise against patients with a 
poorer prognosis, although the strength of this preference declined as the 
prognostic differences became larger.  Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005), in comparing 
the relative strength of concerns for the young versus the severely ill, reported a 
contradictory result.  They found that age was a dominant preference, in that 
respondents preferred to prioritise the young over the old, regardless of the 
relative differences in life expectancy remaining.  Shah (2009) argued that this 
result highlighted the limited perspective of many studies included in his review, 
as most focused exclusively on the trade-offs between health maximization and 
concern for severity, and thus may have failed to capture respondent concerns 
for other factors. 
Life-saving interventions may represent a special case within severity.  A 
number of authors suggested that there is a particular preference for life saving 
interventions, beyond what would be expected on the basis of preferences for 
severity (Nord 1996; Wiseman et al. 2003), and a UK review concluded there 
                                                 
8 Interpreting severity in terms of proximity to death reduces this example to something of a 
tautology, as severity implies a relative lack of capacity-to-benefit, but the example holds 
nonetheless.  Patients initially near death may reasonably be expected to have a shorter 
remaining life expectancy, even with treatment, relative to patients in less severe initial health 
states. 
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was a strong willingness to pay for costly life-saving interventions over more 
cost-effective quality-improving interventions (Shickle 1997).  This preference 
was particularly strong in the case of life-saving interventions for children.  There 
may also be a particular concern for patients at the end of life, defined by NICE 
as patients with a life expectancy of less than 24 months (National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence 2009).  In this context, severity can be 
understood as proximity to death.  A NICE consultation found that 63 percent of 
participants supported giving greater priority to patients with a terminal illness 
and a short (<24 months) life expectancy, although this support was much 
stronger among the public, patients and carers than among healthcare 
professionals (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2009).  In 
contrast, a discrete choice experiment by Shah et al. (2012) concluded that life 
expectancy was not a driving factor in respondent choices.   
Schwappach (2002a) suggested that the desire to prioritise the most 
severely ill can be interpreted as a variant of the rule-of-rescue, or the imperative 
that people feel to rescue identifiable individuals from death.  McKie and 
Richardson (2003), though, disagreed.  They argued that an emphasis on 
‘identifiable individuals’ distinguishes the rule of rescue from a more general 
preference to help the worst off.  Instead, a desire to prioritise those in more 
severe conditions appears to be more consistent with Prioritarianism, and the 
principle of need as the degree of immediate threat to life or ill health.  It may 
also reflect a desire to minimise the differences in well-being between the best 
and worst off, consistent with Rawls’  Difference principle (Rawls 1999) as well 
as Daniels’ equality of opportunity principle (Daniels 1990; Daniels 2001).  
According to Daniels (2001), the purpose of healthcare is to maintain an 
individual's normal functioning, thereby protecting their “equality of 
opportunity.”  In this view, severity represents the relative impairment of an 
individual's normal functioning, and the more restricted an individual's range of 
functioning, the greater their need for healthcare.  This was echoed by Doyal 
(1995), who argued that “the greater the disability caused by illness, the greater 
the moral entitlement to effective treatment.” It is important to recognise, 
however, that in the absence of an effective treatment, need cannot be said to 
exist (Hurley 1998), and on this basis, Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) suggested that 
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severity in itself is not sufficient to justify specific equity concerns.  Any 
conception of priority on the basis of severity must therefore also consider the 
availability of effective treatment, as NICE (2009) did in limiting consideration 
of end-of-life priority to those situations where there was also a treatment that 
could extend life for at least 3 months. 
3.2.10 Final health state 
QALY maximisation is concerned with absolute health gain, implying 
that an improvement in health-related utility from 0.1 to 0.3 is equally as 
valuable as an improvement from 0.6 to 0.8.  But while there is evidence that 
society may be willing to prioritise patients in the most severe health states out of 
a concern for the worst off, there is also evidence that society may be unwilling 
to allocate resources to treatments that leave patients in relatively poor health 
states.  This highlights the tension between the interpretation of need as initial 
severity and need as capacity-to-benefit.   
Roberts et al. (1999) found that respondents were reluctant to allocate 
resources for patients that would remain in a severe health state following 
treatment, even when such an allocation maximised expected QALYs.  In 
addition, contradictory to evidence showing a preference to treat the more 
severely ill, Dolan and Green (1998) found that respondents preferred to give 
treatment to patients in a less severe initial health state and surmised that 
respondents were concerned about the value of the post-treatment health state.  
Qualitative work by Dolan and Cookson (2000) may reconcile this apparent 
inconsistency in finding that respondents tended to evaluate health gains in 
terms of the final health state rather than the relative or absolute improvement.  
It appeared that treatment must result in some minimum, or threshold, level of 
quality in the post-treatment health state in order to justify treatment, regardless 
of initial severity or relative health gain.  Results from other authors appeared to 
support this interpretation.  The SVQ Research Team (Baker et al. 2010) found 
that although 58 percent of respondents preferred to give priority to patients who 
could move from 60 to 80 percent of full health over those that could move from 
80 to 100 percent, only 38 percent of respondents preferred the more severe 
group when the choice was between a move from 0 to 20 percent or 20 to 40 
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percent.  Abellan-Perpiñan and Pinto-Prades (1999), using constant-sum paired 
comparison methods, found that although a better final health state was not 
necessarily a decisive factor in the allocation of resources, respondents were not 
indifferent to final health state.  This suggests that although final health state 
becomes less important once some minimum quality threshold is reached, the 
public is willing to discriminate if a patient is not likely to achieve this threshold.   
Priority to those likely to finish treatment in a better final health state 
would likely be opposed by egalitarians and prioritarians on the grounds that this 
may exacerbate health inequalities and effectively abandon the worst-off.  
However, a preference for some minimum final health state might be justified by 
a maximisation interpretation of Daniels’ view of ‘equality of opportunity’, 
which holds that the purpose of healthcare is to maintain an individual's normal 
functioning (Daniels 2001).  If, after effective treatment, an individual would still 
be unable to achieve minimum normal functioning, it may be preferable from a 
maximising perspective to concentrate scarce resources on those individuals that 
could achieve normal function.  The capability approach might be interpreted in 
a similar maximising context, particularly as Sen (2011) denies that the approach 
prescribes equality of capabilities.  There appears to be empirical evidence and at 
least some ethical justification for the relevance of final health state in priority 
setting. 
3.2.11 Size of health effect 
QALY maximisation implies that when faced with a choice between two 
patients, priority should go to the patient that can generate the greatest aggregate 
health gains (as measured by the QALY).  However, Ubel et al. (2000) suggested 
that this principle also implies that if two similar patients with the same 
condition can be cured, but one patient can be returned to full health while the 
other will be returned to less than full health as a result of some pre-existing 
chronic condition, priority should go to the patient with the greatest potential 
health gain, regardless of their similarity in all other respects.  The emphasis on 
maximising QALYs means that it is less valuable (or even a liability) to cure the 
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patient with a disability, as they will generate relatively fewer lifetime QALYs.9  
Harris (1987) suggested that this represents a form of ‘double jeopardy,’ as 
because of the pre-existing chronic condition, the second patient receives lower 
priority for their current, unrelated illness.  He argues that each life should be 
regarded as equally valuable, regardless of its relative length or quality.  
The comprehensive reviews by Schwappach (2002a) and Dolan et al. 
(2005) found substantial evidence that the public does not favour prioritisation 
on the basis of potential health gains, but prefers to give equal priority to 
individual regardless of their capacity to benefit.  A survey by Nord et al. (1995) 
found that respondents had no preference for prioritising those that could be 
helped the most over equal priority for all patients.  Analogous to the example 
above, Ubel et al. (1999) elicited preferences for life-saving treatments over two 
groups: one group had pre-existing paraplegia and could not be returned to full 
health, while the second group was otherwise healthy and could be returned to 
full health.  Respondents viewed life-saving treatment to be equally important in 
both groups.  A similar result was found by Damschroder et al. (2005).  As 
mentioned in the discussion of severity, a substantial proportion of respondents 
to a number of surveys even preferred to give priority to patients with the poorer 
prospects, over those that could gain more (Damschroder et al. 2005; Green 
2009).  Linley and Hughes (2012), though, found evidence of a statistically 
significant preference for patients that would gain a considerable improvement in 
health over those that would gain relatively little.  The SVQ Research Team 
(Baker et al. 2010) addressed a different aspect of this issue by estimating the 
relative value of equal improvements in health-related quality from different 
points on a quality scale.  They found that an improvement from 20 percent to 
40 percent of full health was associated with greater value than the same sized 
improvement from 0, 40, 60 or 80 percent of full health.  This highlights the 
                                                 
9 This example assumes a multiplicative utility function, as is common in many health economic 
evaluations.  If initially patient 1 is at 100% of full health but patient 2 is at 90% as the result of a 
chronic condition, and both develop an illness that would reduce their health by 50% for 10 
years, curing patient 1 generates 5.0 QALYs [(1.0-(1.0×0.5))×10] and curing patient 2 generates 
4.5 QALYs [(0.9-(0.9×0.5))×10].  If utility is additive, however, and the illness would reduce 
both patients’ utility by an absolute 0.5 for 10 years, then the benefit of a cure would be 5.0 
QALYs for both patients (0.5×10). 
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importance of the context of health improvements, in terms of initial and final 
quality, over the absolute size of the gain.   
Prioritising absolute health gains clearly reflects maximising and 
utilitarian principles.  Indeed, to the extent that heath is viewed as intrinsically 
good or fundamental to well-being, utilitarianism views the maximisation of 
health as a moral obligation (Hausman & McPherson 2006).  However, as Anand 
and Wailoo (2000) noted, the evidence suggests a general belief that it is 
individuals, rather than the health gains they can produce, that should be treated 
equally.  This belief appears consistent with Harris’ (1987) argument of the equal 
worth of all lives, regardless of their absolute health potential.  Finally, Menzel et 
al. (1999) referred to the ‘maintenance of hope,’ or the idea that all patients 
deserve at least the hope of a health gain, not just those that can benefit the most.  
This, together with empirical evidence showing little support for prioritisation on 
the basis of absolute improvement, suggested that that absolute health effect was 
not a primary concern in allocating societal healthcare resources. 
3.2.12 Duration of benefit 
QALY maximisation assumes that the societal value of health gains is a 
linear function of the absolute health gain and the duration of benefit: as 
duration of benefit increases, societal value increases at a proportional rate 
(Bryan et al. 2002; Dolan et al. 2005).  Furthermore, it assumes that quality and 
duration are ‘mutually utility independent.’  This means that the preference for a 
particular health state does not depend on the duration of that state, and that 
there is a constant proportional trade-off in the proportion of life years that an 
individual is willing to give up in return for an improvement in quality, 
regardless of the absolute number of life years involved (Bleichrodt & Pinto 
2006).  Schwappach (2002a), though, argued that the societal value associated 
with a particular duration of health benefit is a complex mixture of life 
expectancy and preferences for age, severity and time, and that it is difficult to 
disentangle preferences for duration alone. 
The empirical evidence appeared to support Schwappach’s argument.  A 
qualitative study by the SVQ research team (Baker et al. 2010) suggested an 
interaction between duration and quality, in that respondents would not want to 
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live longer in a poor health stage.  Another qualitative study of public 
perceptions of distributive justice in the context of liver transplantation found 
that respondents were relatively uninterested in differences in survival gains 
between patients, on that grounds that even a minimal survival gain was 
important (Wilmot & Ratcliffe 2002).  Nord et al. (1996) found support for 
utilitarian ageism based on a preference for a greater duration of health benefit, 
but that these preferences were not proportional to duration of benefit: doubling 
the duration of health benefit did not double the societal value.  A study by 
Dolan and Cookson (2000) also suggested that respondents were more willing to 
trade-off health gains for other objectives once the number of life years gained 
exceeded a certain threshold.  Together these studies suggested declining 
marginal value in the duration of health benefit.   
Nord et al. (1996) dismissed the idea that discounting in economic 
evaluations adjusts for declining marginal value in duration in arguing that 
although discounting reduces the present value of future benefits, it does so to 
reflect a time preference for benefits occurring now compared to benefits 
occurring in the future.  This is not the same as accounting for a diminishing 
marginal value of duration.  Gafni (1995) used the following example: 
A ‘first year benefit’ occurring 10 years ahead is discounted at the same 
rate as the last year of a health effect starting in the present and lasting for 
10 years.  In contrast, a decreasing marginal value based on diminishing 
returns in respect of quantity would result in a higher value attached to the 
first year benefit occurring in 10 years than to the last of a 10 year benefit 
scenario.  
 
It is clear from this example that the marginal societal value of additional life 
year is not the same, nor even the same concept, as the discounted value of a life 
year occurring in the future. 
A preference for a longer duration of health gain over a shorter duration 
can be justified by maximisation principles: more years of life are preferred to 
fewer years of life.  However, Harris (1985) argued that an individual with a 
short life expectancy can place the same value on their remaining time as an 
individual with a much longer life expectancy, “precisely because it is all the 
time left.”  A preference for patients with a longer duration of benefit may also 
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tend to exacerbate outcome inequalities, contrary to egalitarian principles.  
These contradictory results seem to support Schwappach’s argument regarding 
the complexity identifying a preference for duration alone, but also suggest that it 
may be relevant to societal preferences, particularly in its interaction with 
attributes such as quality. 
3.2.13 Direction of benefit 
Schwappach (2002a) suggested that the direction of benefit may be 
relevant to society in terms of a preference for acute or preventive care.  Acute 
care would improve health (i.e. an upward movement on the quality scale or an 
increase in the duration of health), while preventive care would prevent health 
declines.  Expected utility theory suggests that a gain of 0.5 QALYs should be 
valued equally to preventing a loss of 0.5 QALYs; thus society should be 
indifferent between acute or preventative care (Feldman & Serrano 2006).  With 
Prospect theory, however, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) propose that 
individuals are more sensitive to losses than they are to gains, and that the 
disutility associated with a loss may be greater than the utility associated with an 
equal gain.  If Prospect theory holds in the context of health, society may indeed 
prefer preventive over acute care interventions. 
The evidence for preferences around the direction of health benefit 
appeared inconclusive.  Three studies showed at least some preference for 
preventive services.  A survey of the public by the British Medical Association 
and the King’s Fund ranked childhood immunisation and screening for breast 
cancer as the top two priorities from a list of 10 services, ahead of heart 
transplants, hip replacements and cancer treatment for smokers, suggesting a 
preference for preventive services (Shickle 1997).  Johannesson and Johansson 
(1997) conducted a person trade-off exercise comparing preferences for lives 
saved through preventative care and lives saved through acute care, and found 
that a life saved through preventive care was valued slightly more highly, equal 
to 1.2 to 1.4 lives saved through acute care.  Finally, Ubel et al. (1998) asked 
respondents to choose between an intervention that would improve function and 
an intervention that would prevent further decline, where both interventions had 
the same absolute magnitude of benefit.  They found broader support for 
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prevention, although the preferences for prevention versus cure were not 
significantly different when strength of preference was taken into account.  Other 
studies, though, have been more equivocal.  A prioritisation ranking exercise for 
the UK Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) found that 
‘preventative screening and immunisations’ was ranked third behind life-saving 
treatment for children and special care and pain relief for the dying, but ahead of 
items such as hip replacement surgery (rank 4) and organ transplants and other 
life-saving surgeries (rank 7) (Bowling 1996).  A similar ranking exercise 
conducted by the City and Hackney Health Authority found similar results, but 
although preventive services were still ranked behind life-saving treatment for 
children and special care and pain relief for the dying, it was also ranked below 
organ transplants and other life-saving surgeries (Shickle 1997).  Finally, a 
German survey found that respondents strongly favoured improvements in 
health over the prevention of declines (Schwappach 2002b).  Schwappach 
(2002b) suggested that part of the reluctance to prioritise preventive care may lie 
in the uncertainty around its effect: it is impossible to know for certain which 
patients will decline in the absence of preventive care, while it is relatively 
straightforward to identify which patients can benefit from acute care.  
A preference for preventive care would generally favour interventions 
directed toward the healthy rather than the ill, and would seem contrary to 
Daniel’s (2001) and Doyal’s (1995) arguments that an individual’s relative need 
for healthcare should reflect the severity of their health state.  To the extent that 
preventive care implicitly or explicitly favours those who have more health to 
lose, a preference for preventative care would seem to discriminate against more 
severely ill patients, although this is consistent with strictly consequential 
maximisation principles.  It is important to note that a preference for preventive 
care on the basis of perceived cost efficiency is not the same as a preference for a 
particular direction of benefit. 
The distinction between acute and preventive care, though, may be 
largely arbitrary.  For example, do life-saving treatments improve health or 
prevent death?  The direction of benefit may simply lie in the timing – a hip 
replacement in a patient with full mobility prevents a deterioration in health-
related quality; a hip replacement in a patient with limited mobility improves 
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health-related quality.  Given the difficulty of defining precisely what 
distinguishes preventive care from acute care, it is difficult to interpret the studies 
presented above.  If anything, they appear to demonstrate support for 
interventions in children more so than a preference for any particular direction of 
benefit. 
3.2.14 Distribution of health gains 
QALY maximisation, based on a foundation of consequential 
maximisation and the potential Pareto criterion, is indifferent to the distribution 
of health gains: provided that the aggregate gains are the same, large gains to the 
few are equally valuable as small gains to the many.  Society, though, may have 
a preference for one distribution or the other, independent of the characteristics 
of the patients or the interventions (Schwappach 2002a; Dolan et al. 2005).   
Choudhry et al. (1997) found that 56 percent of health ministry officials in 
Ontario, Canada preferred a large increase in life expectancy for the few over 
small gains for the many.  Olsen (2000) found a contradictory result, as a clear 
majority of respondents to a Norwegian survey of the general public preferred a 
more equal distribution of health gains to maximising health gains.  Olsen also 
suggested that there may be a threshold level for health gains, below which 
respondents prefer to concentrate gains and above which respondents prefer to 
distribute gains widely.  Rodriguez-Migueza and Pinto-Prades (2002) found a 
similar result in their survey of Spanish undergraduate students, where 
respondents preferred to distribute smaller gains to a larger number, provided 
gains were sufficiently large.  The threshold for distributing gains appeared to be 
around nine additional life years; below nine years, respondents concentrated 
gains and preferred to give eight additional years to one patient rather than one 
additional year to eight patients.  This threshold effect, as well as differences in 
preferences between health officials and the general public, may explain the 
contradictory findings between Choudhry and the other two surveys.  Finally, 
Ubel et al. (1996) asked respondents to choose between two hypothetical 
screening tests.  The first test could screen the entire population and save 1,000 
lives.  The second, more effective test could only screen 50 percent of the 
population but could save 1,100 lives.  Fifty-six percent of respondents from the 
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general public preferred to make the less effective test available to everyone.  In 
general, there appeared to be consistent public support for egalitarianism in the 
distribution of health gains, while the study by Ubel et al. (1996) also 
demonstrated a clear preference for equality of access over efficiency in saving 
lives.  It could also be argued that this study supports outcome egalitarianism in 
preferring that everyone has the same, albeit less effective, opportunity to have 
their life saved, rather than concentrating a more effective opportunity within 
half of the population, as well as an aversion to an extreme distribution of 
resources, where half the population receives nothing. 
As noted, QALY maximisation is indifferent to the distribution of gains, 
so long as aggregate gains are maximised.  Different egalitarian principles, 
though, would justify different distributions of a fixed gain.  Tsuchiya and Dolan 
(2009) distinguish between gain egalitarianism and outcome egalitarianism.  
Gain egalitarianism prefers equality in health gains, suggesting a preference for 
smaller benefits to the many regardless of their current level of health, while 
outcome egalitarianism prefers equality in overall health, suggesting a  
preference for larger gains concentrated among those that are most deprived.  A 
third egalitarian interpretation, based on equality of access, rejects prioritisation 
on the basis of gains or outcomes, and prefers equal priority to all (Persad et al. 
2009).  With the exception of the study by Choudhry, the empirical evidence 
appeared to indicate a preference for more equal distributions of healthcare 
resources and health gains. 
3.2.15 Disease rarity 
Related to the issue of the distribution of benefits to the many or the few 
is the issue of rarity, or the prevalence of a specific disease in the population.  
Diseases with very low prevalence, usually in the range of 2.5 to 7 cases per 
10,000, are defined as ‘orphan’ diseases (Hughes et al. 2005).  Because of the 
small patient populations, the costs of drug development for such disease can be 
very high, and the cost-effectiveness of such drugs is often much higher than 
would generally be accepted (Desser et al. 2010).  It is argued that this makes it 
more difficult for patients with rare diseases to access potentially beneficial 
drugs, leaving them at a disadvantage relative to patients with more common 
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diseases (Hughes et al. 2005).  The issue in terms of societal preferences is 
whether the relative rarity of a condition should lead to special consideration in 
terms of priority and acceptable cost-effectiveness. 
Empirical evidence of societal preferences around orphan diseases is 
limited.  A NICE Citizen’s Council reported that 16 of 27 members felt that the 
NHS should, under certain conditions, consider paying ‘premium prices’ for 
drugs to treat rare diseases (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
2004).  A further 4 members felt that the NHS should pay premium prices for 
drugs to treat rare diseases under any conditions.  The remaining seven members 
felt that funding decisions for orphan drug should be conducted within the same 
cost-effectiveness framework as any other drug.  In contrast, a conjoint analysis 
of 1,547 respondents in Norway found no societal preference for rarity (Desser et 
al. 2010).  Given a choice between treating an equal number of patients with a 
rare disease or a common disease, assuming both diseases were equally costly, 
70 percent of respondents were indifferent, 20 percent favoured the common 
disease and only 10 percent favoured the rare disease.  This was consistent with 
the hypothesis that there was no explicit preference for rarity, per se.  When, in a 
second scenario, the cost of the rare disease was assumed to be four times more 
expensive than the common disease, the proportion of respondents favouring the 
rare disease declined and many of the previously indifferent respondents shifted 
to favouring the common disease: 47 percent were indifferent, 45 percent 
favoured the common disease and only 7 percent favoured the rare disease.  The 
authors argued that the relatively high proportion of indifferent respondents in 
this high-cost scenario reflects a confounding effect of a general concern for 
fairness and equality in the allocation of healthcare resources rather than true 
indifference between higher cost rare diseases and lower cost common diseases.  
Similarly, a conjoint analysis of 213 respondents in Ontario, Canada also found 
no willingness to pay more for drugs to treat rare disease, or to pay more for each 
life year gained by a patient with a rare disease (Mentzakis et al. 2011).  Instead, 
respondents gave the greatest weight to severity and treatment effectiveness.  
Finally, a qualitative Israeli study of 130 individuals appeared to take a middle 
position: only a minority of respondents favoured prioritising very costly 
medications for small numbers of patients with rare diseases, while the majority 
66 
favoured prioritising medium cost drugs that may be beyond the reach of most 
patients but that could also benefit a relatively large number (Guttman et al. 
2008). 
Ethical arguments in support of special consideration for orphan diseases 
tend to revolve around rights-based arguments that hold “that patients suffering 
from a rare condition should be entitled to the same quality of treatment as other 
patients” (Hughes et al. 2005), and a principle of non-abandonment in the 
allocation of scarce healthcare resources, even where orphan drugs do not meet 
conventional cost-effectiveness thresholds (Gericke et al. 2005).  These 
arguments are largely compatible with Daniels’ (2001) principle of equality of 
opportunity, where all individuals are entitled to healthcare necessary in order to 
maintain a minimum level of normal functioning.  However, as Hughes et al. 
(2005) note, an emphasis on equality-based arguments neglects the fact that 
decisions that favour higher-cost orphan diseases imply that patients with more 
common diseases, and who could benefit equally, are less worthy of treatment.  
As McCabe et al. (2006) argue, priority “for no other reason than rarity of the 
condition seems unsustainable and incompatible with other equity principles and 
theories of justice.”  
3.3 Attributes in other stated preference elicitations 
A summary of the attributes included in other preference elicitations over 
equity and efficiency in health, and the processes used to identify these 
attributes, is shown in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: Attributes in recent stated preference elicitations 
Study Attribute selection process 
Ubel & Loewenstein 
(1996) 
Attribute was specific to objective -- how do people choose to distribute scarce 
organs by prognosis?  Recipients were specified to be children to avoid 
considerations of social worth, ability to pay and personal responsibility for 
illness. 
Attributes: Probability of survival 
Abellan-Perpinan &  
Pinto-Prades (1999) 
Attributes were specific to objective -- how does priority change with potential 
for health? 
Attributes: Relative cost, final health state 
Ratcliffe (2000) Attributes selected by investigator to “reflect key decision criteria which 
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respondents may choose to apply in discriminating between potential 
recipients for donor organs.” 
Attributes: Age, alcoholic liver disease (responsibility), expected survival, time 
spent waiting, re-transplant status 
Bryan et al. (2002) Attributes selected by investigators “to allow investigation of the core 
components of the QALY-maximisation model.” 
Attributes: Number of people, chance of success, survival and quality with 
treatment 
Schwappach (2003) Attributes were chosen by investigator to test preferences for the allocation of 
healthcare resources.  Identification process not specified. 
Attributes: Healthy lifestyle, Socio-economic status, age, life year gain, final 
health state, prior life-saving treatment 
Baltussen et al. (2006) Attributes selected on “basis of a review of priority-setting criteria…, plus 
discussion with a range of stakeholders and policy makers.” 
Attributes: Cost-effectiveness, poverty reduction, age, severity, health benefit, 
budget impact 
Chan (2006) Replicated Ratcliffe (2000) in eliciting preferences for priority in liver 
transplant. 
Attributes: Age, alcoholic liver disease (responsibility), expected survival, time 
spent waiting, re-transplant status 
Dolan et al. (2008) Attributes identified via focus groups with 57 public and 172 NHS employees.  
Attributes: Age, severity, responsibility for illness; added rarity at request of 
NICE 
Green & Gerard (2009) Attributes identified through empirical literature review and discussions with 
experts and decision makers. 
Attributes: Severity, health improvement, value for money, other treatments 
Baker et al. (2010) Attributes identified through qualitative focus groups and ‘Q-methodology.’ 
Attributes: Age, quality-of-life, length-of-life 
Desser et al. (2010) Attributes were specific to objective – is there a preference for prioritising 
drugs for rare diseases? 
Attributes: Disease prevalence, relative cost 
Koopmanschap et al. 
(2010) 
Attributes identified through discussion with “experienced HTA researchers.” 
Attributes: Budget impact, productivity gains, disease severity, cost-
effectiveness, QALY gain per patient, composition of QALY gains (quality vs. 
survival), uncertainty in ICER 
Diederich et al. (2012) Attributes were chosen by investigators to test “whether specific patient groups 
should receive preferential access to medical services.”  Identification process 
not specified. 
Attributes: Health status, quality-of-life, healthy lifestyle (responsibility), patient 
age, carer status, occupational status (SES) 
Linley & Hughes 
(2012) 
Investigators “reviewed relevant documents and policies to identify nine 
specific prioritisation criteria (besides clinical-effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness)”. 
Attributes: Severity, unmet need, innovation, societal benefit, disadvantaged 
population, age, end-of-life, cancer, rare disease 
Shah et al. (2012) Attributes were specific to testing “whether the policy of giving higher priority to 
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life-extending end of life treatments … is consistent with the preferences of 
members of the general public.” 
Attributes: Life expectancy without treatment, quality without treatment, gain in 
life expectancy with treatment, gain in quality with treatment 
Norman et al. (2013) Attributes selected via literature review, particularly Olsen et al. (2003). 
Attributes: gender, smoking status, socio-economic status, healthy lifestyle, 
carer status, gain in life expectancy. 
 
Most of the elicitations in this table identified their attributes via literature 
review or expert opinion, but in a few cases, such as Ubel and Loewenstein’s 
(1996) elicitation of allocative preferences by prognosis,  the attributes were 
dictated by the specific objective of the study.  Dolan et al. (2008) and Baker et 
al. (2010) used focus groups to identify attributes for their elicitations.  Focus 
groups have the notable advantage of allowing for deliberation and reflection 
among participants about each attribute.  Because priority-setting is a social 
exercise, it is argued that the reasons underpinning this process should be elicited 
in a social setting (Hasman 2003).  However, as with any elicitation of public 
preferences, there is nothing to ensure that the opinions that emerge from a focus 
group will be ‘fair.’  Indeed, given relatively small numbers of often 
unrepresentative participants, and the potential for ‘bandwagon effects’, focus 
groups may in fact be more likely to produce an aberrant result than less 
deliberative but more broadly-based approaches (Dolan et al. 2008).  Price (2000) 
also asserts that it is common for members of focus groups to engage in power 
struggles and strategic behaviours that have little empirical or moral relevance.   
None of the studies in Table 3.2 applied an ethical filter as described in 
this chapter.  Therefore, some of the studies included attributes – most notably 
patient gender, but also personal responsibility and disease rarity – that the 
empirical ethics review here found to be ethically unjustified.  Other studies 
included attributes such as occupational status or social role, for which the 
review found little evidence of public support.  Given the importance of context 
in a stated preference elicitation, it is likely that eliciting preferences over 
different sets of attributes will generate different marginal weights for those 
attributes.  For example, to the extent that an older patient may also be viewed 
as more responsible for their illness than a younger patient, including or 
excluding personal responsibility may affect preferences over age.  Including 
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attributes for which there is no prior evidence of public support also means that 
other attributes that are in fact more relevant might be excluded, given the finite 
number of factors that can be included in any elicitation, and particularly stated 
preference elicitations (Froberg & Kane 1989).  
3.4 Fair and relevant attributes 
The empirical evidence and ethical justifications for each of the attributes 
discussed in section 3.2 is summarised in Table 3.3: 
Table 3.3: Summary of the empirical ethics review 
 Attribute Empirical evidence Ethical justification(s) 
Age 
 Consistent preferences for younger 
patients, but not necessarily linear 
 No support for absolute age cut-offs 
 Maximisation of life expectancy 
 Maximisation of productivity 
 ‘Fair innings’ egalitarianism 
Social role/productivity 
 Only limited support for prioritising 
parents/carers 
 Very little support for discrimination 
by productivity 
 Maximising principle of greatest 
happiness for greatest number 
Lifestyle/responsibility 
 Broad preference for prioritising 
patients with healthy lifestyle 
 Minority often strongly opposed to 
prioritising by lifestyle 
 How to allow for epidemiological 
determinants? 
 ‘Healthism’ – paternalistic attitude 
that individuals have moral obligation to 
society to live healthily 
Prior healthcare 
 Mixed evidence of preferences for 
and against patients against patients 
who had received previous life-saving 
care 
 Egalitarianism – no “second piece of 
the pie” 
 Very exclusionary interpretation of 
egalitarianism 
 Implies a narrow definition of 
healthcare 
Social inequality 
 Only limited support for prioritising 
low SES 
 Preferences appear to be for overall 
for equality rather than low SES per se 
 Specific egalitarianism, to extent low 
SES are disadvantaged in health 
 General egalitarianism, if health 
improves overall well-being of low SES 
Desert/merit 
 Little support for prioritisation based  
on past meritorious actions 
 Some evidence of preferences for 
‘punishing’ illegal behaviour (e.g. drug 
use) 
 No clear principle of justice in support 
of priority based on merit or desert 
 Some justification where health 
needs are result of voluntary efforts to 
improve societal well-being? 
 Appropriateness of using healthcare 
system as “omnipotent Supreme Court” 
dispensing reward/punishment (Olsen 
et al. 2003)? 
‘Self’ 
 Very low levels of support for 
prioritising on basis of gender, race or 
sexual orientation 
 No ethical arguments to justify 
prioritisation based on identity 
 Preferences likely associated with 
prejudice or bias 
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Initial severity 
 Preferences for health gains to most 
severe, even when gains were smaller 
 Strong preferences for life-saving 
treatments 
 Need principles 
 Rawls’ Difference principle 
 Equality of opportunity 
Final health state 
 Preferences for final health state 
rather than absolute gain 
 Preferences against patients who 
remain in severe health state 
 Maximising interpretation of ‘equality 
of opportunity’ 
 Capabilities theory? 
 Egalitarianism – exacerbates 
inequalities 
 Prioritarianism – abandons worst off 
Treatment effect 
(absolute benefit) 
 Preferences for equal opportunity 
regardless of absolute gain 
 Maximisation principles 
 “QALY Trap” – emphasis on absolute 
gain may discriminate against disabled 
 Preferences for maximum benefit 
may exacerbate health inequalities  
Duration of benefit 
 Declining marginal value over 
duration 
? Duration a complex function of life 
expectancy, age, severity and time 
preferences 
 Maximisation principles 
 Preferences for longer duration may 
exacerbate inequalities in life 
expectancy  
Direction of benefit 
? Inconclusive evidence of preferences 
for preventative vs. acute care 
? Difficulty in interpreting direction of 
benefit – is prevention just issue of 
timing? 
 Could be consistent with Maximising 
principles if prevention maximises 
outcomes Implies preference for 
healthy over ill, violating Rawls’ 
Difference principle and Prioritarianism 
 
Distribution of gains 
 Consistent preferences for smaller 
gains to many over larger gains to few 
 Aversion to ‘extreme distributions’ 
 Gain egalitarianism 
 Maintenance of hope 
 Contrary to outcome egalitarianism? 
Rarity 
 Limited evidence of support for 
prioritising on basis of relative rarity of a 
condition 
 Equality of opportunity 
 Egalitarianism – shows equal respect 
for all patients 
 Egalitarianism – shows less concern 
for patients with more common 
diseases? 
Attributes shown in bold were included in the pilot preference elicitations.   indicates empirical evidence or 
ethical justification supporting relevance of an attribute;  indicates empirical evidence or ethical 
justification opposing the relevance of an attribute; ? indicates ambiguous evidence. 
 
Among these attributes, four appeared to have clear evidence of public 
support and a defensible ethical justification: patient age, severity without/before 
treatment, final health state with/after treatment, and the distribution of health 
gains.  A fifth, duration of benefit, also appeared to be relevant, notwithstanding 
some ambiguity over its relative strength.  It is worth acknowledging, though, 
that some measure of duration would most likely have been included in the 
elicitation regardless of the empirical or ethical evidence in order to facilitate the 
calculation of QALYs.  Cost attributes such as budget impact and incremental 
cost-effectiveness were specifically excluded from this review as the overall aim 
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of was to consider how different patient and program characteristics contribute 
to the societal value of healthcare.  In turn, these societal values could be used to 
weight an outcome measure – for example, an ‘equity-weighted QALY’ – in an 
economic evaluation.  It would be inappropriate to include cost as a factor in the 
outcome measure as this would double-count costs in the economic evaluation.  
This exclusion is consistent with other recent elicitations of societal preferences 
over efficiency and equity in health (Dolan et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2010; Lancsar 
et al. 2011; Norman et al. 2013).   
It is important to acknowledge the subjectivity of this review, both in 
interpreting the different theories of justice and in judging the consistency of each 
attribute with these theories.  Luck egalitarianism, for example, was rejected as a 
defensible theory of justice largely on the strength of Anderson’s (1999) 
argument that as an egalitarian theory it fails to express equal respect and 
concern for all citizens.  However, as Arneson (2000) noted, this theory also has 
numerous supporters who see it as coherent and defensible.  Likewise, the degree 
to which each attribute was consistent or inconsistent with different theories 
justice was a matter of interpretation, and it was necessary to rely on subjective 
judgement in weighing the ethical arguments for or against each attribute.  This 
means that although empirical ethics may provide a useful framework for 
arriving at a fair and relevant set of attributes, it should not be viewed as a 
strictly objective means of accomplishing this task.  A different reviewer may have 
arrived at a different set of attributes.  Including more than one reviewer, though, 
and arriving at a consensus, might mitigate some of this subjectivity.  Indeed, it 
is useful to note here that best practice in empirical ethics suggests a 
multidisciplinary team that can evaluate the quality of the ethical arguments as 
well as the empirical data (Mertz et al. 2014), although this was not feasible here. 
Richardson (2002) acknowledged the subjectivity inherent in empirical 
ethics and conceded that it will never be able to provide answers to ethical 
questions which are unambiguously true or immune to criticism.  However, he 
stressed that “an integral part of empirical ethics should be an acceptance of the 
fact that argument and evidence are fallible and the conclusions are tenuous and 
more or less strongly supported in some contexts that others.”  In this light, any 
application of empirical ethics can be seen as a balance between a more objective 
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interpretation of the empirical evidence – which leaves the process open to 
Hausman’s (2002) charge of moral relativism – and more subjective 
interpretations of competing theories of justice.  The process described in this 
chapter favoured ethical subjectivity over empirical relativity.   
Some subjectivity is consistent with Walzer’s (1983) argument, 
mentioned earlier, that different principles of justice should govern different 
aspects of life.  A principle that may be appropriate for one aspect – or in this 
case, attribute – may be inappropriate for another.  In this review, for example, 
deontological theories were rejected as offering little practical guidance to 
decision makers, even though they may be eminently practical theories of justice 
for different aspects of life.  Similarly, Konow (2003) noted that the idea of 
‘fairness’ includes concerns for not only fundamental concepts of equity and 
justice, but also for some sense of ‘rightness’ in terms of efficiency and need.  
This suggests that even if it were possible to achieve philosophical agreement on 
a universal principle of justice, it would not perfectly predict societal preferences 
as people are motivated by factors outside the scope of such a principle.  A fair 
allocation of resources must reflect fundamental principles of distributive justice, 
but it must also feel ‘right’ to members of society, even if what feels right may 
vary between different communities or societies.  This vagueness, both in terms 
of the appropriate principles of justice, and what feels right to society, may limit 
reproducibility, but as noted above, it can be seen as an essential characteristic of 
the empirical ethics approach applied here.  Attempts to systematize the 
application of empirical ethics seems more likely to lead to a relativistic emphasis 
on empirical observation, or a fruitless search for a singular, universal principle 
of justice, each at the expense of a joint approach.  Future research, though, 
should seek to establish best practices for the application of empirical ethics.  An 
aspect of this could lie in developing methods of collective deliberation over 
ethical principles and empirical data that could lead to more consistent and 
stable results without resorting to aggregation and moral relativity. 
The empirical evidence for these different attributes was derived from 
surveys of geographically, culturally and demographically diverse populations, 
and therefore does not necessarily represent the preferences of any particular 
community.  This, though, can be viewed as a strength rather than a limitation of 
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the review, as this diversity will tend to support the identification of a broader 
range of potentially relevant attributes than a survey of just one population.  
Furthermore, although the direction of preference may vary between 
populations, the set of relevant attributes is likely to be consistent.  For example, 
some societies may give greater priority to the elderly, while others may give 
greater priority to the young, but the relevance of age to priority setting would be 
equally true in both societies.  As members of the community still have the 
opportunity to assign their own weights (including no weight at all) to each of 
these attributes in subsequent steps of a Communitarian approach, it is the 
community defines the importance of each attribute, regardless of the source of 
these attributes.  It is possible, though, that a particular community or society 
may hold a strong and universal preference for some obscure patient or program 
characteristic.  In such a circumstance, the broad perspective taken here would 
fail to recognise or incorporate this unique preference.  
The attributes identified by this empirical ethics review were largely 
consistent with the NICE guidance on social value (National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence 2008).  This guidance specifically excludes ‘rule-of-
rescue’ and lifestyle or responsibility issues, and also states that it is not 
appropriate to consider gender, race or socio-economic status factors in the 
distribution of healthcare resources, although it is appropriate to consider these 
factors in the context of reducing health inequalities.  The key divergence with 
these guidelines is in the inclusion of age.  The NICE guidelines state that 
patients should not be denied or have restricted access to treatment on the basis 
of age alone and exclude any role for age-related preferences.  Rawlins (2005), 
writing on the role of citizen’s juries in prioritising health care resource 
allocation, also suggested that age should not be a factor in societal value 
considerations.  However, the empirical evidence consistently demonstrated 
public support for age as a factor in priority setting, and it is an important 
element of fair-innings egalitarianism as well as utilitarian theories of justice. 
This empirical ethics review supports the hypothesis that society may be 
concerned with more than simply maximising aggregate QALYs.  Although 
initial and final health states are related to absolute health gain, preferences for 
health gains do not appear to be independent of these start and end points.  
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Likewise, the apparent interaction between quality and duration casts doubt on 
the presumption of a strictly linear value function.  A preference for younger 
patients is consistent with QALY maximisation, to the extent that younger 
patients generally have a greater potential for QALY gains, but this preference 
persisted even when younger and older patients had the same capacity to benefit, 
suggesting that such a preference reflects more than maximising principles.  Most 
convincingly, there was a clear preference for egalitarianism over maximisation 
in the allocation of health gains.  Together these findings cast doubt on the 
underlying societal support for the principle of strict QALY maximisation, and 
particularly its presumption of distributive neutrality in the distribution of health 
gains.  This is not sufficient, however, to demonstrate support for a broader 
conception of well-being, as most of the empirical studies were based on simple 
yes/no or ranking questions, with little or no consideration for the strength of 
these preferences or for the trade-offs between different attributes.  For example, 
Ubel et al. (1998) found a preference for preventative care using a simple ranking 
exercise, but showed that when strength of preference information was 
incorporated, this preference was no longer statistically significant.  Likewise, 
Shah (2009) notes that many preference studies focus on a single trade-off and 
may fail to capture concerns for, or interactions with, other factors.  Estimating 
the relative strength of the equity-efficiency trade-off for the attributes identified 
here requires a process that forces respondents to make trade-offs between 
different elements of value.  A review of methods for eliciting such preference 
weights will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4:  
Comparative review of stated  
preference elicitation methods 
The empirical ethics review of Chapter 3 suggested that the public’s 
preferences may not be consistent with the principles of strict QALY 
maximisation, particularly the presumption of distributive neutrality (Nord et al. 
1995; Schwappach 2002a; Dolan et al. 2005).  Instead, the public appeared 
willing to forego some potential health gains in order to prioritise younger 
patients, those in a more severe health state, and those that could be returned to 
some reasonable final health state.  They also appeared to have a preference for 
how health gains were distributed independent of patient characteristics, 
generally preferring smaller gains to more people over larger gains to fewer 
people.   
As noted in the previous chapter, these results in themselves are not 
sufficient to estimate the magnitude of any equity-efficiency trade-off.  
Estimating the relative strength of preferences, rather than just an ordinal 
ordering of priorities, requires a process that forces respondents to make trade-
offs between different factors while recognising the sacrifices or opportunity costs 
associated with those trade-offs (Shackley & Ryan 1995).  Menzel (1999) also 
argues that the shift in perspective associated with Communitarianism, from 
individual well-being to community well-being, has implications for how 
society’s preferences should be measured.  Whereas conventional elicitations of 
individual welfare ask respondents to judge how they would feel about being in a 
certain condition or health state, elicitations of societal welfare require 
respondents to consider interpersonal trade-offs and how they would feel about 
others in a particular condition.   
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This chapter reviews preference elicitation methods that can be used to 
elicit societal preferences.  These methods are based on Lancaster’s theory of 
value and the theory of compensatory decision making, both of which are 
described in Section 4.1.  Section 4.2 outlines a framework for comparing the 
characteristics and context of different elicitation methods, and the results of this   
methodological review are presented in section 4.3.  Based on these 
comparisons, section 4.4 discusses the rationale for preferring two particular 
stated preference methods: discrete choice experiments and constant sum paired 
comparisons.  Finally, section 4.5 reviews recent applications of these two 
methods in the context of healthcare, including the setting and format of the 
surveys and their approaches to statistical modelling. 
4.1 Measuring preferences and choices 
Preference elicitation methods seek to measure the relative impact or 
importance of different characteristics or attribute levels in a decision (Louviere 
et al. 2000a; Louviere & Islam 2008).  Economics has typically relied on a 
revealed preferences approach, which infers preferences from actual decisions 
made under realistic circumstances and binding constraints.  In contrast, the 
defining characteristic of a stated preference elicitation is the hypothetical nature 
of the task: respondents are asked to make a hypothetical choice between (often 
hypothetical) scenarios (Hensher et al. 2005; Louviere et al. 2000b).  Stated 
preference approaches fall into two broad categories: choice tasks and matching 
tasks.  Choice tasks ask respondents to choose one or more preferred options 
from a set of alternatives, while matching tasks ask respondents to provide a 
number that would make them indifferent in some sense between two or more 
alternatives (Carson & Louviere 2011).   
The primary advantage of the revealed preferences approach is that it 
avoids the possibility of a ‘hypothetical bias,’ which suggests that respondents to 
a stated preference elicitation may be more or less sensitive to aspects of a 
hypothetical choice than they would be when making an actual choice (Loomis 
2011).  However, the disadvantage of a revealed preferences approach is that it is 
often limited to observable markets and historical decisions.  The attributes in a 
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revealed preferences analysis also often move together, making it difficult to 
evaluate the impact of an independent change in a specific attribute.  In contrast, 
stated preference elicitations are based on experimental designs that can be 
systematically manipulated to test the impact of each attribute over scenarios, or 
even markets, that do not necessarily exist in the real world (Hensher et al. 2005; 
Louviere et al. 2000b).  Although it is possible that these hypothetical responses 
would not necessarily translate into actual choices, there is evidence to suggest 
that techniques such as ‘cheap talk’ and uncertainty coding can reduce the 
incidence of hypothetical bias in a stated preferences elicitation (List & Gallet 
2001; Murphy et al. 2005). 
4.1.1 The theory of value and compensatory decision making 
Stated preference methods stem primarily from psychometrics, which 
seeks to assign values to subjective psychological concepts such as attitude and 
preference, but also draw on economic theory, particularly the theory of value 
and the principle of compensatory decision making (Brazier et al. 1999).  
Lancaster’s theory of value holds “…that goods possess, or give rise to, multiple 
characteristics in fixed proportions and that it is these characteristics, not goods 
themselves, on which the consumer's preferences are exercised” (Lancaster 
1966).  That is, utility is derived from the characteristics goods possess, rather 
than from the goods per se.  Any class of good, therefore, can be defined by its 
particular combination of characteristics or attributes.  Different candy bars, for 
example, can be described by a set of characteristics that may include sweetness 
and chewiness.  Any one good may be associated with many characteristics, and 
many goods may produce the same set of characteristics (Louviere et al. 2000b).   
The theory of value is the basis of compensatory decision-making, which 
assumes that in choosing between alternatives, a less preferred level in one 
attribute can be compensated for by a more preferred level in another attribute 
(Hogarth & Karelaia 2005; Kjær 2005).  Formally, the utility (U) of alternative i 
to individual n is an additive function of the positive or negative value (vin) 
associated with the level of each attribute (ai) and the decision weight associated 
with that attribute (win): 
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 Uin = ∑ f(ai∙vin∙win) (4.1) 
Compensatory decision making is consistent with a rational comprehensive 
approach to decision making.  Decision makers adopting a rational 
comprehensive strategy are assumed to estimate the expected net utility 
associated with the attributes and levels of each alternative, and to choose the 
alternative that maximises expected value (Rosenhead 1980; Wright 1975).   
The precise willingness to trade a quantity of one attribute for another is 
defined by the marginal rate of substitution (MRS): 
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⁄
  
   
⁄
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Where MRS is the ratio of the marginal change in the value (v) of a good or 
alternative given marginal changes in attributes a1 and a2.  If the MRS of each 
attribute characterising a good is calculated relative to the same attribute, the 
relative importance of each attribute can be expressed in terms of the willingness 
to trade or sacrifice that common attribute, known as the numeraire.  When this 
numeraire is price or income, MRS can be interpreted as the marginal 
willingness-to-pay for a marginal change in the level of attribute a1 (Lancsar et al. 
2007; Lloyd 2003). 
4.1.2 Random utility theory  
The conception of utility in a stated preference elicitation is generally 
based on random utility theory (RUT), which holds that the study of any 
particular decision process is probabilistic and cannot be perfectly predicted 
(Kjær 2005; Louviere et al. 2000a).  Under RUT, the latent (unobserved) utility 
(Ui) associated with a particular good or alternative is derived from an observed, 
systematic component (vi) and an unobserved component (εi):  
 Ui = vi + εi (4.3) 
Although the respondent is assumed to be a rational, utility-maximising 
consumer consistent with classical microeconomic consumer theory, including 
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complete, stable and consistent preferences, the unobserved component of utility 
renders any decision stochastic from the perspective of an observer. 
Respondent preferences are incorporated into the choice model by 
specifying the systematic component of utility (vi) as a function of observed 
attributes: 
    = ∑       
(4.4) 
where k is the number of observed attributes, βk is the impact or importance of 
attribute k on observed utility and xk is a vector of observed values for attribute k.  
It is these β’s, or ‘part-worth utilities,’ that stated preference methods seek to 
measure, either directly or indirectly (Louviere et al. 2000a).  Direct elicitation 
methods ask respondents to indicate the degree of importance they attach to each 
attribute, while indirect measures infer attribute importance by analysing 
repeated choices or matching estimates (Louviere & Islam 2008).  Direct 
approaches can often be associated with strategic behaviours, such as 
respondents offering ‘protest bids’ in order to manipulate the results of the 
elicitation, while indirect approaches are felt to limit the opportunity for such 
strategic behaviours, in part because respondents may be less likely to recognise 
the objective of the elicitation (Carson et al. 2001).  Perhaps for this reason, 
Louviere and Islam (2008) found little correlation between preferences elicited 
using direct and indirect methods.   
4.2 A framework for comparing stated preference methods 
Shackley and Ryan (1995) argue that any elicitation of stated preferences 
should measure preferences on a cardinal scale, allow consideration of 
opportunity cost, and incorporate an appropriate context.  First, a cardinal scale 
allows for the measurement of the distance between alternatives or attribute 
levels on some interpretable scale of importance (Ali & Ronaldson 2012).  An 
interval cardinal scale is fixed at an arbitrary point and allows measurement of 
the distance between points in common units (i.e. the distance between 4 and 5 
is equal to the distance between 9 and 10), but one cannot say that 10 is twice as 
much as 5.  A ratio cardinal scale, on the other hand, has a natural zero that 
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allows relative comparisons such as “twice as much” or “half as much.”  
Economic comparisons require a cardinal scale, but in general an interval scale is 
sufficient to measure the incremental difference between two alternatives 
(Brazier et al. 1999).  Second, opportunity cost is the explicit recognition of 
potential benefits that must be foregone as the result of choosing to allocate 
scarce resources in an alternative way.  It is the recognition of such costs that 
distinguishes preferences from choices.  A car buyer may prefer a luxury model, but 
financial constraints and/or consideration of the opportunity costs may result in 
the buyer choosing a more economical model (Louviere et al. 2000b).  Finally, 
context refers to the combination of elements such as the choice format, the 
detail provided, and the attributes and levels themselves, all of which interact to 
form the context of the decision task.  For example, a task that provides 
descriptive text or a photograph of a single alternative has a very different 
context than a task that describes two or more competing alternatives in 
quantitative terms.  There is no ‘correct’ context, but as a number of authors 
note, decision makers are used to making decisions within a particular context, 
and there is substantial evidence to suggest that changing that context to suit a 
particular elicitation method may adversely impact the face validity, accuracy 
and predictive ability of the task (Giacomini et al. 2012; Hensher & Collins 2011; 
Louviere et al. 2000b; Shackley & Ryan 1995).  For this reason, stated preference 
methods should generally be appropriate to the usual context of the decision that 
is being elicited: the method should adapt to the decision context, not the other 
way round (Mullen 1999).  This simple guidance is complicated here though, by 
the fact that this is not a ‘usual’ decision – most respondents will have never 
thought about the degree to which they prefer equity over efficiency in the 
allocation of healthcare resources, let alone have a usual context for this 
decision.  As such, the appropriate context is not clear.  Context is still relevant, 
though, as Huber (2009) outlines a number of contextual properties of stated 
preference elicitations that can influence responses in a systematic manner:    
 Comparative vs. individual-alternative orientation: Comparative tasks 
tend to put more emphasis on quantitative attributes whose differences are 
easy to discern or compare across alternatives, while individual-alternative 
tasks put more emphasis on qualitative attributes that can be interpreted in 
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the absence of an external reference.  Tasks with a comparative orientation 
tend to encourage respondents to ensure one alternative is ‘better’ than the 
other, while tasks with an individual-alternative orientation focus on the 
overall quality of the alternative.  In general, comparative tasks are more 
contextual and allow for greater consideration of opportunity costs than 
individual-alternative tasks. 
 Competitive beliefs: Competitive beliefs, or pre-existing expectations and 
associations, may be used as heuristics to simplify choice tasks.  For 
example, a consumer may associate high price with high quality, regardless 
of what is actually shown in the task.  Decontextualising a task, as in an 
indirect elicitation or single-alternative scenario, breaks down these 
conscious or unconscious associations and forces decision makers to assess 
the importance of each attribute independent of the others. 
 Reflective vs. immediate: Reflective tasks tend to emphasise longer-term 
trade-offs that may be less tangible, while immediate tasks are more 
competitive and tend to emphasise attributes with more direct and 
immediate impacts (e.g. price).  Matching tasks tend to be more reflective, as 
respondents must consider the absolute quality of both alternatives, while 
choice tasks tend to be more immediate, and emphasise finding the ‘best’ (or 
avoiding the ‘worst’) alternative.   
 Attentional shifts: Simply mentioning an attribute tends to increase its 
impact, and attributes that would normally have been ignored may now 
appear important.  Attentional shifts may be avoided by increasing the 
number of attributes in a task, so that unimportant attributes receive less 
attention, but this risks respondents over-simplifying the task and ignoring 
most of the attributes.  Direct elicitations tend to draw a respondent’s 
attention to less important attributes to a greater extent than indirect 
elicitations. 
 Simplification risk: Respondents can simplify a decision task across and/or 
within attributes.  In simplifying across attributes respondents may focus on 
a few important or ‘dominant’ attributes, while disregarding attributes 
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deemed less important (Cairns et al. 2002).  Within attributes, respondents 
may dismiss alternatives with low levels on important attributes (i.e. “loss 
avoidance”).  More complex, immediate or competitive tasks tend to 
increase the risk of simplification, while more reflective tasks may reduce the 
risk of simplification. 
Each of these properties is present to a greater or lesser degree in all stated 
preference methods, and as such, each method has different strengths and 
weaknesses.  Therefore, to identify preferred methods for the elicitation of 
societal preferences over efficiency, equity and distributive justice goals in the 
allocation of healthcare resources, a comparative review of stated preference 
methods was conducted in terms of the properties outlined above.  
4.3 Review of stated preference methods 
As noted above, stated preference tasks can be categorised as matching 
tasks or choice tasks.  Open-ended contingent valuation is a common indirect 
matching task, where respondents are asked to estimate a willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) that would make them indifferent between obtaining a particular good 
and keeping the money.  Most individuals, though, have difficulty estimating 
their WTP for a market good, and have even more difficulty estimating their 
WTP for a non-market good, often leading to missing or inaccurate responses.  
For this reason, as well as objections – often in the form of protest bids – to 
valuing health outcomes in terms of money, open-ended contingent valuation is 
not commonly used in healthcare (Klose 1999).  Although there are other forms 
of matching tasks used in healthcare such as standard gamble and time trade-off 
tasks, choice-based approaches are felt to present more familiar decision tasks to 
respondents, and partly for this reason, are more commonly used (Ali & 
Ronaldson 2012; Brazier et al. 1999; Carson et al. 2001; Smith 2000).   
Choice-based approaches measure ‘dominance,’ or whether one 
alternative is more, less, or equally preferred to another.  Strongly ordered 
measures of dominance allow a complete ranking of all alternatives with no 
possibility of two alternatives being equally ranked (‘tied’).  Weakly ordered 
measures can identify one or more preferred alternatives from a set of 
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alternatives, but assume that the remaining alternatives are equally preferred 
(Louviere et al. 2000a; Louviere et al. 2000b).  These measures are ordinal, in 
that they can establish the ordering of preferences but not the relative strength of 
preferences.  They can, however,  be transformed to a cardinal scale by analysing 
repeated responses to the same comparison, or responses to multiple 
comparisons by the same respondent (Ali & Ronaldson 2012; Brazier et al. 1999; 
Ryan et al. 2001). 
A review of common direct and indirect choice and matching methods is 
presented below, with an emphasis on their basis in theory and a discussion of 
their contextual properties as outlined above.  A sample of each task is also 
shown.  These methods include conventional and conjoint ranking tasks, direct 
and indirect constant sum scaling, full-profile rating, binary and multinomial 
choice tasks, and person trade-off tasks.  The review is summarised in Table 4.1 
at the end of this section. 
4.3.1 Ranking 
Ranking tasks can be indirect, where respondents order a set of 
alternatives described in terms of their attributes and levels, or direct, where they 
order specific attributes or levels.  These orderings, by ascending or descending 
importance or desirability, provide a strongly ordered set of preferences as each 
option can be identified as more preferred or less preferred to every other option, 
and can be recast as a series of implicit head-to-head choices in order to 
transform them to a cardinal scale (Ben-Akiva et al. 1991; Brazier et al. 1999).  
Miethe (1985) found that in terms of test-retest reliability, convergence between 
scales, and consistency with theoretical predictions, simple ranking tasks 
outperformed rating scales and magnitude estimation in measuring ordinal 
values.  Whereas the ranking tasks forced differentiation between values, many 
respondents to the rating and magnitude estimation tasks opted to say that values 
were equally important, and the resulting lack of variability and differentiation 
adversely affected the measurement properties of the tasks.  This is a common 
shortcoming of many simple preference surveys.  Overall, he concluded that rank 
ordering had desirable measurement properties in terms of establishing ordinal 
importance.   
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However, ranking tasks are cognitively demanding when there are more 
than a few options.  This is especially true of indirect ranking tasks, where 
respondents are asked to rank a set alternatives, each of which is itself composed 
of a set of attributes and levels (Flynn et al. 2007; Lee et al. 2007).  For this 
reason, indirect ranking tasks are rare.  The primary drawback of any ranking 
task, though, is that there is no explicit consideration of the opportunity cost of 
ranking one alternative more highly than another (Ryan et al. 2001).  Although 
rankings can be expanded into a series of head-to-head comparisons, it is not at 
all clear that this is how respondents interpret the task.  Ben-Akiva (1991) also 
questions how far these comparisons should be extended.  He suggests that 
respondents are likely find it easy to rank their more preferred options, but may 
be less likely to pay attention when ranking their less preferred alternatives, 
making these rankings unreliable.  Similarly, forced ranking tasks may lead to an 
arbitrary ranking of elements over which respondents hold no significant 
preferences, adversely affect the measurement properties of the task (Lee et al. 
2007). 
Box 4.1: Direct ranking task 
 
Please arrange the following list of attributes in order of importance, from the attribute you 
consider most important in deciding whether to fund this healthcare program, to which attribute 
you consider least important: 
 
Importance Attribute 
1 Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs 
2 Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
3 Utility after treatment is 0.5 
4 Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential 
5 1000 patients can be treated 
. 
 
The focus of a direct ranking task is on the relative importance of each 
attribute, which will tend to decontextualise the task and force respondents to 
consider each attribute in itself, breaking down simplifying associations between 
attributes.  However, as mentioned earlier, relative preferences are likely to 
depend on the marginal context of the task, which can only be meaningfully 
understood in the context of the opportunity cost associated with a particular 
choice.  The decontextualised nature of a direct elicitation ranking task will tend 
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to emphasise the absolute levels of qualitative attributes, which can more easily 
be interpreted in the absence of a specific comparator, and therefore may 
emphasise quality improvements over quantitative gains.  A ranking task may 
also increase the attention given to attributes that may not have been considered 
in an actual decision, while the reflective nature will tend to focus more attention 
on longer-term benefits and trade-offs, and relatively less on immediate gains.  
The complexity of a ranking task increases dramatically with more than a few 
elements, suggesting that simplification risk –  perhaps in the form of an arbitrary 
ranking of less important attributes – may be high. 
4.3.2 Conjoint ranking (best-worst scaling) 
 As in a conventional ranking task, best-worst scaling (BWS) conjoint 
ranking tasks present respondents with a set of options, but rather than asking 
them to rank all options, respondents identify only their most preferred and least 
preferred elements.  This is based on the assumptions that respondents can more 
easily identify the best and worst or most and least important elements in a 
choice set than rank all elements, and that the probability of choosing a 
particular best-worst pair is proportional to the distance between them on a 
latent utility scale (Flynn et al. 2007; Louviere & Islam 2008).  The more 
common ‘single profile’ BWS task, illustrated in Box 4.2, presents a single 
scenario or profile to respondents and asks them to identify their most and least 
preferred elements.  By using an experimental design to repeat the best-worst 
ranking task over different subsets of attributes and levels, BWS can establish the 
rank of each attribute level relative to a single, least-preferred attribute level on a 
cardinal scale of ‘relative importance’ (Auger et al. 2007; Flynn et al. 2007; 
Marley & Louviere 2005).  In contrast to choice tasks, this allows a cardinal 
measure of utility relative to a single attribute (i.e. ‘worst’) rather than to an 
entire alternative or scenario (Fraenkel 2013; Lancsar et al. 2007).  
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Box 4.2: Single-profile best-worst scaling task 
 
From the following list of attributes, please indicate which one attribute you consider most 
important and which one attribute you consider least important in deciding whether or not to 
fund this healthcare program: 
 
Most 
Important 
Attribute 
Least 
Important 
 Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs  
 Initial utility of patients is 0.2  
 Utility after treatment is 0.5  
 Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential  
 1000 patients can be treated  
. 
 
 
The less-common ‘multi-profile’ BWS task is similar to a discrete choice 
tasks in that respondents are asked to choose between entire scenarios, but unlike 
discrete choice tasks, respondents must identify their least preferred alternative in 
addition to their most preferred alternative (Flynn 2010).  Although this 
additional step means that more information on the dominance relationships is 
collected from a multi-profile BWS than a discrete choice task if there are more 
than two scenarios in the choice set, it also makes the task more difficult for 
respondents.  The appropriate statistical model is also a matter of some debate 
(Flynn 2010).  For these reasons, multi-profile BWS tasks are not common in 
health economics and the remainder of this section will consider the more 
established single-profile BWS. 
Like conventional rank ordering, single-profile BWS forces differentiation 
between attributes and has an unambiguous interpretation, as there should be 
only one way for a respondent to interpret “most important” or “least 
important” (Lee et al. 2007).  However, it has the advantage of doing so in a 
much less cognitively demanding manner, as because respondents are only 
presented with a subset of the overall ranking task at any one time, they are 
typically able to identify the extremes of a choice set more easily than they can 
rank those attributes somewhere in the middle (Lee et al. 2007; Marley & 
Louviere 2005).  Lee et al. (2007) found that single-profile BWS results were 
closely correlated with rank ordering, but required much less cognitive effort on 
the part of respondents.  BWS is also more statistically efficient than ‘pick-one’ 
discrete choice approaches.  A 3-item best-worst choice set generates a complete 
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set of preference orderings, while a 4-item set can identify 9 of the 11 possible 
dominance relationships (Marley & Louviere 2005).  As in a conventional 
ranking task though, there is no explicit consideration of opportunity cost.  BWS 
results are less strongly ordered than a traditional ranking task, as a BWS task 
generates an incomplete ranking for choice sets of more than 3 items (Louviere 
et al. 2000a).  
The contextual characteristics of a single-profile BWS are similar to a 
conventional ranking task.  The focus of the task is on the relative importance of 
each decontextualised attribute, breaking down simplifying associations between 
attributes and tending to emphasise qualitative over quantitative attributes.  The 
direct nature of the elicitation will tend to increase the attention given to less 
important attributes, and the reflective nature of the task will tend to focus 
relatively more attention on less immediate outcomes.  Unlike conventional 
ranking tasks, it imposes relatively few cognitive demands on respondents and 
may therefore be relatively less likely to encourage simplification or heuristics in 
identifying best-worst pairs. 
4.3.3 Direct constant sum scaling 
Direct constant sum scaling (CSS), also known as ‘budget pie’ or 
‘allocation of points,’ asks respondents to allocate a fixed number of points or 
shares between different attributes to indicate their relative degree of importance.  
CSS is considered a matching task, although as Carson and Louviere (2011) 
note, it may be seen more intuitively as utility maximisation subject to a budget 
constraint as it is not necessarily clear what quantity is being matched in the task.  
There is no specific theoretical basis for CSS, but it has been argued that because 
the technique forces respondents to consider trade-offs in their allocation of 
shares within constrained budget, the technique is consistent with economic 
theory and possesses cardinal, ratio measurement properties, and in this sense, 
may be theoretically related to contingent valuation approaches (Ryan et al. 
2001).  Like a BWS task, a direct CSS attempts to identify the relative 
importance of attributes and levels within an alternative.  Attribute importance 
weights are calculated by dividing the points allocated to each attribute by the 
total points allocated.  Unlike a BWS task, though, a direct CSS task allows 
88 
attributes to be valued as equally important.  While this may allow for genuine 
indifference, it also allows respondents to opt-out of difficult trade-offs between 
attributes (Louviere & Islam 2008).  It is also not clear what attribute weights 
represent: the relative importance of the attribute, the desirability of the attribute 
level, or some combination of the two (Louviere & Islam 2008).     
Box 4.3: Direct constant sum scaling task 
 
Please allocate 100 points across the attributes listed below in terms of their relative importance 
to you in deciding whether or not to fund this healthcare program: 
 
Attribute Points 
Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs 25 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 40 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 25 
Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential 5 
1000 patients can be treated 5 
Total 100 
. 
 
The decontextualised nature of a direct CSS task will tend to emphasise 
the relative importance of attributes and levels within an alternative, and not 
allow respondents to consider the opportunity costs associated with the 
alternative as a whole.  The instruction to allocate points across all attributes is 
also likely to draw attention to attributes that may have otherwise been 
unimportant, and this effect may increase with the size of the initial allocation of 
points.  Unlike BWS, direct CSS does not necessarily force respondents to trade-
off between attributes, and is not likely to break down a respondent’s pre-existing 
associations between attributes, as respondents can allocate equal shares to every 
alternative.  In terms of the earlier example, respondents who associate high 
price and high quality do not need to distinguish which attribute is more 
important in itself, and as such, direct CSS may actually reinforce pre-existing 
(but unobserved) associations and confound the measurement of the importance 
of individual attributes (Huber 2009).  Like BWS, the individual-alternative 
orientation and lack of context in a direct CSS task is likely to emphasise 
qualitative attributes that can be judged in isolation.  This would be reinforced by 
the reflective nature of the task.  Simplification risk seems moderate to high, as 
the task is more demanding than a conventional ranking task in that it effectively 
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asks respondents to estimate the cardinal importance of each attribute in addition 
to the its ordinal rank.  These cognitive demands risk respondents essentially 
opting out of the task by assigning the same number of points to each attribute or 
alternative.  
4.3.4 Indirect constant sum paired comparison 
In contrast to direct constant sum scaling, which asks respondents to 
allocate some fixed quantity between attributes and levels within an alternative, 
indirect constant sum paired comparison (CSPC) asks respondents to allocate a 
quantity between alternatives.  This allocation is assumed to reflect the relative 
importance or priority the respondents attach to each alternative (Mullen 1999).  
The initial allocation of this quantity, though, is a critical element in the design 
of the task.  Respondents may have difficulty coping with realistic monetary 
sums outside of their normal experience, but hypothetical points or unrealistic 
budgets are likely to result in unrealistic responses.  As such, it is more common 
that respondents are asked to allocate budget shares than actual monetary sums 
(Mullen 1999).   
As with the CSS, CSPC is considered a matching task, although it is not 
necessarily clear what quantity is being matched (Carson & Louviere 2011).  
Louviere et al. (2000a) suggest that allocation tasks such as CSPC are consistent 
with RUT if it can assumed that differences in the allocations reflect differences 
in latent utility between the alternatives.  They also show that responses to CSPC 
tasks can be transformed to dominance rankings on the basis of which alternative 
was allocated the majority of the budget.  These ranking are more weakly 
ordered than a conventional ranking task owing to the possibility of equal 
allocations between alternatives, but may be more strongly ordered than discrete 
choice tasks given the intensity of preference information that can be inferred 
from the relative allocations.   
In the context of healthcare, Schwappach (2003) suggested that the CSPC 
task is unique in explicitly connecting budget constraints, opportunity costs, 
health outcomes and patient characteristics.  Schwappach and Strasmann (2006) 
also suggested that it is particularly suited to setting priorities in healthcare given 
the ability of respondents to avoid extreme distributions by allocating shares to 
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less preferred groups, consistent with a view of the importance of the 
‘maintenance of hope’ in the allocation of healthcare resources (Menzel et al. 
1999).  Finally, McIntosh (2003), citing Swallow et al. (2001), suggested that for 
choices that are highly emotive – such as the allocation of healthcare resources – 
dichotomous choice tasks may leave respondents dissatisfied with the limited 
information they are allowed to provide.  Indeed, Swallow et al. (2001) found 
that respondents were anxious to provide information on their strength of 
preference, and suggested that restricting this ability may discourage respondents 
from participating fully, possibly introducing a sampling bias into discrete choice 
tasks.   
Box 4.4: Indirect constant-sum scaling task 
 
Please allocate 100 points across the drug programs listed below in terms of the relative share of 
societal resources you would prefer to see allocated to each drug: 
 
Program X 
Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 
Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential  
1000 patients can be treated 
Points for 
Program X 
 
40 
 
 
 
Program Y 
Average patient will gain 5.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.6 
Utility after treatment is 0.9 
Utility after treatment is 90% of full potential  
500 patients can be treated 
Points for 
Program Y 
 
60 
 
 
. 
 
The indirect, comparative orientation of CSPC provides much more 
context than the direct CSS approach, as the allocation of points between 
alternatives forces consideration of the absolute value of both alternatives as well 
as the opportunity costs associated with funding one alternative over the other.  
Although there is a competitive aspect to the task that may encourage 
simplification and emphasise a few quantitative attributes, the need to consider 
the relative quality of both alternatives in allocating points suggests that the task 
may be somewhat more reflective than binary or discrete choice tasks 
(Schwappach & Strasmann 2006).  This relatively greater reflection may also 
encourage consideration of longer-term and qualitative aspects of the 
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alternatives.  The cognitive demands of CSPC are relatively high as respondents 
are asked to simultaneously judge the direction and the relative magnitude of 
their preferences, although a review of preference elicitation methods by Ryan et 
al. (2001) report favourable completion rates in CSPC tasks.  Cognitive demands 
are likely to be lower than in a CSS task, though, as respondents only have to 
evaluate two alternatives, rather than a potentially much larger set of attributes 
and levels.  These cognitive demands, as well as ethical objections to any priority 
setting exercise, may lead respondents to allocate points equally between each 
alternative to simplify the task.  A strategy of loss avoidance may also encourage 
respondents to moderate their allocations out of a desire to avoid committing too 
heavily to what may turn out to be the ‘wrong’ alternative (Baron et al. 2001).  
Also, similar to biases encountered with rating scales, there is potential for 
extreme response or end-point bias in the allocation of points between 
alternatives, where respondents may systematically prefer or avoid the extremes 
of the constrained budget allocations for reasons unrelated to attribute levels or 
ethical beliefs (Kaplan et al. 1993; Lee et al. 2007).   Overall, the context of a 
CSPC task seems very high, given its simultaneous consideration budget 
constraints, trade-offs and opportunity costs. 
4.3.5 Magnitude Estimation 
 Magnitude estimation (ME) is an indirect matching task deriving from 
psychometrics that asks respondents to provide an estimate of how much better 
one alternative is than another on a ratio scale.  These ratios estimates are 
aggregated across respondents as a geometric mean and the resulting measure is 
argued to have cardinal, ratio properties (Brazier et al. 1999; Kaplan et al. 1993).  
However, ME has no clear basis in economic theory and, as Richardson (1994) 
notes, the interpretation of the ME question, “how many times is x better (or 
worse) than y is ‘deeply obscure.’”  In a comparison of ranking, rating and ME 
approaches, Miethe found that magnitude estimates demonstrated the lowest 
degree of convergence with the other results (Miethe 1985).  The results of an 
ME elicitation are more weakly ordered than a ranking task given to the 
possibility of ties in the preference ordering, but more strongly ordered than a 
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discrete choice approach owing to the additional strength of preference data 
collected through the ratio estimation task. 
Box 4.5: Magnitude estimation task 
 
Please indicate the value of Program Y by giving it a score relative to the score of Program X.  For example, 
if you believe Program Y is twice as good as Program X, you should give it a score of 20.  If you believe it is 
half as good, you should give it a score of 5. 
 
Program X 
Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 
Relative gain is 75% of potential health 
1000 patients can be treated 
 Program Y 
Average patient will gain 5.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.6 
Utility after treatment is 0.9 
Relative gain is 90% of potential health 
500 patients can be treated 
 
Program X = 10 
 
 
Program Y = 
 
15 
 
 
. 
 
 The pair-wise format of a ME task provides respondents a high degree of 
context and may tend to focus attention on the differences in attribute levels 
between the two alternatives, as well as reduce the importance of external 
reference points.  However, the requirement to express the overall quality of one 
alternative relative to the other in the ME task should also force respondents to 
reflect on the overall quality of each alternative.  Despite these relative and 
absolute comparisons, there is no explicit consideration of opportunity cost in a 
ME task.  The ratio scaling task does not require any explicit trade-offs or 
choices, and in this respect it is strictly a comparative rating task.  The pair-wise 
comparison format of an ME task makes it easy for respondents to identify 
differences between attribute levels and will tend to emphasise quantitative 
attributes, but it also allows the easy comparison of attributes that would 
otherwise have been unimportant.  This may lead to an overemphasis of less 
important attributes in the scaling task.  The ME task appears to be cognitively 
demanding, requiring consideration of both relative differences and absolute 
levels, suggesting that respondents may choose to opt-out of difficult ME tasks 
by choosing a magnitude estimate that set the sets the ratio at or close to one.  As 
in the CSPC, a simplifying strategy of loss avoidance may also encourage 
respondents to moderate their responses (Baron et al. 2001). 
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4.3.6 Person trade-off 
Person trade-off (PTO) is an indirect matching task that asks respondents 
how many outcomes of type Y they would consider equivalent in terms of 
(social) value to X outcomes of another kind.  The ratio of Y/X represents the 
social value of outcome Y relative to X, and is consistent with a random utility 
interpretation.  By repeating the task for different alternatives relative to a 
common comparator (X), the relative value of each alternative can be plotted on 
a cardinal scale (Green 2001; Nord 1995a).  Many authors argue that PTO is 
particularly suited to considering the trade-offs inherent in allocating societal 
healthcare resources as PTO judgements go beyond issues of individual utility to 
include concepts of fairness and equity (Menzel 1999; Nord 1995a; Pinto Prades 
1997; Ubel et al. 2000). 
PTO has an intuitive appeal and is argued to have cardinal measurement 
properties.  Baron suggests that “PTO is like [standard gamble (SG) and time 
trade-off (TTO)] because it asks subjects for a number that makes two options 
equally preferred in hypothetical decision” (Baron et al. 2001).  It also has a 
number of recognised limitations, however, including start point bias, where the 
equivalence ratio tends to be correlated with the number of patients in the initial 
state, and ‘ratio inconsistency’ or ‘multiplicative intransitivity,’ where the 
equivalence ratios of A:B and B:C are not consistent with the equivalence ratio 
of A:C (Baron et al. 2001; Schwarzinger et al. 2004; Ubel, Loewenstein, et al. 
1996).  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, respondents often find the task 
complex, difficult, and even offensive (Green 2001; Nord 1995a).  Damschroder 
et al. (2007) reported that 91 percent of respondents to one PTO elicitation 
refused to make a trade-off between groups despite clear differences in severity 
and health gains.  Even when respondents understand and are willing to 
complete the task, Nord (1995a) reported a high degree of random variation in 
equivalence estimates, suggesting that PTO may be statistically inefficient 
relative to tasks with less random variation, and that a large and carefully 
instructed sample may be required to derive reliable preference estimates.   
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Box 4.6: Person trade-off task 
 
How many persons would have to be treated under Program Y in order for you to be indifferent to funding 
Program X or Program Y? 
 
Program X 
Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 
Relative gain is 75% of potential health 
 Program Y 
Average patient will gain 5.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.6 
Utility after treatment is 0.9 
Relative gain is 90% of potential health 
 
Program X = 100 
 
 
Program Y = 
 
150 
 
 
. 
 
PTO tasks are highly contextualised, as similar to CSPC and ME tasks, 
respondents must consider the overall quality of both alternatives in formulating 
a person equivalence value.  This will tend to make the task less competitive and 
more reflective than choice tasks, although the comparative nature may tend to 
emphasise a few quantitative attributes where differences are easier to discern.  
The opportunity cost of prioritising one group over the other is implicit in the 
person equivalence value; indeed, the equivalence value defines the opportunity 
cost of prioritising one group over the other.  Although reflective tasks generally 
have a lower simplification risk than more immediate choice tasks, the 
simplification risk with PTO seems higher in light of evidence that many 
respondents appeared to avoid the trade-offs intrinsic to the PTO by offering 
protest bids of infinity or equal equivalence values (Green 2001).  In order to 
overcome the difficulty of choosing a specific person equivalence values in a 
PTO task, many investigators use a ‘ping pong’ format to present a series of 
successively narrower high and low equivalence values to respondents until they 
converge at an indifference point (Nord 1995a; Rodriguez-Miguez & Pinto-
Prades 2002; Damschroder et al. 2005; Baker et al. 2010).  This iterative choice 
format, though, changes the nature of the PTO from a matching task to a series 
of linked discrete choice tasks. 
4.3.7 Full-profile ratings 
 Full-profile ratings tasks ask respondents to assign a value or rating to an 
individual alternative defined in terms of its attributes and levels.  This rating can 
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be measured on a numeric scale such as 0 to 10, or a more qualitative scale such 
as ‘relative importance’ or ‘likelihood of choice.’  Full-profile ratings are popular 
due in large part to the relative ease of the task: they are not cognitively 
demanding, they can be performed in relatively little time, and they can typically 
accommodate more attributes than a ranking task (Lee et al. 2007).  However, as 
Louviere et al. (2000a) note, the approach assumes that respondents are able to 
consistently and reliably estimate their preference for each alternative.  They 
argue that this is a strong assumption in light of common biases associated with 
ratings scales, including acquiescence bias, where respondents decline to trade-
off and value most or all attributes or alternatives as important; extreme response 
bias, where respondents systematically use only one segment of the rating scale 
(i.e. moderate responses concentrated around the scale mid-point or extreme 
responses concentrated at the upper or lower ends of the scale); and, in the 
opposite direction, a tendency for respondents to want to use each category in a 
rating scale equally often (Kaplan et al. 1993; Lee et al. 2007).  In addition, there 
is no theoretical basis for interpreting the difference between, for example, a 6 
and a 7 and it is therefore not clear that the distance between different points on 
a rating scale have interval properties (Kaplan et al. 1993; Louviere et al. 2000b).  
Although ratings data can be transformed into cardinal utility if it can be 
assumed that the rating scale accurately represents underlying latent utility, and 
that a particular rating implies a latent utility between two critical utility 
thresholds, it is also possible to transform ratings data into weakly ordered 
ordinal rankings data after allowing for ties.  Such a transformation requires 
much weaker assumptions about the nature of the rating scale and the abilities of 
the respondents than does treating the scale as representative of latent utility 
(Louviere et al. 2000b).  However, in a comparison of ratings versus rankings 
and discrete choice tasks,  Boyle et al. (2001) found that ordinally transformed 
ratings could not recover full rankings or ‘choose one’ discrete choices,  
primarily due to respondents opting-out of implicit ranking tasks by choosing 
ties. 
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Box 4.7: Full-profile rating task 
 
On the scale below, please indicate how likely you would be to recommend Program X for funding: 
 
Program X 
Average patient will gain 3.0 Life years 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 
Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential  
1000 patients can be treated 
 
Not at 
all likely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
likely 
. 
 
 Full-profile rating emphasises the absolute quality of an alternative as a 
whole, rather than the relative importance of attributes.  The tasks are 
intrinsically reflective, as they do not require trade-offs or direct differentiation 
between attributes or alternatives, although there is evidence that respondents 
can quickly recognise and adapt to the range of quality between the alternatives, 
suggesting at least some comparative element to the task (Huber 2009; Kaplan et 
al. 1993).  Kaplan (1993) argues that this property may allow ratings data to be 
meaningfully analysed using an analysis of variance approach.  Unexpectedly, 
full-profile ratings tasks have been found to focus respondents’ attention on a 
small number of attributes.  Huber (2009) notes, “there is no logical reason why 
ratings-based conjoint should limit attention to a small number of attributes, but 
that is what happens, study after study.”  There also tends to be a simplifying 
emphasis on loss avoidance as respondents penalise alternatives with low levels 
on key attributes (Huber 2009).  However, the individual-alternative orientation 
– even with the implicit comparative element between alternatives within a 
larger elicitation – and the abstract nature and weak theoretical basis of ratings 
scales means the task is extremely decontextualised and does not allow for any 
consideration of opportunity cost.   
4.3.8 Binary choice 
A binary choice task can be thought of as a special case of a full-profile 
ratings task where the rating scale is reduced to ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ or ‘acceptable’ 
and ‘unacceptable.’  Such an approach eliminates the scale biases associated with 
full-profile ratings tasks and provides an unambiguous interpretation of the 
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response.  Binary choice tasks are less cognitively demanding than full-profile 
ratings tasks as respondents need only answer yes or no as opposed to assigning 
a rating, and there is a suggestion that this may reduce the incidence of non-
compensatory decision making (Lim & Edlin 2009).  Binary choice tasks have 
the advantage of closely approximating the format of the decision task facing 
health care decision makers, where they most often must judge the acceptability 
of an individual alternative rather than assign a rating or make a choice between 
competing alternatives (Tappenden et al. 2007).   
Box 4.8: Binary response task 
 
Please indicate if you consider Program X to be acceptable for societal funding: 
 
Program X 
Average patient will gain 3.0 Life years 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 
Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential  
1000 patients can be treated 
 
 Acceptable  Unacceptable 
. 
 
Preferences for a particular alternative are calculated relative to a defined 
or undefined status quo.  If the status quo is explicitly defined prior to the choice 
task, it allows some implicit consideration of the opportunity cost associated 
with rejecting the alternative, although there is no consideration of the 
opportunity cost of accepting the alternative.  If the status quo is not explicitly 
defined, it is possible, and even likely, that each respondent will have a different 
interpretation of the utility implications and opportunity cost associated with 
rejecting the alternative.  As such, it may be difficult to identify the specific 
attributes and levels associated with the rejection of the alternative (Kjær 2005; 
Ryan & Skatun 2004).  
The results of a binary choice task are more weakly ordered than full-
profile ratings transformed into ranks as there is likely to be a greater proportion 
of ties given the greatly reduced response scale (Louviere et al. 2000b).  At the 
extreme, all alternatives in a binary choice task could be tied as ‘acceptable’ or as 
‘not acceptable’.  In this case, there is no differentiation between alternatives and 
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no meaningful preference data is captured.  Otherwise, the context of the task is 
very similar to the full-profile rating task. 
4.3.9 Discrete choice experiments 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are an indirect, choice-based 
approach that asks respondents to select their most preferred option from a set of 
two or more alternatives.  Such tasks are similar to decisions respondents face on 
a daily basis and appear relatively easy for respondents to grasp.  For this reason, 
discrete choice tasks are increasingly preferred over ranking and rating tasks for 
eliciting preferences in healthcare (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, et al. 2010; Kjær 
2005; Ryan et al. 2001).  As a discrete choice task identifies only one preferred 
alternative per choice set, the results are very weakly ordered and it is necessary 
to repeat the choice task across a series of alternative pairs (or triplets) to 
generate a complete ordering of preferences (Louviere et al. 2000b).  Although 
responses to a DCE are strictly ordinal, cardinal preferences can be derived by 
assuming, based on probabilistic choice theory, that the probability of choosing 
one alternative over another is proportional to the difference in latent utility 
between alternatives (Ali & Ronaldson 2012; Kjær 2005).   
Box 4.9: Discrete choice task 
 
If you were able to fund only one of the two drug programs described below, would you prefer to fund 
Program X, Program Y or neither drug? 
 
Program X 
Average patient will gain 3.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.2 
Utility after treatment is 0.5 
Utility after treatment is 80% of full potential 
1000 patients can be treated 
 Program Y 
Average patient will gain 5.0 LYs 
Initial utility of patients is 0.6 
Utility after treatment is 0.9 
Utility after treatment is 90% of full potential 
500 patients can be treated 
. 
 Prefer to fund Program X 
 Prefer to fund Program Y 
. 
 
 Discrete choice tasks are conceptually related to binary choice tasks, but 
the inclusion of two or more mutually exclusive alternatives, rather than an often 
implicit status quo, makes the task highly contextualised and highlights the 
opportunity costs associated with choosing one alternative over another.  Unlike 
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matching tasks such as CSPC and PTO, where respondents must judge the 
relative value of both alternatives, or even more reflective full-profile choice 
tasks, DCE tasks only require respondents to identify the ‘best’ alternative.  This 
is likely to shift attention away from the overall quality of an alternative and 
toward a competitive focus on ensuring that one alternative is better than 
another.  There is a high risk that this competitiveness may lead to simplification 
and a focus on differences in a few key attributes – particularly on quantitative 
attributes where differences are easy to discern.  This may also manifest itself as 
‘loss avoidance’, where alternatives with low levels on key attributes are quickly 
dismissed, even where those attributes may have otherwise been unimportant in 
the decision process (Huber 2009). 
Simplification can also lead to non-compensatory decision strategies such 
as lexicographic or dominant preferences, where respondents do not trade-off 
between alternatives but rather always choose the alternative with the preferred 
level of a specific attribute, regardless of the levels of the other attributes (Scott 
2002).  Such preferences are not irrational, but complicate the analysis of choice 
as such preferences cannot be expressed in terms of marginal rates of substitution 
or an additive utility function as no trading takes place, and thus are inconsistent 
with the theory underlying the stated preferences approach (Lancsar & Louviere 
2006; McIntosh & Ryan 2002; Scott 2002). 
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4.4 Choosing a preferred method 
As noted, each stated preference elicitation method has particular 
strengths and weaknesses and the most appropriate approach depends on the 
study objectives.  Referring back to Chapter 1, the objective here was to identify 
the relative strength of preferences for different patient and program 
characteristics, with particular attention to the trade-offs between efficiency and 
equity or distributive justice in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources.  It is 
also useful to recall the desirable properties of a stated preference elicitation 
outlined by Shackley and Ryan (1995): preferences should be measured on a 
cardinal scale, and incorporate the concept of opportunity cost and an 
appropriate context.   
On the basis of these criteria, highly decontextualised tasks such as 
ranking, conjoint ranking (best-worst scaling), constant sum scaling, full-profile 
rating and magnitude estimation are immediately excluded as they do not allow 
for a consideration of opportunity costs.  More specifically, they do not allow 
consideration of preferences at the margin: namely, what is one willing to 
sacrifice to get marginally more efficiency or marginally more equity?  In 
addition, Louviere and Islam (2008) note that responses to indirect tasks tend to 
give much richer insight into preferences than those to direct tasks, offering 
further justification for excluding the direct ranking, conjoint ranking and 
constant sum scaling tasks from consideration. 
Binary choice tasks eliminate the scale biases associated with full-profile 
ratings tasks and provide an unambiguous result that can be interpreted on a 
cardinal scale.  There is also some consideration of opportunity cost through an 
implicit or explicit consideration of the status quo state.  They also resemble the 
context of many decision tasks in healthcare, where decision makers more often 
must judge the acceptability of an individual alternative than make a choice 
between two competing alternatives (Tappenden et al. 2007).  Binary choice 
tasks have been successfully used in the context of healthcare to analyse the 
preferences of seniors over cataract surgery (Lim & Edlin 2009), and of NICE 
committee members in recommending healthcare technologies (Tappenden et al. 
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2007).  Notably, Tappenden and colleagues chose a binary task because, as here, 
it closely reflected the nature of the decision problem faced by respondents.  
However, the objective of the current study was not to predict funding decisions, 
but to measure the relative importance of efficiency and different aspects of 
equity, and the trade-offs between them.  As noted in the previous chapter, cost 
was not be included as an attribute in the elicitations as this would, in effect, 
double count costs in any subsequent economic evaluation.  In the absence of 
cost, a binary choice task would not present decision makers with enough 
information to make an informed choice, as there would be no opportunity cost 
associated with accepting a scenario and therefore little reason not to accept 
every scenario. 
With respect to PTO, Nord (1995a), Menzel (1999) and Ubel et al. (2000) 
argued that it is particularly suited to considering the trade-offs inherent in 
allocating societal healthcare resources, as PTO judgements extend beyond 
utility to include considerations of fairness and equity.  As noted earlier 
however, respondents often find the task complex, difficult, and even offensive, 
and many respondents refused to make trade-offs between groups despite clear 
differences in severity and health gains.  The results of a very small pre-pilot test 
of this method performed as part of this study are consistent with these findings, 
as most respondents reported a great deal of difficulty arriving at a specific 
person equivalence value.  Although some investigators have used a ping-pong 
format to make the task easier, this may negate the reflective nature that Nord 
(1995a) and others view as an advantage of the method.  A number of authors 
have noted in the context of contingent valuation that dichotomous iterative 
choice tasks can be associated with a start point bias, as well as a yea-saying bias, 
where respondents may feel increasing pressure to accept an alternative as the 
number of iterations grows (Swallow et al. 2001; Chien et al. 2005).  The need to 
fundamentally alter the response format from matching to iterative choice would 
seem to suggest that although the conceptual basis of PTO is sound, it may be 
too difficult – cognitively and ethically – for respondents to complete as 
originally envisioned.  This recalls Mullen’s (1999) observation that “theoretical 
validity does not always coincide with acceptability, people’s comprehension 
and even people’s value systems.”  Indeed, Pinto Prades (1997), in specific 
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reference to the difficulty respondents had in expressing their preferences with 
the PTO, quotes Fischhoff et al. (1993): “if subjects cannot use the response 
mode most convenient to investigators, then investigators must find a response 
mode that works for subjects.” 
Indirect constant sum paired comparison also seems well suited to the 
elicitation of preferences over the allocation of healthcare resources, given its 
simultaneous consideration of budget constraints, opportunity costs, health 
outcomes and patient characteristics (Schwappach 2003).  The CSPC allocation 
task makes it explicit that prioritising one patient group means that the other 
must necessarily receive lower priority.  The task can force a recognition of the 
same trade-offs as the PTO if the number of patients treated is included as one of 
the attributes, but it would seem to do so in a more intuitive, less direct, and 
arguably less discomforting manner.  Although Schwappach and Strasman 
(2006) reported that 10 percent of respondents to a CSPC elicitation refused to 
make differential budget allocations, this was well below the 91 percent of 
respondents who refused to make a trade-off in a PTO reported by Damschroder 
(2007), and the 32 percent reported by Nord (1995a).  These may reflect a refusal 
to trade-off over what Bartels and Medin (2007) referred to as ‘protected values,’ 
and Scott (2002) called ‘rights-based’ preferences.  Schwappach and Strasmann 
(2006) argued that the ability to allocate points or budget shares to less preferred 
groups may allow respondents to avoid compromises over such values and make 
the task more acceptable to respondents.  Indeed, this is consistent with a 
principle of fairness in the allocation of healthcare highlighted by Giacomini et 
al. (2012): namely, that everybody should get something and nobody should get 
nothing.  In this sense, although CSPC may not necessarily elicit a better answer 
than PTO, it may be better at eliciting an answer, if respondents are more likely 
to compromise over budget shares than persons.  Although the use of CSPC in 
health economics is not widespread, and its basis in choice theory is less clear 
than some of the other methods (Ryan et al. 2001), it has been used successfully 
in a number of elicitations of preferences and values in the allocation of 
healthcare resources, in addition to the studies noted above (see for example 
Chan et al. 2006; Linley & Hughes 2012; Ratcliffe 2000).   
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Finally, discrete choice experiments have the advantage of being 
relatively easy for respondents to grasp and having a solid basis in probabilistic 
choice theory (Kjær 2005; Ryan et al. 2001).  They also clearly highlight the 
trade-offs and opportunity costs associated with choosing one alternative over 
the other.  Indeed, the fact that some investigators have suggested reformatting 
the PTO matching task as a series of linked choices between alternatives suggests 
that many of the advantages of the PTO can be reproduced with a DCE.  They 
are increasingly being used in health economics for eliciting individual as well as 
societal preferences, and have been successfully used to elicit societal preferences 
over the allocation of healthcare resources (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, et al. 2010).   
Relative to CSPC, a DCE task is likely to be more competitive and less 
reflective, as the emphasis is on picking the best (or avoiding the worst) rather 
than matching, in some sense, the value of two alternatives.  DCE also forces an 
extreme ‘all-or-nothing’ distribution that may not be consistent with respondent 
preferences for the allocation of healthcare resources, particularly when such 
distributions may involve trade-offs over rights that respondents may feel should 
not or cannot be compromised in pursuit of other goals.  CSPC may be more 
acceptable to respondents in this context, given its ability to avoid extreme 
distributions.  In allowing respondents to express preferences for specific 
resource distributions, including equality or maximisation, it may also be a 
richer source of preference data than the forced-choice task of the DCE.  
However, CSPC presents a much more challenging task to respondents 
compared to DCE, and this may lead respondents to choose equal allocations as 
a way to opt out of difficult allocation tasks, even if they are not truly indifferent 
to the two alternatives.  In light of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages 
of both methods, it was decided to proceed with both approaches in a pilot study 
to compare the response characteristics of DCE and CSPC.  From this 
comparison, discussed in the next chapter, a preferred method would be chosen 
for the primary elicitation.   
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4.5 Other studies using CSPC or DCE methods 
A methodological summary of other studies using CSPC or DCE stated 
preference elicitations in a societal healthcare context is presented in Table 4.2 
below.  It highlights the study sample, administration format, and analysis 
methods, including the regression model, if applicable, and other comparisons or 
descriptive statistics reported as part of the study. 
Table 4.2: Summary of recent DCE and CSPC methods 
Study 
Sample & 
administration 
Analysis methods 
CSPC 
Ubel & Loewenstein 
(1996) 
Prospective jurors 
(N=169) 
Self-administered 
paper survey 
Categorical: proportion of respondents by categorical 
distribution of livers and proportion of respondents by 
reason for allocation. 
Qualitative descriptions and quantitative summary of 
reasons for allocation. 
Abellan-Perpinan &  
Pinto-Prades (1999) 
Undergraduate 
students (N=149) 
Self-administered 
paper survey 
Categorical: proportion of respondents by categorical 
allocation of monetary budget. 
Ratcliffe (2000) University employees 
(N=303) 
Self-administered 
paper survey 
Additive random and fixed effects linear models and 
fixed-effects double-bounded tobit model.  
Respondent ranking of importance of individual 
attributes. 
Proportions by difficulty rating and with dominant or 
strictly egalitarian preferences. 
Schwappach (2003) Undergraduate 
students (N=154) 
Self-administered 
internet survey 
Additive double-bounded random effects tobit or 
random effects linear model. 
Proportions by difficulty rating and dominant or strictly 
egalitarian preferences. 
Chan (2006) Random households 
(N=281) 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Additive random effects linear model.  
Respondent ranking of importance of individual 
attributes. 
Proportions with dominant or strictly egalitarian 
preferences. 
Desser et al. (2010) Random sample of 
online survey panel 
(N=1547) 
Self-administered 
internet survey 
Categorical: proportion of respondents favouring rare 
or common disease, or indifferent. 
Likert scale attitudinal questions 
Linley & Hughes (2012) Representative UK 
online survey panel 
(N=4118) 
Self-administered 
Categorical: proportion of respondents favouring one 
group or the other, by each attribute independently. 
Logistic regression to test association between 
respondent characteristics and preference across 
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internet survey each attribute independently. 
DCE 
Bryan et al. (2002) Random households 
(N=909) 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Additive random effects binary probit. 
Proportions with dominant preferences or choosing 
non-dominant alternative in test of non-satiation. 
Baltussen et al. (2006) Convenience sample 
of decision makers 
(N=30) 
Group self-
administered paper 
survey 
Additive random effects logistic model. 
Dolan et al. (2008) Random households 
(N=559)  
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Social welfare function to estimate inequality aversion 
and marginal rates of substitution for different 
attribute combinations. 
Subgroup analysis of preferences by observed 
respondent characteristics. 
Green & Gerard (2009) Random-location 
quota sampling 
(N=259) 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Additive fixed effects conditional logit model. 
Proportions choosing non-dominant alternative in test 
of non-satiation and rating task as difficult. 
Koopmanschap et al. 
(2010) 
Convenience sample 
of policy-makers, 
HTA practitioners 
and health 
economics students 
(N=66) 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Pooled additive multinomial logit model. 
Subgroup analysis of preferences by interacting 
attributes and subgroup. 
Diederich et al. (2012) Representative 
German sample 
(N=2031) 
Computer-assisted 
personal interviews 
(CAPI) 
Pooled additive multinomial logit model. 
Attribute relative importance. 
 
Lancsar et al. (2011) Representative UK 
sample (N=587) 
Computer-assisted 
personal interviews 
(CAPI) 
Log-linear and ‘powered’ log-linear conditional logit 
model, allowing for clustering of standard errors. 
Distributional QALY weights based on compensating 
variations 
Norman et al. (2013) Representative 
Australian sample 
(N=616) 
Self-administered 
internet survey 
Additive random effects probit with interactions 
between categorical main effects and LE gain. 
Equity weights as ratio of expected utility relative to 
reference scenario. 
Subgroup analysis of preferences by observed 
respondent characteristics. 
Shah et al. (2012) Representative UK 
sample (N=4008) 
Self-administered 
Additive conditional logit model with interactions. 
Subgroup analysis of preferences by observed 
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internet survey respondent characteristics. 
Proportions choosing non-dominant alternative in test 
of non-satiation. 
 
Four of the seven CSPC elicitations took a categorical approach, 
describing the proportion of respondents that favoured one group or the other, or 
were indifferent between the two, in their allocations.  Desser et al. (2010), for 
example, described the proportions of respondents that favoured prioritising 
patients with a rare disease, patients with a common disease, or were indifferent 
between them (i.e. an equal allocation to both).  The limitation of a categorical 
approach, though, is that in simplifying the continuous allocations to discrete 
categories, it discards information that would provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between attribute levels and preferences, as 
well as improve statistical efficiency.  In addition, a categorical approach cannot 
interpret the effect of multiple attributes simultaneously.  The other three CSPC 
studies took a regression approach, relating differences in the budget allocations 
to differences between attribute levels.  Reflecting the bounded nature of the 
response variable, Ratcliffe (2000) and Schwappach (2003) both tested a double-
bounded tobit model but ultimately settled on a random effects linear model as 
they found only minimal evidence of censoring in responses.  Chan (2006) used 
a random effects linear model without testing the fit of a tobit model.  In the 
analysis of DCE responses, all the studies used non-linear logit or probit models 
and most adopted a random effects specification to account for the panel nature 
of the data as each individual contributed multiple choice responses. 
As outlined earlier in equations 4.3 and 4.4, random utility theory 
assumes that for individual i, the latent utility associated with task t is a 
combination of a systematic component based on the sum of k observed attribute 
levels (   ) and their part-worth utilities (  ), and a random component, εit: 
    = ∑         
(4.5) 
A random effects specification further assumes that the random component can 
be disaggregated into an individual-specific term (μi), and a stochastic term (εit) 
(Baltagi 2008; Croissant & Millo 2008): 
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    = ∑             
(4.6) 
The individual-specific term is fixed for all choices by individual i but varies 
between individuals.  This allows for correlation between choices by the same 
respondent and for heterogeneity between different respondents.  In a random 
effects specification, though, the variability in latent utility between individuals 
reflects the pre-specified distributions of the individual and stochastic error terms 
and is not directly linked to heterogeneity in tastes or preferences (Morey & 
Greer Rossmann 2003).   
To identify differences in preferences by observed respondent 
characteristics, Dolan et al. (2008), Koopmanschap et al. (2010), Shah et al. 
(2012), Linley & Hughes (2012), and Norman et al. (2013) compared preferences 
between subgroups of respondents stratified by characteristics such as gender, 
age, children, health status, employment status, or professional role.  The studies 
found some evidence of heterogeneity in preferences over observed respondent 
characteristics, but this approach has the disadvantage of being strictly 
deterministic – all respondents in a particular group (e.g. males, or non-smokers) 
are assumed to share the same preferences (Boxall & Adamowicz 2002; Morey 
& Greer Rossmann 2003).   
Lesson from these DCE and CSPC analyses will be used to inform the 
analysis of the pilot elicitation, to be discussed in the next chapter, and the 
subsequent primary elicitation.  In addition, the potential benefits of a latent 
class approach as an alternative to the random effects specification, as well as to 
an assumption of strictly deterministic preferences by respondent subgroup, will 
be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 5:  
Pilot survey methods & results 
The review of stated preference elicitation methods identified the DCE 
and CSPC formats as having notable advantages over the others in eliciting 
societal preferences in a healthcare context.  As there was no clear theoretical 
basis for preferring one method over the other, however, it was decided to 
conduct an empirical comparison to identify a preferred method for the primary 
elicitation of societal preferences, as well as to refine the wording and 
presentation of the choice tasks.    
As noted in the previous chapter, DCE and CSPC methods are both 
consistent with random utility theory, and section 5.1 details this theoretical 
basis.  The remainder of the chapter describes the methods and results of the 
pilot survey.  The methods, outlined in section 5.2, are structured around a 
process described by Ryan (1999) that has become a standard in designing health 
economic stated preference surveys.  The empirical ethics review discussed in 
Chapter 3 represented the first stage, the identification of attributes.  The second 
stage was to assign levels to these attributes that were both realistic but that also 
allowed consideration of the full range of values that may be relevant to 
respondents.  The third stage was the experimental design – the systematic 
combination of attributes and levels that was presented to respondents in order 
to observe their choices.  This stage had to balance statistical efficiency with 
‘respondent efficiency’ (Severin 2001), in the sense that there is a limit to the 
cognitive capacity of any respondent to process the information presented by an 
experimental design (Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008).  This section also discusses the 
assumption of rationality that underlies all stated preference approaches, and the 
tests of rationality that are often incorporated into experimental design.  The 
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fourth stage was data collection, which was conducted with a convenience 
sample to compare the response behaviours of the two formats and to pilot test 
the wording and presentation of the choice tasks.  The fifth stage of the methods 
describes statistical methods used in analysing and interpreting the DCE and 
CSPC choice data.  The emphasis was on comparative measures such as 
response behaviour and ease of completion, but the importance weights derived 
from the choice data are also described.  Finally, the results are presented in 
section 5.3, and the implications of these results for the identification of a 
preferred format are discussed in section 5.4.   
5.1 DCE and CSPC in the context of random utility theory 
DCE tasks ask respondents to choose between two alternatives in 
straightforward manner, and clearly highlight the trade-offs and opportunity 
costs associated with choosing one alternative over the other (Kjær 2005; Ryan 
et al. 2001).  In a random utility model of discrete choice, the probability of 
choosing alternative i from choice set [i,j] is assumed to be proportional to the 
difference in latent utility (U) between the alternatives: 
     (       =      (         (5.1) 
This can be re-written to incorporate the systematic (v) and stochastic (ε) 
components of random utility for each alternative, consistent with random 
utility: 
 
    (      =     [(       (        
=     [(           (                 
(5.2) 
In this model, the probability of choosing alternative i from choice set [i,j] is 
proportional to the difference in systematic utility.  The greater vi relative to vj, 
the greater the probability of a decision maker choosing alternative i.  Relating 
differences in observed utility (vi - vj) to the observed probability of choice means 
that systematic utility can be measured on the same cardinal scale as probability 
(Kjær 2005; Green & Gerard 2009; Ali & Ronaldson 2012).   
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CSPC tasks present two or more alternatives in the same form as a DCE, 
but ask respondents to allocate points or shares between alternatives, where the 
relative allocation is assumed to reflect the relative importance or priority the 
respondents attach to each alternative (Mullen 1999).  Although this is a more 
cognitively demanding task than DCE, Schwappach (2003) argues that CSPC is 
unique among stated preference methods in explicitly linking budget constraints, 
opportunity costs, health outcomes and patient characteristics in the 
consideration of preferences.  The theoretical basis for CSPC is less clear than for 
DCE, but Carson and Louviere (2011) suggest that CSPC can be seen as utility 
maximisation subject to a budget constraint.  In the context of random utility 
theory, this implies that the goal of the respondent is to maximise utility (U) by 
allocating a fixed budget (B) between alternatives i and j: 
  =   (     ε     (     ε ) ∑   =  
 
   
 (5.3) 
Where v and ε are the systematic and stochastic components of latent utility as in 
5.2 above, and bi and bj are the shares of the budget allocated to alternative i and 
j, respectively, subject to the constraint that these shares must sum to the fixed 
budget.  Louviere et al. (2000a) suggest that the difference in the budget shares 
reflect the differences in latent utility between the alternatives: 
 (         [(      )   (ε   ε )  (5.4) 
Analogous to the probabilistic model of discrete choice shown in 5.2, a budget 
difference of zero (an equal 50%-50% allocation) implies that there is no 
difference in the latent utility of the two alternatives, while a positive (negative) 
budget differences implies that the latent utility associated with alternative i is 
greater (less) than alternative j.  As these differences provide cardinal strength of 
preference information, CSPC tasks, and ordered-response tasks more generally, 
tend to produce more strongly ordered preference data than DCE, giving them a 
potential advantage in terms of statistical efficiency (Louviere et al. 2000a; 
Swallow et al. 2001).  This statistical advantage may be offset, though, if a 
substantial proportion of respondents find the CSPC too cognitively demanding 
and adopt simplifying strategies in their responses. 
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5.2 Stated preference design 
This section describes the five stage process that was followed in design, 
administering and analysing the DCE and CSPC questionnaires: the 
identification of attributes, the assignment of levels, the development of the 
experimental design, data collection, and data analysis (Ryan 1999).  Each of 
these stages is described in turn below. 
5.2.1 Identification of attributes 
The number of unique scenarios possible for a set of attributes is given by 
LA, where L is the number of levels within an attribute and A is the number of 
attributes, and shows that the number of possible choice scenarios increases 
exponentially with the number of attributes (Hensher et al. 2005).  As the 
statistical power of any stated preference elicitation is a function of the number 
of respondents and the number of choice tasks completed by each respondent, 
this means that that for each additional attribute in an elicitation, a greater 
number of scenarios must be presented to respondents to achieve a given 
statistical power (Orme 2006b).  Given finite limits to the number of potential 
respondents, and the time they are willing to devote to completing an elicitation, 
this means that there is a practical limit to the number of attributes than can 
reasonably be included in any stated preference task.   
There may also be cognitive limits to the ability of respondents to process 
choice tasks, limiting the number of attributes that can be included in an 
elicitation.  Louviere et al. (2000b), though, argue against such a theoretical 
limit, and this appears to supported in part by empirical work from Weiss (1982).  
She tested the impact of increasing decision complexity in a choice task in terms 
of the quantity of information presented to decision makers and found that the 
marginal uptake as new information was added to a scenario was positive 
(decision makers used more information as more was presented).  However, she 
also found an increase in cognitive strain and a decline in the proportion of all 
available information used by respondents as complexity increased (decision 
makers ignored more information as complexity increased).  In a similar study, 
Wright (1975) tested for a tendency toward non-compensatory decision making 
as complexity increased, and found that decision makers “become increasingly 
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unidimensional under moderate information load.”  This suggests that decision 
makers stop considering compensatory trade-offs between attributes and focus on 
maximising fewer and fewer attributes as decision complexity increases.  Both of 
these results are consistent with Simon’s (1955) model of satisficing in response 
to decision complexity, where he proposed that decision makers make increasing 
use of simplifying decision rules as complexity increases, sacrificing utility 
maximisation to minimise cognitive effort.  
A psychological explanation for simplification in the face of decision 
complexity is provided by Miller (1956), who suggested that humans can only 
process “seven, plus or minus two” separate pieces of information any one time.  
This finding is the basis for Froberg and Kane (1989) recommending that no 
more than nine attributes, and preferable fewer, should be included in a stated 
preference choice task.  DeShazo and Fermo (2002) provide more empirical 
support in reporting that an increase in the number of attributes in a choice task 
from between four and seven to nine increased the variance in the random 
component of utility, and that this variance outweighed any potential increase in 
decision consistency as a result of a more complete description of the 
alternatives.  On these bases, seven attributes was taken as the maximum 
number that could be feasibly included in the pilot elicitations.  This limit is also 
consistent with several recent reviews of conjoint surveys in healthcare, which 
found that most elicitations included no more than 6 attributes (Green & Gerard 
2009; de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, et al. 2010; Marshall et al. 2010).   
Beyond how many attributes can be included in an elicitation is the 
critical question of which attributes should be included (Hall et al. 2004), but 
there is little consensus on the most appropriate methods or sources for 
identifying such attributes – theory, existing measures and scales, literature 
reviews, focus groups, clinical trials, key informant interviews and expert 
opinion all can and have been used (Kjær 2005; Coast & Horrocks 2007).  In this 
case, the empirical ethics literature review described in Chapter 3 found four 
attributes that had empirical evidence of support and a defensible ethical 
justification: patient age, initial severity, final health state, duration of benefit, 
and the distribution of health benefits.  To allow for conceptions of severity 
based on health state as well as proximity to death, this concept was decomposed 
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into two separate attributes: initial health state and life expectancy without 
treatment.  Life years gained with treatment was included to allow for an 
estimate of the duration of benefit, as well as to test societal support for the 
principles of strict QALY maximisation, despite ambiguous evidence for 
duration or absolute gain as relevant factors in the empirical ethics review.  To 
consider distributional preferences, the number of patients that could be treated 
under each alternative was included as an attribute.  Together, these attributes 
allowed for the calculation of the aggregate QALYs gained with each 
alternative.10  Aggregate QALYs gained was fixed in each DCE alternative, but 
varied with the number of patients treated in each CSPC alternative.  As noted 
previously, cost was not included as an attribute. 
5.2.2 Assigning levels 
There are no clear rules for assigning numeric or qualitative levels to 
attributes, but in general the levels should be plausible and realistic to 
respondents and constructed so that they are willing to make trade-offs between 
attributes (Ryan 1999).  The range between the highest and lowest levels of an 
attribute should also be large enough to include all relevant levels, but not so 
large as to be unrealistic.  However, as the ISPOR Conjoint Analysis Best 
Practices Task Force (Bridges et al. 2010) notes, “attribute levels should 
encompass the range that may be salient to subjects, even if those levels are 
hypothetical or not feasible given current technology.”  The importance of an 
appropriate range is highlighted by Kjær (2005), who emphasised that “an 
insignificant coefficient does not necessarily mean that the attribute is 
unimportant to respondents; the correct interpretation is that the attribute did not 
influence the choice for given levels.”  
 A change in the level of an attribute is associated with a change in the 
utility of that attribute.  Increasing the number of levels in an attribute provides 
more information on the form of the utility function – two levels allow the 
estimation of a strictly linear utility function, while more levels provide more 
                                                 
10 Aggregate QALYs gained = [(life expectancy + life years gained) × final utility – (life 
expectancy × initial utility)] × patients treated 
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information on the shape of the utility function (Hensher et al. 2005) – but 
increasing the number of levels within an attribute has also been shown to be 
associated with ‘level bias,’ where increasing the number of levels in an attribute 
tends to increase the significance of that attribute in respondents’ choices.  That 
is, an attribute with 5 levels will often be more significant than an attribute with 
3 levels, even if the end-points are the same (Kjær 2005).  In addition, as the 
number of levels in any attribute increase, so does the number of choice 
scenarios required to achieve a given level of statistical power.  To balance the 
issues of statistical efficiency and level bias with information on the shape of the 
utility function, each attribute was therefore assigned three levels.  As the 
objective of the stated preference elicitations was to elicit respondents’ 
preferences over a wide spectrum of hypothetical program alternatives, the levels 
of each attribute were evenly spaced and set as widely as possible across a 
plausible range.  The specific levels assigned to each attribute are shown in Table 
5.1: 
Table 5.1: Pilot survey attributes and levels 
Level Age Initial utility 
Initial life 
expectancy 
Final utility 
Gain in life 
expectancy 
Patients 
treated 
1 10 .1 1m .1 1y 500 
2 40 .5 5y .5 5y 2,000 
3 70 .9 10y .9 10y 5,000 
 
 The levels for age were intended to test preferences for the young, middle-
aged and elderly.  Similarly, levels for initial and final health states were 
intended to test preferences for poor, moderate and excellent health.  To simplify 
the presentation of health-related for respondents, each health state was 
described on a hypothetical 0 to 10 numerical scale, with 0 representing dead 
and 10 representing perfect health.  The characteristics of the levels presented in 
the tasks were described using health state profiles based on EQ-5D dimensions, 
similar to the approach used by Schwappach (2003).  A minimum life 
expectancy before treatment of 1 month was intended to represent imminent 
death while avoiding implausible combinations associated with zero life 
expectancy but positive utility.  The minimum gain in life expectancy after 
treatment was chosen to be a minimal yet meaningful gain, while the maximum 
gain in life expectancy after treatment was chosen to be plausible when 
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considered in combination with maximum age and initial life expectancy.  
Defining the appropriate levels for the number of patients treated was analogous 
to the challenge of defining the budget in the CSPC – respondents would likely 
have difficulty coping with counts that reflected national populations, while 
small patient counts risked respondents not recognising trade-offs between levels 
and effectively ignoring the attribute.  As such, an upper level of 5000 patients 
was chosen to represent a comprehensible number of patients, and the lower 
level was defined to allow for a meaningful distinction between the levels.  The 
middle level was simply the approximate midpoint.  See Appendix 5.1 for the 
attribute descriptions provided to respondents. 
5.2.3 Experimental design 
The systematic plan for the presentation of different attributes and 
attribute levels in order to observe respondent choices is known as the 
experimental design (Louviere et al. 2000b; Hensher et al. 2005).  The most 
comprehensive experimental design is a full factorial, in which every possible 
combination of attributes and levels is presented.  The key advantage of a full 
factorial design is that each attribute and level appears an equal number of times 
and each attribute-level combination appears with every other attribute-level 
combination at least once.  This allows the effect of each attribute-level 
combination, including two-way and higher order interactions, on choice to be 
estimated independently of each other, known as orthogonality.  However, given 
the 6 attributes noted above, each with 3 levels, the number of possible 
combinations in a full factorial design is 36 = 729.  This is clearly too many tasks 
to present to any respondent, and it highlights the key drawback of a full factorial 
design; namely, that it often results in an impractical and unmanageable 
experimental design (Louviere et al. 2000b). 
A more practical alternative to a full factorial is a fractional factorial 
design, which presents only a subset of possible combinations to any one 
respondent.  Orthogonal fractional designs focus on creating statistically 
independent designs with no correlations between attributes while largely 
disregarding statistical efficiency.  Optimal fractional factorial designs, on the 
other hand, focus primarily on maximising statistical efficiency – extracting the 
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maximum amount of information from respondents, subject to constraints such 
as the number of attributes in the design, the number of levels, and the number of 
tasks in the elicitation (Carlsson & Martinsson 2003).  Recall that a full factorial 
design includes all possible combinations of attributes and levels, and allows for 
every main effect, as well as all two-way and higher order interactions, to be 
estimated independently (Kuhfeld et al. 1994).  If not all of these effects are of 
interest, the size of an experimental design can be reduced without sacrificing 
precision in the relevant parameter estimates by allowing some correlation 
between irrelevant parameters.   
An efficient optimal fractional factorial design maximises the precision of 
the parameter estimates – or equivalently, minimise the variance of those 
estimates – for a given set of constraints.  The statistical efficiency of different 
designs can be compared in terms of A-efficiency, G-efficiency or D-efficiency.  
All three measures are highly correlated, but D-efficiency is used most often, 
mainly because it is less computationally burdensome than the other measures 
(Carlsson & Martinsson 2003; Kuhfeld et al. 1994).  A D-efficient design relates 
to the covariance matrix (Ω) of the model to be estimated (Hensher et al. 2005; 
Carlsson & Martinsson 2003): 
  Ω = ∑ ∑ ∑      
         
 
   
 
   
 
    (5.5) 
Where      is a vector of attribute levels presented to individual i in alternative j 
or task set t, and      is the probability of choosing that alternative, which 
McFadden (1974) showed is given by: 
 
  (       =
       
∑            
 
(5.6) 
Where    is the vector of utility weights associated with alternative     .  A D-
efficient design seeks to minimise D-error, calculated as the determinant of the 
geometric mean of the inverse of the covariance matrix, Ω: 
 D-error = [   (     
 
 ⁄  (5.7) 
Where k is the number of parameters to be estimated from the design.  
Minimising D-error has the effect of minimising the variance-covariance matrix 
of the model, known as the Fisher information matrix, and maximising the 
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statistical efficiency of the experimental design (Hensher et al. 2005; Carlsson & 
Martinsson 2003; Kuhfeld et al. 1994).  However, as shown in equations 5.5 and 
5.6, the D-error of a particular design depends on the choice probability of each 
alternative in that design.  This leads to the paradoxical result that an efficient 
experimental design requires prior knowledge about the very parameters that the 
stated preference elicitation is trying to estimate.   
The importance of knowing the choice probability of each alternative 
stems from the criteria for an optimally efficient non-linear choice design 
identified by Huber and Zwerina (1996): level balance, orthogonality, minimal 
overlap and utility balance.  The design is non-linear because the response 
variable, choice, is discrete rather than continuous.  Although the response 
variable in the CSPC tasks is continuous, the CSPC questionnaire was based on 
the same experimental design as the DCE as the design principles are similar for 
the two formats.  Level balance implies that each level appears with equal 
frequency in the overall design.  Orthogonality refers to the statistical 
independence of the attributes.  Minimal overlap means that the same attribute 
level should not appear in more than one alternative in a particular choice task.  
Finally, utility balance means that the probability of each alternative being 
chosen is roughly equal, and that there are no clearly dominated alternatives in 
the choice set.  Little preference information is generated if one alternative is 
dominated by the other; selection of the dominant alternative simply 
demonstrates that a respondent is rational by the axioms of choice theory 
(Johnson et al. 2007).  There is a limit to the desirability of utility balance, 
though, as at the extreme a perfectly balanced scenario would, in effect, be a 
random choice between two equally attractive alternatives and would not 
generate any useful choice information (Kanninen 2002).  Optimising utility 
balance requires information on the choice probability of each alternative, 
although Carlsson and Martinsson (2003) show that when no prior information 
is available, it can be assumed that the choice probabilities of all the alternatives 
are equal, even though this limits the potential efficiency of a design.  They argue 
that the utility balance requirement of an efficient design should be seen as an 
imperative for pilot work that can inform the design of the primary elicitation. 
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To ensure that correlations between the effects of interest are minimised, 
a model must be pre-specified at the design stage.  The degrees of freedom 
required to estimate this model determine the minimum number of choice sets 
that must be included the experimental design (Hensher et al. 2005).  For a main 
effects model with categorical parameters, the degrees of freedom are given by 
A(L-1), where A is the number of parameters to be estimated and L is the number 
of levels.  For continuous parameters, the degrees of freedom required are simply 
A.  To estimate two-way categorical interactions, the additional degrees of 
freedom required are given by (L-1)×(L-1), while continuous interactions require 
1 degree of freedom each.  One degree of freedom is also required to estimate the 
model.  For simplicity in the pilot phase, only the main effects for the six 3-level 
attributes noted in section 5.2.2 were estimated.  As this estimation required 12 
degrees of freedom, plus one degree for estimation, the pilot survey required a 
minimum of 13 choice sets.  However, as the SAS® design macros showed that a 
design of this size would not achieve level balance, an optimal design could not 
be generated for 13 choice sets.  Instead, the smallest feasible design with at least 
13 degrees of freedom was 18 choice sets.   
The design process started with a 36 full factorial candidate design with 
attributes for age, initial health state, initial life expectancy, final health state, life 
years gained and the number of patients.  As a product of the other attributes, 
aggregate QALYs were not included as a separate attribute in the experimental 
design.  Illogical attribute combinations where the net QALY gain with 
treatment was negative were excluded from the final design, but combinations 
where the aggregate QALYs gained was zero were included if an increase in 
quality was offset by a deterioration in life expectancy, or vice versa.  Scenarios 
where health state and life expectancy were unchanged before and after 
treatment were also excluded.  Although it could be argued that such a scenario 
might represent the maintenance of current health through preventative care, it 
leads to a confusing choice task.  This exclusion can also be justified on the 
grounds that preferences for the direction of health benefit were considered and 
rejected in the empirical ethics review.  Of the 729 scenarios in the full factorial 
design, 135 (19%) were excluded as illogical.  Note that such exclusions are 
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likely to introduce some correlations between the attributes in the remaining 
scenarios (Bridges et al. 2010). 
A D-efficient fractional factorial design was generated using Kuhfeld’s 
(2010) SAS® macros.  The D-error of different combinations of the 594 logical 
scenarios from the candidate design was evaluated using a modified Fedorov 
algorithm (Johnson et al. 2007; Kuhfeld 2010).  This algorithm generated a 
random design from the candidate design, subject to the specified number of 
choice sets and alternatives per choice set.  For each choice set in this initial 
design, the algorithm replaced one alternative with a random alternative from 
the eligible scenarios and evaluated the change in D-error.  If it was an 
improvement, the algorithm moved on to the next choice set.  This was repeated 
for all choice sets until D-error was minimised for that particular design.  This 
process was repeated 100 times and the design with the lowest D-error was 
selected.  As Kuhfeld et al. (1994) note, this process will find an efficient design, 
but there is no guarantee that it will find the most efficient design.   Also, as noted 
above, this algorithm is most effective when prior preference weights can be 
incorporated into the design algorithm (Carlsson & Martinsson 2003), but as 
these weights were not known in the pilot phase the algorithm assumed that all 
scenarios had equal choice probabilities.   
The final design had 18 choice sets, but as the literature suggested that 
this was likely an excessive number of choice sets to present to a single 
respondent (Bridges et al. 2010), it was evenly divided into two subsets, or 
blocks, of 9 choice tasks per respondent.  The design macros optimised the 
blocking strategy so as to avoid any interactions with the blocking variable itself.  
Block 1 of the design was used for the DCE questionnaire, and block 2 was used 
for the CSPC questionnaire.  Although this simplified questionnaire 
administration, it violated the principles of optimal experimental design and 
further limited the statistical efficiency of the elicitations (Carlsson & 
Martinsson 2003).  For this reason, the preference data derived from the pilot 
survey should be viewed as secondary to the comparison of the response 
behaviours with the two elicitation formats.   
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5.2.4 Stated preferences & rationality 
Stated preference elicitations assume that respondents are rational, or 
more specifically, that their preferences are complete and transitive (Lancsar & 
Louviere 2006).  Completeness holds that individuals are able to rank every 
alternative as more preferred, less preferred or indifferent relative to all other 
alternatives.  This allows for the possibility of utility functions and non-
intersecting indifference curves.  Transitivity holds that if an individual prefers x 
to y, and y to z, then they will also prefer x to z.  Transitivity rules out the 
possibility that preferences may ‘cycle.’  An individual holding some quantity of 
x, who prefers x to y, and y to z, but intransitively prefers z to x, would in theory 
be willing to pay some premium to trade x for z, z for y, and y for x.  After a cycle 
of irrational trading, the individual would be back where they started, holding x, 
but worse-off for having paid a premium at each trade.  In the context of 
revealed preferences – that is, preferences revealed by actual choices – it is 
assumed that the market will quickly exploit, and thereby correct, irrational 
preferences.  However, as McFadden (1999) notes, there is no market in the 
context of stated preferences, and therefore no endogenous mechanism to correct 
irrational preferences.  It has therefore been felt necessary to include tests of 
rationality in stated preference elicitations to prevent irrational preferences from 
biasing the results.  A test of transitivity involves a systematic series of tasks, 
included among those presented as part of the experimental design, over which 
respondents are asked to choose between x and y, y and z, and z and x.  
Respondents whose choices are not consistent with transitivity are flagged as 
irrational and generally excluded from further analysis. 
As recent stated preference research has highlighted, though, seemingly 
irrational preferences can be based on rational reasons, particularly when 
respondents may have inferred information that was not included, or intended, 
as part of the choice task (Miguel et al. 2005; Ryan 2009; Giacomini et al. 2012).  
This can be exacerbated by the fact that rationality is often judged according to 
the researcher’s expectation of the preferred alternative, which may itself reflect 
bias or omitted information through poor task design (Lancsar & Louviere 
2006).  McFadden (1999) argues that to accurately characterise responses as 
irrational, it is necessary to understand a respondent’s perceptions, beliefs, 
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attitudes, motives and preferences.  All of this calls into question the ability of 
simple tests to distinguish between rational and irrational preferences.  In 
general, Lancsar and Louviere (2006) argue that even though it is clear that not 
all preferences are rational, “it may not be the case that all preferences labelled as 
‘irrational’ are indeed so.”  They go on to argue that such irrational responses 
should not be excluded from interpretation without a very strong theory or 
empirical evidence to support doing so, and that to do otherwise is to risk 
imposing the researcher’s a priori expectations and preferences on the data.  As a 
practical matter, rationality tests can also add a considerable number of tasks to 
an experimental design, adding to the time it takes to complete a survey and 
potentially adversely affecting completion rates and the attentiveness of 
respondents (Miguel et al. 2005). 
Preferences are also generally assumed to be monotonic, stable, and 
continuous, although these axioms are not essential to rationality (Lancsar & 
Louviere 2006; Ryan 2009).  Monotonicity implies that preferred attributes are 
‘goods’ and that more of a good is always preferred to less.  Stable, or 
immutable, preferences imply that if x is preferred to y now, x will continue to be 
preferred to y in the future, or at least until there is a material change in the 
relative value of x and y.  Finally, continuous, or compensatory, preferences 
imply that a deterioration in one attribute can be compensated for by an 
improvement in another.  The assumption of compensatory decision making is 
fundamental to choice-based stated preference elicitations, even though 
compensatory decision making is cognitively demanding, as it requires decision 
makers to calculate – implicitly or explicitly – the positive or negative utility 
derived from the level each attribute, and aggregate utility over each alternative.   
Evidence from the psychology literature, though, suggests that decision 
makers are more likely to be ‘cognitive misers,’ who view decision making a 
trade-off between the desire to make an optimal decision (the decision benefit) 
and the desire to minimise the decision cost in terms of cognitive effort or time 
(Hogarth & Karelaia 2005; Payne et al. 1993; Wright 1975).  Compensatory 
strategies may also require trade-offs that respondents find difficult, or even 
offensive, particularly if they view the choices to be between rights that should 
not or cannot be compromised in pursuit of other goals (Bartels & Medin 2007; 
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Scott 2002).  This seems particularly likely in the context of healthcare, where a 
number of studies of have reported that respondents are often reluctant to choose 
between different patient, viewing such choices as ‘playing god’ (Cookson & 
Dolan 1999; Dolan & Cookson 2000; Litva et al. 2002).  
Non-compensatory strategies function as ‘heuristics’ or decision short-
cuts that allow decision makers to minimise decision effort and avoid explicit 
trade-offs between attributes (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011; Hogarth & 
Karelaia 2005; Wright 1975).  One of the most common heuristics, particularly 
in the context of a paired stated preference elicitation, is a dominant preference, 
where a respondent always chooses the alternative with the preferred level of a 
particular attribute, regardless of the levels of the other attributes (Brandstatter et 
al. 2006; Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996; Scott 2002).  If the levels of the 
dominant attribute are equivalent, trade-offs can take place between the other 
attributes.  Lexicographic preferences are a more specific case of dominant 
preferences where no trade-offs between any attributes takes place.  All attributes 
are ranked by decreasing importance and the decision weight of each attribute is 
greater than the sum of all weights that come after it.  If the levels of the most 
important attribute are equivalent, then the levels of the second most important 
attribute are compared, and so on until a preferred alternative is identified 
(Hogarth & Karelaia 2005; Scott 2002).   
Dominant or lexicographic preferences are not irrational as they do not 
violate the axioms of completeness, transitivity or stability (Mathews et al. 2007; 
Lancsar & Louviere 2006).  Indeed, a dominant or lexicographic preference for 
aggregate QALY gains is the definition of rationality within the QALY 
maximising framework.  However, such preferences cannot be represented by an 
indifference curve, and as no trading takes place over some or all attributes, 
marginal rates of substitution have no meaning (Louviere et al. 2000b; Scott 
2002).  For this reason, non-compensatory preferences are generally excluded in 
the interpretation of stated preference data (Lancsar & Louviere 2006; McIntosh 
& Ryan 2002; Scott 2002).  As Lancsar and Louviere (2006) note, though, it may 
be the case that what appears to be a lexicographic preference may simply be a 
reluctance to trade over the range of attributes levels in the experimental design.  
It may also suggest that some or most of the attributes included in the 
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experimental design are unimportant to some respondents.  Therefore, excluding 
apparently non-compensatory preferences can have the effect of excluding the 
strongest preferences.  The very nature of a fractional factorial experimental 
design also complicates the interpretation of non-compensatory preferences; as 
such designs present only a subset of all possible attribute and level 
combinations, it is not possible to say with certainty that observed instances of 
non-compensatory decision-making would persist across all possible scenarios 
(Lancsar & Louviere 2006; Scott 2002). 
Despite these limitations in identifying non-compensatory preferences, it 
was necessary to be able to distinguish respondents with dominant preferences 
for aggregate QALYs from those willing to sacrifice some QALY gains for 
equity objectives.  Therefore, the identification of QALY maximisers and other 
non-traders followed an approach outlined by Scott (2002).  He acknowledged 
the difficulty of identifying lexicographic preferences within a fractional factorial 
design, so to support the characterisation of a respondent as a ‘non-trader’, he 
applied two criteria.  First, dominant preferences were identified as “individuals 
who always choose the scenario where    is greater than   
 , no matter what the 
level of the other attributes” (Scott 2002).  Second, individuals with dominant 
preferences were classified as non-traders if they also rated that attribute as the 
most important factor in their decisions in a follow-up rating exercise.  This 
process is described in more detail in the data analysis section. 
A test of preference stability was also included, despite the reservations 
outlined above, in order to compare the DCE and CSPC formats.  Miguel et al. 
(2005) found that increasing choice complexity can lead to an increased 
incidence of ‘irrational’ responses, which may include unstable or inconsistent 
preferences.  Although it is true that many of individuals flagged as inconsistent 
may not necessarily be so, a significant difference in the proportions of 
inconsistent respondents between the DCE and CSPC may be indicative of an 
overly complex elicitation format.    
 125 
5.2.5 Data collection 
The first phase of the pilot data collection was conducted using informal 
interviews and focus groups to evaluate the comprehensibility and acceptability 
of the DCE and CSPC formats.  Focus groups were conducted in classes of 
undergraduate and graduate students in economics and epidemiology, as well as 
with individual decision makers, healthcare professionals and members of the 
general public.  Focus group participants were presented a short questionnaire 
with two DCE and two CSPC tasks and asked to offer their feedback on the 
relative ease or difficulty of understanding the choice task, and their ability to 
provide a meaningful response.  These comments were used to improve the 
wording and presentation of the tasks.  Choice responses collected in this phase 
were not included in the final dataset.  The second phase of the pilot data 
collection administered full DCE and CSPC questionnaires based on the blocked 
experimental design detailed above.  Responses were elicited from a convenience 
sample of respondents, including graduate and undergraduate students at 
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, and The University of 
Sheffield, UK, staff at the Capital District Health Authority in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, as well as the general public.   
The pilot questionnaires were administered via the internet.  Face-to-face 
administration of stated preference elicitations has significant benefits, including 
the ability to explain thoroughly the objectives of the survey and to provide 
timely feedback to respondents (Damschroder et al. 2004).  Damschroder et al. 
(2004) found that respondents to face-to-face surveys were also less likely to 
provide quick or irrational responses.  However, face-to-face administration is 
costly, time consuming and can often lead to small or selective samples.  
Relative to less personal elicitation formats, there is also evidence that face-to-
face interviews tend to increase ‘social desirability’ or ‘yea saying’ biases, where 
respondents offer the answer they perceive to be socially ‘correct’ or that will 
please the interviewer, rather than their true preference (Arrow et al. 1993; 
Leggett et al. 2003).  Although there are also limitations to a web-based 
approach, the validity of the approach is supported by Damschroder et al. 
(2004), who found no significant differences in PTO equivalence values elicited 
using face-to-face and computerised formats.  There is also evidence that web-
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based administration can minimise social desirability bias in accurately eliciting 
socially sensitive information (Kreuter et al. 2008).  Samples of the pilot DCE 
and CSPC choice tasks are shown in Appendix 5.1.   
Participants were randomised to either a DCE or CSPC questionnaire 
using a random number algorithm.  As each potential respondent followed an 
online link and was assigned a questionnaire, a record was written to a database 
indicating the assigned survey.  These counts were used as the denominator in 
calculating the completion rate for each survey.  The database counted each time 
an individual was assigned a questionnaire, but there was nothing to prevent an 
individual from being counted more than once.  For example, individuals who 
dropped out of an assigned survey but later returned and were re-randomised 
would have been counted more than once.  Additionally, there was no way to 
ensure that a returning participant was assigned to the same design that they 
originally started.  Therefore, to the extent that some individuals may have been 
double-counted, completion rates based on these counts were correspondingly 
underestimated.  No demographic information was collected at the time of 
randomisation, so it was not possible to calculate group-specific completion 
rates. 
Respondents were asked to imagine themselves as a societal decision 
maker responsible for allocating a fixed budget between two alternative 
healthcare programs.  They were told that both programs had the same cost, and 
that the budget was large enough to fully fund one program or the other, but not 
both.  The precise budget and the cost of the programs were not specified as 
realistic program costs are likely to be unfamiliar to respondents and may 
compromise their ability to make realistic allocations, while trivial sums risk 
respondents not taking the task seriously (Mullen 1999; Ryan et al. 2001).  The 
concept of cost-effectiveness was not mentioned, but the QALY maximising 
alternative under an assumption of equal costs will, by extension, also be the 
more cost-effective alternative, and some respondents may have recognised this 
fact.   
The DCE questionnaire asked respondents to allocate the entire budget to 
their preferred program, while the CSPC questionnaire asked respondents to 
allocate budget percentages between the two programs by moving a slider.  
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Respondents could allocate 100 percent of the budget to program A or program 
B, or to some combination of the two, including an equal 50-50 split.  The 
number of patients treated in each DCE task was fixed according to the levels in 
the experimental design, but the number of patients treated in the CSPC tasks 
was allowed to vary between zero and the maximum level defined by the 
experimental design in proportion to the budget allocated to each program (e.g. a 
25 percent budget allocation meant that 25 percent of the maximum potential 
number of patients could be treated).  It was felt that this would highlight the 
opportunity cost associated with different budget allocations.  The position of the 
CSPC slider was randomised between each task in order to minimise anchoring 
and framing effects (Boyle & Ozdemir 2009; Payne et al. 1993).   
The CSPC administered here was unique in dynamically linking attribute 
levels to the budget allocation.  Among the CSPC elicitations described in Table 
4.2, Schwappach (2003) and Desser et al. (2010) did not include any attributes 
that would vary with the relative budget allocation, while Linley and Hughes 
(2012) skipped the intermediate step of allocating a budget and directly asked 
respondents how many patients from each of two equally-sized groups they 
would prefer to treat.11  Linking the number of patients treated – and, indirectly, 
aggregate QALYs gained – to the relative budget share clearly highlighted the 
trade-off between the two alternatives.  This reality may be obscured in discrete 
choice tasks as respondents can choose one group without necessarily 
appreciating that the nature of the task implies that no patients from the other 
group will be treated.   
There is evidence that respondents may choose to avoid difficult choices 
by selecting an opt-out option, even when one alternative in the choice task may 
provide greater utility (Ryan & Gerard 2003; Kjær 2005).  For this reason, most 
DCEs in healthcare are based on a forced choice with no opt-out option.  
However, to minimise dropout from the pilot DCE questionnaire before ratings 
of difficulty and comprehension could be collected, it was decided to allow 
                                                 
11 This arguably moved the task conceptually closer to a PTO, which asks respondents how many 
outcomes of type X they would consider equivalent in terms of value to Y outcomes of another 
kind.  However, it is not clear that the final allocation of patients in a CSPC can be interpreted as 
an indifference point, or in terms of relative value, as it can in a PTO. 
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respondents to skip tasks without answering.  This option was labelled as ‘no 
answer’ and these responses were excluded from the analysis.  The nature of the 
CSPC tasks meant that respondents to that questionnaire could indicate equality 
or indifference between alternatives by selecting an equal 50-50 allocation of the 
budget.  This was taken to indicate sincere indifference, although it is possible 
that at least some CSPC respondents chose equality in resources as a way to 
avoid difficult decisions.  
Each respondent saw 10 choice tasks, including one repeated task to test 
preference stability.  In this repeated task the position of two alternatives 
presented in task 3 of each block were reversed and re-presented as task 8.  The 
original choice set was presented as the third task in order to allow respondents 
to become familiar enough with the tasks to avoid learning effects, and re-
presented as the eighth task to allow respondents some time to forget the original 
choice set, yet not so late as to risk significant fatigue effects.  If a respondent’s 
preferences were stable, and if they were paying attention, they should have 
preferred the same program the same in both choice tasks (Mathews et al. 2007).   
Following the choice tasks, respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of each attribute, including aggregate QALYs and distributional 
concerns, in their choices on a 0 to 10 scale, and to separately rate the difficulty 
of understanding and of answering the tasks on 7-point scales ranging from 
extremely easy to extremely difficult.  Respondents were also asked to indicate 
their gender and age group and to identify themselves as a governmental 
decision maker or academic expert, a physician, and/or a frequent healthcare 
user (12 or more healthcare contacts in the past 12 months).  These categories 
were not mutually exclusive, and each respondent could identify as one or more 
(or none) of these groups.   
The questionnaires and the subsequent data analyses were approved by 
The University of Sheffield Research Ethics Committee, Sheffield UK, and the 
Capital Health Research Ethics Board, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. 
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5.2.6 Data analysis 
The emphasis in the pilot survey was on identifying a preferred format for 
the primary elicitation, rather than the estimation of respondent preferences per 
se.  Responses from the two surveys were compared on a number of dimensions 
to assess the difficulty and the acceptability of the two formats, and their ability 
to elicit valid preference data.  These included completion rates, the respondent-
rated ease of understanding and answering the questionnaires, preference 
stability, and the incidence of non-compensatory decision making.  A simple 
analysis of the choice responses was also conducted in order to compare the 
preference information derived from the two questionnaires.  P-values were 
adjusted for simultaneous comparisons using Hommel’s (1988) method,12 with 
the exception of p-values on the coefficients in the statistical models of DCE and 
CSPC choices, which were not adjusted in order to allow for the broadest 
possible inclusion of potentially explanatory parameters (Hosmer & Lemeshow 
2000). 
5.2.6.1 Completion rates and respondent-rated difficulty 
Differences in questionnaire completion rates and stakeholder and gender 
proportions were tested using a two-sample Z-test of proportions.  Age group 
proportions were tested using a    test of independence.  On the assumption that 
the randomisation algorithm assigned an equal proportion of each age, gender 
and stakeholder subgroup to each questionnaire, differences in these proportions 
among completed questionnaires were taken to indicate a differential drop-out 
rate among these groups.  The proportions of respondents who indicated that 
they found the questionnaire ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘extremely difficult’ to 
understand or to answer were also compared using a two-sample Z-test of 
proportions.   
                                                 
12 The more common Bonferroni method for adjusting p-values for n multiple simultaneous 
comparisons typically sets the acceptable error rate in each comparison (    such that   = 
 
 
, 
where α is the overall acceptable error rate (e.g. α = 0.05).  This approach, though 
straightforward, is argued to be overly-conservative, often failing to reject the null hypothesis 
when in fact it is false (Shaffer 1995; Wright 1992).  Hommel’s method is more complicated but 
statistically more powerful.  Order the hypotheses to be tested by their unadjusted p-value, 
p(  )…p(  ).  Let j be the largest integer for which p(        
  
 
, for all  k=1,…,j.  If no such j 
exists, reject all the hypotheses; otherwise, reject the hypotheses for which p ≤ 
 
 
  (Shaffer 1995). 
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5.2.6.2 Preference stability 
Preference stability was measured by including a repeated task in each 
questionnaire, where the position of the two alternatives presented as task 3 in 
each design block were reversed and re-presented as task 8.  For the purposes of 
assessing stability, the CSPC budget allocations were transformed to discrete 
choices on the basis of the alternative to which the majority of resources were 
allocated.  Equal allocations were allowed, but the allocations had to be equal in 
both tasks in order to be considered consistent.  The proportion of consistent 
responses was compared using a two-sample Z-test of proportions.  The 
statistical significance of the individual differences between the initial and 
repeated budget allocations in the CSPC questionnaires was tested using a paired 
t-test. 
5.2.6.3 Dominant preferences 
As Scott (2002) noted, lexicographic preferences are rarely identifiable in 
the context of a stated preference elicitation, but it is generally possible to 
identify dominant preferences.  To test for such preferences, a set of flags was 
created for each alternative in each choice task.  These flags indicated whether or 
not an alternative presented the most preferred, or dominant, level of each 
attribute.  For example, based on evidence of public support and an ethical 
justification for prioritising more severely ill patients from the empirical ethics 
review, if one alternative presented patients in a more severe initial health state, 
that alternative was flagged as ‘best’ (from the perspective of the respondent) in 
the initial utility attribute; the corresponding attribute flag for the paired 
alternative was set to zero.  Similarly, if one alternative was associated with 
greater life year gains than the other, that alternative was flagged as best in that 
attribute.  There were a total of seven flags for each alternative: age, initial 
utility, initial life expectancy, final utility, life years gained, (potential) number of 
patients treated and (potential) number of QALYs.  CSPC responses were 
transformed to discrete choices on the basis of the program to which the 
respondent allocated the majority of the budget, and the flags were set based on 
the potential number of patients that could be treated and the potential number 
of QALYs gained if 100% of the budget were allocated to that alternative.  CSPC 
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alternatives that received a 50% budget allocation were flagged as ‘not chosen’ 
(i.e. both alternatives were assigned a choice flag of zero) as neither alternative 
was prioritised, but the impact of counting such allocations as prioritising both 
attributes was also tested.   
The absolute value of the correlation between choice and each attribute 
flag, measured by Kendall’s tau (Herve 2007), was taken to represent the degree 
of that attribute’s dominance in each respondent’s choices.  A respondent that 
always chose the alternative with, for example, the younger patients, would have 
a choice correlation coefficient of 1.0 with the age attribute.  Which end of each 
attribute scale the respondent considered ‘best’ was not critical, as in this 
example correlation would -1.0 if they always chose the alternative with the 
older patients.  It is important to note, though, that this approach to identifying 
dominant preferences only holds where preferences are monotonically increasing 
or decreasing over the attribute, as was assumed here.   
As respondents saw only a subset of possible scenarios, it was not possible 
to say that a perfect correlation between a respondent’s choices and the level of a 
particular attribute would necessarily hold across all possible scenarios (Scott 
2002).  Therefore, to support the identification of non-traders, each respondent’s 
self-rated attribute importance scores were converted to rankings, and 
individuals with a perfect choice-attribute correlation who also rated that 
attribute as most important were considered to have a dominant preference for 
that attribute.  The proportion of non-traders was compared across the two 
questionnaires using a two-sample Z-test.  A very high incidence of non-
compensatory preferences in a particular questionnaire may invalidate the 
interpretation of the responses, while a significant difference between 
questionnaires may reflect excessive task complexity and a corresponding degree 
of simplification in one of the formats.  Similarly, CSPC respondents who 
allocated every budget so as to equalise resources, the number of patients treated, 
or the aggregate QALYs gained in each group were characterised as strict (non-
trading) egalitarians if they also ranked the distribution of resources as the most 
important factor in their choices. 
With respect to preferences for aggregate QALYs, recognise that in the 
context of equal program costs, a dominant preference for greater aggregate 
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QALYs is also a preference for the more cost-effective alternative.  However, in 
holding costs constant it was not possible to distinguish between a preference for 
the more cost-effective alternative, and a dominant preference for aggregate 
QALYs that may have held regardless of relative cost.  A dominant preference 
for aggregate QALYs was therefore necessary but not sufficient to confirm 
support for the principles of QALY maximisation.  To test whether one format 
was associated with a greater preference for aggregate QALYs, even if these 
preferences were not necessarily dominant, the mean number of QALY 
maximising choices made by respondents to the two questionnaires was 
compared using a two-sample t-test.   
5.2.6.4 Choice analysis 
Given the limited degrees of freedom available in each block of the 
experimental design, the choice models assumed monotonic preferences and 
only estimated linear main effects.  The QALYs gained attribute, as a linear 
combination of initial and final utility, life years gained and number of patients 
treated, was excluded from the analyses in order to avoid collinearity.  
Responses to the repeated task were excluded to avoid double counting, as were 
‘no answer’ responses from the DCE questionnaire.  All respondents were 
included in the analysis, including those identified as non-traders.  The analyses 
were performed with R, version 2.15.2 (R Core Team 2013) using the mlogit 
(Croissant 2012), censReg (Henningsen 2012) and plm (Croissant & Millo 2008) 
packages.   
CSPC responses were analysed using a double-bounded tobit model to 
account for the censored dependent variable.  Although the previous chapter 
mentions the potential advantages of a latent class model, a random effects 
specification was adopted for simplicity and parsimony in the pilot analysis. 
 
      
   =           
           
           
   
        
            
             
       
     
(5.8)  
 
The response variable (      
   ) was the budget allocated to Program B less the 
budget allocated to Program A by respondent i in task t.  If 100% of the budget 
was allocated to Program B,       
   =       if 100% was allocated to 
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Program A,       
   =       if the budget was allocated 50%-50%, 
      
   =  .  Similarly, the parameters were the differences in the continuous 
attribute levels between Program B and Program A.  The β’s represented the 
change in latent utility associated with a one-unit increase in the level of an 
attribute,    was an individual-specific error term, and   was a stochastic error 
term.  To be as consistent as possible with the CSPC analysis, DCE responses 
were modelled using a binary random effects probit, where the parameters were 
defined as in equation 5.8, but the response variable was a 0, 1 flag indicating 
whether or not alternative B was chosen.  As noted in section 4.5, there are 
limitations to a random effects specification, but it was felt to be sufficient for the 
pilot elicitation given its emphasis on the response characteristics of the two 
questionnaire formats rather than respondent preferences per se, and its limited 
degrees of freedom.  The DCE and CSPC models were compared in terms of the 
relative contribution of each attribute to overall utility, or the relative importance 
of each attribute (Orme 2006a), as well as the marginal rates of substitution 
between individual life years gained and the other parameters in each model. 
In the DCE, each attribute’s contribution to systematic utility was 
calculated based on the most preferred and least preferred level of attribute x:  
   (  = (       (       (5.9) 
Where (    
    was the utility associated with the most preferred level of 
attribute x, (    
    was the utility associated with the least preferred level of 
attribute x, and   (   was the net difference in utility.  This attribute-specific 
contribution was then divided by the difference in overall utility between the 
‘best’ scenario (vmax), based on the most preferred levels of all the statistically 
significant attributes in the model, and the ‘worst’ scenario (vmin), based on the 
least preferred levels of all the attributes: 
 Relative Importance of x = 
  (  
         
 (5.10) 
Where   (   is defined as in equation 5.9 above.  The calculation was 
essentially the same for the CSPC, except that the x’s represented the smallest 
and largest differences, rather than absolute levels, and   (   was the overall 
difference in latent utility.   
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As the levels of each attribute are measured on scales with different 
origins and different units, this means that the attribute coefficients within each 
model cannot be compared unless they are transformed to some common scale 
(Lancsar et al. 2007).  The coefficients were transformed on the basis of marginal 
rates of substitution (MRS), using individual life years gained as the numeraire: 
 MRS = 
  
    
 (5.11) 
Where βx is the coefficient on attribute x, and βLYg is the coefficient on the 
individual life years gained attribute.  MRS represents the number of individual 
life year gains that respondents would, in theory, be willing to sacrifice in return 
for a 1-unit change in the level of attribute x.  A statistically significant and 
negative MRS indicated a preference for a lower level of an attribute, while a 
statistically significant and positive MRS indicated a preference for a higher 
level.   
5.3 Results 
Data collection for the pilot survey ran from March to May 2011, and a 
total of 604 individuals began a questionnaire: 348 (58%) were randomised to the 
CSPC questionnaire and 256 (42%) were randomised to the DCE questionnaire.  
Participants were initially allocated between the two questionnaires on an equal 
basis, but to compensate for lower observed completion rates among participants 
allocated to the CSPC in the early stages of data collection this was adjusted to 
allocate an arbitrary 60 percent of participants to the CSPC questionnaire.  
Completion rates and respondent characteristics are shown in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Respondent characteristics by questionnaire 
 DCE (%) CSPC (%) p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
Overall completion 
rate 
154/256 (60%) 150/348 (43%) <0.001 <0.001  
Self-identified stakeholders, N (%)  
   Decision maker 33 (21%) 18 (12%) 0.04 0.20  
   Doctor 35 (23%) 35 (23%) 1.00 1.00  
   Frequent user 14 (9%) 18 (12%) 0.52 1.00  
Demographics, N (%)  
   Female 113 (74%) 107 (71%) 0.77 1.00  
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   Mean age* 31.5 33.2 0.65 1.00  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
* Mean age was calculated using the mid-point of the different age groups; the p-value was based on a 
   test of independence 
 
A significantly greater proportion of individuals completed the DCE 
questionnaire compared with the CSPC questionnaire, suggesting that the CSPC 
may have been less acceptable to respondents in some respects.  There were no 
significant differences in the gender distribution or mean age, or in the 
proportion of respondents who identified themselves as doctors or frequent 
healthcare users.  However, a lower proportion of CSPC respondents identified 
themselves as a government decision maker or academic expert, suggesting a 
higher drop-out rate among this group in the CSPC relative to the DCE, 
although this difference was not statistically significant after adjusting for 
multiple comparisons.  Conversely, a slightly greater proportion of frequent 
healthcare users completed the CSPC questionnaire, although again this 
difference was not statistically significant.  As frequent users may be more likely 
to be chronically ill than the other respondent subgroups – and therefore also 
more likely to feel that they may be viewed as a less preferred group by the larger 
society – it is possible that these respondents may have preferred the CSPC, with 
its ability to reserve some resources for less preferred groups, to a greater degree 
than the other subgroups.  Note that these groups were not mutually exclusive as 
respondents could identify as belonging to more than one stakeholder group. 
The CSPC completion rate was similar to that reported by Ratcliffe (38%) 
in her application of CSPC (Ratcliffe 2000), but the DCE completion rate was 
lower than the 77 percent completion rate reported by Norman et al (2013) and 
the 75 percent reported by Shah et al. (2012). 
5.3.1 Respondent-rated difficulty 
As shown in Table 5.3, there was no significant difference between the 
two surveys in the proportion that rated the tasks ‘somewhat difficult’ or 
‘extremely difficult’ to understand among all respondents who submitted a 
questionnaire.   
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Table 5.3: Respondents rating the questionnaires ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘extremely 
difficult’ to understand 
 DCE (%) CSPC (%) p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 19/154 (12.3%) 19/150 (12.6%) 1.00 1.00  
Decision maker 5/33 (15.2%) 5/18 (27.8%) 0.47 1.00  
Doctor 6/35 (17.1%) 5/35 (17.1%) 1.00 1.00  
Frequent user 1/14 (7.1%) 2/18 (11.1%) 1.00 1.00  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
 
Among stakeholder subgroups, a greater proportion of decision makers 
found the CSPC tasks difficult to understand compared to the DCE, although 
this difference was not statistically significant, even before adjusting for multiple 
comparisons.  Likewise, Table 5.4 suggests that there were no statistically 
significant differences overall or by respondent subgroup in the perceived 
difficulty of answering the tasks, although a greater proportion of all decision 
makers (across both questionnaires) reported the tasks to be difficult to answer 
(76.5%) relative to all other respondents excluding decision makers (63.2%).  
This difference, though, was not statistically significant (p=0.10, adjusted-
p=0.49).   
Table 5.4: Respondents rating the questionnaires ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘extremely 
difficult’ to answer 
 DCE (%) CSPC (%) p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 100/154 (64.9%) 99/150 (66.0%) 1.00 1.00  
Decision maker 25/33 (75.8%) 14/18 (77.8%) 1.00 1.00  
Doctor 20/35 (57.1%) 21/35 (60.0%) 1.00 1.00  
Frequent user 7/14 (50.0%) 11/18 (61.1%) 1.00 1.00  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
As these difficulty ratings were limited to those respondents who 
submitted a completed questionnaire, they may be biased downwards as 
individuals who found the surveys exceedingly difficult are more likely to have 
dropped-out before completion.  However, the proportions reporting the 
questionnaires to be somewhat or extremely difficult to understand or to answer 
were similar to the proportions reported by other authors using DCE or CSPC 
methods to elicit societal preferences.  Green and Gerard (2009) reported that 
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40% of respondents found the DCE difficult to understand and 68% found it 
difficult to answer, while Ratcliffe (2000) reported that 41 percent of respondents 
found her CSPC moderately or very difficult to complete, and Schwappach 
(2003) reported that 52 percent of respondents found his CSPC quite or very 
difficult. 
5.3.2 Preference stability 
In the DCE survey, 148 out of 154 respondents (96%) preferred the same 
program (including 3 consistent ‘no answers’) in the original and the repeated 
task.  After transforming budget allocations to discrete choices on the basis of the 
program to which the majority of the budget was allocated, 119 out of 150 CSPC 
respondents (79%) allocated the majority of the budget to the same program or 
preferred an equal allocation of resources in both tasks.  The difference in the 
proportion of respondents that chose the same alternative in the repeated task 
was significantly greater in the DCE questionnaire than the CSPC (p < 0.001).  
While this suggests that not all respondents had stable preferences, or that not all 
respondents were not paying attention to their choices, some of the observed 
inconsistencies may be explained by respondents adopting an egalitarian 
perspective on their choices: if a respondent remembered prioritising a group 
with the same characteristics in the original task, they may have wanted to ‘even 
out’ the allocation of resources by prioritising the other group in the repeated 
task. 
When the individual differences between the specific budget allocations in 
the original and repeated CSPC task were considered, the mean budget 
allocation to program B in the original task was 27 percent compared to 19 
percent in the repeated task, for a net difference of -8 percent (p < 0.001, 
adjusted-p < 0.001).  It is worth noting, however, that the mode budget 
difference – accounting for 18 percent of the paired responses from the original 
and repeated task – was zero, indicating the same allocation in both tasks. 
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5.3.3 Dominant preferences and non-trading behaviour 
Excluding three individuals who always chose ‘no answer’ in the DCE, 9 
percent of DCE respondents (14/151) and 5 percent of CSPC respondents 
(7/150) always chose the alternative with the preferred level of a particular 
attribute.  This difference was not statistically significant (p=0.27).  The attribute 
most frequently perfectly correlated with choice in the DCE was final health 
state (9/14), and in the CSPC it was individual life years gained (6/7).  Among 
the respondents with at least one perfectly correlated attribute, 7 DCE (5%) and 
3 CSPC (2%) respondents also ranked that attribute as the most important factor 
in their choices, which was taken as confirmation of a dominant preference.  
Again, this difference was not statistically significant (p=0.34).  When equal 
CSPC budget allocations were counted as prioritising the dominant attribute, the 
proportion of respondents with perfect choice-attribute correlations increased to 
from 5 to 11 percent (16/150), and the proportion with a confirmed dominant 
preferences increased from 3 to 5 percent (8/150), but the differences between 
the CSPC and DCE were still not significant (p=0.83 and 0.99, respectively). 
Three additional DCE respondents had a perfect correlation between 
choice and total patients treated, but due to a coding error in the database 
attribute importance ratings were not recorded for the number of patients treated 
attribute, and it was not possible to confirm a dominant preference for these 
respondents.  If all 3 had ranked this attribute as the most important factor in 
their choices it is possible that up to 12 DCE respondents (8%) may have had a 
dominant preference, although this would not change the statistical 
insignificance of difference between the DCE and CSPC (p=0.49).   
With specific reference to aggregate QALY gains, only one respondent, 
from the DCE questionnaire, chose the QALY maximising alternative in every 
task.  This individual also ranked QALYs as the most important attribute, 
confirming a dominant preference for aggregate QALYs.  On average, DCE 
respondents chose the QALY maximising alternative in 6.3 out of 10 tasks, 
compared to 5.4 tasks out of 10 among CSPC respondents (p <0.001).  Both 
rates were slightly but significantly greater than the 5 choices out of 10 that 
would be expected by chance alone, given that one alternative in each choice 
pair maximised QALYs gained (adjusted-p <0.001 in both comparisons).  
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However, this relatively low rate of prioritising the QALY-maximising 
alternative in either formats appeared to offer little support for QALY 
maximisation as a societal decision rule. 
The proportion of respondents with a confirmed dominant preference in 
both of the questionnaires was less than the 45 percent reported by Scott (2002) 
and the 19 percent by Norman et al. (2013) using DCE methods, and the 5.7 
percent reported by Chan (2006) using a CSPC.  However, it was greater than 
the 2 percent reported by Schwappach (2003) and the 0.3 percent reported by 
Ratcliffe (2000), both of whom also used a CSPC. 
5.3.4 Choice analysis 
Although respondents to the DCE and CSPC did not see the same choice 
sets, there were only weak correlations between the block indicator and the 
specific attribute levels, ranging from -0.14 to 0.16, suggesting that there was no 
systematic bias in the attribute levels presented in the two questionnaires.   
Appendix 5.2 presents the model coefficients and p-values from the DCE 
and CSPC models, along with marginal rates of substitution (MRS) and relative 
attribute importance weights and rankings.  Initial life expectancy and the 
number of patients treated were not significant at a 0.10 threshold in the initial 
DCE probit model, and it was re-estimated excluding these attributes.  All six 
attributes were significant in the CSPC model.  The direction of preferences was 
consistent between the two models: negative coefficients on age and initial utility 
suggested that younger and more severe patients were preferred, while positive 
coefficients on individual life years gained and final utility suggests respondents 
preferred greater individual life year gains and better final health states.  CSPC 
respondents also preferred larger patients groups and patients with greater initial 
life expectancy, while these attributes were not significant in the DCE.  
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As illustrated in Figure 5.1 below, within the range of the attributes 
tested, final health state was the single most important attribute in both models, 
with relative importance weights of close to 50 percent in both questionnaires, 
but the rankings diverged for the other attributes.  The next most important 
attribute in the CSPC was initial health state, where respondents had a 
preference for patients in more severe initial health states, while DCE 
respondents gave more importance to individual life year gains.  CSPC 
respondents also had a preference for larger patient groups, while the number of 
patients was not statistically significant in the DCE.  This result is notable as it 
may be reflective of a ‘prominence effect,’ by which respondents may become 
more sensitive to a quantity when it is harder for them to ignore (Baron & 
Greene 1996; Fischer et al. 1999).  In this case, the number of patients treated 
changed as CSPC respondents moved the budget slider, potentially highlighting 
this attribute and leading CSPC respondents to give it more weight in their 
choices. 
 
5.3.5 CSPC budget allocations  
Figure 5.2 shows that the modal CSPC allocation (18% of all responses) 
maximised the budget allocation to program A (0 percent to program B) or 
program B (100 percent to program B), while 7 percent of responses equalised 
Figure 5.1: Attribute relative importance by format 
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the budget between the two alternatives.  At the respondent level, 2 percent of 
respondents (3/150) maximised the budget in every task, and 11 percent 
(16/150) maximised the budget in 5 or more of their 10 choices.  No respondents 
equalised budgets, patients or QALYs in more than 5 of their choices, and there 
were no significant differences in the proportion of decision makers who 
equalised or maximised relative to all other respondents in the survey. 
 
The absence of any respondents who equalised allocations in every task 
was in contrast to the results of CSPC elicitations reported by Ratcliffe (2000) 
and Chan et al. (2006), who both found that 2 percent of respondents equalised 
resources in every task, and to Schwappach (2003), who found that 11 percent of 
respondents equalised resources in every task.  Schwappach also reported than 
only 3 percent of all allocations maximised the budget allocation to one group or 
the other, sharply contrasting with the much higher proportion observed here.  In 
general, the low rates of equalising behaviour suggest that respondents were not 
using equal budget allocations as a way to avoid making difficult allocation 
choices. 
Figure 5.2: Pilot CSPC budget allocations 
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5.4 Identifying a preferred elicitation format 
In order to identify a preferred format for the primary preference 
elicitation, DCE and CSPC questionnaires were compared in terms of 
completion rates, difficulty ratings, preference stability, the incidence of non-
trading behaviours (including strict QALY maximisation), and attribute 
importance weights.  The results of these comparisons, though, did not seem to 
identify a clearly superior alternative.  The clearest advantage was in terms of 
completion rates, where a significantly greater proportion of assigned DCE 
participants completed a questionnaire compared to assigned CSPC participants.  
This suggested that participants found the DCE more acceptable than the CSPC 
in some respects, even though the difficulty ratings of the two questionnaires, in 
terms of understanding as well as answering, were virtually identical.  This 
appeared to undermine Schwappach and Strasmann’s (2006) suggestion that 
CSPC may be more acceptable to respondents in a healthcare context given its 
ability to avoid extreme distributions, although there may have been an element 
of this in the higher completion rate observed with the CSPC relative to the DCE 
among frequent healthcare users.  It also offered little support for Swallow et al.’s 
(2001) suggestion that dichotomous choice tasks may leave respondents 
dissatisfied with the limited information they are allowed to provide.  It was 
somewhat surprising to note that decision makers, who might be expected to be 
more familiar with abstract choice tasks, expressed the greatest difficulty in 
understanding the CSPC, and as a group, reported the greatest difficulty in 
answering the tasks in both questionnaires.  This group was also less likely to 
complete the CSPC questionnaire compared to the DCE questionnaire. 
Respondents to the DCE questionnaire were significantly more consistent 
in preferring the same alternative in the repeated task, suggesting greater 
preference stability – or at least greater attentiveness – among these respondents.  
However, the choice sets that were arbitrarily chosen for the repeated task may 
have contributed to the observed stability.  Ninety-five percent of respondents 
preferred the same alternative in the original DCE task, compared to only 77 
percent in the original CSPC task, and the near unanimity of choice in the DCE 
task suggests that one alternative was an ‘obvious’ choice and therefore an overly 
easy test of preference stability.  An ideal test would have presented two 
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alternatives with roughly equal choice probabilities, although it was not possible 
to predict these probabilities prior to the elicitation.   
Respondents to the CSPC appeared slightly – although not significantly – 
less likely to demonstrate non-trading behaviours in the form of a non-
compensatory dominant preference for a particular attribute than respondents to 
the DCE.  This is consistent with the notion that the more competitive nature of 
the ‘pick one’ DCE task may tend focus attention on a single attribute to a 
greater degree than a relatively more reflective task such as the CSPC (Huber 
2009).  It also suggests that respondents to the more cognitively demanding 
CSPC were no more likely to resort to a simplifying heuristic such as a dominant 
or lexicographic preference than respondents to the DCE.   
With specific reference to QALY maximising behaviour, only one 
respondent to either questionnaire had a dominant preference for aggregate 
QALYs gained, and there was a relatively low overall proportion of QALY 
maximising choices in either questionnaire.  This is particularly noteworthy in 
the CSPC, where aggregate QALYs gained changed along with total patients 
treated as respondents moved the budget slider.  The statistical significance of the 
number of patients treated attribute in the CSPC budget allocations, in contrast 
to its insignificance in the DCE choices, may suggest the possibility of a 
prominence effect associated with this dynamic link in the CSPC tasks.  In light 
of qualitative evidence that suggests respondents to stated preference elicitations 
often reduce abstract, macro-level allocation problems to more comprehensible 
two-person analogies (Giacomini et al. 2012; Ryan 2009), an effect that ‘nudges’ 
respondents to account for the macro- or societal-level implications of their 
choices might be an advantage in maintaining the intended perspective of a 
societal preference elicitation (Fischer et al. 1999; McQuillin & Sugden 2012).  
However, if there was indeed such an effect associated with the number of 
patients treated, it did not appear to carry over to aggregate QALYs gained.  
Furthermore, the evidence for a prominence effect in the CSPC must be 
interpreted cautiously, given the relatively small sample sizes and the fact that 
the respondents to the two questionnaires did not see the same experimental 
design.  It is not possible to say with certainty, therefore, that the observed 
differences in attribute importance weights were due to the elicitation formats 
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themselves, and not simply due to differences in the choice sets presented to 
respondents. 
Notwithstanding the low proportion of strict QALY maximisers in the 
CSPC, there was an unexpected willingness among CSPC respondents to 
maximise budget allocations that challenged previous studies that found a 
general aversion to extreme distributions (Ratcliffe 2000; Schwappach 2003).  
Although equal budget allocations were relatively common among the CSPC 
responses, the weak overall preference for an egalitarian distribution of resources 
seems noteworthy, as in the absence of any obvious rationale for a particular 
budget allocation respondents could have been expected to use an equalising 
allocation (of resources, patients or outcomes) as a heuristic for a ‘fair’ 
allocation.  Indeed, as Culyer (2001b) notes, equity and fairness are generally 
held to imply equality in something.  Instead, consistent with a random utility 
theory interpretation of the results, it appeared that respondents chose 
allocations were based on a view of the relative utility of the paired alternatives.  
It also suggested that CSPC respondents to this survey did not tend to use equal 
budget allocations as a way to avoid difficult decisions.   
Overall, the DCE questionnaire appeared to be better at eliciting 
responses, as more participants completed it compared to the CSPC 
questionnaire.  However, as judged by the statistical significance of the different 
attributes in the choice models, respondents to the CSPC appeared to 
incorporate more of the attributes presented in each alternative into their choices 
compared to DCE respondents.  Consistent with a narrower focus, DCE 
respondents also appeared more likely to have a dominant preference for a single 
attribute in their choices.  This suggests a possible tension between the quantity 
and the quality of responses elicited by the two stated preference methods, and 
that ultimately, potentially richer preference data with CSPC must be weighed 
against better completion rates and preference consistency (‘respondent 
efficiency’ (Severin 2001)) with DCE.  As neither format distinguished itself as 
clearly superior, it was decided to proceed with both formats for the primary 
elicitation.  This allowed for further exploration of their response behaviours and 
a fuller comparison of the preference weights using more sophisticated models 
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based on an optimal experimental design.  The methods and results of these 
elicitations are described over the next four chapters. 
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Appendix 5.1: Sample DCE and CSPC choice tasks 
 
Sample discrete choice experiment 
 
 
 
 
Sample constant sum paired comparison task 
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Respondent attribute rating task 
 
Please indicate how important each of the factors listed below were to you in deciding how to allocate 
public healthcare resources. 0 stars means a factor had no bearing on your decision and 10 stars 
means it was the most important attribute in your decision. Click on the blue text for a more complete 
definition of the attribute. 
 
 
 
 
 
Attribute descriptions 
 
 Quality-of-life refers to how well/sick a patient is before treatment and is 
measured on an imaginary 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means death and 10 is perfect 
health. At level 1, patients have severe problems with pain and mobility and 
they are unable to perform their usual activities. At level 5, patients have 
moderate problems with pain and mobility and they can only participate in 
some of their usual activities. At level 9, patients have very minor or no 
problems with pain and mobility and they are able to participate in all their 
usual activities. 
 
 Life expectancy refers to how long the average patient will live from today. 
 
 Treatment is a hypothetical drug or procedure that could improve a patient's 
quality of health, life expectancy or both. 
 
 Change in health with treatment refers to the improvement in quality-of-life a 
patient gets from treatment. It is measured on the same scale mentioned above, 
where 0 means death and 10 is perfect health. Because cancer treatment can 
involve harsh chemotherapy drugs and radiation, it is possible that treatment 
could reduce a patient's quality-of-life in order to extend the length of their life. 
 
 Change in life expectancy refers to how many additional years of life a patient 
will gain from treatment. A patient's total life expectancy with treatment would 
be their initial life expectancy without treatment plus their change in life 
expectancy. 
 
 Total life years gained measures the total number of additional number of years 
lived, adding across all patients in the program. For example, if 5 patients live an 
additional 5 years each, the total life years gained is 25. 
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 Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) are a measure of the total benefit of a 
health program. It considers changes in the length of life, change in quality of 
life and the number of patients that can be treated. If a person spends 1 
additional year at health level 10 out of 10 (perfect health), they would count for 
1 QALY. If they spent 1 additional year at health level 5 out of 10 (i.e. half as 
good as level 10, or perfect health) they would count for 0.5 QALYs. Total 
QALY gains are calculated as the change in life expectancy × the change in 
quality × the number of patients treated. 
 
 The share of healthcare resources refers to the portion of the healthcare budget 
that one patient group receives compared to the other group.  Ensuring each 
group gets an equal share means you believe that each group should always 
receive an equal share of the budget regardless of their age, quality-of-life, life 
year gains, QALYs, or any other of the characteristics listed above. 
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Chapter 6:  
Primary data collection methods  
and sample characteristics 
The objective of the primary survey was to estimate preference weights 
for the attributes identified in the empirical ethics review of Chapter 3 from a 
representative sample of the Canadian public, and the intention was to use the 
elicitation method that performed best in the pilot elicitation.  However, the pilot 
survey did not identify a clearly preferred method, and in fact raised a number of 
interesting methodological issues that would benefit from further exploration.  
These included the possibility of a prominence effect around the number of 
patients treated, and questions around the relative stability of preferences with 
the two methods.  Therefore, it was decided to proceed with both methods for 
the primary survey of preferences.  Secondary objectives of this survey included a 
more detailed comparison of the properties of the two elicitation methods, taking 
advantage of the larger and more representative sample, and to compare the 
preferences of the general public with those of decision-making agents 
responsible for making prioritisation decisions on behalf of the public.   
As described by Coast (2001a), agents in this context are part of an 
implicit principal-agent relationship with the public, where the public may feel 
that they are ill-informed about their preferred allocation of healthcare resources 
and relies on agents to make allocation decisions on their behalf.  Culyer (1989), 
in the context of the traditional doctor-patient relationship, saw the ideal agency 
relationship as one where the agent makes the decision that the ‘client’ would 
have if they had the same knowledge and information.  As argued in Chapter 2, 
however, the goodness of any particular allocation of societal resources is a 
subjective truth, and as such, no special knowledge or unique objectivity is 
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required or even necessarily desirable, as such restrictions would be counter to 
Sen’s (2011) view of the importance of the ‘universality of inclusion’ in societal 
decision-making.  By this view, agent preferences should reflect those of the 
public.  Brouwer et al. (2008), though, suggest that the responsibility of a societal 
decision maker is not to reflect how citizens would act, but rather how they ought 
to act.   By this view, agent preferences should be expected to diverge from those 
of the general public, perhaps in terms of a greater emphasis on QALY 
maximisation. 
This chapter describes the methods for the primary preference elicitation 
surveys, which drew heavily on the methods used in the pilot survey, and 
summarises the characteristics of the survey respondents.  The development of 
the experimental design, the target sample populations, and the format of the 
DCE and CSPC choice and rating tasks are described in section 6.1.  Section 6.2 
describes the master experimental design administered to respondents, and 
reports on the correlations between each of the attributes in the design.  Some 
correlation is inevitable given the fractional factorial design, but ideally these 
correlations should be relatively small.  A descriptive summary of the survey, 
including the total number of respondents, their characteristics, and the total 
number of choices made by respondents is presented in section 6.3, along with 
their attitudes towards healthcare rationing.  These attitudinal questions included 
their agreement or disagreement with the need for rationing, their support for 
different stakeholder groups in rationing decisions, and their comfort with 
having their preferences used in priority setting decisions.  The implications of 
these attitudes for a democratic or Communitarian approach to priority setting 
are discussed in section 6.4. 
6.1 Survey methods 
The survey methods were based closely on the on the pilot methods, 
although there were some differences in the experimental design and data 
collection.  There were also some additional tests of validity and rationality 
included in each questionnaire, along with some attitudinal rating tasks.  The 
differences between the two methodologies are detailed below. 
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6.1.1 Experimental design 
The experimental design used the same attributes as the pilot survey.  
Each alternative was described in terms of the average age of patients, their 
health state (utility) and life expectancy without treatment, health state and life 
years gained with/after treatment, the number of patients that could be treated in 
each group, and aggregate QALYs gained, which was calculated as a product of 
the other attribute levels.   The only change from the pilot survey was in the 
number of patients treated attribute: the levels were changed from 500, 2000 and 
5000, to 100, 2500 and 5000 to have a slightly greater range and to be more 
symmetrical around the middle level.   
Table 6.1: Primary survey attributes and levels 
Level Age Initial utility 
Initial life 
expectancy 
Final utility 
Gain in life 
expectancy 
Patients 
1 10 .1 1 month .1 1 year 100 
2 40 .5 5 years .5 5 years 2,500 
3 70 .9 10 years .9 10 years 5,000 
 
Respondents were told that the patient groups all had some form of 
cancer, but specific diagnoses were not mentioned (i.e. the alternatives were 
unlabelled).  It was hoped that this additional context would allow all 
respondents to understand the choice tasks, and their attributes and levels, in a 
more comparable, consistent manner.  To ensure a focus on the attribute levels 
and not the disease labels, the alternatives were presented simply as Program A 
and Program B.  Although labelled alternatives have the advantage of making 
hypothetical choice tasks more realistic and concrete, respondents may also use 
such labels to infer information that was not presented – or intended – as part of 
the task (de Bekker-Grob, Hol, et al. 2010).  At the extreme, respondents may 
ignore trade-offs between labelled alternatives and make their choices based on 
their perceptions of the labels alone (Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008).   
The experimental design process began with the set of 594 logical 
scenarios from the pilot design, excluding combinations where the net QALY 
gain with treatment was negative as well as scenarios where health state and life 
expectancy were unchanged before and after treatment.  The Fedorov algorithm 
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used to derive the D-efficient design was able to take advantage of the preference 
weights derived from the pilot survey to estimate the expected choice probability 
for each possible scenario given the pre-specified value function.  This value 
function was defined as continuous main effects with a two-way interaction 
between life years gained and final health state.  The weights for these 
parameters were derived from a simple multinomial logit model using the 
combined DCE and CSPC responses, with CSPC responses transformed to 
discrete choices on the basis of the alternative to which the majority of the 
budget was allocated.  The results of this model are shown in Appendix 6.1.  The 
incorporation of these weights meant that the algorithm was able select scenario 
pairs that balanced scenario utility while also respecting the other design 
principles, leading to a more statistically efficient optimal fractional factorial 
design (Huber & Zwerina 1996; Carlsson & Martinsson 2003; Kuhfeld 2010).  
This was an intentionally simple model, but as Carlsson and Martinsson (2003) 
noted, D-efficient designs appear to be robust against biased priors, and biased 
D-efficient designs still lead to more precise parameter estimates than orthogonal 
designs. 
Given this specification, the smallest feasible design was 18 choice sets, 
and to minimise the burden on individual respondents, it was again divided into 
2 blocks of 9 tasks each.  Each block also included a test of dominance, or non-
satiation, and a repeated task to test preference stability.  In the dominance task, 
two alternatives with identical levels of age, initial health state and number of 
patients treated, all set to their middle level, were presented to respondents.  
Final health state and life years gained were also included at their middle levels 
in one alternative, while the other alternative included them at their highest 
level.  In this choice task, one alternative was unambiguously better in terms of 
health gain and was intended to test non-satiation in respondents (Miguel et al. 
2005; Ryan 2009).  This was presented as the first choice in all versions of the 
design, in hopes that it would be a relatively easy choice that would ease 
respondents into the elicitations (Carson et al. 1994).  In the repeated task, the 
two alternatives presented in task 5 of each block were reversed and re-presented 
as task 8.  It was felt that the greater incidence of inconsistent preferences in the 
pilot CSPC relative to the DCE may have been due in part to a longer learning 
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process with the more complex format.  Therefore, the initial choice set was 
presented as the fifth rather than the third task in order to allow respondents to 
become more familiar with their preferences in the context of the choice tasks.  
This task was re-presented as the eighth task to allow respondents some time to 
forget the original task, yet not so late as to risk significant fatigue effects.  As in 
the pilot survey, these tests of rationality were used only to compare response 
behaviours in the two questionnaires, and were not used to exclude ‘irrational’ 
respondents (Lancsar & Louviere 2006).   
Including the tests of non-satiation and stability, each block of the 
experimental design had a total of 11 choice tasks.  The test of dominance was 
always the first task, and the original and repeated tasks to test stability were 
always presented as the fifth and eighth tasks, respectively, but the order of the 
other tasks was systematically rotated, resulting in three versions of each design 
block.  To illustrate, choice set 1 in block 1 was the second task in version 1, the 
ninth task in version 2, and the fourth task in version 3.  Fixing the order of the 
tests of non-satiation and consistency ensured comparability across versions, 
while varying the order of the other tasks allowed each task to have a roughly 
equal chance of being seen at the beginning, middle or end of the elicitation, 
mitigating ordering effects as well as allowing for the identification of possible 
learning or fatigue effects.   
Responses to the repeated task were excluded from the analysis of 
preferences as they did not contribute new preference information, and although 
responses to the dominance task were included as a valid expression of 
preferences, the task was identical in both blocks and therefore contributed only 
a single degree of freedom.  Over the two blocks, counting only one degree of 
freedom for the common test of dominance, this provided 19 degrees of freedom 
as understood in the context of conjoint analysis (Hensher et al. 2005).   
6.1.2 Data collection 
The survey population was drawn from two groups: an age and gender 
representative sample of the Canadian general public, and a convenience sample 
of Canadian decision-making agents in oncology, including funding and 
formulary committee members and oncology professionals.  As with the cancer 
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context of the survey, limiting agents to oncology decision-makers and 
professional was intended to encourage a common understanding of the different 
attribute levels, but it was also for pragmatic reasons.  There are a relatively large 
number of oncology decision-making bodies in Canada, so agents in this area 
may be more familiar with their prioritisation preferences than agents in other 
disease areas.   
The general population sample was drawn from an online survey panel 
maintained by Research Nowtm, a market research firm.  There is no formal 
sample size calculation for choice-based stated preference elicitations, but Orme 
(2006b) offered the following rule-of-thumb:  
 
   
 
      (6.1) 
Where n is the number of respondents, t is the number of choice tasks each 
respondent is presented, a is the number of alternatives per task, and c is the 
largest number of levels in an attribute.  For models that include interactions, c is 
the product of the number of levels in the largest interaction.  Re-arranging 
equation 6.1 to solve for n, and using the design characteristics described in 
section 6.1.1, allowing for two-way interactions between attributes and not 
counting the test of dominance or the repeated task, yielded a minimum sample 
size of 250 respondents per design block: 
 
   
    
  
 
   
   (    
(  (  
 
       
(6.2) 
Given two design blocks in each of the two questionnaire formats, this implied a 
minimum sample of 1000 respondents.   
A quota was defined for each combination of sex and 10-year age group 
to in order to match the Canadian age-sex distribution.  Information on 
respondent income and education was provided by Research Nowtm, but these 
characteristics were not included among the quota criteria as this would have 
substantially complicated recruitment without clearly improving the 
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representativeness of the sample.  Respondents were allocated to the DCE or 
CSPC questionnaire using a form of sequential balancing, by which each 
respondent was assigned to the design with the lower number of competed 
questionnaires for their age-sex subgroup (Borm et al. 2005).  This approach 
ensured that the number and demographic characteristics of respondents would 
be balanced between the two elicitation formats. 
Potential decision-making agents were invited to participate via email and 
flyers distributed by the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review, the Canadian 
Association of Medical Oncologists, the Canadian Centre for Applied Research 
in Cancer Control, and provincial cancer authorities including Cancer Care 
Nova Scotia, Cancer Care Ontario, and Cancer Care British Columbia.  All 
respondents to these agent invitations were allowed to participate in the survey 
regardless of their age and gender, but they were asked to identify themselves as 
health system decision makers, including members of decision making 
committees, program or formulary managers, and health technology assessment 
practitioners, and/or as oncology professionals.  Individuals not self-identifying 
as one or more of these decision-making groups were categorised as general 
public.  Questionnaires were administered via the internet. 
6.1.3 Choice and ratings tasks 
As in the pilot elicitation, respondents were asked to imagine themselves 
as a societal decision maker responsible for allocating a fixed budget between 
two alternative healthcare programs.  They were told that both programs had the 
same cost, and that the budget was large enough fund one program or the other, 
but not both.  The DCE questionnaire asked respondents to allocate the entire 
budget to their preferred group, while the CSPC questionnaire asked respondents 
to allocate budget percentages between the two groups by moving a slider.  In 
each CSPC choice task, the number of patients treated and aggregate QALYs 
gained changed in proportion to the budget as a respondent moved the slider, 
and the position of the slider was randomised between each task in order to 
avoid anchoring effects.  Although very few respondents took advantage of the 
‘no answer’ option in the DCE questionnaire, this option was included again in 
order to encourage questionnaire completion.   
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The presentation of the choice tasks was changed slightly based on 
comments from the pilot survey.  The table of attributes and levels in each choice 
task was re-arranged, so that the levels in each alternative were closer together 
and could be compared more easily.  A line was added to the beginning of the 
instruction following the first task to inform respondents that it had not changed 
and was the same as in the previous task.  Respondents to the pilot survey had 
complained that they had had to read the full instruction each time to see if 
anything had changed.  A line was also added to note that resources could not be 
used for research that might improve a patient’s condition in the future, as some 
pilot respondents had asked about this possibility.  QALY graphs were included 
in each choice task to illustrate the magnitude of individual QALY gains with 
each of the two alternatives.  The graphs were similar to those used by Dolan et 
al. (2008) and Baker et al. (2010), and also illustrated age at disease onset and 
death, and the patient’s initial health state and health state with/after treatment.  
A limitation of the graphs was that they illustrated individual rather than 
aggregate QALY gains, but a note was added to each graph to highlight this fact 
and to encourage respondents to also consider the number of patients treated in 
their decisions.  See Appendix 6.3 for sample DCE and CSPC choice tasks and 
QALY graphs. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the primary survey was conducted in the context 
of cancer.  This was largely for pragmatic reasons, but it was hoped that a 
defined disease context would encourage respondents to take their choices more 
seriously, and to understand the levels of the different alternatives – particularly 
survival and quality gains – in a more comparable manner (Amaya-Amaya et al. 
2008; de Bekker-Grob, Hol, et al. 2010).  The characteristics of the different 
patient groups presented in the choice tasks, though, were purely hypothetical 
and specific diagnoses were not mentioned.  The introduction to the 
questionnaires is shown in Appendix 6.3. 
Respondents from the general population sample received rewards for 
submitting complete – though not necessarily well-considered – questionnaires, 
and this may have led some respondents to ‘click through’ the questionnaires 
without fully considering their answers.  Louviere et al. (2000b) argue that such 
responses appear as random ‘statistical noise’ rather than a systematic bias, but 
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to assess the impact of potentially unconsidered responses, individuals who 
completed the general population surveys in less than one half of the median 
completion time of each design were flagged as ‘fast completers’ and preference 
weights were re-estimated excluding these respondents.  Completion times were 
not available for respondents to the agent invitations, but as there was no reward 
for completing this version of the survey, there was little reason to expect these 
respondents would submit random or unconsidered responses.  In addition, 
CSPC respondents who did not move the slider from its initial random position 
in any of their responses and who were also fast responders were classified as 
non-informative ‘static responders’ and excluded from the analyses.  Although it 
is possible that the randomised initial positions exactly matched the static 
respondents’ preferences, the likelihood of such a series of random coincidences 
seems so small that these exclusions do not appear to be a case of imposing 
preferences. 
Following the choice tasks, respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of each attribute, including total QALYs gained and distributional 
concerns, in their choices on a 0 to 8 scale.  The 8-point scale reflected the 
number of factors that respondents were asked to rate, and it was hoped that this 
would encourage respondents to consider the ratings in terms of relative 
importance.  An actual ranking exercise was not used as it was thought that it 
would be too challenging for respondents, particularly after having already 
completed the choice tasks, and that it might discourage respondents from 
completing the task.  Respondents were also asked to rate the difficulty of 
understanding the tasks, and of answering them, on 5-point scales ranging from 
extremely easy to extremely difficult, and to indicate “How confident are you 
that your answers in this survey accurately reflect your preferences for how 
healthcare resources should be allocated?” on a similar 5-point scale, ranging 
from very confident to not at all confident.   
Attitudes toward healthcare rationing and public participation in 
healthcare decision making were also elicited.  First, respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement with the statement "It is impossible for any government 
or healthcare system to pay for all new medical treatments or technologies, so 
difficult funding choices will always have to be made" on a 4-point scale ranging 
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from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  No neutral or undecided option was 
included on the scale in order to force respondents to express agreement or 
disagreement.  Second, they were asked “Who do you think should make the 
decisions about whether or not different programs should be funded?”  
Respondents were able to pick one or more of health system decision makers and 
other experts, doctors and nurses, patients, and citizens or the general public.  
There was also a text field to allow respondents to enter their own suggestions.  
Finally, respondents were asked “How comfortable would you be if your 
preferences were used in determining the allocation of healthcare resources to 
different programs?” on a 5-point scale ranging from extremely comfortable to 
extremely uncomfortable.  The wording and layout of these ratings tasks is 
shown in Appendix 6.4. 
The questionnaires and the subsequent data analyses were approved by 
The University of Sheffield Research Ethics Committee, Sheffield UK, and the 
Capital Health Research Ethics Board, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. 
6.2 Primary experimental design 
The primary experimental design, with attribute-level combinations for 
each block and version, is shown in Appendix 6.1. Table 6.2 shows the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the parameters included in the value function 
specified in the experimental design phase, including the life years gained-final 
health state interaction term, as well as the correlations between the attributes 
and the block and alternative assignments in the presentation of the choice tasks.  
Ideally, the attributes should not be correlated with each other or with the block 
and alternative in which they appear, but the non-orthogonal optimal fractional 
factorial design that was used here, as well as the exclusion of illogical scenarios, 
makes some correlation inevitable.  Absolute correlations equal to or greater 
than a moderate threshold of 0.30 (Cohen 1988) are shown in bold. 
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Table 6.2: Experimental design attribute correlations 
 LYg Age U0 LE0 U1 Pats LYg:U1 Block Alt 
LYg ---- 0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.17 0.66 0.07 0.07 
Age  ---- -0.07 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.50 
U0   ---- -0.08 0.37 0.09 0.19 -0.07 0.22 
LE0    ---- 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.14 
U1     ---- -0.08 0.61 0.04 0.24 
Pats      ---- 0.09 0.00 -0.27 
LYg:U1       ---- 0.19 0.21 
Block        ---- 0.00 
Alt         ---- 
LYg=individual life years gained; Age=Patient age; U0=initial utility; LE0=initial life expectancy; U1=final life 
expectancy; nPats=total patients treated; LYg:U1= LYg×U1 interaction term; Block=Design block; Alt=Choice 
alternative.  Correlations equal to or greater than a moderate threshold of 0.30 are shown in bold. 
Not surprisingly, there were strong positive correlations between the life 
years gained-final health state interaction term (LYg:U1) and its components, LYg 
(r=0.66) and U1 (r=0.61).  Correlations among the main effects were generally 
low, although there was a moderate positive correlation (r=0.37) between initial 
health state (U0) and final health state (U1).  This was most likely driven by the 
exclusion of scenarios with no QALY gains or negative QALY gains from the 
candidate design, forcing U1 to be at least equal to U0 in most scenarios.  With 
respect to the presentation of attribute levels in the choice tasks, there was a 
moderate correlation between age and alternative (r=0.50), suggesting that 
Alternative B (the right-hand side of the choice task) may have tended to present 
scenarios with older patients than Alternative A (the left-hand side of the choice 
task).  
6.3 Sample characteristics 
Data collection for the general population survey began on 31 January 
2012 and continued until the quota of 1,000 respondents was met on 7 February 
2012.  However, due to a misspecification of the sampling frame, the initial 
quotas generated a sample that was representative by age and sex independently, 
rather than jointly.  Respondents were representative of the Canadian population 
by age independent of sex, and representative by sex independent of age, but not 
representative over age and sex jointly, and younger females and older males 
were substantially over-represented in the sample.  To correct this, the survey 
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was re-opened on 1 August 2012 but was restricted to participants from the 
under-represented age-sex groups.  Data collection continued until enough 
respondents in the under-represented age-sex groups were added to allow for the 
possibility of an age-sex representative sub-sample of at least 1000 respondents.  
This second phase of the data collection was closed on 3 August 2012.  Data 
collection from the agent invitations began on 30 November 2011 and continued 
until 22 March 2012.  Respondents to the agent invitations were initially 
allocated between the CSPC and DCE on a 60-40 basis, as in the pilot survey, 
but this was adjusted to an even 50-50 split when it appeared that responses to 
the CSPC were outnumbering those to the DCE mid-way through the survey. 
The combined agent and general population surveys collected 1,318 
completed questionnaires: 656 from the DCE and 662 from the CSPC.  The 
distribution of survey respondents by sex and age group, relative to the Canadian 
age-sex distribution from the 2011 census (Government of Canada 2012), is 
shown in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Canadian and survey age-sex distributions  
 2011 Cdn. Census Survey 
Age group Males Females Males Females No answer 
18-24 6% 6% 62 (5%) 79 (6%) 0 (0%) 
25-34 9% 9% 109 (8%) 125 (9%) 0 (0%) 
35-44 9% 8% 97 (7%) 213 (16%) 5 (0%) 
45-54 10% 10% 113 (9%) 117 (9%) 3 (0%) 
55-64 8% 8% 89 (7%) 100 (8%) 2 (0%) 
65-74 5% 5% 68 (5%) 31 (2%) 0 (0%) 
75+ 3% 5% 32 (2%) 71 (5%) 0 (0%) 
No answer - - 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0%) 
Subtotal 49% 51% 570 (43%) 736 (56%) 12 (1%) 
Total  1,318 
 
As there was little reason to expect that age and gender were the only factors that 
might influence preferences, it was decided to include the full sample of general 
population respondents in the analysis, rather than to select a random subset of 
respondents to generate a representative sample.  The full sample was broadly 
reflective of the Canadian population in terms of their distribution by age and 
gender, although women in the 35-44 year old age group were substantially over-
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represented, while women in the 65-74 year old age group were under-
represented.  A small number of respondents chose not to answer the 
demographics questions, but these missing values were not large enough to skew 
the overall age and gender distribution of the sample.   
Among the 1,318 respondents, a total of 101 self-identified as a healthcare 
decision maker and/or oncology professional.  These represented 7.6 percent of 
all respondents, and the proportion of agents was not significantly different by 
format: agents represented 6.7 percent of DCE respondents and 8.6 percent of 
CSPC respondents (p=0.23).  Among the agents, 39 (39%) identified themselves 
as health system decision makers, 42 (42%) as oncology professionals, and 20 
(20%) as both health system decision makers and oncology professionals. 
Overall, the survey respondents appeared to be broadly representative of 
the Canadian population in terms of the distribution of age, gender, higher 
education and income.  However, there is little reason to believe that such socio-
demographic factors are the only observable factors that might influence 
preferences.  Having children, for example, might affect a respondent’s 
preferences for younger age groups, but this characteristic – along with an 
infinity of other possible confounders – was not accounted for in the sampling 
frame.  In addition, the potential for unobserved heterogeneity or random taste 
variation among respondents –preferences unrelated to observable characteristics 
– means that the elicited preferences and attitudes may still be biased or 
unrepresentative despite the overall socio-demographic representativeness of the 
sample (Glasgow 2001). 
Overall, the survey respondents appeared to be broadly representative of 
the Canadian population in terms of the distribution of age, gender, higher 
education and income.  However, there is little reason to believe that such socio-
demographic factors are the only observable factors that might influence 
preferences.  Having children, for example, might affect a respondent’s 
preferences for younger age groups, but this characteristic – along with an 
infinity of other possible confounders – was not accounted for in the sampling 
frame.  In addition, the potential for unobserved heterogeneity or random taste 
variation among respondents –preferences unrelated to observable characteristics 
– means that the elicited preferences and attitudes may still be biased or 
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unrepresentative despite the overall socio-demographic representativeness of the 
sample (Glasgow 2001).   
Table 6.4Table 6.4 shows that respondents were well balanced between 
the two elicitation formats in terms of age and sex.  The proportion of general 
population respondents that had graduated college or university was 35 percent, 
and this was identical to the 2006 Canadian census population (p=0.98) 
(Statistics Canada 2009), but the median family income category in the sample 
($60,000-64,999) was lower than the 2010 Canadian median family income 
($76,950) (Statistics Canada 2010).  There was no significant difference in the 
proportion of DCE and CSPC general population respondents that graduated 
college or university (34% vs. 37%, respectively, p=0.22), although the median 
family income category among DCE respondents was slightly lower than among 
CSPC respondents ($60,000-65,999 vs. $65,000-69,999, respectively).  Income 
and education were not collected from respondents to the agent invitations, but it 
is likely that both would be somewhat higher than in the general population. 
Overall, the survey respondents appeared to be broadly representative of 
the Canadian population in terms of the distribution of age, gender, higher 
education and income.  However, there is little reason to believe that such socio-
demographic factors are the only observable factors that might influence 
preferences.  Having children, for example, might affect a respondent’s 
preferences for younger age groups, but this characteristic – along with an 
infinity of other possible confounders – was not accounted for in the sampling 
frame.  In addition, the potential for unobserved heterogeneity or random taste 
variation among respondents –preferences unrelated to observable characteristics 
– means that the elicited preferences and attitudes may still be biased or 
unrepresentative despite the overall socio-demographic representativeness of the 
sample (Glasgow 2001).   
Table 6.4: Age and sex distribution by questionnaire design  
 DCE CSPC 
Age group Male Female No answer Male Female No answer 
18-24 32 (5%) 39 (6%) 0 (0%) 30 (5%) 40 (6%) 0 (0%) 
25-34 61 (9%) 65 (10%) 0 (0%) 48 (7%) 60 (9%) 0 (0%) 
35-44 48 (7%) 108 (16%) 1 (0%) 49 (7%) 105 (16%) 4 (1%) 
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45-54 54 (8%) 56 (8%) 1 (0%) 59 (9%) 61 (9%) 2 (0%) 
55-64 45 (7%) 45 (7%) 1 (0%) 44 (7%) 55 (8%) 1 (0%) 
65-74 35 (5%) 14 (2%) 0 (0%) 33 (5%) 17 (3%) 0 (0%) 
75+ 13 (2%) 36 (5%) 0 (0%) 19 (3%) 35 (5%) 0 (0%) 
No answer 0 (%) 0 (%) 2 (0%) 0 (%) 0 (%) 0 (0%) 
Subtotal 288 (44%) 363 (55%) 5 (1%) 282 (43%) 373 (56%) 7 (1%) 
Total 656 (50%) 662 (50%) 
 
6.3.1 Responses by design block and version 
Table 6.5 shows that although slightly more respondents were 
randomised to version 3 of each block, the differences in the overall distribution 
of respondents between versions were not significant (p=0.67).   
Table 6.5: Unique respondents by design block and version 
Version 
Block 1 2 3 All 
1 192 (14.6%) 215 (16.3%) 231 (17.5%) 638 (48.4%) 
2 220 (16.7%) 224 (17%) 236 (17.9%) 680 (51.6%) 
All 412 (31.3%) 439 (33.3%) 467 (35.4%) 1,318 (100%) 
χ2=0.8, p=0.67 
 
These counts included respondents to both the DCE and the CSPC 
questionnaires, but there were more than 300 respondents to each block of each 
questionnaire format – well above the suggested minimum of 250 respondents 
per block.  Overall the number of respondents to each questionnaire were similar 
to the samples in a number of recent stated preferences elicitations in healthcare 
(Green & Gerard 2009; Lancsar et al. 2011; Norman et al. 2013).  However, the 
101 agents who responded were less than hoped for, and therefore the agent-
specific results must be interpreted judiciously. 
Table 6.6 shows the same relative distribution of total choices by block 
and version but accounts for the multiple choices by each individual.  With the 
larger numbers, however, the differences in the overall distribution of responses 
became statistically significant (p=0.01).  In general, though, the distribution of 
responses by version appeared even enough to ensure that each choice task, 
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excluding the tests of dominance and consistency, was seen at a different stage in 
the elicitation and had an equal chance of being affected by any learning or 
fatigue effects. 
Table 6.6: Unique choices by design block and version 
Version 
Block 1 2 3 All 
1 2,112 (14.6%) 2,365 (16.3%) 2,541 (17.5%) 7,018 (48.4%) 
2 2,420 (16.7%) 2,464 (17.0%) 2,596 (17.9%) 7,480 (51.6%) 
All 4,532 (31.3%) 4,829 (33.3%) 5,137 (35.4%) 14,498 (100%) 
χ2=0.8, p=0.01 
 
6.3.2 Completion times  
The distribution of completion times in the general population sample, 
excluding times greater than 60 minutes, is illustrated in Figure 6.1.  Completion 
times were not available for respondents to the agent invitations.  The median 
completion time was 9.5 minutes for the DCE and 11.7 minutes for the CSPC.  
Based on a Mann-Whitney U test, the median completion time among CSPC 
respondents was significantly greater than among DCE respondents (p<0.001).  
The boxes show the inter-quartile range (IQR) and contain 50% of the observations from each 
questionnaire.  The heavy vertical lines show the median completion times.  The solid horizontal lines 
(whiskers) extend up to 1.5 times the IQR.  Observations outside ±1.5×IQR are shown as dots (Massart et 
al., 2005).  Completion times greater than 60 minutes are not shown. 
Figure 6.1: DCE and CSPC completion times, general population respondents only 
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The minimum and maximum completion times were 1.2 minutes and 1,244 
minutes (20.7 hours), respectively, for the DCE questionnaire, and 1.2 minutes 
and 4,141 minutes (69.0 hours) for the CSPC questionnaire.  Although there 
were a few extremely high completion times, which were likely respondents who 
were interrupted and returned to complete the questionnaire at a later time, 98 
percent of all the submitted questionnaires were completed in 60 minutes or less. 
Among the general population sample, 60 respondents to the DCE (10%) 
and 75 respondents to the CSPC (13%) had completion times of less than one 
half the median time for their respective format and were flagged as ‘fast 
completers.’  These proportions were not significantly different (p=0.22).  Of the 
75 CSPC fast completers, 4 did not move the slider from the initial randomised 
positions in any choice task.  This was taken as overwhelming evidence of 
inattention in the tasks and their allocation choices were excluded from the 
choice analyses, although their responses to the attitude questions and the 
difficulty ratings were included.  All respondents to the agent invitations moved 
the slider in each of their choices. 
6.3.3 Respondent attitudes toward rationing 
The distribution of respondent attitudes toward the need for healthcare 
rationing is shown in Table 6.7.  The majority of respondents somewhat or 
strongly agreed with the statement “It is impossible for any government or 
healthcare system to pay for all new medical treatments or technologies, so 
difficult funding choices will always have to be made,” although agents were 
significantly more likely to agree than the general population sample (89% vs. 
75%, respectively, p < 0.01). 
Table 6.7: Rationing attitudes by sample 
Sample Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
General population 9% 16% 46% 29% 
Agents 6% 5% 19% 71% 
Combined 9% 15% 44% 32% 
 24% 76% 
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The proportion of public and agent respondents supporting a decision-
making role in healthcare funding decisions for health system decision makers 
and other experts, doctors, patients and/or citizens is shown in Table 6.8.  These 
categories were not mutually exclusive and respondents could choose none, 
some, or all groups.   
Table 6.8: Proportion of public and agent respondents supporting stakeholder roles in 
healthcare funding decisions 
Stakeholder group Public Agents p Adjusted-p Sig 
Decision makers and experts 62% 85% <0.001 <0.001 *** 
Doctors and nurses 71% 68% 0.624 0.933  
Patients 46% 45% 0.933 0.933  
Public 50% 56% 0.251 0.754  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
 
Public respondents were most likely to indicate a role for doctors in 
funding decisions, and least likely to indicate a role for patients.  Agents were 
most likely to indicate a role for health system decision makers and other experts 
and, like the public respondents, least likely to indicate a role for patients.  The 
only statistically significant difference, though, was in the proportions indicating 
a role for health system decision makers and other experts, where the public was 
much less likely than agents to indicate support for their role in funding decisions 
(adjusted-p < 0.001).  Most respondents did not take the opportunity to indicate 
other groups that should be included in funding decisions, but among those that 
did, family members was the most frequently mentioned group.  This response 
was somewhat concerning, as it suggests that respondents may have 
misinterpreted the tasks as patient-level treatment decisions rather than system-
level allocation decisions.  Other groups mentioned, in no particular order, 
included scientists, health researchers, ethicists and philosophers, health 
economists, religious representatives and politicians, including ministers of 
health.  Politicians were also mentioned as a group that should be specifically 
excluded from participating in funding decisions.   
Interestingly, support for decision maker and expert involvement in 
healthcare funding decisions was not universal among self-identified decision-
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making agents.  One hypothesis for this somewhat counter-intuitive result was 
that it reflected the differing perspectives of the health system decision makers 
and physicians that were grouped together as agents.  In particular, physicians 
may have been less likely to support a role for health system decision makers and 
other experts, preferring to leave such decisions to themselves and other 
physicians at a more micro-level.  This hypothesis was not borne out by the data, 
though, as physicians were not significantly less likely than health system 
decision makers to indicate support for decision makers and experts (83% vs. 
86%, respectively; adjusted-p=0.88).  Instead, this lack of universality appears 
simply to reflect incomplete responses to this question, as agents who did not 
indicate support for decision makers also showed lower levels of support for all 
other stakeholder categories. 
Finally, the distribution of responses to the question “how comfortable 
would you be if your preferences were used in determining the allocation of 
healthcare resources to different programs?” is shown in Table 6.9.  Agents were 
significantly more likely than the public to indicate that they would be somewhat 
or extremely comfortable having their preferences used for priority setting 
(65.3% vs. 52.8%, p=0.02). 
Table 6.9: Proportions by comfort with having their preferences used in priority setting 
decisions 
Preference comfort Public Agents 
Extremely comfortable 10% 8% 
Somewhat comfortable 43% 58% 
Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 28% 15% 
Somewhat uncomfortable 15% 16% 
Extremely uncomfortable 5% 3% 
Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.018.  Proportions may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
Although the proportion of general population sample who reported that 
they would be somewhat or extremely comfortable (53%) was very similar to the 
proportion who were comfortable with giving the public a role in priority setting 
decisions (50%), Table 6.10 suggests that there was only a slight and statistically 
insignificant association between a respondents own comfort and their support 
for a public role in priority setting.   
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Table 6.10: General public support for a public role in decision making  
by own preference comfort 
 Support public role?  
Own preference comfort Yes No 
Somewhat or extremely comfortable 52% 48% 
Neutral or uncomfortable 46% 54% 
Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.57.  Proportions may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
6.4 Implications for democratic or Communitarian priority setting 
The higher support among the general public for physician involvement 
in healthcare rationing decisions relative to their support for public or patient 
involvement appears consistent with an implicit principal-agent relationship in 
healthcare rationing decisions.  The public appeared to prefer physicians to act as 
their agents in these decisions over health system decision makers and other 
experts, and this is perhaps not surprising, given the well-established doctor-
patient agency relationship in healthcare (Ryan 1994), as well as evidence of a 
distrust of top-down rationing by experts (Leonard 2012) and of government in 
general (Edelman 2013).  Agents expressed slightly greater support for a public 
role in priority setting, which is consistent with suggestions that agents may 
support public involvement as a way of “sharing a bit of the pain” (Coast 2001a), 
or forcing the public to take ownership of the tough choices (Lomas 1997) 
involved in making difficult allocation decisions.  However, this support was still 
substantially lower than their support for health system decision-makers and 
physicians. 
The level of support among the general population sample for public 
involvement in priority setting, although relatively low, appears slightly stronger 
than results from other work in this area.  Lomas (1997) and Coast (2001a) both 
found that members of the public generally felt that they lacked sufficient 
knowledge and objectivity to contribute to rationing decisions, and that they 
would prefer to avoid the responsibility of rationing care.  Interestingly, Abelson 
et al. (1995) found that although only 17 percent of the public felt that other 
members of the public should have a decision-making role in healthcare priority 
setting, 61 percent were willing to take a personal decision-making role.  This 
suggested that the lack of public support for public participation may be less 
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about reservations over taking responsibility for rationing decisions and more 
about concerns over the suitability of others for this role.  Such a distinction 
between support for a personal role and a role for the general public at large was 
not observed in this survey. 
Litva et al. (2002) found that the public’s willingness to participate in 
healthcare decision making increased as the identifiability of the patient 
decreased.  Only 21 percent of their study participants were willing to be 
involved in patient-level allocation decisions, citing reservations about 
responsibility and denial disutility, but 68 percent were willing to participate in 
system-level decisions.  The level to which respondents to this survey felt they 
were contributing is not clear, but Litva et al.’s (2002) observation suggests that 
clearly explaining that preferences would be used to define system objectives and 
not to discriminate between individual patients may increase support for a public 
role and the willingness to have one’s preferences used in priority setting.  Litva 
et al. also found that participants were more willing to participate if they felt that 
they would have a real opportunity to influence decisions, rather than just a 
consultative role.  This suggests that although a democratic or Communitarian 
approach to priority setting may not be embraced by all citizens, a process where 
all citizens have an genuine opportunity to participate in setting system-level 
objectives may generate greater citizen support and participation than indirect 
processes where only a small number of ‘representative’ citizens express an 
opinion.   
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Appendix 6.1: Pilot preference weights used in developing the 
primary experimental design 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig 
LYg 0.251 0.027 9.318 <0.001 *** 
Age -0.019 0.002 -12.598 <0.001 *** 
U0 -0.774 0.094 -8.226 <0.001 *** 
LE -0.026 0.007 -3.671 <0.001 *** 
U1 3.204 0.268 11.970 <0.001 *** 
nPats 0.000 0.000 5.566 <0.001 *** 
U1:LYg -0.173 0.045 -3.820 <0.001 *** 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
LYg=Life years gained; U0=Initial utility; LE=Initial life expectancy; U1=Final utility; nPats=Number of 
patients treated 
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Appendix 6.3: Sample choice tasks 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This survey will ask you to imagine you are responsible for deciding how a healthcare budget 
should be divided between different groups of cancer patients.    
  • The survey is designed to measure your personal preferences.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  
  • The type of cancer in each group is not specified.  You should make your decision based on the 
information presented, not the type of cancer you think they might have.    
  • As you consider your answers, remember that it is possible that you or someone in your family could 
be part of one of these groups, now or in the future.    
  • The questions can be quite challenging, and even uncomfortable, but the results could help 
improve how money is spent on our healthcare in the future, so your opinions are very 
important.    
 
Thank you for your time and attention.  
 
 
Sample DCE task 
 
 
 
Sample CSPC task 
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Sample QALY graph 
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Chapter 7:  
Comparison of the  
DCE and CSPC formats 
The pilot survey, discussed in Chapter 5, suggested that the DCE had 
relatively better completion rates, lower difficulty ratings, and greater preference 
consistency, suggesting a greater ‘respondent efficiency.’  This had to be weighed 
against the ability of the CSPC to elicit specific preferences for the distribution of 
resources and/or outcomes between groups, and to avoid discomforting extreme 
distributions by allowing respondents to allocate some resources to the less 
preferred group.  However, the non-orthogonal application of the pilot 
experimental design meant that respondents to the DCE and CSPC 
questionnaires did not see the same choice sets.  As a result, it was not possible 
to say with certainty that the observed differences between the two pilot 
questionnaires were due to the elicitation methods themselves, and not simply 
due to differences in the choice sets presented to respondents.  Therefore, it was 
of interest to re-compare the two formats on the basis of the larger sample and 
more appropriate application of the experimental design of the primary 
elicitation. 
It was also useful to compare the response behaviours of the two formats 
before estimating respondent preferences for the different attributes included in 
the DCE and CSPC questionnaires.  If an excessive proportion of respondents to 
one questionnaire or the other reported difficulty understanding or answering the 
tasks, or adopted a non-compensatory decision making strategy, it may call into 
question the validity of the elicited preferences.  The inclusion of respondents 
with dominant or non-compensatory preferences generally presupposes that they 
represent a relatively small proportion of all respondents, but if a majority of 
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respondents adopted such a strategy, it would imply that most attribute levels 
had no impact on choices, and regression coefficients and rates of substitution 
would have no meaningful interpretation (Scott 2002).  Similarly, high rates of 
difficulty or simplifying non-compensatory decision-making may indicate an 
overly complex or confusing elicitation format that may compromise the 
collection of meaningful preference data (DeShazo & Fermo 2002). 
The different dimensions of the comparison of the DCE and CSPC 
response behaviours, including completion rates, difficulty ratings, tests of non-
satiation and preference stability, learning and fatigue effects, dominant 
preferences, and QALY maximising behaviours, are discussed in section 7.1, 
with the results of these comparisons presented in section 7.2.  Finally, the 
implications of this comparison for identifying a preferred format for the 
elicitation of societal preferences over the allocation of healthcare resources are 
discussed in section 7.3. 
7.1 DCE-CSPC comparisons 
The response behaviours of the DCE and CSPC respondents were 
compared on a number of dimensions.  These included completion rates, 
difficulty and confidence ratings, preference stability, and the incidence of 
dominant preferences, as in the pilot survey, but the primary survey added 
comparisons of completion times, learning and fatigue effects, and a test of non-
satiation or dominance.  It is important to note that for all these comparisons 
each respondent only saw a single questionnaire and never compares the two 
formats directly.  All statistical tests were conducted using R 2.15.3 (R Core 
Team 2013), and a significance threshold of 0.05 was adopted. 
7.1.1 Completion rates 
Completion rates for the two formats were compared using a two-sample 
Z-test of completed questionnaires as a proportion of questionnaires begun.  In 
the general population survey, the assigned questionnaire format, completion 
status, and (if applicable) completion time, were linked to each individual 
respondent.  Individuals who quit a questionnaire but returned at a later time 
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could pick up where they left off and submit a completed questionnaire.  This 
would be counted as one survey begun and submitted (a 100% completion rate).  
Owing to differences in the sample and the survey software, however, responses 
from the agent invitations were entirely anonymous, and it was not possible to 
track individuals who may have quit one questionnaire but returned later to 
complete another.  Such a case would be counted as two surveys begun, with 
one drop-out and one completion (a 50% completion rate).  To the extent that 
respondents to the agent invitations began more than one questionnaire, 
completion rates in this group will be correspondingly understated.   
For the purposes of this comparison, the agent sample included all 
respondents to the agent invitations, regardless of whether they self-identified as 
a decision-making agent.  As it was not possible to know the status of individuals 
who started but did not submit a questionnaire, it was not possible to calculate 
an agent-specific denominator or completion rate.  For all other analyses, which 
only included completed questionnaires, non-agent respondents to the agent 
invitations were included among the general public sample. 
The proportion of ‘no answers’ among DCE responses was also reported, 
including a comparison of the proportion of no answers between agents and the 
general public.  The trend in the proportion of no answers by task sequence was 
tested using linear regression.  The proportion of no answers in the repeated task 
was also compared to the proportion across all other tasks combined.  The 
choice set used as the repeated task in each design block was the set with closest 
utility balance, and there is evidence to suggest that greater utility balance tends 
to make discrete choice tasks more complex (DeShazo & Fermo 2002).  It was of 
interest, therefore, to test whether this relatively greater complexity may have led 
respondents to opt out of these tasks at a greater rate than the other tasks. 
7.1.2 Respondent-rated difficulty and confidence 
The difficulty of the two formats was compared in terms of the 
proportions of DCE and CSPC respondents who rated the questionnaires as 
‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘extremely difficult’ to understand or to answer in the 
follow-up rating tasks.  As the pilot survey suggested that decision makers were 
more likely to rate the tasks as difficult, this comparison was stratified by agent 
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status.  The questionnaires were also compared in terms of the proportion of 
respondents who were ‘somewhat confident’ or ‘extremely confident’ that their 
responses to the choice tasks accurately reflected their preferences.  Proportions 
were compared using a two-sample Z-test.   
7.1.3 Tests of non-satiation and stability 
Each block of the experimental design included a test of each 
respondent’s consistency with the axiom of non-satiation, as well as a repeated 
task to test preference stability.  Stated preference elicitations have generally held 
that ‘rational’ respondents should prefer the dominant alternative (Miguel et al., 
2005; Ryan, 2009).  CSPC allocations were transformed to discrete choices on 
the basis of which alternative was allocated the majority of the budget, and 50-50 
allocations were taken as not prioritising the dominant alternative.  The 
proportion of respondents in each questionnaire demonstrating non-satiation 
was compared using a two-sample Z-test.   
Learning from the pilot survey, where high stability in the repeated DCE 
task may have been aided by an extreme imbalance in utilities between the two 
alternatives, the repeated task used in each design block was the choice set with 
the closest expected utility balance.  Again, CSPC budget allocations were 
transformed to discrete choices on the basis of the alternative to which the 
majority of resources were allocated.  Equal 50-50 allocations were allowed, but 
the allocations had to be equal in both tasks in order to be classified as 
consistent.  As an equal budget allocation was treated as a distinct choice from 
Program A or B, a stricter definition of stability was effectively applied to 
individuals choosing this specific allocation relative to individuals who allocated 
a majority of the budget to one alternative or the other, as there was only one 
specific budget allocation that would be accepted as stable.   
The proportion of respondents with stable responses to the repeated task 
was compared using a two-sample Z-test.  To assess the impact of the stricter 
consistency criterion for individuals with an equal budget allocation, the 
statistical significance of the mean difference in the repeated budget allocations 
of individuals with at least one 50-50 allocation was tested using a one-sample t-
test.   
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7.1.4 Learning and fatigue effects 
Experimental evidence that suggests that there are simultaneous processes 
of learning and fatigue that may affect choices as respondents progress through a 
stated preference elicitation (Bech et al., 2011; Johnson and Desvousges, 1997; 
Maddala et al., 2003).  To allow for the identification of such effects, the 11 
choice sets in each block of the experimental design were divided into 3 
segments, which were systematically rotated to create 3 versions of each block 
(see Appendix 6.2 for the task sequence within each block and version).  The 
positions of test of non-satiation and the original and repeated tasks to test 
preference stability were fixed across all versions, but the position of the 
remaining tasks rotated by version.  The order of the tasks in each version is 
shown in Appendix 6.1. 
To test for learning or fatigue effects, a series of one-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted for each choice set and design block to test 
for a statistically significant difference by task sequence in the proportion of DCE 
respondents that preferred alternative B, or in the mean CSPC budget allocation 
to alternative B.  If a particular choice set was associated with a significant 
difference, a post hoc test was used to identify which version was the outlier.  
Preferences that were significantly and systematically different in choice sets seen 
earlier relative to other versions would suggest a learning effect.  Conversely, a 
significant difference for sets seen later relative to other versions would suggest a 
fatigue effect.  The analyses of variance were performed using the car package in 
R 2.15.3 (Fox & Weisberg 2011).   
7.1.5 Dominant preferences 
What appears to be a dominant or non-compensatory preference for a 
particular attribute may simply be a reluctance to trade over the range of levels 
presented in the experimental design, or an indication that the attributes included 
in the experimental design are unimportant to some respondents (Lancsar & 
Louviere 2006).  A fractional factorial experimental design also complicates the 
interpretation of non-compensatory preferences, as it is not possible to say with 
certainty that observed instances of non-compensatory decision-making would 
persist across all possible scenarios (Lancsar & Louviere 2006; Scott 2002).  For 
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these reasons, respondents with a dominant preference are generally included in 
the analysis of stated preference elicitations.  However, this presupposes that 
such respondents represent a relatively small proportion of all respondents.  If all 
respondents adopted non-compensatory decision making strategies, it would 
imply that attribute levels had no impact on choices, and would invalidate the 
stated preference elicitation.  Therefore, the incidence of dominant preferences in 
the two elicitation formats – including a dominant preference for QALY 
maximisation – was assessed before proceeding with the choice analysis. 
As in the pilot survey, a respondent was considered to have a dominant 
preference for a particular attribute if they always chose or prioritised the 
alternative with the highest or lowest level of that attribute, regardless of the 
levels of the other attributes (Scott 2002).  To test for dominant preferences, a set 
of seven flags was created for each alternative in each choice task: age, initial 
utility, initial life expectancy, final utility, life years gained, (potential) number of 
patients treated and (potential) aggregate QALYs gained.  Each flag indicated 
whether or not the alternative presented the higher level of a particular attribute.  
For example, the alternative that included the older patients was flagged as 
‘highest’ in the age attribute, and the flag for the corresponding alternative was 
set to zero.   
The correlation between each individual's choice and attribute flags was 
taken as a measure of that attribute’s impact on their choices.  A respondent 
who, for example, invariably chose the alternative with the youngest patients 
would have a correlation coefficient of -1.0 between choice flag and the age flag 
(perfect choice-attribute correlation).  Correlation coefficients close to zero 
would indicate the attribute had relatively little direct impact on their choices.  
This was slightly different than the approach taken in the pilot survey, where the 
flags indicated whether the attribute presented the ‘more preferred’ level based 
on expectations from the empirical ethics review.  In this revised approach, no 
effort was made to anticipate the preferred level of the attribute, and the sign on 
the correlation coefficient indicated which end of the attribute scale was 
preferred (if either): a negative coefficient indicated a preference for the lower 
level, and a positive coefficient indicated a preference for the higher level.  Note, 
though, that this still only holds where individual preferences are monotonically 
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increasing or decreasing over the attribute, as was assumed here.  CSPC 
responses were transformed to discrete choices on the basis of which program 
was allocated the majority of the budget, and the attribute flags were set based on 
the potential number of patients treated and QALYs gained if 100% of the 
budget were allocated to that alternative.  For the purposes of this analysis, 
CSPC alternatives that received a 50% budget allocation were flagged as ‘not 
chosen’ (i.e. both alternatives in a given task were assigned a choice flag of zero) 
as neither alternative was prioritised.  Kendall’s tau (Herve 2007) was used as the 
measure of correlation, which was estimated using the ltm package (Rizopoulos 
2006). 
Responses to the test of non-satiation were excluded from the analysis, as 
the common levels of age, initial health state, initial life expectancy and patients 
treated in this task meant that both alternatives in the task would be flagged as 
non-dominant over these attributes.  Regardless of which alternative a 
respondent chose, they would be flagged as choosing the non-dominant 
alternative, and by definition could not hold a dominant preference for those 
attributes, even if all their other choices were based on the level of one of those 
attributes. 
To confirm the identification of a possible dominant preference, each 
respondent’s self-rated attribute importance scores were converted to rankings 
and compared to their choice-attribute correlation coefficients.  Individuals with 
a perfect choice-attribute correlation who also rated that attribute as most 
important were considered to have a confirmed dominant preference for that 
attribute.  As a respondent could give more than one attribute the same rating, 
more than one attribute could be ranked as most important, but dominant 
preferences were considered to be confirmed even in the case of ties with other 
attributes.  The proportion of dominant preferences was compared across the 
two formats using a two-sample Z-test.   
7.1.6 QALY maximisation 
The results from the pilot survey suggested that respondents did not, in 
general, adopt a strict QALY maximising decision rule.  Only one respondent 
prioritised the QALY maximising alternative with every choice, and on average, 
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DCE and CSPC respondents chose the QALY maximising well less than the 10 
times out of 10 that would seem to be required by a strict QALY maximising 
approach.  As noted, however, respondents to the two formats did not see the 
same choice sets, so it was of interest to test for differences in the number of 
QALY maximising choices by format when all respondents saw the same choice 
sets.  The mean number of QALY maximising alternatives chosen by each 
respondent was compared across the formats using a two-sample t-test.  CSPC 
respondents were considered to have prioritised the QALY maximising 
alternative if that program received the majority of the budget allocation.  An 
equal budget allocation between the two programs was counted as a non-
maximising choice.  To test whether agents, who may have been more familiar 
with QALYs and the principles of QALY maximisation than the general public, 
were significantly more likely to adopt a QALY maximising decision rule, the 
number of QALY maximising choices was also compared across respondent 
subgroups.  Finally, to test whether the QALY graphs (see Appendix 6.3), which 
illustrated QALY gains at the individual rather than the aggregate level, may 
have tended to encourage respondents to focus on individual over aggregate 
QALY gains, the number of choices that maximised QALYs at the individual 
level were compared with the number of choices maximising QALYs at the 
aggregate level.     
Note that in each choice task, one of the two alternatives was always the 
QALY maximising alternative.  Therefore, respondents had a 50 percent 
probability of prioritising the QALY maximising alternative by chance alone, 
disregarding for now equal CSPC budget allocations.  Monte Carlo simulation 
was used to test whether the observed proportion of QALY maximising choices 
was significantly different than what might be expected by chance alone, similar 
to an approach used by Diederich, Swait and Wirsik (2012).  Each respondent’s 
vector of observed choices was replaced by a vector of random choices, and the 
difference in the number of QALY maximising choices between the observed 
and random vectors calculated.  This process was repeated 1000 times and sorted 
by ascending difference.  The differences at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, for 
agents and for the general population sample, were taken as estimates of the 95 
percent confidence intervals of the mean difference between the proportion of 
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observed QALY maximising choices and what would be expected by chance 
alone.  Statistically significant intervals greater than zero were taken to indicate 
support for the principles of QALY maximisation, while significantly negative 
intervals were taken to indicate opposition to this rule.  Intervals that crossed 
zero were taken to indicate no statistical preference for aggregate QALYs.   
Finally, empirical evidence (Payne et al. 1992; Ryan 2009; Slovic 1995), 
as well as anecdotal evidence from the pilot survey, suggested that respondent 
may construct preferences as they progress through a stated preference 
elicitation.  Therefore, it was also of interest to test whether a respondent’s 
tendency to choose the QALY maximising alternative changed over the task 
sequence in either format.  There were two competing hypotheses: one 
hypothesis was that respondents would become more likely to prioritise the 
QALY maximising alternative as they became more familiar with the concept of 
QALYs as a measure of aggregate health gain.  The other hypothesis was that 
respondents would use aggregate QALY gains as a simplifying heuristic in the 
early tasks, but become less likely to prioritise on the basis of QALY gains as they 
became more familiar with the trade-offs and levels in the choice tasks. 
A probit model was used to estimate the change in the probability of a 
respondent prioritising the QALY maximising alternative by task sequence and 
questionnaire format.  The specific attribute levels in each choice set were 
disregarded; only the position of the choice in the overall task sequence was 
considered.  The test of non-satiation, presented as task 1 in all questionnaire 
versions, was excluded from the model as it was felt that the fixed position of the 
task, as well as the dominance of one alternative, might make it an outlier in the 
overall trend.  Predicted choice probabilities were derived from the probit 
coefficients using the effects package (Fox 2003), and the standard errors were 
adjusted for clustering using the lmtest package (Zeileis & Hothorn 2002).   
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7.2 DCE and CSPC response behaviours 
7.2.1 Questionnaire completion rates 
The number of individuals who were randomised to a DCE or CSPC 
questionnaire and the number who submitted a completed questionnaire are 
shown in Table 7.1, stratified by respondent subgroup. 
Table 7.1: Completion rates by questionnaire format and respondent subgroup 
Survey sample DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 656/738 (89%) 662/792 (84%) 0.003 0.009 ** 
General public 595/640 (93%) 595/672 (89%) 0.007 0.014 ** 
Agent invitations 61/98 (62%) 67/120 (56%) 0.410 0.410  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
The agent invitations sample includes individuals not self-identifying as decision-making agents.  The 
adjusted p-values for the difference between the general public and agent invitation response rates were 
<0.001 in both the DCE and CSPC. 
The completion rate among the general population subset was slightly but 
significantly higher in the DCE than the CSPC, while the difference among 
respondents to the agent invitations was not significantly different.  Within each 
format, agents were significantly less likely than the general population sample 
to submit a completed questionnaire.  Overall, the DCE had a significantly 
higher completion rate, although the absolute difference was only 5.3 percent. 
As noted earlier, the invited sample of agents included individuals that 
were not necessarily decision-making agents, but 101 of the 128 total 
respondents to these invitations (79%) did self-identify as an agent, including 57 
respondents to the CSPC (56%) and 44 respondents to the DCE (44%).  
Although an agent-specific denominator was not available, the relatively even 
distribution of agents across the two surveys contradicts the substantially lower 
representation of agents in the pilot CSPC, suggesting that agents were no more 
likely to drop out of the primary CSPC than the DCE. 
The ‘no answer’ option was chosen in 5.8 percent of all DCE responses, 
and the rate was virtually identical among agents and the general public (5.1% 
vs. 5.8%, respectively, p=0.37).  Linear regression found no significant trend in 
the proportion of no answers by task sequence (p=0.98), and contrary to the 
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hypothesis of greater utility balance in the repeated tasks leading respondents to 
opt out at a greater rate, the proportion of no answers in the repeated tasks was 
slightly but significantly less than the proportion across the other tasks combined 
(5.1% vs. 6.0%, p=0.03).  If the greater utility balance in the repeated tasks did 
indeed result in a relatively more complex task, it does not appear that this 
complexity induced a greater proportion of no answers. 
7.2.2 Respondent-rated difficulty and confidence 
The proportions of respondents rating the tasks as somewhat or extremely 
difficult to understand are shown in Table 7.2, by format and respondent group.  
A greater proportion of respondents found the CSPC difficult to understand, 
particularly among agents, who were three times more likely to rate the CSPC as 
difficult compared to the DCE, although none of the differences were significant 
after adjusting for multiple comparisons.  Within each format, the proportions of 
agents rating the tasks as difficult to understand were not significantly different 
from those of the general public. 
Table 7.2: Respondents rating the tasks as somewhat or extremely difficult to 
understand, by format 
Group DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 112/656 (17%) 143/662 (22%) 0.04 0.08 + 
General public 108/612 (18%) 126/605 (21%) 0.18 0.18  
Agents 4/44 (9%) 17/57 (30%) 0.02 0.07 + 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
The adjusted p-value for the difference in the proportions of the general public and agents rating the tasks 
as somewhat or extremely difficult was 0.85 in the DCE and 0.63 in the CSPC. 
 
The proportions of respondents rating the tasks as somewhat or extremely 
difficult to answer are shown in Table 7.3.  There were no significant differences 
in the proportions of agents or the general public who rated the tasks as difficult 
to answer, and no difference between agents and the general public in the 
proportion rating the DCE as difficult to answer, but a significantly greater 
proportion of agents rated the CSPC as difficult to answer compared to the 
public. 
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Table 7.3: Respondents rating the tasks as somewhat or extremely difficult to answer, 
by format 
Group DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 311/656 (47%) 328/662 (50%) 0.47 0.81  
General public 284/612 (46%) 286/605 (47%) 0.81 0.81  
Agents 27/44 (61%) 42/57 (74%) 0.27 0.71  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
The adjusted p-value for the difference in the proportions of the general public and agents rating the tasks 
as somewhat or extremely difficult was 0.31 in the DCE and 0.001 in the CSPC. 
Finally, the proportions of respondents who indicated that they were 
somewhat or extremely confident that their answers in the DCE or CSPC choice 
tasks accurately reflected their preferences are shown in Table 7.4.  A majority of 
all respondents were confident that their answers accurately represented their 
preferences, and there were no statistically significant differences between the 
two formats or between agents and the general public after adjusting for multiple 
comparisons.    
Table 7.4: Respondents who indicated they were somewhat or extremely confident that 
their answers accurately reflected their preferences, by format 
Group DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 461/656 (70%) 431/662 (65%) 0.05 0.21  
General public 429/612 (70%) 393/605 (65%) 0.06 0.26  
Agents 32/44 (73%) 38/57 (67%) 0.66 0.91  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
The adjusted p-value for the difference in the proportions of the general public and agents rating their 
confidence as very or somewhat confident was 0.91 for both the DCE and the CSPC. 
The relatively high confidence in both formats and in both respondent 
groups seemed to imply that respondents felt they were able to express their 
preferences accurately, regardless of any difficulties in understanding or 
answering the tasks.  Indeed, a substantial proportion of the respondents who 
rated the tasks as difficult to answer also indicated that they were confident their 
answers accurately reflected their preferences. 
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7.2.3 Non-satiation and preference stability 
Table 7.5 shows the proportion of respondents to the DCE and CSPC 
questionnaires who demonstrated a preference for the alternative with the 
dominant health outcomes in the test of non-satiation, by format and respondent 
subgroup.  The results suggested that general population respondents to the DCE 
were substantially and significantly more likely to choose the dominant 
alternative compared to CSPC respondents (adjusted-p < 0.001), as almost all of 
the DCE respondents chose the dominant alternative compared to just over two-
thirds of CSPC respondents.  Eleven percent of all CSPC respondents equalised 
the budget allocation in this task and were not counted as prioritising the 
dominant alternative, but this only explains 41 percent of the relative difference 
between DCE and CSPC respondents.  Agent respondents to the DCE survey 
also appeared substantially more likely to choose the dominant alternative 
compared to agents in the CSPC, although this difference was not as large as in 
the general population sample and was not statistically significant (adjusted-
p=0.33).  Agents were significantly less likely than general population 
respondents to choose the dominant alternative in the DCE (adjusted-p=0.003), 
but there was no significant difference between agents and the general public in 
the CSPC (adjusted-p=0.96). 
Table 7.5: Non-satiation by questionnaire format and stakeholder group 
Stakeholder group DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
All respondents 625/656 (95%) 457/662 (69%) <0.001 <0.001 *** 
General public 588/612 (96%) 417/605 (69%) <0.001 <0.001 *** 
Agents 37/44 (84%) 40/57 (70%) 0.16 0.33  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
 
As noted earlier, stated preference elicitations generally assume that 
rational respondents should prefer the dominant alternative, but the normative 
quality of non-satiation in this context is not clear.  Non-satiation ensures well-
behaved, monotonically increasing indifference curves, but it is not a specific 
requirement of rationality in conventional choice theory (Lancsar & Louviere 
2006).  Indeed, a number of studies identified in the empirical ethics review 
found a preference for patients with the worst prospects, even if they would 
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benefit less from treatment than other groups.  Therefore, although the difference 
in non-satiation between the two formats is notable, and may suggest that the 
CSPC induces a different cognitive process than the DCE, it is not in itself a 
fundamental advantage or limitation of either format. 
Table 7.6 shows the proportion of respondents to the DCE and CSPC 
who were consistent in their preference for the same program in the original and 
the repeated task of each questionnaire.  It suggests that respondents to the DCE 
had significantly greater preference stability, with a 10 percent advantage over 
the CSPC in all groups, although this difference was not statistically significant 
among the agent sample.  The difference in the proportion of consistent 
responses between agents and the general public was not significant in the DCE 
(p=0.41) or the CSPC (p=0.37).   
Table 7.6: Preference stability by questionnaire format and respondent subgroup 
Stakeholder group DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted p Sig 
All respondents 475/656 (73%) 414/662 (63%) <0.001 <0.001 *** 
General public 446/612 (73%) 382/605 (63%) <0.001 <0.001 *** 
Agents 29/44 (66%) 32/57 (56%) 0.429 0.429  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
The adjusted-p for the difference between agents and the public in the proportion with stable preferences 
was 0.41 in the DCE and 0.37 in the CSPC. 
 
The distribution of individual budget differences between the original and 
repeated CSPC tasks is shown in Figure 7.1.  The mean budget allocation to 
program B was 41.9 percent in the initial task and 37.7 percent to the same 
program in the repeated task.  The individual differences were clustered around 
zero, confirming that most CSPC respondents allocated a roughly similar budget 
share in both tasks, and although the mean difference was significantly different 
from zero, it was still relatively small (mean absolute difference=-4.2%, 
p<0.001). 
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Ninety-six of the 662 CSPC respondents (15%) chose an equal 50-50 
budget allocation in at least one of the original or repeated task, and 27 of those 
respondents were consistent in choosing an equal allocation in both tasks.  As 
with the overall distribution, the budget differences for individuals with at least 
one 50-50 budget allocation were clustered around zero, and although the mean 
difference was statistically significant it was again relatively small (mean 
absolute difference=-4.8, p=0.02).   
7.2.4 Learning and fatigue effects 
The mean proportions of DCE respondents preferring alternative B in 
each choice set, and the mean CSPC budget allocations to alternative B in each 
choice set, stratified by format, block and questionnaire version, are shown in 
Figure 7.2.  Note that the choice sets differed between blocks, and that the order 
that the choice sets were presented within each block differed by version.  The 
numeric labels indicate the sequence in which the choice sets were presented in 
each version. 
Figure 7.1: Distribution of individual budget differences between the repeated CSPC tasks 
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The figures suggest that there was very little difference in the proportions 
or means over the choice sets by version, and this impression was largely 
confirmed by the results of the one-way ANOVAs by format, block and choice 
set shown in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: ANOVA adjusted p-values by choice set, format and block 
Choice set DCE, Block 1 DCE, Block 2 CSPC, Block 1 CSPC, Block 2 
1 0.393 0.008 0.812 0.386 
2 0.706 0.405 0.428 0.517 
3 0.614 0.113 0.273 0.269 
4 0.694 0.114 0.269 0.063 
5 0.705 0.200 0.441 0.781 
Figure 7.2: Choices and budget allocations by design, choice set and task sequence 
The order the choice sets were presented differed by version, and the numeric labels indicate the order 
each choice set appeared in the different versions.  Choice set 10 was the test of dominance and was 
always presented as the first task.  Choice sets 77 and 88 were the reversed versions of sets 7 and 8, 
respectively.  The original and repeated choice sets were always presented as tasks 5 and 8, respectively. 
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6 0.510 0.274 0.987 0.396 
7 0.325 0.273 0.132 0.058 
8 0.866 0.630 0.825 0.090 
9 0.626 0.365 0.284 0.921 
10 0.212 0.297 0.104 0.545 
77 0.801 N/P 0.228 N/P 
88 N/P 0.259 N/P 0.251 
P-values less than 0.10, highlighted in bold, indicate a significant difference in the proportions or means by 
questionnaire version.  The order of the choice sets varied by version, but choice set 10 was the test of 
dominance and was always presented as the first task.  Choice set 7 was repeated as set 77 in block 1 of 
both formats, and set 8 was repeated as set 88 in block 2 of both formats.  The original and repeated tasks 
were always presented as tasks 5 and 8, respectively.  N/P=Not presented in the design block. 
 
Choice set 1 of DCE block 2 was the only set with a statistically 
significant difference at a 0.05 threshold, but relaxing this threshold to 0.10 
added three other instances, all from block 2 of the CSPC: choice sets 4, 7 and 8.  
Post hoc tests of these four instances are shown in Appendix 7.1.  Set 1 of DCE 
block 2, version 1, which presented this set as the second task in the sequence, 
was associated with a significantly lower probability of choice relative to versions 
2 (task 9) and 3 (task 4), which presented the task later in the sequence.  In CSPC 
block 2, set 4 had a higher mean budget allocation as task 9 than as task 6, while 
set 7 had a significantly higher mean budget allocation as task 2 than task 6.  In 
both cases, earlier tasks had significantly greater budget allocations. There was 
also a statistically significant difference in set 8 of CSPC block 2, but recall that 
was the original task in the repeated test of preference consistency and was 
presented at the same point in the task sequence (task 5) in all three versions.  
This suggests that this observed difference was not specifically associated with 
learning or fatigue effects, although it is possible that there were more complex 
ordering effects in that block.   
These differences suggest the possibility of learning effects in both the 
DCE and the CSPC, as responses to the tasks presented earlier in the choice 
sequence were significantly different from responses when the same sets were 
presented later in the sequence.  However, only 4 out of the 44 possible choice 
sets were associated with any statistically significant differences, and in the case 
of the CSPC these differences were relatively small (absolute differences of 5-
8%).  It is difficult to conclude, therefore, that there were meaningful learning or 
fatigue effects over the sequence of choice tasks presented in either format.  This 
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seems particularly noteworthy for the more complex and cognitively demanding 
CSPC. 
7.2.5 Dominant preferences 
The distribution of individual choice-attribute correlations by format and 
attribute are illustrated in Appendix 7.3.  In these histograms, a perfect 
correlation between choice and the higher level of an attribute appears as a 
correlation coefficient of 1.0, and a perfect correlation between choice and the 
lower level of an attribute appears as -1.0.  The proportion of respondents with at 
least one perfect correlation between choice and a particular attribute flag is 
shown in Table 7.8, along with the proportions of respondents with perfect 
choice correlations by specific attributes.  By chance, it was possible for 
respondents to have perfect choice correlations with more than one attribute, so 
the sum of respondents across attributes is greater than the number of unique 
individuals with a perfect-choice attribute correlation.  As well, the alternative 
with the greatest number of patients treated was also always the alternative with 
the greatest aggregate QALYs gained.  As the two attribute flags were 
themselves perfectly correlated, it was not possible to disentangle the choice 
correlations for the two attributes, and the same individuals were counted in 
both attributes. 
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Table 7.8: Individuals with perfect choice-attribute correlation by attribute and format 
Attribute DCE CSPC p value Adjusted-p Sig 
Any perfect 
correlation 
61/656 (9.3%) 24/658 (3.6%) <0.001 <0.001 *** 
By attribute      
  Age 39/656 (5.9%) 16/658 (2.4%) 0.002 0.011 * 
  Life expectancy 3/656 (0.5%) 1/658 (0.2%) 0.610 1.000 
 
  Life years gained 0/656 (0.0%) 1/658 (0.2%) 1.000 1.000 
 
  Patients treated 19/656 (2.9%) 4/658 (0.6%) 0.003 0.015 * 
  Aggregate QALYs 19/656 (2.9%) 4/658 (0.6%) 0.003 0.015 * 
  Initial health state 0/656 (0.0%) 2/658 (0.3%) 0.483 1.000 
 
  Final health state 0/656 (0.0%) 0/658 (0.0%) n/d n/d 
 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
n/d: p-value not defined where both formats have no events.  The CSPC results exclude 4 respondents who 
did not move the slider in any of their choices and finished the questionnaire in less than one-half the 
median completion time.   
The proportion of respondents with at least one perfect choice-attribute 
correlation in the DCE was significantly higher than the proportion in the CSPC 
(9.3% vs. 3.6%, adjusted-p <0.001).  Consistent with this overall difference, there 
were also significant differences between formats in the proportions with a 
perfect choice correlation with age, total patients treated and aggregate QALYs 
gained.  The majority of perfect choice-attribute correlations were associated 
with the age attribute, where 12 out of 16 CSPC respondents (67%) and 33 out of 
39 DCE respondents (85%) favoured the lower (younger) level.  All 19 DCE 
respondents who had a perfect choice correlation with total patients and 
aggregate QALYs favoured higher levels, but 2 of the 4 CSPC respondents who 
had a perfect correlation with these attributes always chose the lower levels. 
To distinguish dominant preferences from perfect choice-attribute 
correlations that may have happened by chance, each perfect correlation was 
compared to the respondent’s self-rated importance ratings.  Table 7.9 shows the 
proportion of respondents with at least one perfect choice-attribute correlation 
who also ranked that attribute as most important in the rating task that followed 
the DCE and CSPC choice tasks.  As it was possible for a respondent to have 
more than one perfect choice-attribute correlation, and to rate multiple attributes 
as equally important, it was possible for a respondent to have a confirmed 
dominant preference for more than one attribute.  This was particularly true for 
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the number of patients treated and aggregate QALYs gained, where as noted 
above, the flags for the two attributes were themselves perfectly correlated.   
Table 7.9: Individuals with confirmed dominant preferences by attribute and format 
Attribute DCE CSPC p-value Adjusted-p Sig 
Any dominant 
preference 
45/656 (6.9%) 18/658 (2.7%) <0.001 0.006 ** 
By attribute      
  Age 32/656 (4.9%) 14/658 (2.1%) 0.010 0.049 * 
  Life expectancy 0/656 (0.0%) 0/658 (0.0%) n/d n/d  
  Life years gained 0/656 (0.0%) 1/658 (0.2%) 1.000 1.000  
  Patients treated 13/656 (2.0%) 2/658 (0.4%) 0.009 0.045 * 
  Aggregate QALYs 15/656 (2.3%) 2/658 (0.4%) 0.003 0.022 * 
  Initial health state 0/656 (0.0%) 0/658 (0.0%) n/d n/d  
  Final health state 0/656 (0.0%) 0/658 (0.0%) n/d n/d  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
n/d: p-value not defined where both formats have no events.  The CSPC results exclude 4 respondents who 
did not move the slider in any of their choices and finished the questionnaire in less than one-half the 
median completion time. 
Again, the DCE was associated with a significantly higher proportion of 
respondents with a confirmed dominant preference (6.9% vs. 2.7%, adjusted-
p=0.006).  There were also significant differences between the formats in the 
proportion of respondents holding a dominant preference for age, total patients 
treated and aggregate QALYs gained, with the DCE higher across all three 
attributes.  The most common dominant preference in both formats was for age, 
where 10 out of the 14 CSPC respondents (71%) and 30 out of the 32 DCE 
respondents (94%) had a dominant preference for the younger patient group in 
each choice.  This was in contrast to the pilot survey, where the most frequent 
dominant preference in the DCE was for final health state, and in the CSPC was 
for individual life years gained. 
7.2.6 QALY maximisation 
The distribution of respondents by the count of their total QALY 
maximising choices out of the 11 choice tasks in each questionnaire is illustrated 
in Figure 7.3, and detailed in Table 7.10.   
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Contrary to the hypothesis of a possible prominence effect in the CSPC, 
which may have encouraged respondents to give more weight to aggregate 
QALY gains in their allocations, it was DCE respondents who were significantly 
more likely to choose the QALY maximising alternatives in their choice tasks.  
DCE respondents made on average almost two more QALY maximising choices 
than CSPC respondents (p <0.001).  Overall, there was little evidence of QALY 
maximising behaviour among respondents to either format, as only 2 percent of 
all respondents prioritised the alternative that maximised QALYs in every task.  
It is interesting to note that a majority of CSPC respondents (59%) consistently 
prioritised the QALY minimising alternative in making five or fewer QALY 
maximising choices, and this was significantly more than the proportion of DCE 
respondents (26%, p<0.001). 
Table 7.10: Respondents by number of QALY maximising choices and questionnaire 
format 
QALY maximising choices DCE CSPC Combined 
0 1 (0%) 18 (3%) 19 (1%) 
1 0 (0%) 13 (2%) 13 (1%) 
2 6 (1%) 40 (6%) 46 (3%) 
3 19 (3%) 82 (12%) 101 (8%) 
Figure 7.3: QALY maximising choices by questionnaire format 
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4 41 (6%) 103 (16%) 144 (11%) 
5 102 (16%) 133 (20%) 235 (18%) 
6 134 (20%) 120 (18%) 254 (19%) 
7 128 (20%) 69 (10%) 197 (15%) 
8 83 (13%) 47 (7%) 130 (10%) 
9 79 (12%) 24 (4%) 103 (8%) 
10 44 (7%) 7 (1%) 51 (4%) 
11 19 (3%) 2 (0%) 21 (2%) 
All respondents 656 (50%) 658 (50%) 1314 (100%) 
Mean QALY maximising 
choices per respondent 
6.81 5.02 5.91 
p-value <0.001  
The CSPC results exclude 4 respondents who did not move the slider in any of their choices and finished the 
questionnaire in less than one-half the median completion time. 
Table 7.11 shows the distribution of respondents by their QALY 
maximising choices, this time stratified by agent status.  The number of QALY 
maximising choices made by agents was not significantly different than the 
number made by respondents from the general population sample (5.83 vs. 5.92, 
p=0.70).   
Table 7.11: Respondents by number of QALY maximising choices and agent status 
QALY maximising choices Agents Public Combined 
0 0 (0%) 19 (2%) 19 (1%) 
1 2 (2%) 11 (1%) 13 (1%) 
2 6 (6%) 40 (3%) 46 (3%) 
3 8 (8%) 93 (8%) 101 (8%) 
4 11 (11%) 133 (11%) 144 (11%) 
5 13 (13%) 222 (18%) 235 (18%) 
6 26 (26%) 228 (19%) 254 (19%) 
7 11 (11%) 186 (15%) 197 (15%) 
8 11 (11%) 119 (10%) 130 (10%) 
9 10 (10%) 93 (8%) 103 (8%) 
10 2 (2%) 49 (4%) 51 (4%) 
11 1 (1%) 20 (2%) 21 (2%) 
All respondents 101 (8%) 1213 (92%) 1314 (100%) 
Mean QALY maximising 
choices per respondent 
5.83 5.92 5.91 
p-value 0.70  
The public results exclude 4 CSPC respondents who did not move the slider in any of their choices and 
finished the questionnaire in less than one-half the median completion time. 
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Finally, as the individual-level QALY graphs presented to respondents 
may have encouraged a focus on individual rather than aggregate QALY gains, 
Table 7.12 shows the distribution of respondents by the number of choices they 
made that maximised individual QALY gains and aggregate QALYs gains.  The 
table shows that respondents were slightly but significantly more likely to choose 
the alternative that maximised aggregate QALY gains over individual QALY 
gains (5.91 vs. 5.72, p=0.02).  This suggests that the individual-level QALY 
graphs did not focus respondent attention on individual gains to the exclusion of 
consideration of aggregate gains.  Similar to the result observed in Table 7.10, 
when  results shown in Table 7.12 were further stratified by questionnaire format 
(not shown), the majority of CSPC respondents (56%) were more likely to 
prioritise the individual QALY minimising alternative, compared to 36 percent of 
DCE respondents (p<0.001).  In considering these results, note that the 
individual QALY maximising and the aggregate QALY maximising alternatives 
were often one and the same.  The results shown in Table 7.12 should therefore 
be interpreted in terms of the relative trend rather than as an absolute trade-off 
between individual or aggregate QALY gains. 
Table 7.12: Respondents by number of individual and aggregate QALY maximising 
choices 
QALY maximising choices Individual QALYs Aggregate QALYs 
0 13 (1%) 19 (1%) 
1 11 (1%) 13 (1%) 
2 36 (3%) 46 (4%) 
3 108 (8%) 101 (8%) 
4 187 (14%) 144 (11%) 
5 251 (19%) 235 (18%) 
6 246 (19%) 254 (19%) 
7 220 (17%) 197 (15%) 
8 127 (10%) 130 (10%) 
9 80 (6%) 103 (8%) 
10 27 (2%) 51 (4%) 
11 8 (1%) 21 (2%) 
All respondents 1314 (100%) 1314 (100%) 
Mean QALY maximising  
choices per respondent 
5.72 5.91 
p-value 0.021 
Excludes 4 CSPC respondents who did not move the slider in any of their choices and finished the 
questionnaire in less than one-half the median completion time. 
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Overall, respondents chose the aggregate QALY maximising alternative 
in just over half of all tasks, and 58 percent of all respondents maximised QALYs 
in more than half of their choices.  However, the Monte Carlo simulated 
confidence intervals suggested that the difference between the number of QALY 
maximising choices made by agents was not significantly different than the 
number that might be expected by chance (mean difference=0.11; 95% CI: -0.21, 
0.44).  Simulated confidence intervals for the general population sample were 
positive and statistically significantly different than chance (mean 
difference=0.29; 95% CI: 0.20, 0.37), which suggested some support for QALY 
maximisation, although the size and meaningfulness of this difference was still 
quite small. 
A probit model tested the impact of task sequence, questionnaire format, 
and agent status, as well as interactions between sequence and format, and 
sequence and agent status on the likelihood of choosing the QALY maximising 
alternative in each task.  After adjusting for clustering in the standard errors, 
agent status and the two interaction terms were not statistically significant at a 
0.10 threshold, and the model was re-estimated with task sequence and 
questionnaire format only.  The results of this more parsimonious model, shown 
in Appendix 7.2, suggested a statistically significant negative trend in the 
likelihood of choosing the QALY maximising alternative as a respondent 
progressed through the task sequence.  As well, consistent with the significant 
difference in mean number of QALY maximising choices by format shown 
above, the CSPC format was associated with a significantly lower likelihood of 
choosing the QALY maximising alternative.  The predicted choice probabilities 
over the task sequence by questionnaire format are shown in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.13: Predicted QALY maximising probabilities by task sequence and format 
Task sequence DCE 95% CI CSPC 95% CI 
2 0.618 (0.600 - 0.635) 0.466 (0.448 - 0.484) 
3 0.611 (0.595 - 0.626) 0.459 (0.443 - 0.475) 
4 0.604 (0.590 - 0.617) 0.452 (0.438 - 0.466) 
5 0.597 (0.584 - 0.609) 0.444 (0.432 - 0.457) 
6 0.589 (0.577 - 0.601) 0.437 (0.425 - 0.449) 
7 0.582 (0.570 - 0.594) 0.430 (0.418 - 0.442) 
8 0.575 (0.562 - 0.588) 0.423 (0.410 - 0.436) 
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9 0.568 (0.554 - 0.582) 0.416 (0.402 - 0.430) 
10 0.561 (0.545 - 0.576) 0.408 (0.393 - 0.424) 
Task 1 was always the test of dominance, and was excluded from the model as a possible outlier in the 
overall trend.  95% CI = 95% confidence interval. 
These probabilities illustrated a slight but statistically significant 
downward trend in the likelihood of choosing the QALY maximising alternative 
over the sequence of tasks, independent of the attribute levels in the tasks 
themselves, which varied by questionnaire block and version.  There was no 
overlap in the confidence intervals between the formats, suggesting a 
significantly lower likelihood of CSPC respondents prioritising the QALY 
maximising alternative in any given task. 
These results appeared consistent with the hypothesis that respondents 
become less likely to prioritise on the basis of aggregate QALY gains as they 
became more familiar with the trade-offs and attribute levels in the choice tasks.  
They may also be consistent with a similar idea that the initial test of non-
satiation primed respondents to favour the QALY maximising alternative, but 
that this effect gradually wore off over the course of the choice tasks.  Overall, 
the relatively small effect over the range of tasks tested suggested that the net 
impact of this trend on preferences would be minimal.  
7.3 Discussion of the DCE-CSPC comparisons 
The results of the DCE-CSPC comparisons are summarised in Table 7.14, 
and in general they reinforce the findings of the pilot study.  The DCE appeared 
to be associated with greater respondent efficiency in terms of better completion 
rates and greater preference consistency, while the CSPC appeared to be a more 
cognitively demanding task, associated with longer completion times and more 
difficulty understanding the task, particularly among agents. 
Table 7.14: Summary of DCE-CSPC comparisons 
Comparison DCE CSPC Adjusted-p Sig 
Overall completion rate 89% 84% 0.009 ** 
Median completion time 9.5 minutes 11.7 minutes <0.001 *** 
Fast completers 9.1% 11.3% 0.22  
Somewhat or extremely difficult to understand 17% 22% 0.08 + 
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Somewhat or extremely difficult to answer 47% 50% 0.81  
Somewhat or extremely confident  
choices reflect preferences 
70% 65% 0.21  
Non-satiation  
(% preferring dominant alternative) 
95% 69% <0.001 *** 
Stable preferences in repeated task 73% 63% <0.001 *** 
Perfect choice-attribute correlations 9.3% 3.6% <0.001 *** 
Confirmed dominant preferences 6.9% 2.7% 0.006 ** 
Mean QALY-maximising choices (out of 11) 6.81 5.02 <0.001 *** 
     
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
 
Some agents commented that the CSPC task, which asked respondents to 
divide a fixed budget between two alternatives, was not a realistic reflection of 
their usual decision-making tasks.  This highlights the fact that respondents are 
used to making decisions within a particular context, and as noted in Chapter 4, 
changing the context of a decision to suit a particular elicitation method may 
adversely impact the face validity, accuracy and predictive ability of a task. 
The longer median completion time and the lower incidence of perfect 
choice-attribute correlations and dominant preferences among CSPC 
respondents, including for the QALY maximising alternative, are also consistent 
the characterisation of the CSPC as a more reflective task than the DCE.  The 
CSPC required respondents to consider the relative value of the two alternatives 
in each task, and this may encourage them to consider the overall quality of both 
alternatives to a greater degree than the ‘pick one’ nature of the DCE (Carson & 
Louviere 2011; Huber 2009).  Schwappach and Strasmann (2006) argue that the 
ability to reserve a portion of the budget for a less preferred group will also tend 
to make CSPC tasks more reflective, as respondents must consider how much of 
the budget, if any, to reserve.  This explicit consideration of the less preferred 
group may also explain the greater proportion of CSPC respondents (31%) who 
gave priority to the non-dominant group in the test of non-satiation compared to 
the DCE (5%).  Some of this difference is explained by the 11 percent of CSPC 
respondents who chose to equalise the budget allocations rather than prioritise 
one group or the other, but the remainder appeared to reflect a fundamentally 
different cognitive process in the CSPC compared to the DCE, perhaps leading 
to a relatively greater concern for patients with poorer prospects and/or potential 
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for gain.  Qualitative work to understand the specific rationale of CSPC and 
DCE respondents in this task would be of interest, particularly in confirming 
what might be termed a ‘compassion bias’ in the CSPC. 
There was little evidence of strict QALY maximising behaviour among 
respondents to either format, as only 2 percent of all respondents prioritised the 
alternative that maximised QALYs in every task.  Respondents to the CSPC 
were significantly less likely than respondents to the DCE to choose the QALY 
maximising alternative, consistent with the notion of a compassion bias in the 
CSPC.  Again, though, some of the lower rate of QALY maximising behaviour 
may be explained by the opportunity CSPC respondents had to equalise 
allocations between alternatives.  Agents were also no more likely than the 
general population to be strict QALY maximisers.  In fact, the number of QALY 
maximising choices made by agents was slightly but significantly less than the 
general population sample, and was not significantly different than what would 
be expected by chance.  Some of the higher rate of QALY maximising behaviour 
among the general population sample may have been the result of a simplifying 
QALY-maximising decision rule, while the lower rate observed among agents 
may have been driven by the relatively high proportion of clinicians among the 
agent sample: almost two-thirds of the agents in the sample were oncology 
professionals and they may have been less likely than non-clinicians to adopt a 
QALY maximising rule. 
Although the CSPC makes the trade-offs between patient groups more 
explicit, as respondents see the number of patients treated in one group decline 
as they allocate resources to the other, this did not appear to translate into a 
significant prominence effect around this attribute or aggregate QALYs gained 
that might encourage respondents to maintain a societal-level perspective.  
Furthermore, the higher completion rate and similar levels of preference 
confidence in the DCE relative to the CSPC do not appear to support Swallow et 
al.’s (2001) contention that respondents may be reluctant to complete 
dichotomous preference elicitations over highly emotive choices.  In the absence 
of these hypothesised advantages of CSPC, the greater completion rate and 
slightly more favourable difficulty rating of the DCE gives it a pragmatic 
advantage for the elicitation of societal preferences.  However, the CSPC was 
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associated with a significantly lower incidence of dominant preferences, and the 
cardinal nature of its response format suggests that it may have an advantage in 
terms of statistical efficiency, although this was not specifically tested here.  
Overall, both formats were associated with similar difficulty ratings and 
preference confidence, minimal learning or fatigue effects, and relatively few 
cases of dominant preferences.  This suggests that both formats are eliciting valid 
preference data, which will be presented over the next two chapters. 
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Appendix 7.1: Post hoc test of significant ANOVA results  
Table 7.15: Tukey’s test of honest significant difference 
Version (Task sequence) Difference L95CI U95CI Adjusted-p Sig 
DCE block 2, set 1 
v2(9) - v1(2) 0.172 0.018 0.325 0.024 * 
v3(4) - v1(2) 0.185 0.028 0.343 0.016 * 
v3(4) - v2(9) 0.014 -0.142 0.169 0.977 
 
      
CSPC block 2, set 4 
v2(2) - v1(6) 5.087 -3.270 13.443 0.325  
v3(9) - v1(6) 7.904 -0.030 15.837 0.051 + 
v3(9) - v2(2) 2.817 -5.200 10.832 0.686  
      
CSPC block 2, set 7 
v2(6) - v1(10) -6.140 -14.253 1.972 0.177  
v3(2) - v1(10) 1.481 -6.220 9.183 0.893  
v3(2) - v2(6) 7.622 -0.160 15.404 0.056 + 
      
CSPC block 2, set 8 
v2(5) - v1(5) -7.306 -15.126 0.514 0.073 + 
v3(5) - v1(5) -3.426 -10.850 3.998 0.523  
v3(5) - v2(5) 3.880 -3.621 11.381 0.444  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
Table shows the pairwise comparison of differences in the proportion of DCE respondents preferring 
alternative B in block 2, set 1 by questionnaire version.  L95CI=Lower 95% confidence interval; 
U95CI=Upper 95% confidence interval 
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Appendix 7.2: Probit analysis of QALY maximising choices by task 
sequence and questionnaire format 
 
Table 7.16: Probit model of likelihood of choosing the QALY maximising alternative 
Factor Estimate Std. Error* z value Pr(>|z|) Sig 
(Intercept) 0.336 0.029 11.460 <0.001 *** 
Sequence -0.018 0.004 -4.811 <0.001 *** 
Format: CSPC -0.384 0.022 -17.457 <0.001 *** 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
* Standard errors were adjusted for clustering using the ‘sandwich estimator’.(Freedman 2006; Zeileis & 
Hothorn 2002) 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Predicted probabilities of choosing/prioritising the QALY maximising 
alternative by task and questionnaire format 
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Appendix 7.3: Distribution of choice-attribute correlations 
Age=patient age; LE=initial life expectancy; LYg=individual life years gained; nPats=number of patients 
treated; QALYs=aggregate QALYs gained; U0=initial utility; U1=final utility.  Correlations towards -1.0 
indicate a lower level in an attribute was consistently preferred, and correlations towards 1.0 indicate a 
higher level in an attribute was consistently preferred. 
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Chapter 8:  
Primary DCE results 
The primary objective of the analysis of the DCE responses was to 
estimate the strength of the equity-efficiency trade-off between individual life 
year gains and the equity factors identified in the empirical ethics review: age, 
initial health state, untreated life expectancy, and final health state, as well as the 
relative distribution of benefits.  To use Broome’s (1989) terminology, these 
factors were taken to constitute claims to scarce healthcare resources on the basis 
of empirical support and defensible ethical justifications, distinct from the wider 
set of reasons that a particular patient or group might deserve priority.  The 
relative strength of the trade-off over different attributes was taken as an estimate 
of the strength of societal preferences, or the welfare effect, associated with 
prioritising patients or groups with those particular characteristics.  From a 
Communitarian perspective, prioritising patient groups that best satisfy 
community preferences is argued to increase overall societal well-being.   
Section 8.1 describes the specification of the DCE choice model, 
including the rationale for choosing between additive versus multiplicative and 
linear versus effects-coded value functions.  Section 8.2 outlines the issue of 
individual heterogeneity in preferences and describes the two leading methods 
for dealing with this issue in the context of a DCE: latent class models and 
random parameters models.  The use of compensating variation as an estimate of 
the strength of the equity-efficiency trade-off is discussed in section 8.3, including 
its advantage over the marginal rate of substitution, which was used in the pilot 
survey.  The results of the DCE model, and the derived welfare effects, are 
described in section 8.4, along with a ranking of choice scenarios by predicted 
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utility and a comparison of agent and public preferences.  Finally, these results 
are interpreted and discussed in section 8.5.   
8.1 Specifying the DCE model 
The analysis of the DCE responses was based on the assumption that 
respondents derived different degrees of utility from allocating resources to 
patient groups with different characteristics or attributes.  An additive main 
effects value function was specified for the experimental design, but alternative 
value functions suggested by the literature were also considered, including main 
effects interacted with life year gains and a multiplicative log-linear specification.   
In its simplest form, an additive value function implies that the utility 
derived from each attribute is independent of the level of the other attributes.  
Any utility derived from allocating healthcare resources to a group of younger 
patients, for example, would be independent of other attributes such as life years 
gained with treatment or initial health state.  This functional form is common in 
the DCE literature, and is consistent with recent models of choice in a societal 
healthcare context (Bryan et al. 2002; Mortimer & Segal 2008; Green & Gerard 
2009; Ratcliffe et al. 2009).  The experimental design was based on an additive 
value function of the form v = β1LYg + β2Age + β3U0 +  β4LE + β5U1 + β6nPats + 
β7U1∙LYg, where LYg is the number life years gained per patient with treatment, 
Age is the average age of patients in the group, U0 is the quality of the initial 
health state, measured on a 0-1 utility scale, LE0 is life expectancy without 
treatment, U1 is the utility of the health state with/after treatment, nPats is the 
total number patients that could be treated, and U1∙LYg is the interaction of U1 
and LYg, intended to account for the quality of additional life years.  Aggregate 
QALYs gained, as a linear combination of the other attributes, was excluded to 
avoid collinearity.  In addition, the use of the QALY pre-supposes a specific 
trade-off between life years gained and health state that may not hold in this 
context.  The age and the number of patients treated parameters were divided by 
10 and 1000, respectively, to re-scale them to a magnitude comparable with the 
other parameters in order to improve the chances of model convergence (Long 
1997).  An interaction term capturing the absolute change in utility, as (1-U0)U1, 
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was also incorporated in more complex versions of the additive value function.  
The possible values of this interaction term are shown below: 
Table 8.1: Initial and final health state interaction values 
U0 
                            U1 
1-U0 
0.1 0.5 0.9 
0.1 0.9 0.09 0.45 0.81 
0.5 0.5 0.05 0.25 0.45 
0.9 0.1 0.01 0.05 0.09 
U0 = initial utility; U1 = final utility 
The value of this term was maximised in scenarios when patients move from the 
worst initial health state to the best final health state, and minimised when 
patients move from the best initial health state to the worst final health state. 
Norman et al. (2013) suggested that a strictly additive value function is 
inappropriate in the context of health programs, arguing that as the health gains 
derived from a hypothetical program tend to zero, so too should the utility 
associated with that program, regardless of the level of other attributes.  This is 
analogous to the ‘zero condition’ of the QALY model, which implies that 
different health states with a duration of zero life years will all have zero utility, 
regardless of their quality or other characteristics (Miyamoto et al. 1998).  As 
such, they used an additive value function but interacted each attribute with the 
gain in life expectancy in their analysis of relative preferences for efficiency and 
equity in the allocation of healthcare resources.  In this form, the utility 
associated with different patient attributes is dependent on gains in life 
expectancy, with the other attributes weighting, positively or negatively, the net 
value of that gain.  Lancsar et al. (2011) also made the argument that utility in 
the context of healthcare resource allocation should be dependent on health gain, 
but used a log-linear value function to model the utility as a multiplicative 
function of the logged attribute levels13 in order to estimate QALY distributional 
preferences.  In this form, utility can be non-linear but still monotonic over the 
range of an attribute.    
                                                 
13 Recall that log(a) + log(b) = log(ab) 
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However, the DCE elicitations in these two studies were structured 
differently than the elicitation presented here.  Norman et al. (2013) elicited 
preferences over changes in life expectancy to patients described in terms of 
gender, smoking status, income, healthy lifestyle, and dependents, but did not 
include a quality attribute.  Lancsar et al. (2011) elicited preferences for QALY 
gains to patients described in terms age at disease onset, age at death, and 
potential quality of life lost without treatment, but did not consider quality and 
survival as distinct elements, as both were captured by the QALY.  The structure 
of these elicitations is consistent with the zero condition: in the absence of any 
life year or QALY gains, the value of changes in the other levels is zero.  The 
attributes included in the current DCE and CSPC elicitations, however, 
theoretically allowed for improvements in quality over an unchanged life 
expectancy,14 and so changes in attribute levels still have value even in the 
absence of life year gains and the zero condition is not applicable.  For this 
reason, a strictly multiplicative value function was excluded.  Interactions with 
life year gains were included in potential value functions, though, on the grounds 
that some or even many respondents may view life extension as the primary 
objective of healthcare.  
Linear and design-coded parameters were also tested within the different 
value functions.  Whereas a linear parameter has a single coefficient, implying 
that the change in utility for a given change in attribute level is constant, design-
coded parameter can have multiple coefficients, allowing for non-linear effects 
over the range of the attribute (Hensher et al. 2005).  For example, the utility 
associated with a three level dummy coded parameter, with level 2 as the 
reference level, is given by: 
  =               (8.1) 
Where β1 and β2 represent the marginal utility associated with levels 1 and 3, 
respectively, relative to the omitted reference level, level 2, and β0 is the utility 
associated with the reference level.   
                                                 
14 In practice, however, the smallest individual life year gain in the experimental design was 1 
year.  
 215 
 Dummy coded parameters are straightforward to code and interpret, but 
as is clear from the specification above, the utility of the reference level, β0, is 
perfectly confounded with the intercept, also known as the alternative-specific 
constant (ASC) (Hensher et al. 2005).  Confounding is a particular problem 
when a discrete choice task is defined relative to a fixed comparator or in terms 
of labelled alternatives, as it is impossible to distinguish the default utility 
associated with the fixed comparator or labelled alternative from the utility 
associated with the reference level of the dummy coded attributes.  In such cases, 
effects coding is strongly recommended (Bech & Gyrd-Hansen 2005; Hensher et 
al. 2005; Louviere et al. 2000b).  Like dummy coding, effects coding creates L-1 
design variables with an excluded reference level.  Effects coding for a three-level 
categorical attribute is shown below, again with level 2 as the reference level:  
 E1 E3 
L1 1 0 
L2 -1 -1 
L3 0 1 
 
In this example, the utility of the excluded reference level 2 is β0 + βE1(-1) + βE3(-
1), or β0 – (βE1 + βE3), and can be estimated independently of the ASC (Hensher et 
al. 2005).  However, the interpretation of effects coding is less straightforward 
than dummy coding as the coefficient on an effects coded parameter represents 
the deviation of the ‘level mean utility’ from ‘overall mean utility’, which not 
necessarily the same as the difference from the reference level, particularly in a 
non-orthogonal experimental design (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000).  
Furthermore, confounding is much less of a problem in generic experimental 
designs, where there is no expectation of a default preference for one alternative 
or the other as in labelled designs.  Indeed, generic designs often assume a priori 
that the ASC is non-significant and exclude it from the choice model (Bech & 
Gyrd-Hansen 2005).  Given the generic design used here, and the challenge of 
interpreting effects coded parameters, dummy coded parameters were felt to be 
sufficient for allowing for non-linear effects. 
 216 
 The alternative models and value function specifications were compared 
on the basis Akaike’s information criterion with a correction for finite sample 
sizes (AICc) and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Burnham & 
Anderson 2004; Magidson & Vermunt 2004).  These criteria guide model 
selection by weighing the trade-off between model fit and parsimony; 
specifically, the potential for bias stemming from too few parameters, and the 
potential for imprecision or spurious results stemming from an over-specified 
model.  Both criteria penalise the log-likelihood function (LL) by a factor based 
on the sample size (n) and the number of parameters (k) in the model:  AICc is 
defined as -2LL + 2k + 2k(k+1)/(n-k-1), which converges to -2LL + 2k in large 
samples, and BIC is defined as -2LL + k∙log(n).  A smaller criterion value is 
preferred in both cases.  Both criteria are commonly used in selecting between 
discrete choice models, but because BIC applies a larger parameter penalty in 
reasonably large samples, it tends to tends to favour parsimonious models more 
strongly than AICc (Swait 2007).   
The DCE statistical models were estimated using LIMDEP 9.0/NLOGIT 
4.0.  Consistent with Hosmer and Lemeshow’s (2000) suggestion of relaxing the 
threshold of statistical significance in order to allow for the broadest possible 
inclusion of explanatory parameters, a significance threshold of 0.10 was 
adopted and p-values were not adjusted for multiple comparisons.  Dummy 
coded parameters were excluded from the parsimonious specifications only if all 
levels were insignificant (Hensher et al. 2005).  Robust clustered standard errors 
for coefficient estimates were calculated using the ‘sandwich estimator’ 
(Freedman 2006).  Estimates of compensating variation and their associated 
confidence intervals were calculated in LIMDEP 9.0/NLOGIT 4.0 using the 
delta method, based on coefficient means and covariances derived from the 
regression models (Oehlert 1992).  A significance threshold of 0.05 was adopted 
for all other analyses, and p-values were adjusted for multiple simultaneous 
comparisons using Hommel’s method (Shaffer 1995; Wright 1992). 
8.1.1 Agent vs. public preferences 
A secondary objective of the analysis was to test for heterogeneity 
between the preferences of self-identified agents and those of the general public.  
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To test for the effect of agent status on attribute preferences given the limited 
number of agents who participated in the survey, a classical approach was used, 
interacting each attribute with agent status (Morey & Greer Rossmann 2003).  
The baseline value function was based on simple main effects with agent 
interactions, but a more complex value function with life year gain interactions 
was also tested.  If the interactions between a specific attribute and agent status 
was found to be significant, the difference in compensating variation between the 
general population and agents would be calculated and taken as significant if the 
95 percent confidence interval around the difference in CV between agents and 
the general public did not cross zero (Schenker & Gentleman 2001). 
8.2 Modelling individual heterogeneity 
Each respondent to the survey contributed multiple responses over a 
series of choice tasks.  The simplest approach to analysing such panel data is the 
‘pooled model,’ which assumes that preferences are homogeneous across all 
individuals (Baltagi 2008).  However, if unobserved factors influence the choices 
made by an individual, particularly as a result of random taste variation or 
unobserved heterogeneity, these responses will tend to be correlated and treating 
them as independent observations will reduce the realism of the model and can 
lead to biased regression estimates (Hole 2008; Glasgow 2001).  Random taste 
variation arises when unobserved individual characteristics influence how the 
observed characteristics of an alternative affect choice.  That is, individuals with 
the same observed characteristics may place different weights on different aspects 
of a choice, leading to correlation in the utility of alternatives within a particular 
choice task.  Unobserved heterogeneity arises when an individual’s choices 
depend on unobserved characteristics, leading to correlation in the utility of 
alternatives between different choice tasks (Glasgow 2001).  For example, having 
children, or experience with a particular disease, may exert an unobserved 
influence on respondents’ choices over a series of choice tasks.  Other sources of 
individual heterogeneity in choice tasks could include response heterogeneity, 
where respondents utilise response scales differently, perceptual heterogeneity, 
where respondents differ in their perception of the attributes in a task, and form 
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heterogeneity, where respondents apply different decision rules in evaluating the 
alternatives in a task (Desarbo et al. 1997).   
Because an individual’s personal characteristics are constant across their 
responses, it is impossible to estimate the effect of these characteristics on the 
probability of choice.  The classical approach to incorporating heterogeneity into 
a choice model, therefore, has been to interact attributes with individual 
characteristics.  For example, a price attribute may be interacted with gender to 
determine if males are more sensitive to price than females.  As noted in section 
4.5, though, this approach has the drawback of assuming that heterogeneity is 
strictly deterministic, and that everyone with the same observed characteristics 
must share the same preferences (Boxall & Adamowicz 2002; Morey & Greer 
Rossmann 2003). 
As alternatives, latent class models and random effects or random 
parameters models allow for more realistic representations of individual 
heterogeneity in the context of discrete choice experiments.  In a conditional 
logit model of discrete choice (McFadden 1974), 
 
  (       =
       
∑            
  
(8.2) 
Where   (        is the probability of individual i choosing alternative j in task t 
given a vector of preference weight   , and a vector of attribute levels     , 
individual heterogeneity in preferences can be represented as: 
   =           (8.3) 
Where β is the mean population preference weight, Δzi is a vector of individual 
characteristics and associated coefficients, and ei is a stochastic individual effect 
(Hole 2008).  Broadly speaking, if the components of ei are assumed to be 
continuous and assigned a subjective distribution, this leads to a random effects 
model.  If the components of ei are assumed to be discrete, this leads to a latent 
class model (Greene & Hensher 2003; Hole 2008). 
Latent class models assume that there are two or more ‘classes’ or groups 
underlying the data, which share unobserved (latent) characteristics that affect 
choice.  Critically, preferences are assumed to differ between classes, but to be 
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homogeneous within classes (Greene & Hensher 2003).  As membership in a 
particular class (c) is a function of latent characteristics, it must be estimated 
probabilistically, most often using a conventional multinomial logit model: 
   ( =      =
     
∑          
 
(8.4) 
Where Pr(C=c|zi) is the probability of individual i being in class c given a vector 
of characteristics zi, ∑   (  =  
 
   , and      is a vector of observed individual 
characteristics and associated coefficients (Hernández Alava et al. 2012; 
Provencher et al. 2002).  If    is zero, membership in a particular class does not 
depend on observed characteristics and the likelihood of belonging to any 
particular class is constant across individuals (Hole 2008).   
As the probability of individual i choosing alternative j is conditional 
upon class membership, choice and class membership must be estimated 
simultaneously:  
   (    = [
         
∑              
] [
     
∑          
] 
(8.5) 
Such a model allows the characteristics of the alternatives and the characteristics 
of the individual to jointly explain choice behaviour, by weighting the probability 
of choice by the probability of membership in a discrete number of classes (Ben-
Akiva et al. 1997; Boxall & Adamowicz 2002).   
In contrast to the latent class model, a random parameters model 
integrates the probability of choice over all possible values of individual taste and 
requires subjective assumptions about the distribution of these tastes (Boxall & 
Adamowicz 2002).  In this approach, βi or ei is assumed to be a random variable 
with a subjectively specified distribution which can be interpreted as random 
variation in individual preferences (individual heterogeneity) or an error term 
that introduces correlation among the utility of different alternatives (random 
taste variation) (Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008; Morey & Greer Rossmann 2003).  
Wedel et al. (1999) noted that the subjective assignment of a distribution has the 
advantage of being able to force a random parameters model to conform to an 
underlying theory of behaviour (e.g. by constraining a particular parameter to a 
positive distribution), as well as facilitating the estimation of individual-level 
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parameters.  They also pointed out that a latent class model cannot fully account 
for heterogeneity if preferences are in fact continuous.  In such cases, latent 
classes are an artificial partition of continuous preferences and the assumption of 
homogeneity within those classes is unrealistic.  Finally, random parameter 
models hold the individual random effect, ei, constant, inducing correlation 
across an individual’s choices, whereas latent class models assume that each 
choice is an independent draw from a discrete distribution (Greene & Hensher 
2003; Shen 2009).  However, the subjectivity of the random parameter 
distributions is also a limitation, as there is little formal theory to guide the 
selection of which parameters should specified as random and which distribution 
to choose.  Results are likely to be sensitive to the choice of distribution, and mis-
specifying a distribution (e.g. constraining a distribution to  positive values when 
in fact there is density on both sides of zero) can lead to biased results (Amaya-
Amaya et al. 2008; Greene & Hensher 2003; Hole 2008; Wedel et al. 1999).  A 
continuous distribution of preferences can also be more difficult to interpret than 
a small number of distinct latent classes (Boxall & Adamowicz 2002; Wedel et 
al. 1999).  
Greene and Hensher (2003) suggested that a latent class model can be 
thought of as a non-parametric approximation of the continuous random 
parameters model that avoids the problem of specifying which parameters are in 
fact random and their distributions.  However, latent class models pose the 
analogous challenge of correctly specifying the number of classes.  Like the 
specification of random distributions in the mixed logit, there is little theory to 
guide this specification.  In practice, classes are generally added so long as the 
additional class is associated with a decrease in the BIC (Boxall & Adamowicz 
2002; Hernández Alava et al. 2012), but this arbitrary approach to specifying the 
number of latent class offsets to some degree the non-parametric advantage of a 
latent class model (Greene & Hensher 2003; Hole 2008).   
Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) regard the latent class model as a balance 
between the perfect homogeneity of a pooled model, where each individual is 
assumed to have identical preferences, and the perfect heterogeneity of a random 
parameters model, where each individual can be thought of as their own 
individual latent class.  In this light, they characterised the difference between a 
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random parameters and a latent class model as the difference between 
incorporating heterogeneity and explaining heterogeneity.  With a random 
parameters model, individual preferences differ only because each individual is 
an independent draw from a specified random distribution (Morey & Greer 
Rossmann 2003), while in a latent class model, individual preferences can be 
explicitly related to latent or observed characteristics as well as observed choices.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the classical interaction approach to incorporating 
heterogeneity, which deterministically divides individuals into groups based 
solely on observed characteristics, a latent class model assigns individuals to 
classes probabilistically, allowing for different preferences among individuals 
with the same observed characteristics.  This ability to explain individual 
heterogeneity as a function of observed and unobserved individual characteristics 
is the key advantage of the latent class model relative to the classical interaction 
or random parameters approaches.  Although it is almost certainly a 
simplification to assume homogeneous preferences within latent classes, such 
simplification greatly enhances the interpretability and salience of the estimates.  
Latent class models do not appear to have been used previously to analyse stated 
preferences in a healthcare context, although they have been used in marketing 
and transportation applications (Ramaswamy & Cohen 2007; Greene & Hensher 
2003).  Given its potential advantages, a latent class multinomial logit model was 
tested alongside the simple pooled multinomial logit in identifying a preferred 
modelling approach.   
Within a latent class approach, the ability of the preferred specification to 
distinguish between the latent classes was assessed in terms of relative entropy 
(E), or relative classification certainty, defined as: 
 
 =   
 ∑ ∑   (    ∙     (  (     
 
   
 
   
 ∙    (  
 
(8.6) 
Where N is the number of individuals in the data, C is the total number of classes 
in the model, and   (     is the probability of individual i being a member of 
class c (Dias & Vermunt 2006).  Relative entropy is measured on a [0, 1] scale, 
with values toward 1 suggesting highly stable classifications with clear 
distinction between classes, and values toward 0 suggesting highly unstable 
classifications with no clear distinctions.  
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8.2.1 Relating individual characteristics to latent class membership 
The significance of individual characteristics in predicting latent class 
membership was assessed with a linear logit model, transforming the predicted 
probability of each individual’s membership in class c to the logit scale, and 
estimating a linear model with dummy-coded parameters for agent status, 
university or college graduate, gender, and ‘fast completer,’ along with 
categorical age group.  Although education was not collected as part of the agent 
questionnaires, it was assumed that all agents had graduated college or 
university.  Given the perfect collinearity between agent status and the 
graduation flag induced by this assumption, the model was also specified 
without agent status to exclude its potentially confounding effect.  The relative 
effect of each factor (f) on the overall probability membership in class c [Pr(c)] 
was calculated as   (    (   ∙    (   (Gujarati 1988). 
As Clark and Muthén (2009) note in discussing approaches to relating 
individual covariates to latent class membership, the probability regression 
approach is superior to deterministically assigning class membership on the basis 
of the highest probability as it allows for differences in probability between 
individuals.  Specifically, a deterministic approach does not account for the fact 
that one individual may have a 51 percent probability of class membership while 
another may have a 99 percent probability of membership; both individuals 
would be assigned a deterministic weight of 1.0.  However, they also note that in 
treating the probability of class membership as an observation rather than a 
probabilistic estimate, the probability regression approach may under-estimate 
the error and potentially over-estimate statistical significance.  One way to 
compensate for this over-estimation of significance is to adopt a more rigorous 
threshold for statistical significance.  However, the magnitude of such under-
estimation is negatively related to entropy: as entropy approaches 1.0 (perfect 
classification certainty), the error associated with treating class membership as an 
observation approaches zero.  In a model with reasonably entropy, the error in 
significance is not overly problematic.  As such, the same 0.10 significance 
threshold used elsewhere in the analysis was used to assess the statistical 
significance of the p-values the on the individual covariates after adjusting for 
multiple simultaneous comparisons. 
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8.3 Estimating welfare effects using compensating variation 
The coefficients from the DCE statistical model represented the change in 
systematic utility given a 1-unit change in an attribute.  However, the 
interpretation of these coefficients is complicated by the fact that many were 
measured on different scales.  Age, for example, was measure in years, while 
severity was measured on a 0 to 1 quality scale, and the number of patients 
treated was measured in terms of persons.  To transform these marginal utility 
estimates to a common scale, the analysis of the pilot survey used marginal rates 
of substitution (MRS), calculated as the ratio of the coefficients on a particular 
attribute to the coefficient on individual life years gained.  This represents the 
rate at which respondents would be willing to trade-off individual life year gains 
for a 1-unit change in another attribute.  However, this interpretation of MRS 
only holds when the value function is strictly additive, and for a marginal change 
in single attribute (Lancsar et al. 2007).   
Compensating variation (CV) is conceptually similar to MRS, and indeed 
if the only change in the ‘state of the world’ is a 1-level increase or decrease in a 
single attribute, CV and MRS are identical (Ryan 2004; Silva 2004).  However, 
the advantage of CV is that it can also accommodate discrete changes in multiple 
attributes, as well as multiplicative interaction terms (Small & Rosen 1981; 
Lancsar & Savage 2004).  This means that CV can value changes in entire 
scenarios, rather than just a change in a single attribute.  CV is measured in 
terms of the amount of some valued good that an individual would theoretically 
be willing to sacrifice in order to secure that change.  Specifically, it measures 
how much of that good – the numeraire – could be taken away from an 
individual following a change so as to leave them at the same level of well-being 
as before the change (Feldman & Serrano 2006).  This is illustrated in Figure 8.1 
below.  
In this figure, an individual has an initial allocation of goods X and Y 
shown by point 1 on the budget constraint shown by the dashed line AA, and 
tangential to the indifference curve U1.  If, as the result of a policy change, good 
X becomes relatively less costly and shifts the budget constraint outward to AA1, 
the individual will move to point 2, tangential to the more preferred indifference 
curve U2.  This move from point 1 to point 2 is a combination of a ‘substitution 
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effect’ and an ‘income effect’.  The substitution effect, allowing for a change in 
prices but holding income constant, moves the utility maximising allocation 
from point 1 to point 3 on the original indifference curve U1.  The income effect, 
allowing for a change in income but holding prices constant, moves the utility 
maximising point from point 3 to point 4, on the new budget constraint AA1 and 
tangential to the more preferred indifference curve U2.  Together, the two effects 
combine to move the utility maximising point to point 2.  The welfare effect of 
this policy change, taking Y as the numeraire, can be estimated by the vertical 
distance between the new budget line, AA1, and a hypothetical budget line, BB, 
parallel to budget line AA1 and tangential to the original indifference curve at 
point 3.  This distance, CV1→2, is the amount of the numeraire that could be 
taken away from the individual, given the new implicit prices of X and Y, so as 
Figure 8.1: Illustrating compensating variation 
CV1→2 
CV2→1 
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to leave him exactly as well off as before the change.  This can be interpreted as 
an individual’s maximum willingness-to-sacrifice in order to secure a change 
from point 1 to point 4 (Feldman & Serrano 2006; Zerbe & Dively 1994).   
Conversely, if the individual was initially at point 2 and a policy change 
increases the relative price of X, shifting the budget constraint from AA1 to AA, 
the individual would move to point 1, tangent to the less preferred indifference 
curve U1.  The welfare effect associated with this move can be estimated, as 
above, by the vertical distance between the new budget constraint, AA, and a 
hypothetical, parallel budget constraint, CC, tangential to the original 
indifference curve at point 4.  In the case of a move to a less preferred point, this 
distance, CV2→1, represents the minimum amount of the numeraire that the 
individual would be willing-to-accept in order to agree to the change.  However, 
as illustrated in Figure 8.1 the individual’s minimum willingness-to-accept in 
compensation for a move from point 2 to point 1 (CV2→1) is much larger than his 
maximum willingness-to-pay to secure a move from point 1 to point 2 (CV1→2), 
despite the fact that he is moving between the same two points (Feldman & 
Serrano 2006). 
This apparent inconsistency in the welfare effect of a move between 
points 1 and 2 is driven by the interaction between the income and substitution 
effects, as the preferred level of X depends on the current level of the numeraire, 
Y.  This can be resolved, though, by assuming that individual utilities are 
‘quasilinear’.  Under this assumption, Y is considered to be a special good that 
enters every individual’s utility function additively.  The numeraire can be any 
good, but is most intuitively understood as wealth or income.  A quasilinear 
utility function can be written as: 
   =   (    μ   (8.7) 
Where individual utility (Ui) is some function of X, plus the amount of the 
numeraire, Y, weighted by µ, the constant marginal utility of Y.  In this form 
each individual’s indifference curves are parallel, with a shape given by   (    
and a vertical shift given by Δ  , with the implication that the preferred level of X 
does not depend on Y (Feldman & Serrano 2006).  The estimation of 
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compensating variation under an assumption of quasilinear utility functions is 
illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
 In this figure, as in Figure 8.1 earlier, an individual is initially at point 1 
and moves to point 2 as the result of a decrease in the price of X, shifting the 
budget constraint from AA to AA1.  Again, this move is a combination of 
substitution and income effects as a result of the change in price and the implicit 
change in income, respectively.  The substitution effect, holding income 
constant, results in a shift from point 1 to point 3 on the initial indifference curve 
(U1) and an increase in the preferred level of X from X1 to X2.  The income 
effect, holding prices constant, results in a shift from point 3 on the initial 
indifference curve to point 2 on the more preferred indifference curve (U2).  
Figure 8.2: Compensating variation with quasilinear utility 
CV1→2 
EV2→1 
CV2→1 
EV1→2 
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However, under an assumption of quasilinear utility, the income effect shown in 
Figure 8.2 does not induce an additional change in X. 
As earlier, the CV associated with a move from point 1 to point 2, based 
on the prices at point 2, is given by the vertical distance between AA1 and BB, 
and the CV associated with moving from point 2 back to point 1, based on the 
prices at point 1, is given by the vertical distance between AA and CC.  
However, unlike in Figure 8.1, the CV associated with the two moves is 
equivalent.  By removing income effects from the quasilinear utility function, CV 
is not dependent upon the initial starting point, and the welfare effect, in terms of 
Y, is consistent regardless of the direction of change.  This consistency equates 
compensating variation with the related concept of equivalent variation (EV).  
Whereas CV is a measure of the welfare effect based on the new prices, EV is a 
measure of welfare effect based on the original prices (Feldman & Serrano 2006).  
For a move from point 1 to the more preferred point 2, EV is a measure of how 
much of the numeraire an individual would be willing-to-accept in order to 
forego the move, while for a move from point 2 to the less preferred point 1, EV 
is a measure of how much of the numeraire an individual would be willing-to-
pay in order to prevent the change.  As shown in Figure 8.2, under an 
assumption of quasilinear preferences the willingness-to-pay to secure a move 
from point 1 to point 2 (CV1→2) is equivalent to the willingness-to-pay to avoid a 
move from point 2 to point 1 (EV2→1).  This symmetry between CV and EV 
means that the initial position is arbitrary, and that it is possible to consistently, 
and arguably more intuitively, interpret welfare effects in terms of the 
willingness-to-pay to secure a move to a more preferred level, or to avoid a move 
to a less preferred level. 
In the context of the elicitations here, quasilinear utility implies that the 
preferred level of a particular attribute does not depend on the number of 
individual life years gained, similar to the utility independence condition 
commonly assumed to underlie the QALY model.  This condition holds that 
preferences for a particular health state are independent of its duration (Pliskin et 
al. 1980; Miyamoto & Eraker 1988).  This is undoubtedly a simplification, as 
there are reasons other than income effects for a divergence between CV and EV.  
These include endowment effects, or the idea that individuals value losses more 
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highly than gains (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), and moral property rights or 
intrinsic values, which may make more reluctant to accept compensation for a 
loss than to sacrifice for a gain (Boyce et al. 1992; Shogren et al. 1994).  
Likewise, Tsuchiya and Dolan (2005) showed that the utility independence 
assumption may not always hold, and that individuals’ preferences for a health 
state may indeed depend upon its duration.  However, the estimation of 
compensating variation under an assumption of quasilinear utility is consistent 
with conventional stated preference methods (Jedidi & Zhang 2002; Lancsar & 
Savage 2004; Lancsar et al. 2007) and has been applied in a recent societal 
preference elicitation of distributive preferences in healthcare (Baker et al. 2010; 
Lancsar et al. 2011).  Note that this assumption does not imply that respondents 
would not be willing to sacrifice life year gains in order to secure a more 
preferred level of an attribute, or that respondents would not be willing to 
sacrifice other attributes in order to secure greater individual life years gains.   
Based on these assumptions, compensating variation, or the change in 
welfare associated with a change in attribute levels was calculated in the context 
of a ‘state of the world model’ (Small & Rosen 1981; Ryan 2004; Silva 2004) as: 
    :   =
 
    
[       
(8.8) 
Where βLYg is the coefficient on the numeraire, life years gained, or the constant 
marginal utility of one additional life year gained, and v0 and v1 are the scenario 
utilities before and after a change in one or more attribute levels, respectively.  In 
the case of a move to a more preferred scenario, CV will be negative (life year 
gains must be taken away to return utility to the pre-change level), while in the 
case of a move to a less preferred scenario, CV will be positive (life years must be 
added to return utility to the pre-change level).  The magnitude of the CV 
estimates for different scenarios where the only change was a 1-level move away 
from the baseline level was taken to represent the relative strength of preferences 
for the new levels relative to the baseline level.  Note that these potential life year 
gains were assumed to accrue to other individuals in society, not to the 
respondent. 
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The estimate of compensating variation associated with each attribute 
was used to test the null hypothesis that changes in attribute levels other than 
individual life years gained would have no impact on welfare, and that 
respondents would not be willing to sacrifice individual life year gains for equity 
or distributive justice goals.  The use of aggregate, rather than individual, life 
year gains as the numeraire was considered, but ruled out on the grounds that 
this would imply a default preference for aggregate life year gains that may not 
hold.  Statistically significant welfare effects were taken as a rejection of the null 
hypothesis for that attribute. 
8.3.1 Scenario rankings 
The compensating variation results, which considered marginal 
preferences holding all other attributes constant, were supplemented by ranking 
each scenario in the experimental design by its predicted utility, allowing for all 
attributes to vary simultaneously.  DCE scenario utilities were calculated by 
weighting the attribute levels in each scenario by the attribute coefficients derived 
from the statistical model.  Spearman’s rho was calculated to provide a sense of 
the strength and direction of association between each attribute level and a 
scenario’s relative ranking.  As the scenarios were ranked by descending utility, a 
negative correlation coefficient implies that the relative rank of a scenario 
improved as an attribute level increased, while a positive correlation coefficient 
implies that relative rank worsened as an attribute level increased.   
The probability of choice for each DCE scenario was calculated relative 
to a reference scenario with all attributes at their middle (baseline) level, 
although this scenario was not actually shown to respondents in the choice tasks.  
The probability of choosing each scenario over the reference scenario was 
calculated in the context of a conventional multinomial logit model (McFadden 
1974): 
   (        =
     
                
 (8.9) 
Where i was a specific scenario, ref was the reference scenario, and β and x were 
vectors of attribute coefficients and levels, respectively. 
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8.4 DCE results 
A number of alternative models and functional forms were tested, 
including pooled and latent class multinomial logit (MNL) models, and strictly 
additive main effects or main effects with life year gains interactions value 
functions.  The different model and value specifications are shown in Appendix 
8.1, ranked by improving log likelihood, AICc and BIC.  Only specifications that 
were associated with an improvement over the previous in terms of at least one 
of these criteria are shown. 
The additive main effects MNL pre-specified at the experimental design 
stage had the worst fit relative to the other specifications tested.  The interaction 
between final health state and life years gained included in the pre-specified 
value function was not significant in the additive main effects MNL, but 
replacing it with an interaction between initial and final health state improved 
the fit by all information criteria, as did the inclusion of life year interactions 
with each of the main effects.  The main effects remained significant after the 
introduction of life year interactions, suggesting that respondents may have 
derived value from allocating resources on the basis of these attributes, 
independent of the number of life years gained.  A parsimonious version of this 
additive interaction model was associated with an insignificant decrease in log-
likelihood and improvements in AICc and BIC.  Dummy coded main effects 
also improved model fit, suggesting non-linearity in preferences across these 
terms.  Despite the penalties associated with the substantial increase in the 
number of parameters, the latent class model was preferred to the pooled logit on 
the basis of AICc and BIC, indicative of significant unobserved heterogeneity in 
preferences.  Overall, a parsimonious version of the 3-class latent class logit with 
continuous main effects and life year gains interactions was preferred by BIC, 
while a 2-class, dummy coded main effects specification with continuous life 
year gains main effects and interactions was preferred on the basis of log 
likelihood and AICc.  Although a 3-class dummy coded specification was 
associated with further improvement in fit by the information criteria, it had very 
high standard errors in one class.  Hole (2008), in discussing the trade-off 
between model fit and the precision of the parameters, suggested that fewer 
classes with more precise parameters are generally preferred.  A parsimonious 
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version of the 2-class dummy coded specification, excluding the non-significant 
interaction between life year gains and final health state, did not converge.   
8.4.1 Overall DCE results 
Although the more parsimonious 3-class continuous specification was 
preferred by BIC, the 2-class dummy coded specification had the advantage of 
allowing for non-linear preferences over the levels presented in the survey, and 
was preferred in terms of log-likelihood and AICc.  The results of this model, 
weighting the class-specific coefficients by the individual probability of class 
membership, are shown in Appendix 8.2.  The intercept, or alternative specific 
constant (ASC) was not significant in the overall results, as expected in a generic 
design.  Most of the other coefficients were significant at the 0.10 threshold and 
moved in the directions anticipated by the empirical ethics review.  The 
insignificant coefficients in these overall results, specifically the dummy on the 
lower level of total patients treated, and the interactions between life years 
gained and final health state and total patients treated, were significant in one of 
the two latent classes and were therefore retained in the overall result.  The use 
of life years gained as the numeraire in estimating compensating variation 
appeared justified, as the model showed that the marginal utility of an additional 
life year gained was positive and highly significant (βLYg=0.28, p < 0.001), 
suggesting that individual life year gains were indeed valued by respondents.   
The use of non-linear dummy coded parameters in modelling the overall 
results appeared to have only limited justification based on the results of Wald 
tests, shown below in Table 8.2.  If preferences were linear over an attribute, the 
negative slope coefficient at one end of the range would offset the positive slope 
coefficient at the other end of the range, and the sum of the two coefficients 
would not be significantly different than zero.  The Wald tests showed that the 
sum of the slope coefficients on the high and low dummy-coded parameters were 
not significantly different than zero for age and initial health state, while final 
health state was only significant at a 0.10 threshold.   
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Table 8.2: Wald tests of non-linearity in dummy-coded parameters 
Attribute levels Difference Std. Error Diff/Std. err Adj. p-value Sig 
Age(10) + Age(70) 0.41 0.34 1.21 0.45  
U0(0.1) + U0(0.9) -0.24 0.37 -0.63 0.53  
LE(1m) + LE(10yrs) -0.79 0.19 -4.08 <0.001 *** 
U1(0.1) + U1(0.9) -1.02 0.44 -2.30 0.06 + 
nPats(100) + nPats(5000) 1.37 0.55 2.48 0.04 * 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
U0=initial health state; LE=life expectancy; U1=final health state; nPats=number of patients treated 
 
The compensating variation (CV) associated with an upward or 
downward change in the level of each attribute, relative to a baseline state with 
all attributes at their middle level, are also shown graphically in Figure 8.3, and 
detailed in Table 8.3.  To clearly illustrate which attribute levels were more 
preferred and less preferred relative to the reference level, the y-axis was reversed 
to show more preferred scenarios (negative CV) above zero, and less preferred 
scenarios (positive CV) below zero. 
Table 8.3: DCE compensating variations by change in attribute levels 
Attributes Attribute levels 
CV (95% CI),  
Baseline → Low 
CV (95% CI),  
Baseline → High 
Patient age 10y/o - 40y/o - 70y/o -4.36  (-7.45, -1.26) 2.91  (0.91, 4.91) 
Initial health state 0.1 - 0.5 - 0.9 -0.57  (-1.63, 0.48) 1.41  (-0.55, 3.36) 
Life expectancy 1m - 5yrs - 10yrs 3.57  (1.82, 5.32) -0.77  (-1.30, -0.25) 
Final health state 0.1 - 0.5 - 0.9 2.88  (1.34, 4.43) 0.71  (-1.27, 2.69) 
Total patients treated 100 - 2500 - 5000 -0.60  (-2.03, 0.83) -4.20  (-6.55, -1.86) 
CV=compensating variation; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval.  CVs are for a change away from the 
baseline (middle) level, holding all other attributes at their baseline level.  Statistically significant CVs are 
shown in bold. 
Confidence intervals that did not cross zero were taken to be statistically 
significant.  Negative CVs indicated a positive welfare effect (i.e. a quantity of 
the numeraire could be taken away following a change in attribute levels and 
leave respondents at least as well-off as before the change), and positive CVs 
indicated a negative welfare effect (i.e. a quantity of the numeraire would have to 
be added following a change in attribute levels to leave respondents at least as 
well-off as before the change).   
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Figure 8.3: DCE compensating variations by attribute 
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The statistically significant CVs associated with the upper and lower 
levels of patient age suggested that there were positive welfare effects associated 
with prioritising 10-year-old patients, and negative welfare effects associated 
prioritising 70 year-old patients, although this effect was weaker than in the 
younger age group.  Contrary to the expectation of a preference for prioritising 
more severe patients suggested by the empirical ethics review, there were no 
significant effects over initial health state and negative welfare effects associated 
with prioritising patients with the shortest untreated life expectancy.  There was 
a small but statistically significant welfare gain associated with prioritising 
patients with the longest initial life expectancy.  There was also a significant 
welfare loss associated with prioritising patients that would finish in the worst 
final health state after treatment, but no significant effect associated with patients 
that ended up in the best final health state.  Finally, there was a significant 
welfare gain associated with treating 5000 over 2500 patients, but no significant 
welfare loss associated with treating 100 rather than 2500 patients.   
Overall, the greatest welfare gains were associated with prioritising 10-
year-old patients over 40-year-old patients, and treating an additional 2500 
patients over the baseline scenario.  Conversely, the greatest welfare losses were 
associated with giving priority to patients with the shortest life expectancy, the 
oldest age or the worst final health state.  The greatest absolute difference in CV 
between the high and low levels of an attribute, taken as an indicator of relative 
importance, was over patient age (ΔCV=7.27, 95% CI: 2.53, 12.01), followed by 
individual life years gained (ΔCV=5.43, 95% CI: 2.32, 8.54). 
8.4.2 DCE scenario rankings 
The utility associated with each DCE scenario was calculated by 
weighting the attribute levels in each choice alternative by the overall finite 
mixture model coefficients shown in Appendix 8.2.  The 11 choice tasks in each 
of the two design blocks presented 22 different choice sets, for a total of 44 
scenarios.  The two choice sets (4 scenarios) that were re-presented in repeated 
task of each block were excluded, as was one of the choice sets (2 scenarios) 
from the test of dominance in the second design block, as this set was identical in 
both blocks, leaving a total of 38 scenarios to be ranked.  A reference scenario, 
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with all attributes at their middle (baseline) level, was included as a comparator, 
although this scenario was not actually shown to respondents.   
These scenarios, ranked from most to least preferred in terms of their 
predicted utility and probability of choice relative to the reference scenario, are 
presented in Table 8.4, along with Spearman correlation coefficients showing the 
association between attribute levels and scenario rank.  As a reminder, the 
scenarios were ranked by descending utility, so a negative correlation coefficient 
implies that the relative rank of a scenario improved as an attribute level 
increased, while a positive correlation coefficient implies that rank worsened as an 
attribute level increased.  
Table 8.4: DCE scenario rankings by predicted utility and probability of choice 
Rank Age U0 LE U1 LYg nPats 
Ind. 
QALYs 
Agg. 
QALYs 
Utility 
Prob. of 
choice  
1 10 0.5 5 0.5 10 5000 5.00 25000 5.19 90.5% 
2 40 0.1 0.083 0.9 10 2500 9.07 22666 5.01 88.9% 
2 40 0.1 0.083 0.9 10 2500 9.07 22666 5.01 88.9% 
4 10 0.1 10 0.5 5 100 6.50 650 4.81 86.8% 
5 10 0.1 0.083 0.5 10 100 5.03 503 4.81 86.7% 
6 10 0.5 10 0.5 1 2500 0.50 1250 4.54 83.3% 
7 10 0.5 5 0.9 10 100 11.00 1100 4.47 82.3% 
8 70 0.5 5 0.9 10 5000 11.00 55000 4.37 80.8% 
9 40 0.5 10 0.5 5 5000 2.50 12500 4.36 80.7% 
10 40 0.5 10 0.5 10 2500 5.00 12500 3.84 71.2% 
11 10 0.5 0.083 0.1 10 5000 0.97 4834 3.62 66.5% 
12 70 0.1 0.083 0.9 5 5000 4.57 22832 3.56 65.2% 
13 40 0.1 10 0.1 10 5000 1.00 5000 3.50 63.8% 
14 10 0.5 0.083 0.1 1 5000 0.07 334 3.26 58.1% 
15 40 0.5 10 0.9 5 100 8.50 850 3.23 57.4% 
16 40 0.1 5 0.5 1 5000 2.50 12500 3.15 55.4% 
17 70 0.1 5 0.1 10 100 1.00 100 2.95 50.4% 
Ref. 40 0.5 5 0.5 5 2500 2.50 6250 2.93 50.0% 
18 10 0.9 0.083 0.9 1 5000 0.90 4500 2.81 46.9% 
19 40 0.9 0.083 0.5 10 5000 4.97 24834 2.74 45.2% 
20 10 0.5 0.083 0.1 10 2500 0.97 2417 2.72 44.7% 
21 70 0.9 10 0.5 10 2500 1.00 2500 2.63 42.4% 
22 10 0.1 10 0.1 5 2500 0.50 1250 2.38 36.6% 
23 10 0.9 5 0.9 5 100 4.50 450 2.38 36.6% 
23 70 0.1 5 0.5 5 2500 4.50 11250 2.27 34.1% 
25 10 0.9 5 0.9 5 2500 4.50 11250 2.17 31.9% 
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26 40 0.5 5 0.9 1 2500 2.90 7250 2.11 30.4% 
27 40 0.9 0.083 0.1 5 2500 0.43 1084 2.04 29.0% 
28 40 0.1 0.083 0.5 5 2500 2.53 6333 2.02 28.6% 
29 70 0.9 10 0.9 10 5000 9.00 45000 1.86 25.4% 
30 10 0.1 10 0.1 1 2500 0.10 250 1.83 24.9% 
31 70 0.1 10 0.1 5 5000 0.50 2500 1.48 19.0% 
32 40 0.9 10 0.9 1 100 0.90 90 1.40 17.7% 
33 40 0.5 0.083 0.1 5 100 0.47 47 1.25 15.7% 
34 70 0.5 0.083 0.5 5 100 2.50 250 1.25 15.7% 
35 70 0.5 10 0.9 1 100 4.90 490 1.18 14.8% 
36 40 0.9 0.083 0.5 1 2500 0.47 1167 1.15 14.4% 
37 40 0.1 0.083 0.5 1 100 0.53 53 0.55 8.4% 
38 40 0.1 5 0.1 1 100 0.10 10 -0.47 3.2% 
           
Rank 
corr. 
0.34 0.21 0.06 -0.21 -0.53 -0.22 -0.55 -0.44   
Age=patient age; U0=initial health state; LE=initial life expectancy; U1=final health state; nPats=patients 
treated; LYg=individual life years gained; Ind. QALYs=QALYs gained per patient; Agg. QALYs=Aggregate 
QALYs (individual QALYs weighted by total patients treated); Utility=Predicted utility from DCE choice model; 
Prob. of choice=Probability of choosing a particular scenario compared to the reference scenario.  The 
reference scenario is shown in bold. 
 
The correlation coefficients suggested that respondents valued individual 
health gains, with larger individual QALY gains and individual life year gains 
having moderate to strong associations with better scenario rankings.  Larger 
aggregate QALY gains and better final health states were also associated with 
better scenario rankings, while increasing patient age and initial health state were 
associated with poorer rankings.  Each of the top five scenarios had individual 
QALY gains in the top 20 percent across all scenarios, and three of the top five 
scenarios had aggregate QALY gains in the top 10% across all scenarios.  
Likewise, seven of the bottom ten scenarios had aggregate QALY gains in the 
bottom 20 percent across all scenarios.  However, four scenarios among the top 
ten, all presenting 10 year old patients, had aggregate QALY gains well below 
the median, and the two scenarios with the largest and the second largest 
aggregate QALY gains, in both cases accruing to 70 year old patients, were 
ranked 8th and 29th out of the 38 scenarios.  Although QALY gains appeared to 
be strongly associated with higher rankings, scenarios with relatively small 
aggregate QALY gains were often ranked favourably when these gains accrued 
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to the youngest patients, while relatively large QALY gains to older patients 
were less favourably ranked. 
The predicted probability of choice of the most preferred scenario suggests 
that 91 percent of respondents would be expected choose that scenario over the 
reference, while only 3 percent of respondents would be expected to choose the 
least preferred alternative over the reference.  By definition, the reference 
scenario had a 50 percent probability of choice relative to itself, which can be 
interpreted as indifference, or an equal probability of choice between two 
identical alternatives.   
In order to control for the strong effect of age and more clearly illustrate 
how the other attributes interacted to drive choice, the scenarios are re-presented 
in Table 8.5 ordered by utility and choice probability within each age level as a 
form of two-way sensitivity analysis.  Note that because the experimental design 
was not perfectly orthogonal, the number of scenarios in each age stratum is not 
equal. 
Table 8.5: Age-stratified DCE scenario rankings by predicted utility and probability of 
choice 
Overall 
rank 
Rank 
within 
age 
U0 LE U1 LYg nPats 
Ind. 
QALYs 
Agg. 
QALYs 
Utility Pr(Choice) 
Age 10 
1 1 0.5 5 0.5 10 5000 5.00 25,000 5.19 90.5% 
4 2 0.1 10 0.5 5 100 6.50 650 4.81 86.8% 
5 3 0.1 0.083 0.5 10 100 5.03 503 4.81 86.7% 
6 4 0.5 10 0.5 1 2500 0.50 1,250 4.54 83.3% 
7 5 0.5 5 0.9 10 100 11.00 1,100 4.47 82.3% 
11 6 0.5 0.083 0.1 10 5000 0.97 4,834 3.62 66.5% 
14 7 0.5 0.083 0.1 1 5000 0.07 334 3.26 58.1% 
18 8 0.9 0.083 0.9 1 5000 0.90 4,500 2.81 46.9% 
20 9 0.5 0.083 0.1 10 2500 0.97 2,417 2.72 44.7% 
22 10 0.1 10 0.1 5 2500 0.50 1,250 2.38 36.6% 
23 11 0.9 5 0.9 5 100 4.50 450 2.38 36.6% 
25 12 0.9 5 0.9 5 2500 4.50 11,250 2.17 31.9% 
30 13 0.1 10 0.1 1 2500 0.10 250 1.83 24.9% 
Age 40 
2 1 0.1 0.083 0.9 10 2500 9.07 22,666 5.01 88.9% 
9 2 0.5 10 0.5 5 5000 2.50 12,500 4.36 80.7% 
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10 3 0.5 10 0.5 10 2500 5.00 12,500 3.84 71.2% 
13 4 0.1 10 0.1 10 5000 1.00 5,000 3.50 63.8% 
15 5 0.5 10 0.9 5 100 8.50 850 3.23 57.4% 
16 6 0.1 5 0.5 1 5000 2.50 12,500 3.15 55.4% 
Ref. Ref. 0.5 5 0.5 5 2500 2.50 6,250 2.93 50.0% 
19 7 0.9 0.083 0.5 10 5000 4.97 24,834 2.74 45.2% 
26 8 0.5 5 0.9 1 2500 2.90 7,250 2.11 30.4% 
27 9 0.9 0.083 0.1 5 2500 0.43 1,084 2.04 29.0% 
28 10 0.1 0.083 0.5 5 2500 2.53 6,333 2.02 28.6% 
32 11 0.9 10 0.9 1 100 0.90 90 1.40 17.7% 
33 12 0.5 0.083 0.1 5 100 0.47 47 1.25 15.7% 
36 13 0.9 0.083 0.5 1 2500 0.47 1,167 1.15 14.4% 
37 14 0.1 0.083 0.5 1 100 0.53 53 0.55 8.4% 
38 15 0.1 5 0.1 1 100 0.10 10 -0.47 3.2% 
Age 70 
8 1 0.5 5 0.9 10 5000 11.00 55,000 4.37 80.8% 
12 2 0.1 0.083 0.9 5 5000 4.57 22,832 3.56 65.2% 
17 3 0.1 5 0.1 10 100 1.00 100 2.95 50.4% 
21 4 0.9 10 0.5 10 2500 1.00 2,500 2.63 42.4% 
23 5 0.1 5 0.5 5 2500 4.50 11,250 2.27 34.1% 
29 6 0.9 10 0.9 10 5000 9.00 45,000 1.86 25.4% 
31 7 0.1 10 0.1 5 5000 0.50 2,500 1.48 19.0% 
34 8 0.5 0.083 0.5 5 100 2.50 250 1.25 15.7% 
35 9 0.5 10 0.9 1 100 4.90 490 1.18 14.8% 
Age=patient age; U0=initial health state; LE=initial life expectancy; U1=final health state; nPats=patients 
treated; LYg=individual life years gained; Ind. QALYs=QALYs gained per patient; Agg. QALYs=Aggregate 
QALYs (individual QALYs weighted by total patients treated); Utility=Predicted utility from DCE choice model; 
Pr(Choice)=Probability of choosing a particular scenario compared to the reference scenario.  The reference 
scenario is shown in bold. 
Consistent with the overall results, the age-stratified results appeared to 
emphasise the importance of survival gains and aggregate QALYs, as the most 
highly ranked scenario within each age strata had the highest level of individual 
life year gains as well as substantial aggregate QALY gains.  However, there also 
appeared to be an offsetting preference against individuals in the best initial 
health state, as scenarios associated with some of the greatest aggregate QALY 
gains were ranked relatively poorly when they accrued to patients in the best 
initial health state.  The absolute gain in health-related utility appeared less 
important than survival gains, as a number of the highly ranked scenarios within 
each age strata were associated with no change between the initial and final 
health states. 
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The scenarios were also stratified by initial life expectancy (not shown) to 
explore its relationship with individual life year gains.  The empirical ethics 
review suggested that respondents might be indifferent over the number of life 
years gained in scenarios where patients faced imminent death on the grounds 
that any gain would be valuable, because as Harris (1985) argues, it is all the 
time they have left.  Contrary to this hypothesis, however, scenarios with larger 
individual life year gains were consistently ranked more favourably than 
scenarios with smaller life year gains when patients had a life expectancy of only 
1 month.  A similar pattern was found in scenarios where life expectancy was 5 
years, but there was no clear preference over life year gains when initial life 
expectancy was 10 years. 
8.4.3 DCE results by latent class 
Overall, the probability of being in a particular latent class was 
approximately equal, as there was a 48 percent probability of belonging to class 1 
and a 52 percent probability of belonging to class 2.  As shown in Figure 8.4, 
however, the individual probability of membership had a bimodal distribution, 
with peaks at very high and very low probabilities of membership, suggesting a 
clear distinction between classes at the individual level.  This was supported by 
the estimate of the relative entropy, which measured the model’s ability to 
distinguish between 
latent classes.  The 
relative entropy of the 
two-class model was 
0.67 on a 0-1 scale, 
suggesting a moderate 
ability to distinguish 
between the latent 
classes. 
  
Figure 8.4: Latent class 1 membership probability density 
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The logit-transformed probability regression model found that university 
or college graduation, gender and age group were not statistically significant 
predictors of the probability of latent class membership, but agent and ‘fast 
completer’ status were significant at a 0.10 threshold.  After excluding the 
insignificant parameters and re-estimating the model, agent status was associated 
with a statistically significant 33 percent relative reduction in the probability of 
membership in class 1 (adjusted-p=0.04).  From an overall probability of 
belonging to latent class 1 of 48 percent, the probability of an agent belonging to 
class 1 was 32 percent, with a corresponding 68 percent probability of belonging 
to class 2, suggesting that agents were twice as likely to belong to class 2 as class 
1.  Fast completion was associated with a 25 percent reduction in the probability 
of membership in class 1, but this reduction failed to meet a 0.10 significance 
threshold (adjusted-p=0.12).  A model excluding agent status, specified to avoid 
possible confounding with education, found that none of the remaining factors 
were significant at a 0.10 threshold.    
The latent class coefficients shown in Appendix 8.3 indicated that the 
majority of coefficients were significant at a 0.10 threshold in both classes, 
although the standard errors were notably larger in class 1 than in class 2.  The 
alternative specific constant in class 1 was not significant, although the constant 
in class 2 was significant and positive, suggesting some a priori preference for 
Alternative B (the right-hand side alternative) among these respondents.  Several 
other coefficients were notable for the difference in sign and magnitude between 
the two classes.  For example, the signs on the coefficients on the lowest and 
highest levels of patient age, as well as the age-life years gained interaction term, 
were reversed between class 1 and class 2.  In addition, the size of the 
coefficients on the dummy-coded age parameters was substantially different.  
However, as the coefficients on the dummy-coded main effects and the age-life 
year interaction term moved in opposite directions in the two classes, it was 
difficult to anticipate the net effect of a change in age on expected utility and 
compensating variation.  The coefficients also showed that use of life years 
gained as the numeraire in the compensating variation calculations was justified 
by its positive and significant coefficient in both classes.  The difference in the 
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marginal utility of an additional life year gained between classes was not 
significant (difference=0.01, p=0.92). 
Wald tests on the sum of the slope coefficients on the high and low levels 
of the dummy-coded parameters, shown in Table 8.6, were much more 
suggestive of non-linearity in the main effects by latent class than in the overall 
results.  Interestingly, although the magnitude of the non-linearities was 
generally smaller in class 2 than class 1, they were also more strongly significant. 
Table 8.6: Wald tests of non-linearity in dummy-coded parameters, by latent class 
Attribute Difference Std. Error β/Std. err Adj. p-value Sig 
Age(10) + Age(70), Class 1 0.37 0.70 0.54 0.59  
U0(0.1) + U0(0.9), Class 1 -2.65 0.72 -3.68 <0.001 *** 
LE(1m) + LE(10yrs), Class 1 -0.91 0.36 -2.56 0.03 * 
U1(0.1) + U1(0.9), Class 1 -2.41 0.86 -2.81 0.02 * 
nPats(100) + nPats(5000), Class 1 3.22 1.05 3.07 0.01 * 
      
Age(10) + Age(70), Class 2 0.44 0.07 6.33 <0.001 *** 
U0(0.1) + U0(0.9), Class 2 1.99 0.10 20.01 <0.001 *** 
LE(1m) + LE(10yrs), Class 2 -0.67 0.07 -9.15 <0.001 *** 
U1(0.1) + U1(0.9), Class 2 0.27 0.13 2.11 0.07 + 
nPats(100)+ nPats(5000), Class 2 -0.35 0.09 -4.06 <0.001 *** 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
U0=initial health state; LE=life expectancy; U1=final health state; nPats=number of patients treated 
 
The compensating variations by attribute within each class, and the net 
differences between classes, are shown in Table 8.7.  They suggest that the 
strength and direction of preferences were generally consistent in the two classes, 
although there were significant differences in the direction of preference for 
initial health states, and the best final health state.  There were also significant 
differences in the strength of preference for the number of patients treated.   
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Table 8.7: Compensating variations and differences between latent classes by attribute 
change 
Attribute change 
CV (95% CI) 
Class 1 
CV (95% CI) 
Class 2 
Difference (95% CI) 
Class 1 - Class 2 
Patient age, 40 → 10 
-7.41 
(-13.80, -1.02) 
-1.67 
(-2.38, -0.97) 
-5.74 
(-12.18, 0.71) 
Patient age, 40 → 70 
6.06 
(0.15, 11.97) 
0.14 
(-0.39, 0.68) 
5.91 
(-0.09, 11.92) 
Initial health state, 0.5 → 0.1 
2.58 
(0.24, 4.91) 
-3.35 
(-4.17, -2.52) 
5.92 
(3.54, 8.30) 
Initial health state, 0.5 → 0.9 
7.02 
(0.68, 13.37) 
-3.54 
(-4.21, -2.86) 
10.56 
(4.24, 16.88) 
Life expectancy, 5yrs → 1mon 
4.72 
(1.54, 7.91) 
2.55 
(1.93, 3.17) 
2.18 
(-1.12, 5.47) 
Life expectancy, 5yrs → 10yrs 
-1.38 
(-2.34, -0.43) 
-0.23 
(-0.50, 0.03) 
-1.15 
(-2.18, -0.12) 
Final health state, 0.5 → 0.1 
3.66 
(0.64, 6.69) 
2.20 
(1.53, 2.86) 
1.47 
(-1.70, 4.63) 
Final health state, 0.5 → 0.9 
5.06 
(1.72, 8.40) 
-3.11 
(-4.42, -1.80) 
8.17 
(4.67, 11.68) 
Total patients treated, 2500 → 
100 
-3.09 
(-6.37, 0.19) 
1.59 
(1.26, 1.93) 
-4.69 
(-7.99, -1.39) 
Total patients treated, 2500 → 
5000 
-8.51 
(-13.97, -3.04) 
-0.41 
(-0.73, -0.09) 
-8.10 
(-13.57, -2.63) 
Statistically significant differences are shown in bold. 
 
Figure 8.5, on the next page, shows that there was a significant and 
positive welfare effect (negative CV) associated with prioritising patients in the 
worst initial health state in latent class 2, but a significant and negative welfare 
effect (positive CV) in latent class 1.  A similar opposing pattern was observed 
for patient groups in the best initial and final health states.  There was a negative 
welfare effect in class 1 associated with patients groups in the best initial health 
state, but a positive effect in class 2.  There was also a negative welfare effect in 
class 1 associated with patient groups that would end up in the best final health 
state, and a positive effect in class 2. 
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Figure 8.5: DCE compensating variation by attribute and latent class 
 
 
Latent class 1  
48% probability of membership 
 
 
 
 
Latent class 2  
52% probability of membership 
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8.4.4 Public vs. agent preferences 
The reference model for the DCE choice model with agent interactions 
was a pooled multinomial logit (MNL) with dummy coded main effects, 
continuous life year gain interactions and agent interactions (see Appendix 8.4 
for a comparison of the alternative value functions, ranked by log-likelihood, 
AICc and BIC).  It was felt that there were not enough agent respondents to 
justify stratifying them further with a latent class approach.  A parsimonious 
version of the MNL model was preferred by AICc and BIC, and was not 
significantly worse than the full model by the likelihood ratio test.  As in the 
previous models, a significance threshold of 0.10 was adopted, and dummy 
coded parameters were only excluded if the entire system of coefficients were 
insignificant.  The results of this model are shown in Appendix 8.5. 
Agents appeared to hold more moderate preferences than the general 
population sample over the high and low levels of initial health state (U0), as the 
coefficients on the initial health state-agent interactions tended to offset the main 
effects coefficients.  Agents also appeared to hold divergent preferences for the 
worst final health state (U1).  Although the general population coefficient was 
positive, the coefficient on the agent interaction term was negative and much 
larger, suggesting a contradictory preference.  The compensating variations 
associated with changes in the initial and final health states are shown below in 
Table 8.8.  These results show that although a move from the baseline to worst 
(lowest) final health state was associated with negative welfare effects (positive 
CV) in both groups, the effect was significantly stronger among agents.  The 
mean difference in the effect associated with a move from the baseline to best 
(highest) initial health state was just significant at a 0.05 threshold.  The 
difference in the welfare effect between the two groups over a move to the best 
(highest) level of initial health attribute reflects the fact that agents had no 
statistically significant preference over either state, while the general public had a 
significant preference for patient groups in the better initial health state.  
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Table 8.8: Compensating variations and differences for agents and the general 
population 
Attribute change 
Compensating 
variation 
Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI 
CV, U0 baseline → low, Public -1.78 -2.42 -1.13 
CV, U0 baseline → low, Agents -3.54 -5.56 -1.51 
Difference, U0 baseline → low, Agents- Public -1.76 -3.79 0.27 
    
CV, U0 baseline → high, Public -1.53 -2.52 -0.54 
CV, U0 baseline → high, Agents 0.99 -1.53 3.51 
Difference, U0 baseline → high, Agents- 
Public 
2.52 0.00 5.04 
    
CV, U1 baseline → low, Public 2.97 1.93 4.02 
CV, U1 baseline → low, Agents 6.61 3.61 9.60 
Difference, U1 0.5 → 0.1, Agents- Public 3.63 0.70 6.57 
    
CV, U1 baseline → high, Public 1.71 -0.12 3.53 
CV, U1 baseline → high, Agents 3.93 0.68 7.18 
Difference, U1 baseline → high, Agents- 
Public 
2.22 -0.56 4.99 
CV=compensating variation; ΔCV=difference in compensating variation (CVagents-CVPublic).  U0=Initial utility; 
U1=Final utility.  Statistically significant differences are shown in bold. 
 
The compensating variations for moves between the levels of initial and 
final health states, by group, are shown graphically in Figure 8.6.  They suggest 
that even for attributes with statistically significant differences in compensating 
variation, the overall direction of preferences was reasonably consistent in both 
groups, with the exception of the effect associated with a move from baseline to 
the best initial health state, where the direction of effect, rather than just the 
relative strength, was significantly different. 
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8.5 Discussion of DCE results 
Consistent with the empirical ethics review, the overall results from the 
DCE suggested that respondents had statistically significant preferences for 
younger patient groups, larger patient groups, and greater individual life year 
gains.  Despite the significant preferences for larger patient groups and greater 
individual life year gains, the interaction between these two terms was not 
significant, suggesting that preferences for these factors were not related to 
preferences for aggregate life year gains.  Indeed, this interaction was negative and 
statistically significant in latent class 1, strongly suggesting diminishing returns to 
aggregate life years gained, while it was statistically insignificant in class 2.  
Instead, the preference for larger patient groups appeared to reflect a desire to 
distribute healthcare benefits as widely as possible.  Also, although the 
interaction between initial and final health state was significant and positive, 
suggesting a preference for absolute quality gain, the interaction between quality 
gain and individual life years gained, or, in effect, individual quality-adjusted life 
years gained, was not significant in either latent class.  These overall 
compensating variation results appeared consistent with the scenario rankings, 
which also suggested that individual gains were more important to respondents 
than aggregate gains, and that smaller benefits accruing to preferred patient 
groups were often preferred over larger gains to less preferred groups. 
Figure 8.6: Compensating variations for changes in initial and final health state, by group 
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In contrast to the empirical ethics review of Chapter 3, which found a 
preference for health gains to individuals in more severe health states, DCE 
respondents had a preference for patients with longer untreated life expectancies, 
even after controlling for potential health gains, and no significant preference for 
patient groups in the most severe initial health state relative to those in better 
initial states.  This non-significant effect appeared to be driven by differences 
between the latent classes over this attribute: whereas class 2 had a significant 
preference for prioritising patients in the worst initial health state relative to 
those in the moderate state, class 1 had a significant aversion to prioritising such 
patients.  This result was mirrored by similarly unexpected preferences for 
patients in the best initial health state: whereas class 2 had a significant 
preference for prioritising patients in the best initial health state over those in the 
moderate state, class 1 had a significant aversion to prioritising such patients.  
These offsetting preferences led to a statistically insignificant overall result 
despite statistically significant preferences over initial health state in both classes.  
This highlights the value of latent class modelling, which allows such 
heterogeneity to be incorporated, and just as importantly, interpreted. 
Respondents had a significant aversion to patient groups that would be in 
the worst final health state following treatment, but no significant preference for 
patients in the best final health state relative to patients in a moderate final health 
state.  Again, this result was driven by offsetting differences between classes: 
although class 2 had a significant preference for patients in the best final health 
state, class 1 had an even stronger aversion to such patients.  This result, though, 
is not inconsistent with the empirical ethics review, as although there was 
evidence of a reluctance to allocate resources to patients that would remain in a 
poor health state following treatment, this did not appear to translate into a 
preference for patients in the best final health state.  It has been suggested that 
such a pattern may imply a preference for achieving some minimum level of 
quality in the post-treatment health state rather than maximising the quality of 
that health state (Schwappach 2002b; Dolan, Cookson 2000). 
As described above, latent class 2 had significantly stronger preferences 
for patients in the worst initial health state and the best final health state, 
compared to patients in moderate initial and final health states.  This appeared to 
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reflect a greater concern for absolute quality gain relative to class 1.  However, 
confidence intervals around the estimates of compensating variation for latent 
class 2 were substantially smaller than the corresponding intervals for latent class 
1, suggesting that the defining latent characteristic may not be the relative 
strength of preferences, but rather the relative homogeneity of preferences.  
Individuals in class 2 appeared to share a well-formed set of preferences, while 
preferences in class 1 were consistently more heterogeneous, ranging from very 
strong to barely significant.  Indeed, the latent classes may even reflect the 
difference between respondents with axiomatically rational preferences 
(complete, stable and transitive), and those with axiomatically irrational or 
poorly-formed preferences.  It is worth noting in this context that despite the 
roughly equal overall probabilities of membership in the two classes, agents were 
statistically much more likely to belong to latent class 2.  In light of evidence that 
respondents may construct their preferences as they progress through a stated 
preference elicitation (Payne et al. 1992; Ryan 2009; Slovic 1995), and to the 
extent that agents may be expected to be somewhat more familiar with their 
preferences over the attributes tested here than the general public, this may lend 
support the notion that the latent classes reflect differences in the consistency and 
‘quality’ of these preferences.   
Reinterpreting the DCE latent class results in this light lends support to 
the notion of a distinction between well-defined versus vaguely-defined 
preferences.  In particular, the very large compensating variations associated 
with age, initial health state and total patients treated in latent class 1 may reflect 
non-compensatory decision-making heuristics that favoured younger patients 
and larger patient groups, and discriminated against those in better final health 
states, without regard for other attribute levels.  In such cases, compensating 
variation would essentially be infinite, as respondents would theoretically be 
willing to sacrifice any number of individual life years in order to prioritise their 
preferred group.  If the distinction between the latent classes indeed reflects the 
quality and consistency of the underlying preferences, it has implications for the 
role of naive public respondents in societal priority setting, and whose 
preferences should be accepted as representative.  At the extreme, one approach 
might be to use latent class modelling to identify and exclude individual 
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respondents with poorly-formed preferences, although efforts to improve 
respondent’s understanding and preference construction would seem to be more 
in keeping with a democratic or Communitarian approach. 
Overall, the DCE results suggest a broadly utilitarian preference, with 
larger QALY gains tending to be associated with greater expected utility, 
although respondents were clearly willing to deviate from this rule to prioritise 
younger or larger patient groups.  The corresponding CSPC methods and results 
will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 8.1: Alternative DCE models and value functions,  
by improving information criteria 
Model and value function k 
LL 
[Pr(χ2)] 
AICc BIC 
 
1.0) MNL; continuous main effects + U1:LYg 
interaction  (pre-specified at experimental design 
stage) 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + U1:LYg 
 
8 -4031.4 8078.8 8133.1 
 
2.0) MNL; continuous main effects + U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
8 -3872.1 7760.1 7814.4 
 
3.0) MNL; continuous main effects + LYg interactions 
+ U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + LYg:Age + 
LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + LYg:nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
13 -3855.6 7737.3 7825.4 
 
3.1) Parsimonious MNL; continuous main effects + LYg 
interactions + U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + LYg:U0 + 
LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + (1-U0):U1 
 
11 
-3860.6 
[0.007] 
7739.2 7800.3 
 
4.0) MNL; continuous LYg + dummy-coded main 
effects + U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + D_AgeL1 + D_AgeL3 + D_U0L1 + D_U0L3 + 
D_LEL1 + D_LEL3 + D_U1L1 + D_U1L3 + D_nPatsL1 + 
D_ nPatsL3 + LYg:Age + LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + 
LYg:nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
18 -3846.1 7718.3 7806.5 
 
5.0) MNL; continuous LYg + dummy-coded main 
effects + continuous LYg and U0:U1 interactions 
v = LYg + D_AgeL1 + D_AgeL3 + D_U0L1 + D_U0L3 + 
D_LEL1 + D_LEL3 + D_U1L1 + D_U1L3 + D_nPatsL1 + 
D_ nPatsL3 + LYg:Age + LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + 
LYg:nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
18 -3815.1 7666.2 7788.2 
 
5.1) Parsimonious MNL; continuous LYg + dummy-
coded main effects + continuous LYg and U0:U1 
interactions 
v = LYg + D_AgeL1 + D_AgeL3 + D_U0L1 + D_U0L3 + 
D_LEL1 + D_LEL3 + D_U1L1 + D_U1L3 + D_nPatsL1 + 
D_ nPatsL3 + LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + (1-U0):U1 
 
16 
-3818.0 
[0.055] 
7666.0 7767.7 
 
6.0) 2-class LC-MNL; continuous main effects + LYg 
interactions + U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + LYg:Age + 
LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + LYg:nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
26 -3763.5 7583.2 7773.0 
 
6.1) 3-class LC-MNL; continuous main effects + LYg 
interactions + U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + LYg:Age + 
39 -3685.1 7454.7 7739.1 
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LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + LYg:nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
 
6.2) Parsimonious 3-class LC-MNL; continuous main 
effects + LYg interactions + U0:U1 interaction 
v = LYg + Age + U0 + LE + U1 + nPats + LYg:U0 + 
LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + (1-U0):U1 
 
33 
-3679.5 
[0.082] 
7431.5 7675.3 
 
7.0) 2-class LC-MNL; continuous LYg + dummy-coded 
main effects + continuous LYg and U0:U1 interactions 
v = LYg + D_AgeL1 + D_AgeL3 + D_U0L1 + D_U0L3 + 
D_LEL1 + D_LEL3 + D_U1L1 + D_U1L3 + D_nPatsL1 + 
D_ nPatsL3 + LYg:Age + LYg:U0 + LYg:LE + LYg:U1 + 
LYg:nPats + (1-U0):U1 
 
37 -3674.4 7425.2 7682.6 
k =parameters, including alternative specific constant; LL=Log-likelihood; AICc= Akaike information criterion, 
with correction for finite sample size; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. MNL=multinomial logit; LC-
MNL=latent class multinomial logit. Only models and value functions associated with an improvement in LL, 
AICc or BIC over the previous specification are shown. The overall minimum log-likelihood, AICc and BIC are 
shown in bold.  The p-value of the likelihood ratio [Pr(χ2)] is shown for nested models. 
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Appendix 8.2: Combined latent class model coefficients 
Attribute Coefficient Std. Error Coef of var β/Std. err Pr(>|z|) Sig 
Intercept -0.13 0.18 1.385 -0.72 0.4709  
LYg 0.28 0.06 0.214 4.64 0.0000 *** 
Age 10 1.98 0.86 0.434 2.30 0.0213 * 
Age 70 -1.57 0.59 0.376 -2.67 0.0076 ** 
U0 0.1 -2.33 0.76 0.326 -3.07 0.0022 ** 
U0 0.9 2.09 0.47 0.225 4.44 0.0000 *** 
LE 1m -1.32 0.36 0.273 -3.71 0.0002 *** 
LE 10yrs 0.53 0.22 0.415 2.38 0.0174 ** 
U1 0.1 0.85 0.26 0.306 3.28 0.0010 ** 
U1 0.9 -1.86 0.64 0.344 -2.90 0.0037 ** 
100 patients -0.03 0.15 5.000 -0.21 0.8338  
5000 patients 1.40 0.49 0.350 2.85 0.0044 ** 
(1-U0):U1 8.75 2.08 0.238 4.21 0.0000 *** 
LYg:Age 0.05 0.03 0.600 1.73 0.0829 + 
LYg:U0 -0.37 0.14 0.378 -2.66 0.0078 ** 
LYg:LE -0.01 0.01 1.000 -2.12 0.0338 * 
LYg:U1 -0.04 0.06 1.500 -0.78 0.4378  
LYg:nPats -0.02 0.01 0.500 -1.43 0.1543  
       
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
Coefficients are based on the latent class coefficients weighted by the individual probabilities of class 
membership.  LYg=individual life year gains; U0=initial utility; LE=initial life expectancy; U1=final utility; 
nPats=number of patients treated. 
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Appendix 8.3: Latent class model coefficients, by class 
Attribute Coefficient Robust SE β/Std. err Pr(>|z|) Sig 
Probability, Class 1 0.48 0.04 13.12 0.000 *** 
Constant -0.67 0.39 -1.74 0.081 + 
LYg 0.28 0.13 2.57 0.027 * 
Age 10 4.81 1.64 4.09 0.003 ** 
Age 70 -4.43 1.08 -5.06 0.000 *** 
U0 0.1 -4.13 1.47 -4.29 0.005 ** 
U0 0.9 1.48 0.95 2.16 0.118  
LE 1m -2.01 0.68 -4.49 0.003 ** 
LE 10yrs 1.10 0.46 3.27 0.017 ** 
U1 0.1 0.60 0.52 1.40 0.253  
U1 0.9 -3.01 1.26 -3.34 0.017 ** 
100 patients 0.33 0.28 0.97 0.244  
5000 patients 2.89 0.97 4.78 0.003 ** 
(1-U0):U1 8.10 4.10 3.03 0.048 * 
LYg:Age 0.18 0.05 4.39 0.001 *** 
LYg:U0 -0.90 0.26 -4.46 0.001 *** 
LYg:LE -0.03 0.01 -3.04 0.016 * 
LYg:U1 -0.01 0.12 -0.04 0.962  
LYg:Pats -0.04 0.03 -2.42 0.083 + 
Probability, Class 2 0.52 0.03 15.29 0.000 *** 
Constant 0.37 0.06 6.61 0.000 *** 
LYg 0.29 0.04 2.57 0.000 *** 
Age 10 -0.63 0.14 4.09 0.000 ** 
Age 70 1.07 0.16 -5.06 0.000 *** 
U0 0.1 -0.67 0.12 -4.29 0.000 *** 
U0 0.9 2.66 0.17 2.16 0.000 *** 
LE 1m -0.68 0.08 -4.49 0.000 *** 
LE 10yrs 0.01 0.07 3.27 0.896  
U1 0.1 1.07 0.11 1.40 0.000 *** 
U1 0.9 -0.81 0.17 -3.34 0.000 *** 
100 patients -0.36 0.11 0.97 0.001 ** 
5000 patients 0.01 0.11 4.78 0.895  
(1-U0):U1 9.35 0.35 3.03 0.000 *** 
LYg:Age -0.07 0.01 4.39 0.000 *** 
LYg:U0 0.12 0.05 -4.46 0.011 * 
LYg:LE 0.00 0.00 -3.04 0.217  
LYg:U1 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.010 * 
LYg:Pats 0.01 0.01 -2.42 0.122  
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
LYg=life year gains; U0=initial utility; LE=initial life expectancy; U1=final utility; nPats=patients treated. 
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Appendix 8.4: Alternative DCE public-agent interaction value 
functions, by improving information criteria 
Attributes p-values, specification 1 p-values, specification 2 
p-values, specification 
3 
Constant 0.150 0.199  
LYg                        0.001 0.000 0.000 
D1_Age                     0.027 0.004 0.000 
D3_Age                     0.884 0.444 0.000 
D1_U0                      0.000 0.000 0.000 
D3_U0                      0.000 0.000 0.000 
D1_LE0                     0.000 0.000 0.000 
D3_LE0                     0.008 0.001 0.001 
D1_U1                      0.050 0.045 0.021 
D3_U1                      0.000 0.000 0.000 
D1_nPats                    0.810 0.544 0.879 
D3_nPats                    0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1-U0):U1                      0.000 0.000 0.000 
LYg:(Age/10)              0.209 0.273  
LYg:U0                     0.589   
LYg:LE0                    0.019 0.005 0.006 
LYg:U1                     0.000 0.000 0.000 
LYg:(Pats/1000)           0.952   
LYg:(1-U0:U1)                  0.000 0.000 0.000 
LYg:Agent              0.527   
D1_Age:Agent           0.894   
D3_Age:Agent           0.373   
D1_U0:Agent            0.067 0.051 0.085 
D3_U0:Agent            0.033 0.038 0.047 
D1_LE0:Agent           0.127 0.552  
D3_LE0:Agent           0.177 0.182  
D1_U1:Agent            0.162 0.011 0.013 
D3_U1:Agent            0.347 0.138 0.114 
D1_Pats:Agent          0.687   
D3_Pats:Agent          0.831   
(1-U0:U1):Agent            0.575   
LYg:(Age/10):Agent    0.575   
LYg:U0:Agent           0.555   
LYg:LE0:Agent          0.540   
LYg:U1:Agent           0.718   
LYg:(Pats/1000):Agent 0.760   
LYg:(1-U0:U1):Agent        0.310   
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Parameters 37 23 19 
LL -3777.8 -3785.7 -3788.4 
Pr(χ2) -- 0.33 0.27 
AICc 7634.2 7617.5 7615.0 
BIC 7795.5 7773.4 7743.8 
Specifications are based on a pooled multinomial logit.  LL=Log-likelihood; AICc= Akaike information 
criterion, with correction for finite sample size; BIC=Bayesian information criterion.  Only value functions 
associated with an improvement in LL, AICc or BIC over the previous specification are shown.  The overall 
minimum log-likelihood, AICc and BIC are shown in bold.  The p-value of the likelihood ratio Pr(χ2) is shown 
relative to the full specification. LYg=individual life year gains; U0=initial utility; LE=initial life expectancy; 
U1=final utility; nPats=number of patients treated; D1=level 1 dummy; D3=level 3 dummy. 
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Appendix 8.5: Dummy-coded MNL with agent interactions 
coefficients 
Attribute Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig 
LYg 0.15 0.01 11.22 0.000 *** 
Age 10 0.66 0.06 10.98 0.000 *** 
Age 70 -0.34 0.08 -4.45 0.000 *** 
U0 0.1 -1.11 0.11 -10.27 0.000 *** 
U0 0.9 1.60 0.16 10.28 0.000 *** 
LE 1m -1.16 0.10 -12.14 0.000 *** 
LE 10yrs 0.23 0.07 3.25 0.001 ** 
U1 0.1 0.35 0.15 2.30 0.021 * 
U1 0.9 -1.04 0.13 -8.23 0.000 *** 
100 patients 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.879  
5000 patients 0.86 0.06 13.89 0.000 *** 
(1-U0):U1 3.66 0.60 6.06 0.000 *** 
LE:LYg -0.01 0.00 -2.75 0.006 ** 
U1:LYg -0.29 0.03 -9.57 0.000 *** 
(1-U0):U1:LYg 0.64 0.08 8.37 0.000 *** 
U0 0.1:Agent 0.26 0.15 1.73 0.085 + 
U0 0.9:Agent -0.37 0.19 -1.98 0.047 * 
U1 0.1:Agent -0.53 0.22 -2.48 0.013 * 
U1 0.9:Agent -0.33 0.21 -1.58 0.114  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
LYg=individual life year gains; U0=initial utility; LE=initial life expectancy; U1=final utility; nPats=number of 
patients treated 
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Chapter 9:  
Primary CSPC results 
As in the previous chapter, the primary objective of the analysis of the 
CSPC responses was to estimate the relative strength of preferences for the 
patient and program characteristics identified in the empirical ethics review.  The 
approach used to estimate the strength of these preferences was similar to that 
taken in the previous chapter: the marginal utility associated with changes in 
each of the attributes was modelled, and the welfare effects associated with these 
changes are reported in terms of compensating variations.  But whereas the DCE 
asked respondents to choose one group to prioritise, the CSPC asked 
respondents to allocate a fixed budget between the two groups.  This difference 
in the response format had implications for how the responses should be 
modelled, and for how compensating variation should be estimated and 
interpreted.   
This chapter outlines the methods used in modelling and estimating 
welfare effects, and discuss the results.  Section 9.1 describes the specification of 
a linear CSPC model, allowing for the continuous CSPC response format and 
the panel nature of the responses.  The estimation and interpretation of 
compensating variation as a measure of welfare effects in light of this response 
format, including a comparison of public and agent preferences, is discussed in 
section 9.2.  Section 9.3 describes the methods used to rank the CSPC scenarios 
by relative utility, as the DCE scenarios were in the previous chapter, in order to 
consider respondent preferences in a more holistic context.  As noted, the CSPC 
has an arguable advantage over DCE in allowing respondents to express a 
preference for a maximising or equalising distribution of resources or outcomes, 
independent of the characteristics of the particular choice scenarios.  Section 9.4 
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describes the methods used to identify these specific distributive preferences.  
Finally, to compare the results of the CSPC in a more direct way to those of the 
DCE, section 9.5 describes the methods for transforming the CSPC allocations 
to discrete choices and the non-linear model used to analyse the results.  The 
results of these analyses, including the model coefficients, estimates of welfare 
effects, scenario rankings, distributive preferences, and a direct comparison of 
DCE and CSPC discrete choices, are described in section 9.6.  Section 9.7 
discusses the results. 
9.1 Specifying the CSPC model 
As with the DCE multinomial logit model, the simplest approach to 
analysing panel data is the linear ‘pooled model’, which implies that preferences 
are the same across all individuals (i) and all tasks (t): 
    =           (9.1) 
Where yit is a continuous response variable, α and β are assumed to be the 
homogeneous for all individuals and all responses, and uit is a stochastic 
individual error term with a mean of zero (Croissant & Millo 2008).  If there is 
heterogeneity in the parameters, however, an ‘unobserved effects model’ may be 
more appropriate:  
    =                  (9.2) 
Where α and β are assumed to be heterogeneous across respondents (‘individual 
effect’), across responses (‘time effect’), or both (‘two-way effect’).  The 
unobserved effects model separates the random error term of the pooled model, 
uit, into two components: an individual-specific component (μi), and a stochastic 
error term (εit) (Baltagi 2008; Croissant & Millo 2008): 
    =        (9.3) 
Although in practice the individual and the stochastic error terms are not 
separately identifiable, assumptions about their behaviour lead to fixed or 
random specifications of the unobserved effects model (Croissant & Millo 2008).   
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Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000a) suggest that CSPC is consistent 
with random utility theory (RUT) and can yield cardinal utility measures if it can 
assumed that the differences in the budget allocation reflect differences in latent 
utility between the two alternatives.  Under this interpretation the difference in 
latent value is theoretically unbounded, even though the observed budget 
difference (ΔBudget = BudgetB – BudgetA) is bounded by -100 (the entire budget to 
program A) and +100 (the entire budget to program B).  As this implies that the 
observed budget differences are censored representations of the difference in 
latent utility, a censored regression, or tobit model, may be more appropriate 
than a continuous linear model.   
In a tobit model, the observed dependent variable, y, is equal to the latent 
variable, y*, when y* is within the upper (τu) and lower (τl) censoring limits, and 
is otherwise censored at the when the latent difference is at or outside of those 
limits (Long 1997): 
 
 = {   =
                   
     
           
     
                  
     
 
(9.4) 
Where βx is a vector of attribute coefficients and levels.  The regression 
coefficient, β, represents the marginal change in the latent outcome y* given a 1-
unit change in the level of x.   
These assumptions were tested in a series of econometric specification 
tests (Baltagi 2008; Croissant & Millo 2008).  The poolability of the data was 
tested using Chow’s F-test, and the presence of unobserved effects was tested 
using Wooldridge’s test of unobserved effects.  A fixed or random effects 
specification was defined on the basis of Hausman’s test, while the presence of 
specific individual, time or two-way effects was tested with Honda’s Lagrange 
multiplier test.  Finally, as the tobit model is based on assumptions of normally 
distributed and homoscedastic errors (Long 1997), the behaviour of the error 
term was tested using the Breusch-Pagan test of homoskedasticity and the 
Anderson-Darling test of normality.  
Linear models are also amenable to a latent class modelling approach, 
where their interpretation as a non-parametric representation of unobserved 
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heterogeneity is the same as in the DCE analysis.  For example, a linear pooled 
or unobserved effects latent class model can be defined as: 
      = [             ∙   (    (9.5) 
Where       is the expected value for individual i at time t, conditional on 
membership in class c, [              is a linear model, and   (    is the 
probability of class membership as given previously in equation 8.4 (Magidson & 
Vermunt 2004).  A latent class approach can also be extended to a single-
bounded tobit model (Brown et al. 2010), but it is currently incompatible with a 
the double-bounded tobit model. 
The dependent variable in each of the different models was the difference 
in the budget allocation between program A and B, and the parameters were 
based on the relative differences in attribute levels.  The simplest value function 
was an additive linear main effects differences specification of the form  =
                                                       , 
where   was the alternative-specific constant associated with alternative B, ΔLYg 
was the difference in individual life years gained with treatment between the two 
alternatives presented to individual i in task t, ΔAge was the difference in age, 
ΔU0 was the difference in initial utility, ΔLE0 was the difference in life 
expectancy without treatment, ΔU1 was the difference in utility with/after 
treatment, and ΔnPats was the difference in total number patients that could be 
treated if 100 percent of the budget was allocated to that alternative.  All 
differences were calculated as the level in alternative B less the level in 
alternative A, and the age and number of patients treated parameters were 
divided by 10 and 1000, respectively, to re-scale them to a magnitude more 
comparable with the other parameters in order to improve the chances of model 
convergence (Long 1997).   
An interaction term, interacting the differences in initial and final utility 
between the two alternative patient groups, was defined as (1+ΔU0)(1-ΔU1) and 
was included in more complex versions of the value function to account for 
relative differences in quality gain.  As the relationship between these terms is 
not immediately intuitive, the range of possible parameter values for this 
interaction term is shown Table 9.1.  
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Table 9.1: Initial and final health state differences interaction values 
 ΔU1B-A -0.8 -0.4 0 0.4 0.8 
ΔU0B-A 
                1-ΔU1B-
A 
1+ΔU0B-A 
0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 
-0.8 1.8 0.36 1.08 1.80 2.52 3.24 
-0.4 1.4 0.28 0.84 1.40 1.96 2.52 
0 1.0 0.20 0.60 1.00 1.40 1.80 
0.4 0.6 0.12 0.36 0.60 0.84 1.08 
0.8 0.2 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.36 
 
The value of the interaction term is maximised when moving from an 
initial health state where there is a large negative difference for patient group B 
relative to group A (e.g. U0A=0.9, U0B=0.1; ΔU0B-A=-0.8), to a final health state 
where there is a large positive difference between the two patient groups (e.g. 
U1A=0.1, U1B=0.9; ΔU1B-A=0.8).  In other words, situations where patient group 
B moves from a much worse initial health state to a much better final health state 
relative to patient group A, and thus gains relatively more quality.  The 
multiplicative interaction avoids collinearity with the main effects, while the 
(1+ΔU0) and (1-ΔU1) terms ensure that relatively more weight is given to the 
worst and best initial and final health states, respectively.  An alternative value 
function interacted main effects differences with differences in life year gains, 
weighting the utility associated with differences in specific attributes by the 
difference in life year gains, consistent with the approach taken by Norman et al. 
(2013). 
The analysis adopted a broadly inclusive significance threshold of 0.10 
and parameter p-values were not adjusted for multiple comparisons.  Robust 
standard errors for coefficient estimates were calculated using the ‘sandwich 
estimator’ (Freedman 2006).  The econometric specification tests were 
conducted with R 2.15.3 using the plm, lmtest and nortest packages, and the 
models were estimated using LIMDEP 9.0/NLOGIT 4.0. 
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9.2 Estimating welfare effects 
As in the DCE analysis, welfare effects were estimated in terms of 
compensating variation in the context of a ‘state of the world’ model (Small & 
Rosen 1981; Ryan 2004; Silva 2004): 
    :    =
 
     
[         
(9.6) 
The numeraire,      , was the marginal utility of an additional individual life 
year gained relative to a comparator, and Δv0 and Δv1 represented the net 
difference in utility before and after a change in one or more attribute levels, 
respectively.  Consistent with the interpretation of the CSPC attributes and 
budget allocations as relative to some comparator, the net utilities are also 
calculated relative to an implicit comparator.  This implicit comparator, though, 
can be assumed to be identical to the initial state of the scenario under 
consideration – that is, before any changes in attribute levels – without affecting 
the interpretation.  In this case, the difference in utility between the initial 
scenario and its implicit comparator (Δv0) can be assumed to be zero, and Δv1 
represents the net change in utility relative to that original state.  A negative CV 
implies a move to a more preferred level (a positive welfare effect), and a positive 
CV implies a move to a less preferred level (a negative welfare effect). 
9.2.1 Public vs. agent preferences 
A secondary objective of the analysis was to test for heterogeneity 
between the preferences of self-identified agents and those of the general public.  
Differences between general public and agent preferences were estimated based 
on the same model used in the overall analysis, but the value function included 
an interaction between each parameter and a flag indicating whether or not the 
respondent self-identified as an agent.  If the interactions between specific 
attributes and agent status were found to be significant, the difference in 
compensating variation between the general population and agents would be 
calculated and taken as significant if the 95 percent confidence interval around 
the difference in CV between agents and the general public did not cross zero. 
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9.3 Scenario rankings 
The CSPC scenarios were ranked by their expected net utility to provide a 
more holistic sense of the relative attractiveness of each scenario, allowing 
different attribute levels to vary simultaneously.  The predicted net utility of each 
choice scenario was calculated by weighting the differences in attribute levels 
between a particular scenario and a reference scenario with all attributes at their 
middle level, by the coefficients from the identified regression model.  Note that 
this reference scenario was the same one that was used to calculate relative 
choice probabilities in the DCE scenario rankings, and that it was not actually 
presented to respondents.  Positive relative utility would indicate a scenario was 
more preferred than the reference scenario, while negative relative utility would 
indicate a scenario was less preferred than the reference scenario.  Unlike the 
DCE analysis, choice probabilities were not calculated as linear models are not 
consistent with the estimation of choice probabilities. 
Spearman’s rho was also calculated to provide a sense of the strength and 
direction of association between each choice scenario’s attribute differences and 
its relative ranking.  The scenarios were ranked by descending utility, so a 
negative correlation coefficient implies that the relative rank of a scenario 
improved as an attribute level or difference increased, while a positive 
correlation coefficient implies that relative rank worsened as an attribute level or 
difference increased.  The CSPC rank and the DCE rank for the same scenario 
were also compared on the basis of Spearman’s rho. 
9.4 Distributional preferences 
Given the attributes included in each CSPC task, respondents could 
express a preference for maximising or equalising resources (budget allocations), 
access (number of patients treated) or outcomes (aggregate QALYs gained).  
Respondents were classified as strict maximisers if they allocated 100 percent of 
the budget to one program or the other in each of their choice tasks, and strict 
equalisers if they chose a 50-50 budget allocation in each of their choice tasks.  
Respondents could also be classified as equalisers if they chose to equalise the 
number of patients treated or aggregated QALYs gained in each choice task.  As 
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respondents could only allocate the budget by iterations of 1 percent it was 
usually not possible to equalise precisely patients or QALYs, so these attributes 
were taken as equalised if the budget was within 2 percent of the allocation that 
would precisely equalise patients treated or QALYs gained.15  
In order to distinguish between respondents who saw no difference in the 
latent utility and were indifferent between alternatives from those who had a 
strong preference for equality, respondents were only classified as strict 
equalisers if they also rated distributional concerns as the most important factor 
in their decisions.  The mean number of tasks equalised or maximised by agents 
and the general public were also compared using t-tests, as were the mean 
number of responses that equalised the number of patients treated or the number 
of QALYs gained.  The t-tests were conducted using R 2.15.3 (R Core Team 
2013). 
9.5 Comparison of DCE and CSPC welfare estimates 
The CSPC allocations were modelled using a linear model, but the DCE 
choices were modelled using a non-linear multinomial logit.  As such, any 
observed differences in welfare effects from the two models may reflect, in part, 
differences in the underlying models assumptions.  To test more directly the 
effect of questionnaire format on the derived estimates of marginal utility and 
welfare, the CSPC responses were transformed to discrete choices on the basis of 
which alternative was allocated the majority of the budget and modelled using a 
multinomial logit comparable to the primary DCE model, including a latent 
class approach if appropriate.  Equal CSPC budget allocations were excluded 
from the analysis as they did not prioritise either alternative, but this meant that 
some valid choice data was discarded.  Please refer to section 8.2 for more details 
on the modelling approach used in the DCE analysis.   
The equivalence of the attribute coefficients and CV estimates derived 
from the DCE and CSPC formats for each attribute were tested using a t-test, 
                                                 
15 The precise patient- and QALY-equalising budget allocations were calculated as the attribute 
level in alternative A divided by the sum of the attribute levels in alternative A and B: 
nPatsA/( nPatsA+ nPatsB) and QALYsA/( QALYsA+ QALYsB), respectively. 
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dividing the difference in the estimates from the two choice models by the 
difference in their standard errors, as per Potoglou (2011).  Statistically 
insignificant results would support the notion of procedural invariance between 
the two formats, while a significant result may suggest that the elicitation format 
had a systematic influence on preferences (Carson et al. 1994; Oliver 2013). 
9.6 CSPC Results 
Chow’s F-test of the poolability of the CSPC data rejected the null 
hypothesis of stable parameters (p<0.001), suggesting an unobserved effects 
model.  This was supported by Wooldridge's test, which rejected the null 
hypothesis of no unobserved effects (p<0.001).  The Hausman test did not reject 
a random effects specification (p=0.99), while Honda’s Lagrange multiplier tests 
for individual, time and two-way effects rejected the null hypotheses of no 
significant effects (p<0.001 in all three tests), supporting a two-way random 
effects specification.  Finally, a histogram of the CSPC budget allocations, 
Figure 9.1: Primary CSPC budget allocations 
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shown in Figure 9.1, appeared to confirm censoring in the dependent variable, 
given distinct clusters at the upper (100% of the budget to Program B) and lower 
(0% of the budget to Program B) bounds of the budget allocations.  In light of 
this possible clustering, as well as the interpretation of the budget differences as a 
bounded representation of the differences in latent utility, a tobit was felt to be a 
theoretically appropriate statistical model for the CSPC responses. 
The Breusch-Pagan test did not reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity in the tobit error terms (p=0.18), but the Anderson-Darling test 
did reject the assumption of normally distributed errors (p<0.001).  On this basis, 
as well as the 
specification tests 
suggesting significant 
individual and time 
effects, one and two-
way random effects 
linear models were 
specified.  However, as 
shown in Figure 9.2, 
the tobit residuals 
appeared very close to 
normally distributed, 
so a tobit specification 
was also tested.  
Comparisons of the 
goodness of fit of these different models and value function specifications are 
presented in Appendix 9.1, ordered by improving information criteria. 
The initial model was a one-way random effects linear model with 
continuous main effects differences, analogous to the value function specified for 
the experimental design.  Despite significant two-way effects in the econometric 
specification tests, a two-way random effects linear model did not find a positive 
time effect and did not converge, and was excluded from further comparisons.  
Interacting the difference in individual life years gained with the other main 
effects improved the fit of the linear model by AICc and BIC, while a 
Figure 9.2: Pooled tobit residuals 
Figure shows a histogram of the pooled tobit residuals with an overlaid 
normal distribution.  
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parsimonious version of this model, excluding parameters that were insignificant 
at a 0.10 threshold, further improved fit by BIC.  A latent class linear model 
based on full and parsimonious versions of this value function did not converge, 
nor did a random effects double-bounded tobit.  A pooled double-bounded tobit 
with main effects and life year gain interactions improved model fit over the 
parsimonious linear model, and a parsimonious version of this value function 
offered the best fit by log-likelihood, AICc and BIC.  The coefficients from this 
parsimonious double-bounded tobit model are shown in Appendix 9.2. 
The alternative specific constant in the model was statistically significant, 
implying a preference for alternative B (the right-hand side of the choice task) 
independent of attribute levels.  The relatively large size of this constant may 
reflect confounding with the initial and final health state interaction term, as 
when these differences are zero, the coefficient on the interaction term will be 
perfectly confounded with the constant (i.e. β0 + β1[1-ΔU0]×[1+ΔU1] = β0 + 
β1[1]×[1] = β0 + β1).    
The other attribute coefficients represented the marginal change in the 
utility of alternative B relative to alternative A, given a marginal change in the 
continuous attribute level.  A positive coefficient indicated that the utility of 
alternative B increased relative to alternative A as the difference in the level of 
attribute x in alternative B increased relative to its level in alternative A (i.e. 
respondents preferred a higher level of x).  A negative coefficient indicated that 
relative utility decreased as the relative difference in x increased (i.e. respondents 
preferred a lower level of x).  Note that the very large coefficients on the 
difference in initial and final health states reflect in part the 0-1 scale of those 
parameters and represent the marginal utility associated with, in effect, the 
difference in moving from a state equivalent to dead (0.0) to perfect health (1.0).  
The large and negative coefficient on the initial and final health states interaction 
term, the value of which increases with a relative gain in quality, would also tend 
to offset the marginal impact of final health state.  The coefficient on the number 
of patients treated was not significant, but the continuous interaction between 
life years gained and the number of patients treated was significant and negative, 
suggesting diminishing returns to aggregate life years gained. 
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9.6.1 Compensating variations 
Attributes with statistically significant compensating variations are 
detailed in Table 9.2 and illustrated in Figure 9.3.  As in the DCE analysis, a 
negative CV indicated a positive welfare effect, and a positive CV indicated a 
negative welfare effect.  CVs were estimated for an upward change in attribute 
level relative to a fixed comparator, holding all other differences at zero, but 
given the linear specification of the value function, CV is necessarily the same for 
an upward or a downward change; the sign simply reverses for a downward 
change.  This is in contrast to the non-linear, dummy-coded DCE parameters 
where CV was potentially different for an upward or downward change from the 
baseline attribute levels.   
Table 9.2: CSPC compensating variations by attribute differences 
Attribute difference CV Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI Adj. p-value Sig 
CV, patient age +30 4.49 3.77 5.20 <0.001 *** 
CV, initial health state 
+0.4 
1.65 1.17 2.13 <0.001 *** 
CV, final health state +0.4 -5.43 -6.19 -4.67 <0.001 *** 
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
CV=compensating variation; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval.  CVs are shown for an increase in the 
difference between attributes, setting all other attributes differences to zero.   
 
The results suggested that there were positive welfare effects associated 
with prioritising patient groups that would finish treatment in better final health 
states, and negative welfare effects associated with prioritising older patient 
groups or those in better initial health states.  There was no statistically 
significant effect associated with initial life expectancy or, notably, the potential 
number of patients treated.  This was in contrast to the pilot survey where CSPC 
respondents gave substantial weight to the number of patients treated. 
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9.6.2 Marginal effects 
As mentioned above, the tobit coefficients were assumed to represent the 
marginal change in latent utility given a 1-unit change in the difference between 
attribute levels, consistent with a random utility theory of choice.  However, as 
Long (1997) notes, some researchers are uncomfortable with regarding observed 
data as a manifestation of a latent process.  To directly relate the effect of a 
change in x to the observed difference in the budget allocation y – not the latent 
outcome y* – it is necessary to weight the marginal utility, βx, by the probability 
of y being censored for a given level x (Long 1997).  The marginal effects shown 
Figure 9.3: CSPC compensating variations by attribute 
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in Table 9.3 represent the expected change in the observed budget difference given 
a 1-unit change in the in the difference in attribute levels, calculated at the mean 
attribute differences.   
Table 9.3: CSPC double-bounded tobit marginal effects 
Attribute 
Marginal 
effect 
Std err ME/Std err p-value Sig Mean(Δx) 
Constant 22.65 5.27 4.30 <0.001 ***  
Δ Life years gained 2.92 0.19 15.76 <0.001 *** 0.48 
Δ Patient age / 10 -4.37 0.32 -13.45 <0.001 *** 2.10 
Δ Initial health state -37.14 6.88 -5.40 <0.001 *** 0.12 
Δ Final health state 64.74 7.45 8.69 <0.001 *** 0.14 
ΔAge:ΔLYg -0.33 0.04 -7.61 <0.001 *** 4.13 
ΔU1:ΔLYg 2.99 0.51 5.90 <0.001 *** -0.21 
ΔnPats:ΔLYg -0.35 0.04 -8.51 <0.001 *** -0.49 
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) -25.10 5.61 -4.47 <0.001 *** 0.95 
       
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
 
These marginal effects are very similar to the coefficients reported in 
Appendix 9.2, but as the interpretation of marginal effects is limited to relating 
the change in the observed budget allocation given a change in attribute 
differences, they are largely inconsistent with an understanding of compensating 
variation as an equalising change in utility.  As such, compensating variations 
based on these marginal effects were not calculated. 
9.6.3 Public vs. agent preferences 
Differences between general public and agent preferences were estimated 
using a pooled double-bounded tobit model with clustering, as in the combined 
analysis.  Alternative value function specifications, ranked by information 
criteria, are shown in Appendix 9.3.  The results of the specification with the best 
fit by AICc and BIC are shown in Appendix 9.4.   
All of the attribute-agent interactions were insignificant, even at a 0.10 
threshold, suggesting no substantial difference between agent and public 
preferences.  The interaction between the difference in age and agent status was 
significant at a 0.10 threshold in less parsimonious versions of the value function, 
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but this interaction was not significant in the final value function.  However, 
given its significance in less parsimonious versions of the value function, the 
compensating variation and 95 percent confidence intervals associated with a 
change in age were estimated for agents and the general public.  Both groups had 
positive and statistically significant CVs (negative welfare effects) associated with 
a 30-year increase in the difference in age: CV was 4.58 (95% CI: 3.85, 5.32) for 
the general public and 5.71 (95% CI: 4.04, 7.39) for agents.  This was suggestive 
of a slightly stronger preference among agents than the general public for treating 
younger patients, but the difference was not significant at a 0.05 threshold 
(ΔCV= 1.13; 95% CI: -0.22, 2.48). 
9.6.4 Scenario rankings 
The utility of each choice scenario, relative to a hypothetical scenario 
with all attributes at their middle level, is shown in Table 9.4.  This table presents 
the same 38 choice scenarios that were presented in the DCE ranking of 
scenarios in Table 8.4, but rather than absolute attribute levels as in the DCE 
analysis, each scenario here is presented in terms of attribute differences relative 
to the reference scenario.  A negative difference indicates that the attribute level 
in a particular scenario was lower than in the reference scenario, while a positive 
difference indicates that the attribute level was higher than in the reference 
scenario.   
The correlation between each attribute and the overall rank of the 
scenario is also shown.  The scenarios were ranked by descending relative utility, 
so a negative correlation coefficient indicates that the relative rank of a scenario 
improved if the difference in an attribute was positive, while a positive 
correlation coefficient indicates that relative rank worsened if the difference was 
positive.  For comparison purposes, the DCE rank for the same scenario is also 
shown, along with the correlation between CSPC and DCE rank. 
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Table 9.4: CSPC scenario rankings by predicted difference in utility 
CSPC 
Rank 
DCE 
Rank 
ΔAge ΔU0 ΔLE ΔU1 ΔLYg ΔnPats 
ΔInd 
QALYs 
ΔAgg 
QALYs 
ΔUtility 
1 7 -30 0 0 0.4 5 -2400 8.50 -5,150 60.73 
2 5 -30 -0.4 -4.917 0 5 -2400 2.53 -5,747 42.36 
3 2 0 -0.4 -4.917 0.4 5 0 6.57 16,416 37.54 
3 2 0 -0.4 -4.917 0.4 5 0 6.57 16,416 37.54 
5 1 -30 0 0 0 5 2500 2.50 18,750 27.91 
6 23 -30 0.4 0 0.4 0 -2400 2.00 -5,800 27.74 
6 25 -30 0.4 0 0.4 0 0 2.00 5,000 27.74 
8 4 -30 -0.4 5 0 0 -2400 4.00 -5,600 16.69 
9 15 0 0 5 0.4 0 -2400 6.00 -5,400 14.47 
10 10 0 0 5 0 5 0 2.50 6,250 13.12 
11 8 30 0 0 0.4 5 2500 8.50 48,750 12.44 
12 29 30 0.4 5 0.4 5 2500 6.50 38,750 11.58 
13 18 -30 0.4 -4.917 0.4 -4 2500 -1.60 -1,750 9.44 
14 20 -30 0 -4.917 -0.4 5 0 -1.53 -3,833 9.07 
15 11 -30 0 -4.917 -0.4 5 2500 -1.53 -1,416 4.35 
16 22 -30 -0.4 5 -0.4 0 0 -2.00 -5,000 3.92 
17 19 0 0.4 -4.917 0 5 2500 2.47 18,584 3.20 
18 28 0 -0.4 -4.917 0 0 0 0.03 83 2.56 
19 12 30 -0.4 -4.917 0.4 0 2500 2.07 16,582 1.19 
Ref Ref 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.64 
20 9 0 0 5 0 0 2500 0.00 6,250 -2.64 
21 26 0 0 0 0.4 -4 0 0.40 1,000 -3.31 
22 6 -30 0 5 0 -4 0 -2.00 -5,000 -5.41 
23 13 0 -0.4 5 -0.4 5 2500 -1.50 -1,250 -5.64 
24 16 0 -0.4 0 0 -4 2500 0.00 6,250 -6.27 
25 32 0 0.4 5 0.4 -4 -2400 -1.60 -6,160 -7.80 
26 30 -30 -0.4 5 -0.4 -4 0 -2.40 -6,000 -7.83 
27 23 30 -0.4 0 0 0 0 2.00 5,000 -11.58 
28 21 30 0.4 5 0 5 0 -1.50 -3,750 -11.60 
29 14 -30 0 -4.917 -0.4 -4 2500 -2.43 -5,916 -13.58 
30 37 0 -0.4 -4.917 0 -4 -2400 -1.97 -6,197 -13.68 
31 17 30 -0.4 0 -0.4 5 -2400 -1.50 -6,150 -15.90 
32 35 30 0 5 0.4 -4 -2400 2.40 -5,760 -16.76 
33 34 30 0 -4.917 0 0 -2400 0.00 -6,000 -16.78 
34 33 0 0 -4.917 -0.4 0 -2400 -2.03 -6,203 -19.75 
35 36 0 0.4 -4.917 0 -4 0 -2.03 -5,083 -20.44 
36 38 0 -0.4 0 -0.4 -4 -2400 -2.40 -6,240 -21.29 
37 31 30 -0.4 5 -0.4 0 2500 -2.00 -3,750 -24.36 
38 27 0 0.4 -4.917 -0.4 0 0 -2.07 -5,166 -29.28 
           
Corr. 0.71 0.46 -0.02 0.01 -0.53 -0.52 -0.07 -0.75 -0.48  
Difference in predicted utility between each choice scenario and a hypothetical reference scenario with all 
attributes set to their middle level.  DCE rank=rank of same scenario in DCE scenario ranking; 
ΔAge=difference in patient age; ΔU0=difference in initial health state; ΔLE=difference in initial life 
expectancy; ΔU1=difference in final health state; ΔnPats=difference in potential patients treated; 
ΔLYg=difference in individual life years gained; ΔInd QALYs=difference in QALYs gained per patient; ΔAgg 
QALYs=Difference in aggregate QALYs by group.  Corr=Correlation between CSPC rank and attribute 
difference.  The reference scenario is shown in bold.  The negative relative utility of the reference scenario 
reflects the significant alternative-specific constant. 
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The single strongest rank-attribute correlation was with individual QALY 
gains (ρ=-0.75), where the strong negative correlation indicated that as 
individual QALYs gained increased relative to the reference scenario, so did the 
rank of that scenario.  Each of the top 10 scenarios had positive and relatively 
large individual QALY gains, while 9 of the bottom 10 scenarios had zero or 
negative individual QALY gains.  Interestingly though, 5 of the top 10 scenarios 
had negative aggregate QALY differences, as larger individual QALY gains 
accrued to fewer patients than in the reference scenario, and the two scenarios 
with the largest relative aggregate QALY gains were ranked outside of the top 
10.  Final health state was the attribute next most strongly correlated with rank, 
followed by individual life year gains.  The number of patients treated attribute 
had only a very weak association with relative rank.  Together these correlations 
suggested that CSPC respondents emphasised individual over aggregate gains.  
As in the DCE rankings, age also had a relatively strong association with rank.  
None of the top 10 scenarios prioritised patients older than the reference 
scenario, while the patients in 4 of the bottom 10 scenarios – and 6 of the bottom 
12 – were older than those in the reference scenario.  Severity, either in terms of 
initial health state or initial life expectancy, had no meaningful impact on the 
rankings.   
Overall, the relative rankings were closely correlated with those from the 
DCE (ρ=0.71), although there were a few notable disagreements.  Most 
apparently, the two scenarios tied at CSPC rank 6 were ranked much less 
favourably in the DCE.  These scenarios involved patients in a relatively good 
initial health state, and the discordance appeared to stem from an indifference to 
initial health state in the CSPC and a relatively strong aversion to patients in the 
best initial health state in the DCE.  Similarly, the CSPC had much stronger 
associations between relative rank and final health state and individual QALY 
gains than the DCE. 
Given the strong association between age and the relative rankings, the 
scenarios are re-presented in Table 9.5 controlling for the relative difference in 
age.  These results show even more clearly the association between rank and 
individual QALY gains.  The largest net individual QALY gains were 
consistently ranked at the top of each age category, and relative rank declined in 
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lockstep with individual QALY gains.  They also reinforce the importance of age 
in the relative rankings.  Six of the top 10 scenarios were associated with 
relatively younger patient groups, while none of the scenarios with relatively 
older patients were among the top 10, including the scenario with the largest net 
individual and aggregate QALY gains (#11 overall), and the scenario with the 
second largest aggregate QALY gains (#12 overall). 
Table 9.5: CSPC scenario rankings controlling for relative age 
Rank 
within 
ΔAge 
Overall 
rank 
ΔAge ΔU0 ΔLE ΔU1 ΔLYg ΔnPats 
ΔInd 
QALYs 
ΔAgg 
QALYs 
ΔUtility 
ΔAge = -30 
1 1 -30 0 0 0.4 5 -2400 8.50 -5,150 60.73 
2 2 -30 -0.4 -4.917 0 5 -2400 2.53 -5,747 42.36 
3 5 -30 0 0 0 5 2500 2.50 18,750 27.91 
4 6 -30 0.4 0 0.4 0 -2400 2.00 -5,800 27.74 
5 6 -30 0.4 0 0.4 0 0 2.00 5,000 27.74 
6 8 -30 -0.4 5 0 0 -2400 4.00 -5,600 16.69 
7 13 -30 0.4 -4.917 0.4 -4 2500 -1.60 -1,750 9.44 
8 14 -30 0 -4.917 -0.4 5 0 -1.53 -3,833 9.07 
9 15 -30 0 -4.917 -0.4 5 2500 -1.53 -1,416 4.35 
10 16 -30 -0.4 5 -0.4 0 0 -2.00 -5,000 3.92 
11 23 -30 0 5 0 -4 0 -2.00 -5,000 -5.41 
12 27 -30 -0.4 5 -0.4 -4 0 -2.40 -6,000 -7.83 
13 30 -30 0 -4.917 -0.4 -4 2500 -2.43 -5,916 -13.58 
ΔAge = 0 
1 3 0 -0.4 -4.917 0.4 5 0 6.57 16,416 37.54 
2 3 0 -0.4 -4.917 0.4 5 0 6.57 16,416 37.54 
3 9 0 0 5 0.4 0 -2400 6.00 -5,400 14.47 
4 10 0 0 5 0 5 0 2.50 6,250 13.12 
5 17 0 0.4 -4.917 0 5 2500 2.47 18,584 3.20 
6 18 0 -0.4 -4.917 0 0 0 0.03 83 2.56 
Ref Ref 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 -2.64 
7 20 0 0 5 0 0 2500 0.00 6,250 -2.64 
8 22 0 0 0 0.4 -4 0 0.40 1,000 -3.31 
9 24 0 -0.4 5 -0.4 5 2500 -1.50 -1,250 -5.64 
10 25 0 -0.4 0 0 -4 2500 0.00 6,250 -6.27 
11 26 0 0.4 5 0.4 -4 -2400 -1.60 -6,160 -7.80 
12 31 0 -0.4 -4.917 0 -4 -2400 -1.97 -6,197 -13.68 
13 35 0 0 -4.917 -0.4 0 -2400 -2.03 -6,203 -19.75 
14 36 0 0.4 -4.917 0 -4 0 -2.03 -5,083 -20.44 
15 37 0 -0.4 0 -0.4 -4 -2400 -2.40 -6,240 -21.29 
16 39 0 0.4 -4.917 -0.4 0 0 -2.07 -5,166 -29.28 
ΔAge = +30 
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1 11 30 0 0 0.4 5 2500 8.50 48,750 12.44 
2 12 30 0.4 5 0.4 5 2500 6.50 38,750 11.58 
3 19 30 -0.4 -4.917 0.4 0 2500 2.07 16,582 1.19 
4 28 30 -0.4 0 0 0 0 2.00 5,000 -11.58 
5 29 30 0.4 5 0 5 0 -1.50 -3,750 -11.60 
6 32 30 -0.4 0 -0.4 5 -2400 -1.50 -6,150 -15.90 
7 33 30 0 5 0.4 -4 -2400 2.40 -5,760 -16.76 
8 34 30 0 -4.917 0 0 -2400 0.00 -6,000 -16.78 
9 38 30 -0.4 5 -0.4 0 2500 -2.00 -3,750 -24.36 
Difference in predicted utility between each choice scenario and a hypothetical reference scenario with all 
attributes set to their middle level, grouped by relative difference in age.  DCE rank=rank of same scenario 
in DCE analysis; ΔAge=difference in patient age; ΔU0=difference in initial health state; ΔLE=difference in 
initial life expectancy; ΔU1=difference in final health state; ΔnPats=difference in potential patients treated; 
ΔLYg=difference in individual life years gained; ΔInd QALYs=difference in QALYs gained per patient; ΔAgg 
QALYs=Difference in aggregate QALYs by group.  The reference scenario is shown in bold. 
The rankings were also stratified by initial life expectancy to explore the 
relationship with life years gained (not shown).  As was observed in the DCE 
rankings, scenarios with relatively greater individual life year gains were 
consistently ranked more favourably in scenarios with relatively shorter life 
expectancies, while there was no clear pattern in scenarios with relatively greater 
life expectancy.  This appeared contrary to Harris’ (1985) argument that the 
duration of benefit should be immaterial to prioritising decisions on the grounds 
that an individual with a short life expectancy may place the same value on their 
remaining time as an individual with a much longer life expectancy.  If Harris’ 
argument held, one would expect the observed pattern to be reversed, with 
respondents indifferent to the duration of benefit in patients with the shortest 
initial life expectancy.  This somewhat counter-intuitive result, though, may 
reflect diminishing returns to life year gains in patients with relatively longer 
initial life expectancies.   
9.6.5 Distributional preferences 
Although the modal CSPC response (12% of all CSPC tasks) was an 
equal budget allocation to each program (zero budget difference), only 8 of 658 
CSPC respondents (1.2%, excluding the 4 respondents deemed non-informative), 
all from the general population sample, equalised budgets between the two 
alternatives in every choice task.  Likewise, even though the second most 
frequent response (9% of all CSPC tasks) was a maximum budget allocation to 
one program or the other (+100 or -100 budget difference), no CSPC respondents 
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maximised budgets in every task.  The distribution of respondents by the number 
of tasks equalised or maximised (excluding the repeated task) is shown in Table 
9.6. 
Table 9.6: Respondents by the number of tasks equalising or maximising the budget 
allocation 
 Respondents equalising budgets Respondents maximising budgets 
Tasks Agents Public Combined Agents Public Combined 
0 30 (52.6%) 
288 
(47.9%) 
318 (48.3%) 49 (86.0%) 
475 
(79.0%) 
524 (79.6%) 
1 14 (24.6%) 
153 
(25.5%) 
167 (25.4%) 4 (7.0%) 80 (13.3%) 84 (12.8%) 
2 9 (15.8%) 78 (13.0%) 87 (13.2%) 2 (3.5%) 28 (4.7%) 30 (4.6%) 
3 1 (1.8%) 31 (5.2%) 32 (4.9%) 1 (1.8%) 8 (1.3%) 9 (1.4%) 
4 3 (5.3%) 20 (3.3%) 23 (3.5%) 1 (1.8%) 3 (0.5%) 4 (0.6%) 
5 0 (0.0%) 9 (1.5%) 9 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (0.8%) 5 (0.8%) 
6 0 (0.0%) 4 (0.7%) 4 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 2 (0.3%) 
7 0 (0.0%) 3 (0.5%) 3 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
8 0 (0.0%) 3 (0.5%) 3 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
9 0 (0.0%) 4 (0.7%) 4 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
10 0 (0.0%) 8 (1.3%) 8 (1.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Total 57 (8.7%) 
601 
(91.3%) 
658 (100.0%) 57 (8.7%) 
601 
(91.3%) 
658 (100.0%) 
Mean 
tasks 
equal. 
or max. 
0.82 1.18 1.15 0.26 0.35 0.34 
p-value 0.03  0.43  
Excludes 4 general public respondents who did not move the slider in any of their choices and finished the 
questionnaire in less than one-half the median completion time.  
 
The table shows that neither maximising nor equalising strategies were 
particularly common among respondents: 48 percent of respondents did not 
equalise budgets in any tasks, and 80 percent of respondents did not maximise 
budgets in any tasks.  Overall, the average respondent equalised 1.15 tasks and 
maximised 0.34 tasks.  Agents had a significantly lower mean number of tasks 
equalised than the general population sample, but there was no significant 
difference in the number of tasks maximised.  Respondents who somewhat or 
strongly disagreed with an inevitable need for rationing in healthcare appeared to 
equalise slightly but significantly more tasks than respondents who somewhat or 
strongly agreed (1.48 vs. 1.07, p=0.04), but there was no significant difference in 
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the number of tasks maximised (p=0.58).  Only 2 of the 8 strict equalising 
respondents also rated distributional concerns as the most important factor in 
their decisions, but 4 of the 8 equalisers had a completion time less than half of 
the median CSPC completion time.  It is not clear, though, whether an 
egalitarian preference may have simplified the CSPC tasks and led to faster 
completion times, or whether equalisation may have been adopted as a 
simplifying heuristic to complete the tasks more quickly.   
The equalising and maximising behaviours observed here were 
substantially different than observed by Schwappach (2003) in a similar CSPC in 
a German setting.  He reported that 11 percent of all respondents equalised 
budget allocations in every task, compared to 1 percent here, and only 3 percent 
of all allocations maximised the budget to one program or the other, compared 
to 9 percent here.  As in the pilot survey, these low rates suggest that respondents 
were not using equal budget allocations to avoid making difficult allocation 
choices. 
In addition to equalising budgets, CSPC respondents could also allocate 
the budget in each task so as to equalise the number of patients treated or the 
aggregate QALYs gained between the two alternatives.  The distribution of 
respondents by the number of tasks where patients or QALYs were equalised 
(excluding the repeated task) is shown in Table 9.7. 
Table 9.7: Respondents by the number of tasks equalising patients treated or QALYs 
gained 
 Respondents equalising patients treated Respondents equalising QALYs gained 
Tasks Agents Public Combined Agents Public Combined 
0 41 (71.9%) 350 (58.2%) 391 (59.4%) 41 (71.9%) 440 (73.2%) 481 (73.1%) 
1 12 (21.1%) 185 (30.8%) 197 (29.9%) 11 (19.3%) 130 (21.6%) 141 (21.4%) 
2 3 (5.3%) 48 (8.0%) 51 (7.8%) 4 (7.0%) 27 (4.5%) 31 (4.7%) 
3 1 (1.8%) 15 (2.5%) 16 (2.4%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 2 (0.3%) 
4 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 2 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.2%) 1 (0.2%) 
5 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.2%) 1 (0.2%) 1 (1.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.2%) 
6 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
7 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
8 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
9 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.2%) 1 (0.2%) 
10 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
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Total 57 (8.7%) 601 (91.3%) 658 (100%) 57 (8.7%) 601 (91.3%) 658 (100%) 
Mean tasks 
with equal 
patients or 
QALYs 
0.37 0.56 0.55 0.42 0.34 0.34 
Adj.  
p-value 
0.14  0.39  
Tasks were classified as equalised if the budget allocation was within 2 percent of the precise equalising 
allocation.  Excludes 4 general public respondents who did not move the slider in any of their choices and 
finished the questionnaire in less than one-half the median completion time.   
Agents appeared slightly less likely than the general population sample to 
equalise patients in their budget allocations, but slightly more likely equalise 
QALYs.  However, neither difference was statistically significant (adjusted 
p=0.14 and 0.39, respectively), and the majority of respondents did not equalise 
patients treated or aggregate QALYs gained in any of their choices.  As noted, a 
task was classified as equalised if the budget was within 2 percent of the precise 
equalising allocation for either attribute.  This margin of error meant that the 
distribution shown in Table 9.7 may, if anything, slightly overstate the true 
proportion of equalised tasks. 
9.6.6 Comparison of preferences from the DCE and CSPC 
The transformed CSPC discrete choices, based on the alternative that was 
allocated the majority of the budget, were modelled using a latent class 
multinomial logit model.  Twelve percent of all CSPC responses assigned an 
equal 50-50 budget allocation and were excluded from this analysis as they did 
not prioritise either alternative.16  The initial value function was the same as used 
in the DCE analysis, and included continuous life years gained, dummy-coded 
main effects, a continuous interaction between initial and final health state, and 
continuous interactions between attribute main effects and individual life years 
gained.  A 2-class model with the full value function did not converge, but a 
more parsimonious specification, excluding less plausible interactions between 
life years gained and initial health state and initial life expectancy did converge.  
A third specification, excluding insignificant interactions between life years 
                                                 
16 It would also have been possible to randomly choose one of the two alternatives for each equal 
budget allocation, but it was felt that this may have misrepresented the preferences of 
respondents who explicitly preferred equality in resources, or who consciously ‘chose not to 
choose.’ 
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gained and age and patients treated further improved model fit by BIC.  All the 
remaining parameters in this specification were significant at a 0.10 threshold in 
at least one of the two latent classes.  A 3-class finite mixture model with the 
same parsimonious value function specification also converged, but had very 
large standard errors in one class and was rejected.  The results of the 
parsimonious 2-class model are shown in Appendix 9.5, along with the results 
from the 2-class DCE latent class model from the primary analysis, previously 
described in Chapter 8.   
T-tests comparing the DCE and CSPC latent class coefficients suggested 
that the differences between most of the coefficients in the two models were 
statistically significant at a 0.05 threshold, even after adjusting for multiple 
comparisons.  The most notable exception was the insignificant difference in the 
coefficients on both dummy-coded age parameters.  However, given interaction 
effects included in both models, it was difficult to predict differences in welfare 
effects based on differences in the coefficients alone.   
The differences in the compensating variations between the two 
questionnaire formats are illustrated in Figure 9.4, arranged by increasing 
absolute difference. 
 
Figure 9.4: CV differences by attribute change, DCE vs. CSPC 
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The figure suggested that there was considerable variation between the two 
formats, ranging from relatively small and statistically insignificant differences 
associated with a downward change in life expectancy or an upward change in 
initial health state, to much larger and statistically significant differences 
associated with upward changes in the number of patients treated and final 
health state.  The format-specific compensating variations and 95 percent 
confidence intervals, as well as the marginal utility of an additional individual 
life year, are shown in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8: Compensating variations and differences by attribute and questionnaire 
format 
Change 
DCE CV  
(95% CI) 
CSPC CV 
(95% CI) 
Difference  
(95% CI) 
Patient age, 40 → 10 
-4.36 
(-7.45, -1.26) 
-3.87 
(-5.08, -2.67) 
-0.48 
(-2.38, 1.41) 
Patient age, 40 → 70 
2.91 
(0.91, 4.91) 
4.29 
(2.87, 5.72) 
-1.38 
(-1.96, -0.81) 
Initial health state, 0.5 → 0.1 
-0.57 
(-1.63, 0.48) 
-1.67 
(-2.43, -0.91) 
1.10 
(0.81, 1.39) 
Initial health state, 0.5 → 0.9 
1.41 
(-0.55, 3.36) 
1.65 
(0.58, 2.72) 
-0.24 
(-1.13, 0.65) 
Life expectancy, 5yrs → 1mon 
3.57 
(1.82, 5.32) 
3.79 
(2.49, 5.08) 
-0.22 
(-0.68, 0.24) 
Life expectancy, 5yrs → 10yrs 
-0.77 
(-1.3, -0.25) 
-0.30 
(-0.95, 0.36) 
-0.48 
(-0.34, -0.61) 
Final health state, 0.5 → 0.1 
2.88 
(1.34, 4.43) 
3.29 
(2.04, 4.54) 
-0.41 
(-0.7, -0.11) 
Final health state, 0.5 → 0.9 
0.71 
(-1.27, 2.69) 
-3.86 
(-4.99, -2.74) 
4.58 
(3.72, 5.43) 
Total patients treated, 2500 → 100 
-0.60 
(-2.03, 0.83) 
-0.01 
(-0.85, 0.84) 
-0.59 
(-1.18, -0.01) 
Total patients treated, 2500 → 5000 
-4.2 
(-6.55, -1.86) 
-2.25 
(-3.16, -1.34) 
-1.95 
(-3.39, -0.52) 
    
Marginal utility of 1 LY gained 
0.28 
(0.16, 0.40) 
0.12 
(0.08, 0.15) 
0.17 
(0.08, 0.25) 
95% CI=95% confidence interval.  Differences calculated as CSPC CV less DCE CV.  A negative CV indicates 
a positive welfare effect. 
Perhaps the single most notable difference was over final health state, 
where there was no significant welfare effect associated with prioritising patients 
that would finish treatment in the best final health state over those who would 
finish in a moderate final health state in the DCE, but a relatively strong and 
statistically significant positive effect in the CSPC.  Likewise, there was no 
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significant effect in the DCE associated with prioritising patients in the worst 
initial health state over those in a moderate state, but a significant positive effect 
in the CSPC.  Together these suggest a greater emphasis on quality improvement 
in the CSPC compared to the DCE.  In contrast, there was a significantly 
stronger welfare effect in the DCE associated with prioritising the largest patient 
group.  This was somewhat counter to expectations, as evidence from the pilot 
survey suggested the CSPC may have been more likely to emphasise the total 
number of patients treated as this attribute changed with the budget allocation.  
Based on the significant difference in the marginal utility of life year gains, 
respondents to the DCE also appeared to value an additional life year more 
highly than respondents to the CSPC.   
Interestingly, there were negative welfare effects associated with 
prioritising patients with the shortest initial life expectancy in both 
questionnaires.  This contradicts expectations from the empirical ethics review, 
and highlights a difference between the tobit and multinomial logit model 
results.  Initial life expectancy was insignificant in the linear tobit analysis, but 
the non-linear analysis of the transformed CSPC responses appeared to reveal a 
statistically significant effect.  It is important to recognise, however, that the 
transformed CSPC responses excluded equal budget allocations, so it not clear 
whether this was a true effect revealed by the non-linear analysis or simply an 
artefact of the subset of responses included in the analysis. 
9.7 Discussion of CSPC results 
The results of the primary tobit analysis of CSPC responses suggested that 
prioritising younger patients, those in worse initial health states, and those that 
would finish in better final health states, as well as those that would gain more 
individual life years, were associated with positive welfare effects.  There was no 
statistically significant effect over the range of life expectancy tested or, 
unexpectedly, over the potential number of patients treated.  This was in contrast 
to the pilot survey, where CSPC respondents gave substantial weight to the 
number of patients treated.  Based on this pilot result, it was hypothesised that 
CSPC respondents may have taken the fact that the number of patients treated 
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changed as they moved the budget slider as a cue to focus on this attribute, 
leading to a prominence effect.  The insignificance of the number of patients 
treated attribute, and the lack of any association between this attribute and the 
relative ranking of each CSPC scenario, appeared to discount this notion.  
Larger aggregate QALY gains were associated with more favourable rankings, 
but this association was not as strong as the association between rank and 
individual QALY gains, or between rank and individual life year gains.   
The proportional relationship between the relative budget and the number 
of patients treated in any alternative highlighted the fact that giving greater 
priority to one group meant that the other group must necessarily receive lower 
priority.  However, it may also have complicated the interpretation of this 
attribute by transforming it from an input parameter to an implicit response 
variable – relatively more patients were treated in alternatives that respondents 
preferred.  In this sense, allowing the number of patients treated attribute to 
change may have shifted the CSPC towards a form of a person trade-off (PTO) 
task.  It is not clear how the significance of the number of patients treated 
attribute might have changed if it had been held fixed.  In light of this possible 
shift in the interpretation of the CSPC, however, it may be informative to 
contrast the results here with the PTO approach reviewed in Chapter 3.  Both the 
CSPC and the PTO clearly highlight the inter-personal trade-offs inherent in 
healthcare priority setting, but it was argued that the CSPC may have an 
advantage in eliciting preferences over these trade-offs in a more intuitive, less 
discomforting manner.  This appeared to be supported by the results.  In contrast 
to the 91 percent of PTO respondents reported by Damschroder  (2007), and the 
32 percent reported by Nord (1995a), who refused to make any trade-offs 
between patient groups and set the person-equivalents equal, only 12 percent of 
all CSPC tasks equalised the budget allocations between alternatives, and only 1 
percent of all respondents equalised the budget allocation in every one of their 
choices.   
When the CSPC responses were transformed from linear differences to 
discrete choices, a negative and statistically significant welfare effect associated 
with prioritising patients with the shortest untreated life expectancy emerged, as 
did a positive and statistically significant effect associated with prioritising the 
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largest patient groups.  However, the strength of the effect around prioritising the 
largest patient group in the CSPC was still significantly less than the 
corresponding effect in the DCE.  Overall, CSPC respondents appeared to put 
significantly more weight on initial and final quality of life, while DCE 
respondents put significantly more weight on maximising the number of patients 
treated and individual life year gains, controlling for the level of the other 
attributes.  This result appears consistent with the characterisation of the DCE as 
a more competitive task, as these two attributes were easy to compare between 
alternatives in order to identify a ‘winning’ alternative.  Interestingly, this 
appears not only to contradict the idea of a prominence effect in the, but suggests 
that CSPC respondents were in fact less likely than DCE respondents to consider 
aggregate outcomes in their choices.   
The CSPC allowed respondents to express specific distributional 
preferences, including preferences for maximising resources and/or outcomes, or 
for the equality of resources (budget), opportunity (patients treated) or outcomes 
(QALYs gained).  As it was, however, only a handful of CSPC respondents 
expressed preferences for strict resource equality.  As was also noted in the 
discussion of the pilot elicitation in Chapter 5, the low incidence of egalitarian 
behaviour was surprising, as it was expected that respondents would view in 
equality in at least one of these aspects as a heuristic for a fair allocation.  
Furthermore, given the relatively high proportion of fast responders among these 
respondents, and the relatively low proportion of these respondents who also 
ranked distributional concerns as the most important factor in their choices, it is 
likely that at least some of the egalitarian responses were the result of a 
simplifying heuristic rather than a considered preference for equality.  It is not 
clear, though, whether an equalising decision rule may have led to fast 
completion times, or whether a desire to complete the questionnaire as quickly 
as possible may have led to an equalising decision rule.   
Agents were slightly but significantly less likely than the general 
population sample to equalise budget allocations, while respondents who 
disagreed within an inevitable need for healthcare rationing were significantly 
more likely to equalise budget allocations.  This likely reflects the underlying 
attitudes of the two groups: agents were more likely to agree with a need for 
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rationing, and therefore may have been somewhat more willing to prioritise 
specific patient groups, while those who disagreed were less willing to see one 
group advantaged relative to another in terms of resources allocated.  No 
respondents maximised the budget allocations to one group or the other in all 10 
choice tasks, perhaps reflecting a general aversion to extreme distributions in the 
allocation of societal resources suggested by Schwappach and Strasmann (2006), 
and consistent with the fairness principle of ‘everybody gets something and 
nobody gets nothing’ noted by Giacomini et al. (2012).   
The insignificance of the number of patients treated, combined with the 
relatively low rate of resource-equalising allocations, appeared to imply that 
CSPC respondents were not necessarily concerned with maximising aggregate 
gains or equalising resources between groups.  Rather, based on the results from 
the scenario rankings, they appeared more concerned with maximising 
individual QALY gains, particularly to those patients that would finish treatment 
in better health states.  Although there is nothing irrational or invalid about this 
preference, it may suggest that respondents may have been reducing the abstract, 
macro-level allocation problems to more comprehensible two-person analogies 
(Giacomini et al. 2012; Ryan 2009).  This may have been exacerbated by the use 
of QALY graphs in the elicitation tasks that illustrated the gains at the individual 
rather than the program level (see Appendix 6.3 for a sample graph).  In this 
light, it is not clear whether the insignificance of the number of patients treated 
reflected a genuine indifference to aggregate outcomes, or a simplifying approach 
to the tasks.  The implications of these preferences results for healthcare priority 
setting, as well as for choosing between the CSPC and DCE as a preferred 
format for eliciting preferences, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 9.1: Alternative CSPC models and utility functions,  
by improving information criteria 
Model and utility function k LL AICc BIC 
 
1.0) 1-way linear random effects; continuous main 
effects differences  
Δv = ΔLYg + ΔAge + ΔU0 + ΔLE + ΔU1 + ΔnPats  
 
7 -34815 71105 75459 
 
2.0) 1-way linear random effects; continuous main 
effects differences + LYg interactions + (1-ΔU0):ΔU1 
interaction 
Δv = ΔLYg + ΔAge + ΔU0 + ΔLE + ΔU1 + ΔnPats + 
ΔAge:ΔLYg + ΔU0:ΔLYg + ΔLE:ΔLYg + ΔU1:ΔLYg + 
ΔnPats:ΔLYg + (1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) 
 
13 -34742 70974 75366 
 
2.1) Parsimonious 1-way linear random effects; 
continuous main effects differences + interactions 
Δv = ΔLYg + ΔAge + ΔU0 + ΔU1 + ΔAge:ΔLYg + 
ΔU1:ΔLYg + ΔnPats:ΔLYg + (1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) 
 
9 -34747 70976 75342 
 
3.0) Pooled double-bounded tobit; log-linear main 
effects differences 
Δv = Δlog(LYg) + Δlog(Age) + Δlog(U0) + Δlog(LE) + 
Δlog(U1) + Δlog(nPats) 
 
7 -33499 67014 67068 
 
3.1) Pooled double-bounded tobit; parsimonious log-
linear main effects differences 
Δv = Δlog(LYg) + Δlog(Age) + Δlog(U0) + Δlog(LE) + 
Δlog(U1) 
 
6 -33499 67012 67059 
 
4.0) Pooled double-bounded tobit; main effects 
differences 
Δv = ΔLYg + ΔAge + ΔU0 + ΔLE + ΔU1 + ΔnPats 
 
7 -33418 66851 66906 
 
5.0) Pooled double-bounded tobit; main effects 
differences + LYg interactions + (1-ΔU0):ΔU1 
interaction 
Δv = ΔLYg + ΔAge + ΔU0 + ΔLE + ΔU1 + ΔnPats + 
ΔAge:ΔLYg + ΔU0:ΔLYg + ΔLE:ΔLYg + ΔU1:ΔLYg + 
ΔnPats:ΔLYg + (1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) 
 
13 -33357 66743 66837 
 
5.1) Pooled double-bounded tobit; parsimonious main 
effects differences + interactions 
Δv = ΔLYg + ΔAge + ΔU0 + ΔU1 + ΔAge:ΔLYg + 
ΔU0:ΔLYg + ΔU1:ΔLYg + ΔnPats:ΔLYg + (1-
ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) 
 
9 -33361 66741 66809 
k=parameters, including alternative specific constant; LL=Log-likelihood; AICc= Akaike information criterion, 
with correction for finite sample size; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. Only models and value functions 
associated with an improvement in LL, AICc or BIC over the previous specification are shown. The minimum 
overall log-likelihood, AICc and BIC are shown in bold.   
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Appendix 9.2: CSPC double-bounded tobit coefficients 
Attribute Coefficient Std err Coef of var β/Std err p-value Sig 
Constant 24.44 5.69 0.233 4.29 <0.001 *** 
Δ Life years 
gained 
3.15 0.20 0.063 15.55 
<0.001 
*** 
Δ Patient age / 10 -4.71 0.35 -0.074 -13.33 <0.001 *** 
Δ Initial health 
state 
-40.07 7.44 -0.186 -5.39 
<0.001 
*** 
Δ Final health 
state 
69.85 8.10 0.116 8.62 
<0.001 
*** 
ΔAge:ΔLYg -0.36 0.05 -0.139 -7.57 <0.001 *** 
ΔU1:ΔLYg 3.23 0.55 0.170 5.87 <0.001 *** 
ΔnPats:ΔLYg -0.38 0.04 -0.105 -8.46 <0.001 *** 
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) -27.08 6.07 -0.224 -4.46 <0.001 *** 
Sigma 55.42 0.87 0.016 63.48 <0.001 *** 
       
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
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Appendix 9.3: Alternative CSPC public-agent interaction value 
functions, by improving information criteria 
Attribute 
p-value, 
model 1 
p-value, 
model 2 
p-value, 
model 3 
p-value, 
model 4 
p-value, 
model 5 
Δ Life years gained 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Δ Patient age / 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Δ Initial health state 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Δ Life expectancy 0.254     
Δ Final health state 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Δ Patients treated 0.711     
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ΔAge:ΔLYg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ΔU0:ΔLYg 0.789     
ΔLE:ΔLYg 0.831     
ΔU1:ΔLYg 0.066     
ΔnPats:ΔLYg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1):ΔLYg 0.861     
ΔLYg:Agent 0.047 0.213    
ΔAge:Agent 0.102 0.005 0.036 0.055 0.101 
ΔU0:Agent 0.701     
ΔLE:Agent 0.2313     
ΔU1:Agent 0.2496 0.2398    
ΔnPats:Agent 0.9892     
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1):Agent 0.8302 0.2733    
ΔAge:ΔLYg:Agent 0.9168     
ΔU0:ΔLYg:Agent 0.0356 0.0332 0.088 0.1079  
ΔLE:ΔLYg:Agent 0.1404     
ΔU1:ΔLYg:Agent 0.1649     
ΔnPats:ΔLYg:Agent 0.5456     
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1):ΔLYg:Agent 0.0304 0.0736 0.2039   
Constant 0.0071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
LL -33346 -33354 -33356 -33357 -33359 
AICc 66747 66737 66737 66737 66738 
BIC 66930 66839 66818 66812 66806 
Specifications are based on a double-bounded tobit.  LL=Log-likelihood; AICc= Akaike information criterion 
with correction for finite sample size; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. Only value functions associated 
with an improvement in LL, AICc or BIC over the previous specification are shown. The overall minimum log-
likelihood, AICc and BIC are shown in bold.  The p-value of the likelihood ratio Pr(χ2) is shown for relative to 
the full specification. 
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Appendix 9.4: CSPC double-bounded tobit with agent interactions 
Attribute Coefficient Std err β/Std err p-value Sig 
Constant 24.41 5.70 4.29 <0.001 *** 
Δ Life years gained (ΔLYg) 3.15 0.20 15.55 <0.001 *** 
Δ Patient age / 10 -4.82 0.36 -13.26 <0.001 *** 
Δ Initial health state -40.04 7.44 -5.38 <0.001 *** 
Δ Final health state 69.79 8.11 8.61 <0.001 *** 
(1-ΔU0):(1+ΔU1) -27.05 6.07 -4.46 <0.001 *** 
ΔAge:ΔLYg -0.36 0.05 -7.56 <0.001 *** 
ΔFinal health state:ΔLYg 3.23 0.55 5.87 <0.001 *** 
ΔPatients treated:ΔLYg -0.38 0.04 -8.45 <0.001 *** 
ΔAge:Agent 1.19 0.72 1.64 0.101  
      
Significance codes:     <0.001= ‘***’     <0.01= ‘**’     <0.05= ‘*’     <0.10=’+’ 
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Chapter 10:  
Discussion and concluding remarks 
The thesis started from the position that greater explicitness in the criteria 
by which competing claims to limited healthcare resources are prioritised is, on 
the whole, desirable.  Explicitness, in the sense that prioritising decisions are 
made on the basis of clearly defined objectives and criteria, is argued to promote 
a more informed citizenry, more accountable decision makers, greater 
opportunities for evaluation and improvement, greater trust in the priority setting 
process, and – ultimately – better decisions.   
The theoretical QALY maximisation framework has the advantage of an 
explicit definition of value as the sum of individual health-related utilities, but it 
has faced criticism over the narrowness of its definition of well-being and its 
presumption of distributive neutrality.  As a result, most jurisdictions that use 
some form of QALY maximisation, including the UK, Canada and Australia, 
implicitly consider equity alongside efficiency in priority setting decisions (see 
for example National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2008; 
Canadian Agency For Drugs and Technologies in Health 2013; pan-Canadian 
Oncology Drug Review 2011; Australian Government Department of Health 
and Ageing 2008).  Such operational frameworks, though, have tended to avoid 
explicitly defining a set of relevant equity concerns and their relative weights. 
Advocates for greater explicitness in priority setting argue that the 
solution is not to accept efficiency and equity as inherently separate and 
incompatible issues, but rather to incorporate more of the elements that 
contribute to societal value and well-being within an explicit framework.  
Indeed, the original motivation for the QALY within the extra-welfarist 
approach was to move beyond individual utility in priority setting decisions, and 
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Culyer (1989) suggested that combining health outcomes and distributional 
concerns into a single outcome measure – such as the equity-weighted QALY – 
could achieve an explicit integration of equity and efficiency in healthcare 
priority setting.  A key issue in developing such a comprehensive outcome 
measure, though, is the identification and relative weighting of relevant equity 
concerns. 
At one extreme, Brouwer et al. (2008) suggested that decision makers 
should define well-being in terms of the preferences they believe society ought to 
hold.  This approach has the advantage of professional judgement and perceived 
objectivity.  As a number of authors have noted, however, there is no objective 
basis for preferring one (Pareto optimal) allocation of healthcare resources over 
another; it is an inherently subjective value judgement.  In their view, the 
importance of different perspectives in arriving at an optimal and legitimate 
allocation should be acknowledged, not avoided, leading to democratic or 
Communitarian approaches which allow for the community to define its own 
equity weights, and measure societal value on the basis of how well a program 
satisfies community preferences.   
Within this context, the thesis made a number of specific contributions 
that may inform healthcare priority setting: 
 It reviewed patient and program characteristics that were potentially 
relevant to the allocation of healthcare resources, and through an 
application of empirical ethics narrowed these potential characteristics to 
those that had evidence of public support and a defensible ethical 
justification; that is, were relevant and fair. 
 It reviewed different stated preference methods and identified two 
methods that appeared particularly suited for eliciting preferences in a 
healthcare context: discrete choice experiments (DCEs) and constant-sum 
paired comparisons (CSPCs), and compared their response characteristics 
to identify a preferred method for the elicitation of societal preferences in 
healthcare. 
 It elicited preferences over the allocation of societal healthcare resources 
in order to estimate the equity-efficiency trade-off associated with the 
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attributes identified in the empirical ethics review, and compared 
preferences between the public and a sample of decision-making agents.   
 
There were several unique elements among these contributions that 
warrant highlighting.  First, this study was the first to the author’s knowledge to 
use an empirical ethics approach in identifying the attributes to be included in a 
stated preference elicitation.  Most elicitations in this area have used focus 
groups or literature review to identify potentially relevant attributes, but have not 
included any process to ensure that the preferences being elicited were, in some 
sense, fair.  The process used here began with a literature review to identify 
attributes that had empirical evidence of public support, but also required those 
attributes to be consistent with some coherent theory of distributive justice.  In 
addition to ensuring that preferences are elicited over attributes that are fair as 
well as relevant, an empirical ethics approach may contribute to standardising 
the set of attributes over which preferences for the allocation of healthcare 
resources are elicited.  Given the importance of context in stated preference 
elicitations, standardising the identification of attributes would help make the 
results of elicitations in this area more comparable.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge the subjectivity inherent in this approach, both in identifying 
appropriate principles of justice and in interpreting the empirical evidence with 
respect to these principles.  This subjectivity may limit reproducibility, but it can 
be seen as an essential characteristic of the empirical ethics approach that was 
applied here, as more systematic approaches may lead to a greater emphasis on 
empirical observation at the expense of ethical judgement. 
Second was the use of CSPC to elicit societal preferences, and to the 
author’s knowledge, the first head-to-head comparison of CSPC and DCE for 
eliciting societal preferences.  A CSPC allocation task makes it clear that giving 
more resources to one group means that the other must necessarily receive less.  
This trade-off can be obscured in a discrete choice task, where it may not be clear 
that choosing one group implies that the other will receive no resources.  The 
incidence of non-compensatory decision making among DCE and CSPC 
respondents, tested as part of the head-to-head comparison, appeared to support 
the characterisation of the CSPC as a more reflective task.  The comparison also 
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suggested that relative to the DCE, the CSPC was associated with greater 
concern for the less well-off group and less consistency with the principles of 
QALY maximisation.  The implications of this finding are discussed in more 
detail in section 10.3 below.  Despite its theoretical advantages, Table 4.2 
suggested that CSPC has not been used as often as DCE for eliciting societal 
preferences.  Among the studies that have used CSPC, a slight majority have 
taken a categorical approach to analysing the responses, simplifying the 
continuous allocations into discrete categories.  This neglects the cardinal 
preference data that is a statistical advantage of the CSPC method, and makes it 
difficult to consider the impact of multiple attributes simultaneously.  The CSPC 
administered here also appeared to be unique in dynamically linking some 
attribute levels to the relative budget allocation, further highlighting the trade-
offs associated with prioritising one group over the other.  This dynamic linkage 
allowed the elicitation to test for preferences for equality in access (number of 
patients treated) or outcomes (aggregate QALYs gained) in addition to the more 
straightforward equality in resources.  No other CSPC elicitation has included 
attributes that varied with the relative budget share, although Linley and Hughes 
(2012) took a direct approach and asked respondents how many patients from 
each of two equally-sized groups they would prefer to treat, skipping the 
intermediate step of allocating a budget.  Treating more patients from one group 
meant that fewer patients from the other group could be treated, emphasising the 
trade-off, but the relative allocation of patients was not linked to an aggregate 
outcome as it was here.  Finally, it is worth noting that only one other CSPC 
elicitation (Linley & Hughes 2012) took a representative sample, as was used 
here. 
Third was the use of a latent class approach to model the DCE responses.  
As shown in Table 4.2, statistical models of DCE and CSPC panel data have 
most often used a random effects specification.  With this specification, however, 
individual preferences differ only because each individual is an independent 
draw from a pre-specified random distribution (Morey & Greer Rossmann 2003).  
In contrast, a latent class approach derives preferences from individual choice 
behaviours and observed or unobserved respondent characteristics.  It also 
allows respondents to be assigned to latent classes on the basis of their choice 
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behaviours rather than a deterministic characteristic.  For example, the latent 
class analysis of DCE responses suggested that agents were substantially more 
likely to belong to one particular class, but it allowed for some agents to have a 
different set of preferences and not to be defined by their status as an agent.  The 
need to pre-define an arbitrary number of latent classes, and the assumption that 
preferences are homogeneous within each class, are limitations of the approach, 
but relative to a continuous distribution of preferences from a random 
parameters model, this simplification improves the interpretability and salience 
of the estimates.  In particular, it allows the interpretation of the different latent 
classes in terms of the characteristics of their members, in a way that would not 
be possible with a random effects specification.  It was suggested in section 8.5, 
for example, that the defining latent characteristic among the DCE respondents 
might have been related to the axiomatic quality of their preference formation.  
This may have implications for how societal preferences are elicited and 
interpreted, and is discussed in more detail below.   
The implications of these contributions are discussed below.  Section 10.1 
discusses the evidence from the DCE and CSPC elicitations for an equity-
efficiency trade-off in societal preferences, and section 10.2 discusses this 
evidence in the context of other recent societal elicitations in healthcare.  Section 
10.3 summarises the response behaviours of the DCE and CSPC methods with 
respect to identifying a preferred method for future elicitations in this area.  
Section 10.4 discusses the implications of the overall results for healthcare 
priority setting, while section 10.5 outlines some of the caveats and challenges to 
incorporating societal preferences into this process.  Finally, section 10.6 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
10.1 An equity-efficiency trade-off? 
The results showed little support for the principles of strict QALY 
maximisation as a societal decision rule, as fewer than 5 percent of all 
respondents always prioritised the alternative that maximised aggregate QALYs 
gained, and decision making agents were no more likely that the general public 
to make such choices.  It was difficult, however, to define a threshold at which 
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one would be confident in accepting or rejecting the relevance of this decision 
rule.  The imperfect and probabilistic nature of preference elicitation under the 
assumptions of random utility theory means that even if there was universal 
support for strict QALY maximisation, it is unlikely that every respondent would 
be observed prioritising the QALY maximising alternative with every choice.  As 
such, a threshold of perfect and unerring consistency is unrealistic.  Bryan et al. 
(2002) suggested that a majority of respondents maximising QALYs gained over 
a majority of their choices may be sufficient to indicate support for QALY 
maximisation.  By this standard support for QALY maximisation was stronger, 
as 75 percent of all DCE respondents chose the QALY maximising alternative in 
at least half of their choices, although only 41 percent of CSPC respondents 
allocated the majority of the budget to the QALY maximising alternative in at 
least half of their choices.  As in any stated preference survey, though, it is not 
possible to say with certainty why a particular alternative was chosen, so it is 
important to recognise that QALY maximising alternatives may have been 
chosen for reasons unrelated to aggregate QALY gains. 
Despite the lack of strict QALY maximising behaviour, the rankings of 
the DCE and CSPC scenarios showed that larger aggregate QALY gains tended 
to be ranked more favourably than those with smaller gains.  However, the 
rankings also suggested an equity-efficiency trade-off, as respondents appeared 
willing to prioritise relatively small aggregate QALY gains to preferred patient 
groups over larger QALY gains to less preferred groups.  In particular, younger 
patient groups were consistently preferred to older patient groups, even when the 
older patients had the potential to gain a greater number of QALYs.   
The idea of an equity-efficiency trade-off was further supported by the 
marginal analyses, which found a statistically significant willingness to sacrifice 
life year gains in order to prioritise younger patients, and those who would finish 
treatment in better final health states.  The CSPC also found a preference for 
patients with the worst initial quality-of-life, while the DCE found a preference 
for patients with longer initial life expectancies – even after controlling for 
potential health gain – and for larger patient groups.  The willingness to forego 
individual life year gains in order to prioritise larger patient groups suggested a 
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preference for smaller individual gains distributed over more beneficiaries to 
larger individual gains concentrated amongst a smaller number of beneficiaries.   
Attribute main effects were significant in both the DCE and CSPC 
models, even after interactions with life year gains were included in the value 
functions.  Some recent elicitations of societal preferences over the allocation of 
healthcare, including Norman et al. (2013) and Lancsar et al. (2011), did not 
include independent main effects in their value functions, consistent with a 
consequentialist view that healthcare is not valued for its own sake but rather for 
the health outcomes it delivers (Mooney 1998a).  However, the significant main 
effects observed here suggested the possibility of welfare gains associated with 
treating particular patient groups, even in the absence of health gains.  For 
example, the positive and significant welfare effects associated with treating 
younger patients, independent of their potential life year gains, suggested that 
society may derive value from seeing young patients receive care, even if that 
care does not lead to improved outcomes.  Such welfare effects would be 
consistent with arguments that society may desire a healthcare system that 
provides for aspects such as compassion, respect for dignity, and maintenance of 
hope, in addition to health gains (Donaldson & Shackley 1997; Wiseman 1997; 
Mooney 1998a; Salkeld 1998).  This possibility was not specifically tested here, 
but future research would be useful in identifying specific non-health factors that 
might be associated with societal welfare gains.  
10.2 Comparison with other societal preference elicitations 
There were some similarities between the methods and results reported 
here and other recent societal elicitations of preferences over societal healthcare 
resources, but the overall body of societal preference research in healthcare is 
characterised by its heterogeneity rather than its consistency.  As noted, other 
elicitations of societal preferences in healthcare have identified different sets of 
relevant attributes, using different methods and different inclusion or exclusion 
criteria.  Green and Gerard (2009), for example, acknowledged that empirical 
evidence appears to suggest that the public supports prioritising younger patients, 
but excluded this factor from their societal DCE primarily on the grounds that 
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NICE does not support age as an independent factor in priority setting.17  
Conversely, Norman et al. (2013) included social role, for which the empirical 
ethics review found a utilitarian justification but little evidence of public support, 
personal responsibility, for which there was evidence of strong public support but 
limited ethical justification, and patient gender, for which there appeared to be 
neither public support nor a clear ethical justification. 
There is nothing within democratic or Communitarian approaches that 
require community preferences to meet any ethical standard.  But if one of the 
objectives of societal participation in priority-setting is to improve the moral 
legitimacy of the allocation of resources, it is difficult to accept that this objective 
would be furthered by incorporating ethically questionable preferences.  Given 
the importance of context in stated preference elicitations, the inclusion or 
exclusion of different attributes may also lead to different trade-offs.  It is 
important to recognise, therefore, that the process of identifying a set of relevant 
attributes may be as important as the elicitation methods themselves in arriving 
at a meaningful set of preference estimates, and a more standardised approach 
may be necessary before elicited preferences can be used for policy in the form of 
equity weights.  Relative to using literature review or focus groups as a basis for 
identifying attributes relevant to the allocation of societal resources, an empirical 
ethics approach may help standardise the attributes included in future elicitations 
and ensure that these attributes are fair as well as relevant.  However, the 
subjectivity in interpreting the ethical justifications for different attributes, as well 
as in identifying ‘defensible’ theories of justice, must be acknowledged and may 
limit the degree to which an empirical ethics approach can in itself contribute to 
this more standardised approach.  There is no universal theory of justice, so it is 
necessary to judge the applicability and appropriateness of different theories of 
justice in the context of allocating healthcare.  Likewise, the degree to which 
different patient or program characteristics are consistent with these theories is 
                                                 
17 NICE guidelines state that “patients should not be denied, or have restricted access to, NHS 
treatment simply because of their age.” (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
2008)  Age is relevant, though, when it is a predictor of treatment outcomes or closely associated 
with some aspect of a patient’s health status or likelihood of adverse events.  The UK Equality 
Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in the provision of public services, including 
healthcare (Carruthers & Ormondroyd 2009). 
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also a matter of subjective interpretation.  However, as Richardson (2002) 
stresses, “an integral part of empirical ethics should be an acceptance of the fact 
that argument and evidence are fallible and the conclusions are tenuous and 
more or less strongly supported in some contexts that others.”   
A summary of recent preference elicitations in healthcare is shown in 
Appendix 10.1, along with a summary of the results from the DCE and CSPC 
administered as part of the thesis.  The attributes are ordered by the frequency 
with which they were included in the different studies.  Life years or QALYs 
gained was the most commonly included attribute, followed by patient age, life 
expectancy, and initial and final quality of life.  The remaining attributes were 
included in only two or three studies each.  Greater life year or QALY gains 
were preferred in all studies that included them, and Bryan et al. (2002), Green 
and Gerard (2009), Koopmanschap et al. (2010), and Lancsar et al. (2011) 
concluded that their results were consistent with a QALY maximising decision 
rule.  Similar studies by Schwappach (2003), Dolan et al. (2008), Linley and 
Hughes (2012), and Norman et al. (2013), though, found a willingness to forego 
potential health gains to prioritise specific patient characteristics and concluded 
that respondent preferences were not consistent with QALY maximisation.   
Among the other elicitations, younger patients were consistently preferred 
to older patients.  It is worth highlighting that this preference was observed 
across a number of different countries, including the UK (Ratcliffe 2000; Dolan 
& Tsuchiya 2005; Dolan et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2010; Petrou et al. 2013), 
Germany (Schwappach 2003), Hong Kong (Chan et al. 2006), and in this study, 
Canada.  However, two other UK studies found no significant preferences over 
age (Lancsar et al. 2011; Linley & Hughes 2012), and a German study found a 
non-linear preference that peaked at middle age and declined over older and 
younger patients (Diederich et al. 2012).  There was also broad agreement across 
the studies in favour of prioritising patients who would finish treatment in better 
final health states and those with lower levels of personal responsibility for their 
illness, although Schwappach (2003) found unexpected support for prioritising 
patients with greater responsibility for their disease.  Support for prioritising 
patients in the worst initial health states was mixed.  Most studies, including the 
current CSPC, found support for prioritising patients in poorer initial health 
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states, but Shah et al. (2012) found the reverse, and Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005), 
Lancsar et al. (2011), and the current DCE found no significant preference.  
Overall, with the exception of a consistent preference for greater life year or 
QALY gains, there was some degree of heterogeneity, either in a conflicting 
direction of preference, or no statistically significant preference, in each of the 
other commonly included attributes.   
As noted earlier, the primary DCE and CSPC elicitations in the thesis 
were conducted in a cancer context.  This did not appear to have affected the 
interpretability of the results relative to the other studies included in Appendix 
10.1, a handful of which were also conducted in specific disease contexts, 
including liver transplant, orphan diseases, and cancer. 
10.3 Choosing between the DCE and CSPC 
The DCE and CSPC elicitations revealed the tremendous potential of 
stated preference methods, as respondents were able to make remarkably 
coherent choices over very complex sets of attributes and trade-offs – even in the 
less intuitive CSPC – with very minimal instruction.  Based on questionnaire 
completion rates, completion times, and difficulty ratings, the DCE appeared to 
be the more straightforward task, although the more competitive nature of the 
DCE also appeared to be associated with a greater incidence of non-
compensatory decision making, as respondents were significantly more likely to 
hold a dominant preference for a single attribute.  The superior completion rates 
and high preference confidence ratings in the DCE appeared to reject Swallow et 
al.’s (2001) contention that respondents may be reluctant to complete 
dichotomous preference elicitations over highly emotive issues.  The results of 
the elicitations also appeared to discount the hypothesis of a prominence effect 
around the number of patients treated attribute in the CSPC, as DCE 
respondents gave more weight to this attribute in their decisions, consistent with 
the more competitive and quantitative tendencies of the task.  The emphasis in 
the CSPC on individual over aggregate QALY gains was also consistent with 
suggestions that respondents to complex societal stated preference elicitations 
may tend to reduce the abstract, macro-level allocation problems to more 
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comprehensible two-person analogies.  This may have been exacerbated by the 
individual-level presentation of the QALY graphs, although it is notable that a 
corresponding emphasis was not observed in the DCE, where respondents saw 
the same graphs but put relatively more weight on aggregate QALY gains.  
Finally, one cannot discount the possibility that the range of the patients treated 
attribute was simply too narrow to distinguish preferences for different levels 
(Kjær 2005).  In the absence of the theorised advantages of CSPC, the greater 
completion rate and slightly more favourable difficulty rating of the DCE 
appeared to give it an advantage in eliciting societal preferences.   
However, a notable difference between the DCE and CSPC was in the 
greater willingness of CSPC respondents to prioritise the group with the poorer 
health prospects in the test of non-satiation.  CSPC respondents also consistently 
prioritised alternatives associated with fewer individual and aggregate QALY 
gains.  It was hypothesised that this may reflect a compassion bias in the CSPC, 
inherent to the nature of the task, which required respondents to consider how 
much of the budget, if any, to reserve for the less preferred group in each task.  
CSPC respondents could see that as they allocated more of the budget to one 
group, fewer patients in the other group could be treated.  DCE respondents 
faced this same trade-off, as choosing one group meant that none of the patients 
in the less preferred alternative would be treated, but the trade-off was not made 
as clear as in the CSPC, and they may not have had to confront fully the 
consequences of their choices.   
The possibility of such a tendency in the CSPC, which appeared to 
encourage a relatively higher proportion of prioritisation choices that might be 
deemed irrational by economic theory, may be linked to the issue of hypothetical 
bias in stated preference elicitations.  DCE respondents were more consistent 
with economic theory in more often choosing QALY maximising alternatives 
and the dominant alternative in the test of non-satiation, but this consistency 
may be in part an artefact of the competitive focus of the task and might not be 
observed in real-life choices.  The arguably less rational CSPC choices might be 
more reflective of how respondents would choose in a real-life situation.  Indeed, 
the results of the CSPC, which suggested preferences for patients in poorer initial 
health states, and those that could be returned to better final health states, 
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appeared more consistent with expectations from the empirical ethics review 
than the results from the DCE, which found no significant preference over those 
attributes.  Note, though, that the results of the empirical ethics review did not 
generally account for opportunity costs or the relative strength of preferences, 
and so should not be interpreted as a gold-standard or assigned any normative 
qualities.  Overall, the differences between the DCE and CSPC were suggestive 
of a violation of the conventional assumption of procedural variance between 
stated preference methods – the observed preferences appeared to be 
systematically influenced by how they were elicited.  To the extent that 
responses to the DCE may have reflected a greater degree of hypothetical bias, 
the CSPC may be a more appropriate stated preference method for eliciting 
societal preferences over emotive issues such as the allocation of societal 
healthcare resources.  More research will be required to verify the existence of a 
relative tendency towards compassion in the CSPC, and to establish which 
format produces a result that is more consistent with a reflective equilibrium.  
10.4 Implications for healthcare policy 
The results of the DCE and CSPC elicitations conducted as part of the 
thesis, as well as the other recent elicitations, suggested that that there were 
statistically significant welfare effects associated with attributes that are not 
generally considered within the theoretical QALY maximising framework.  In 
light of these effects, the aggregate value that society derives from healthcare 
might be improved by giving explicit weight to attributes such as the age of the 
patient and their expected final health state in priority setting decisions in an 
equity-weighted QALY.  Note, however, that even if it had been found that 
societal preferences were entirely consistent with strict QALY maximisation, it 
can be argued that there was additional value in an inclusive approach.  As 
argued in Chapter 2, societal participation can enhance the moral legitimacy of 
the resulting decision rule, and similarly improve public trust in the priority 
setting process. 
In this context, though, it is important to recognise that that equity 
weighting simply redistributes healthcare resources.  The sum of equity weighted 
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QALYs must equal the sum of unweighted QALYs, and for each patient that 
receives higher priority with equity weighting another must necessarily receive 
lower priority (Ham & Coulter 2001; Wailoo et al. 2009).  Implicit equity 
weights may obscure this reality and make it easier for decision makers to 
implement priority setting decisions, but they raise the spectre of Fleck’s (1992) 
invisible class of ‘others,’ as less preferred patients may not realise that they have 
been given lower priority relative to others.  Under implicit weighting, different 
decision makers may also assign different weights to different patient 
characteristics, leading to inconsistent decisions that may jeopardise public trust 
in the priority setting process. 
Interestingly, the DCE analysis found a significant welfare effect 
associated with initial life expectancy, but contrary to a NICE supplementary 
advice that advised giving greater weight to health benefits to patients with less 
than 24 months life expectancy (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence 2009), the DCE result suggested that prioritising patients with the 
shortest life expectancy was associated with a welfare loss, even after controlling 
for potential health gain.  A similar preference for patients with greater untreated 
life expectancy was found by Schwappach (2003), Lancsar et al. (2011) and Shah 
et al. (2012).  This inconsistency may be explained by NICE’s acknowledgement 
that there was no consideration of the opportunity cost of giving greater weight 
to patients at the end of life.  Indeed, the advice appeared to be based largely on 
the fact that 63 percent of stakeholder respondents supported the proposition.  
This highlights the importance of giving explicit consideration to the relative 
strength of preferences in priority setting decisions, as it appears that accounting 
for the trade-offs with other factors might have led to a different advice regarding 
priority for patients at the end of life. 
Together, these results suggest that giving greater priority to the 
healthcare claims of younger patients and those that would finish treatment in 
better health states may enhance overall societal welfare.  Additional weight to 
such patients in an equity-weighted QALY would prioritise health gains 
accruing to particular patients in priority setting decisions, but given the 
suggestion above of societal value associated with non-health outcomes, priority 
may need to extend to the patients themselves, and not just their health gains.  
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Future research is required to understand to what extent society would be willing 
to trade-off health gains for non-health outcomes, and how to incorporate these 
preferences into priority setting criteria.  This issue is similar to the challenge of 
measuring value in palliative care, where health economists have struggled to 
measure the value of care that is more often associated with non-health 
outcomes such as dignity and respect than conventional QALY gains (Normand 
2009).   
Before implementing a policy of greater priority for specific patient 
groups, it is important to recognise that there are legislative prohibitions on 
discriminating between citizens on the basis of personal characteristics.  Despite 
clear preferences for greater priority for younger patients and for those that 
would finish treatment in better final health states, statutes such as the Canadian 
Human Rights Act (Anon 1985) and the UK Equality Act (Anon 2010) prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of age and disability.  Similar to the role of the 
theories of justice discussed in Chapter 3, such legislation ensures that the basis 
of societal resource allocations are just and do not reflect irrational or perverse 
preferences.  There may still be some scope within such legislation, though, for 
prioritising on the basis of such attributes.  For example, a prohibition on 
discriminating on the basis of disability does not preclude prioritising the more 
severely ill in a triage setting.  The balance between protecting the rights of the 
minority while reflecting the preferences of society is a complex issue, but 
societal preference elicitations such as these can help inform such deliberations.  
 There are also a number of methodological challenges to using the 
equity-weighted QALY in priority setting, including how to accommodate 
changing patient characteristics over time and technical challenges to 
incorporating these weights in economic models (Wailoo et al. 2009; Baker et al. 
2010). The next section discusses a number of other methodological issues that 
must be resolved before societal preferences can be used to inform healthcare 
priority setting. 
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10.5 Methodological challenges to incorporating societal preferences into  
  healthcare priority setting and suggestions for future research 
There are a number of substantial methodological challenges to 
incorporating societal preferences into an explicit priority setting framework such 
as the equity-weighted QALY.  This includes the appropriate method for 
calculating equity weights themselves.  For example, Dolan et al. (2008) and 
Lancsar et al. (2011) estimated societal equity weights for specific patient 
characteristics, but they used different methods to calculate these weights and 
they reached different conclusions.  Dolan et al. calculated that health gains to 
children had a statistically significant equity weight of 1.8 relative to adults, 
while Lancsar et al. calculated that equity weights for younger patients relative to 
a 40 year-old ranged from 0.98 to 1.02 and were not statistically significant.  
These differences may reflect differences in the respective methodologies of the 
two studies, but the more general issue of how to reconcile discordant societal 
preferences is discussed below, along with the question of how to elicit 
representative preferences, and the limited public desire to participate in the 
priority setting process. 
10.5.1 Aggregating heterogeneous societal preferences   
Within the DCE, the two latent classes identified held statistically 
significant but offsetting preferences over initial and final health states and the 
number of patients treated.  These results highlighted the value of latent class 
modelling, but also highlighted a fundamental challenge to incorporating societal 
preferences into societal decision-making: respondents in the two latent classes 
held statistically significant but opposing preferences for specific patient 
characteristics that effectively cancelled each other out, resulting in an 
insignificant overall preference.  It is not clear how such opposing preferences 
can or should be reconciled.  The combined, statistically insignificant results did 
not represent the significant preferences of either class, but basing decisions on 
the preferences of just one of the classes effectively imposes their preferences on 
the other class.  In this case, the problem was compounded by the fact that the 
probability of being in either of the two classes was roughly equal, meaning there 
was no scope for an appeal to the ‘will of the majority.’ 
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This dilemma recalls Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem, which 
showed that there is no process by which individual preferences can be 
aggregated in a way that satisfies a relatively weak set of axioms.  These axioms 
included an unrestricted domain of alternatives, unanimity or weak Pareto (if all 
individuals prefer x to y, than society must prefer x to y), non-dictatorship (no 
individual can impose their preferences on society), transitivity (if x ≻ y and y ≻ 
z, then x ≻ z), and independence from irrelevant alternatives (the relative 
ordering of x and y should not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of z) (Mullen 
& Spurgeon 1999; Mueller 2003). Society can only escape this quandary by 
relaxing one of these axioms.   
Perhaps the most obvious solution may be to relax the non-dictatorship 
axiom and allow some expert or impartial party to reconcile the opposing 
preferences.  As Mueller (2003) noted, there is nothing unusual or irrational 
about allowing small groups to make decisions on behalf of a community or 
organization.  Indeed, this logic is the basis of the decision maker perspective, 
and by extension, QALY maximisation.  However, it effectively allows decision 
makers to decide which societal preferences count, again defeating the spirit and 
objective of a democratic or Communitarian approach. 
Mullen and Spurgeon (1999) suggested that a less dictatorial approach 
may be to give different members of society different weights in the aggregation 
of preferences, presumably estimated through a process similar to the estimation 
of allocative preferences described herein.  However, this would seem merely to 
shift the problem from reconciling opposing preferences over the weight to give 
to different patient characteristics to reconciling opposing preferences over the 
weight to give different citizens.  In addition, there is nothing in a ‘citizen-
weighted’ solution that would guarantee that the resulting weighted preferences 
for different patient characteristics would not still be similarly offsetting.  
In light of these shortcomings, Mueller (2003) suggested that a more 
pragmatic solution was not to relax the non-dictatorship axiom, but rather the 
transitivity axiom.  Transitivity is fundamental to many aspects of economic 
theory and is critical in avoiding the problems of cyclical preferences (i.e. if x ≻ y 
and y ≻ z, but z ≻ x, individuals can get caught in a cycle of voluntary trades that 
leave them worse off than their original state (Feldman & Serrano 2006)).  
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However, Mueller noted that the enduring popularity of arbitrary processes such 
as coin flips or drawing straws to resolve conflict suggested that the perceived 
impartiality and fairness of such a solution may be more a fundamental 
requirement of societal decision making than establishing a transitive ranking of 
all alternatives.  A good example is a coin flip to settle an election where two 
candidates received an equal number of votes: a transitive ranking of candidates 
may not have been established, but all sides can accept the result as fair. 
In the context of the offsetting preferences observed here, relaxing the 
transitivity axiom would mean accepting equal weights over the conflicted levels 
of an attribute as an arbitrary resolution of the conflict.  Significant preferences 
for particular levels of an attribute would have no bearing on prioritising 
decisions, but as each group’s preferred level would have an equal opportunity of 
being prioritised this may be acceptable as a fair solution to an otherwise difficult 
quandary.  Note that this is not the same as a priori omitting an attribute from 
consideration – such laundering perverse preferences in the empirical ethics 
review – as relaxing transitivity still allows each individual to express a 
preference, even if aggregation may ultimately render that preference 
insignificant in the distribution of resources.   
The dilemma of how to aggregate preferences persists, though, if some 
citizens will not accept arbitrarily equal weights as a fair solution.  Some 
individuals or groups may adamantly resist equal weights over different levels of 
an attribute that they feel embodies a fundamental or protected value.  For 
example, supporters of an absolute age cut-off on health expenditures may 
strongly resist equal priority over age.  It is irreconcilable dilemmas of this sort 
that advocates of a more implicit approach point to as justification for a more 
deliberative, political process (Klein 1997; Hunter 2001).  This leads back to 
Arrow’s quandary and suggests, somewhat perversely, that the greatest 
challenging to incorporating the strength of individual preferences into societal 
decision-making may be the very strength of some preferences.  Indeed, the 
nature of individual preferences likely means that complete and transitive 
rankings of preferences may only be achievable in very limited circumstances 
(Sen 1992; Mooney 1998b).    
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10.5.2 Eliciting reliable preferences 
Similar to the question of which stated preference format is ‘best’ for 
eliciting preferences is the question of whether preferences should be elicited 
from citizens ‘off the top of their heads,’ or following some deliberative process 
(Dolan et al. 2008).  The results presented in this thesis were based on ‘top of the 
head’ elicitations, with little opportunity for respondents to reflect on their 
preferences.  There was, though, anecdotal evidence of respondents changing 
their earlier answers as they progressed through the questionnaires and their 
understanding of the issues and trade-offs evolved.18  Although preferences 
elicited in this manner are generally held to be representative, it is not clear that 
representativeness in this sense should trump the possibility that more considered 
and reliable preferences may emerge from a deliberative exercise.  Gregory, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1993) argued that stated preference elicitation should be 
seen as a process of preference construction rather than a neutral process of 
preference discovery, and suggested that a more deliberate process may improve 
the result.  As Hausman and McPherson (2006) argued, well-being can only be 
equated with the satisfaction of preferences if those preferences are well-informed 
and well-considered.  There is evidence that a deliberative process can change an 
individual’s stated preferences (Abelson, Eyles, et al. 2003), and Dolan et al. 
(2008) acknowledged that if these changes stem from better knowledge about 
one’s own preferences and those of others in the community, then a more 
deliberative process is probably superior.  However, they also noted that if these 
changes stem from a social desirability bias or ‘bandwagon effect,’ then ‘top of 
the head’ preferences may be preferred.  In addition, Abelson et al. (2003) note 
that although deliberation has come to be understood as requiring some 
interaction amongst a group, as a process of weighing evidence and reasons there 
is no reason that it cannot be seen as an individual activity.  That is, well-
considered preferences do not necessarily have to derive from a group activity.  
A better understanding of how, and more importantly, why, preferences change 
following a deliberative exercise, and how this might be different in an individual 
                                                 
18 A number of respondents interviewed after completing the pilot survey reported that they 
initially prioritised the younger age group in each choice, but changed these answers as they 
began to better recognise the trade-offs with the other attributes. 
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and a group context, will be essential to ensuring that the allocation of healthcare 
resources is based on well-informed preferences, and this represents a critical 
area of future research. 
Similarly, there are concerns over the ability of respondents to complex 
stated preference elicitations, particularly in the context of healthcare, to 
understand and process the information they are given (Ryan et al. 2001; Dolan 
et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2010).  These concerns are shared here, as it was difficult 
to be confident that the respondents to the DCE and CSPC fully understood the 
nuances of the attributes they were ask to consider, such as a patient’s experience 
at different levels of utility, or the concept of the QALY.  These are complex 
concepts to explain, particularly with only a brief online description.  A face-to-
face elicitation format may have been more effective at helping respondents 
develop a full understanding of these concepts.  However, as decision-making 
agents were presumably more familiar with many of these concepts, the lack of 
significant differences between the preferences of agents and the general public 
was somewhat reassuring in this regard.  It suggested that the public had at least 
a comparable understanding of these attributes relative to that of the likely 
somewhat more sophisticated agents. 
10.5.3 Public involvement in priority setting 
The non-significant differences between the preferences of agents and the 
general public also call into question the necessity of societal participation in 
healthcare priority setting: if agents generally hold the same preferences as 
society at large, why devote the time and expense required to involve the public?  
Part of the answer lies in the fact that one can only establish the 
representativeness of agent preferences by also asking the public about their 
preferences.  However, the thesis has also offered a number of theoretical 
advantages associated with more inclusive and participatory approaches to 
priority setting, including the promotion of legitimacy and trust in the process, 
and the ethical importance of ‘universality of inclusion.’  It is also possible that 
there may be ‘procedural utility’ associated with more inclusive or participatory 
approaches to priority setting.  Procedural utility suggests that society may derive 
value from the process by which a decision is made, independent of the 
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outcomes associated with that decision (Frey & Stutzer 2005; Dolan et al. 2007).  
An instrumentalist interpretation of procedural utility suggests that people may 
value a particular process because they believe it will arrive at an outcome with 
which they will be more satisfied, which is little different than a consequentialist 
view.  Non-consequentialist interpretations of procedural utility, though, hold 
that people may value a particular process for its own sake, independent of its 
outcomes, because such a process may be more consistent with valued 
principles.  This interpretation was supported by Dolan et al. (2007), who found 
that among other factors, the public appeared to value what they referred to as 
‘voice,’ or the opportunity for affected parties to participate in decision processes. 
However, the attitudinal results presented in Chapter 6 suggested that 
only about half of the general public respondents would prefer to see the public 
have a role in priority setting decisions, and a similar proportion indicated that 
they would be uncomfortable having their preferences used to set priorities.  This 
result was consistent with Lomas’ (1997) characterisation of citizens as 
“reluctant rationers,” as well as with other similar findings.  This general 
reluctance to participate in societal priority setting leads to questions about the 
representativeness of those members of the public who are willing to participate, 
as to some extent their very willingness to participate makes them 
unrepresentative of the larger community (Mullen & Spurgeon 1999).  Those 
who are willing to participate may be more likely, or at least perceived to be 
more likely, to have a specific motive or agenda, weakening the moral legitimacy 
derived from public participation.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, Fleck’s (1992) resolution to this issue was to 
emphasise the obligations, in addition to the rights, of citizens in a democracy, 
and he more or less endorsed coercing citizens into participation, presumably 
similar to compulsory voting laws in many jurisdictions.  However, involuntary 
participation clearly has its own drawbacks, most particularly around the effort 
such participants might be likely to devote to the task.  Studies of compulsory 
voting have found higher rates of invalid ballots and voters simply choosing the 
name at the top of the ballot (Jackman 2001).  As the time and cognitive effort 
required to participate in a stated preference elicitation would seem to exceed 
that of voting, it is likely that there would be a substantial proportion of invalid 
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responses associated with compulsory participation in a priority setting process, 
which may undermine the result and the overall objective.  Coercion would also 
seem to negate any procedural utility gains that might be associated with more 
inclusive processes, and many participants may in fact experience negative 
procedural utility as a result of this coercion.  This reluctance appears to 
represent the greatest barrier to incorporating societal preferences into healthcare 
priority setting.  Litva et al. (2002) noted that a process where all citizens have an 
genuine opportunity to participate in setting system-level priorities may generate 
greater support and participation than indirect consultations, but the benefits of 
more inclusive priority setting approaches may remain theoretical unless a broad 
segment of society chooses to participate. 
10.6 Concluding remarks 
The stated preference elicitations administered here appeared to reject 
strict QALY maximisation as a societal decision rule for allocating healthcare 
resources, and instead suggested a clear equity-efficiency trade-off in societal 
preferences.  Strict QALY maximisation is, admittedly, something of a straw 
man, as few, if any, jurisdictions actually adhere to this rule in societal priority 
setting decisions, and most include some implicit consideration of equity factors.  
However, implicit consideration of equity was argued to be insufficient, as it fails 
to account for the relative strength of the equity-efficiency trade-off for different 
characteristics, and has the potential to lead to inconsistent and unfair 
allocations that may jeopardise the perceived legitimacy of the priority setting 
process.  It was also argued that democratic or Communitarian approaches to 
estimating explicit equity weights may enhance societal well-being by aligning 
healthcare outcomes more closely with societal preferences. 
The societal preferences estimated here were particularly strong over 
patient age and the quality of a patient’s final health state, suggesting that 
societal well-being may be enhanced by giving priority to younger patients and 
those more likely to finish treatment in a good health state.  This priority may be 
in the form of greater weight to these characteristics in an equity-weighted 
QALY, although such priority must also be consistent with ethical and legal 
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frameworks that ensure that the allocation of healthcare over these 
characteristics is just.  It is also important to recognise that there were some 
substantial discrepancies between the two elicitation methods used here in the 
strength and significance of the equity-efficiency trade-off over different 
attributes.  This inconsistency was mirrored by the heterogeneity in the results of 
the larger body of societal preferences research, and this made it difficult to 
identify a societally preferred weighting scheme.  This consistent inconsistency, 
although perhaps reflective of some procedural variance in the estimation of 
preferences, may also suggest that a single set of societal weights may not exist, 
and in this light efforts at explicit equity-weighting on the basis of current 
research may represent a second-best solution that could worsen rather than 
improve the allocation of healthcare resources.   
Some encouragement, though, may be drawn from Sen (1992), who 
noted that “an approach that can rank the well-being of every person against 
every other in a straightforward way… may well be at odds with the nature of 
these ideas.”  In this sense, evidence of heterogeneity may not be so much a fatal 
flaw of explicit or participatory approaches to priority setting, but rather an 
inherent property of any method that seeks to incorporate individual preferences.  
The goal of research in this area, therefore, should be to contribute to what Ham 
and Coulter (2001) described as “the challenge of improving both technical and 
decision-making processes to enable the judgements that lie behind rationing to 
be as soundly based as possible.”  
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